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DISPATCH SECRET

TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	Chief of Station, WH/Miami		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM
SUBJECT	TYPIC/KDAFGHAN Progress Report for Period 1 October Through 31 December 19[] 09		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

- References:
- A. HMMA-41087, 29 September 19[] 09
 - B. MEXICO CITY 18336, 24 November 19[] 09
 - C. HMMA-41240, 5 November 19[] 09
 - D. HMMW-18065, 24 August 19[] 09
 - E. MEXICO CITY-18654, 7 January 19[] 09

Action Required: Paragraph 9 of the threat of pressure on these probably be enough to make her subject to

1. Summary: Information came to light during this period which causes the Station to believe that (KDAFGHAN) may be under the control of, or known to, AMSTAFF. The Station mounted an operation to determine if this is true, but was unable to complete it. Our efforts continue. Details are given below. Production quality and the percentage of identifications increased. Costs remained within the allowed amounts.

2. Security: As Headquarters is aware, TYPIC operations at this Station have been unproductive since early 1968. Consequently, the COS, the DCOS and, more lately, the TYPIC Chief, have begun to plan and work TYPIC operations on the assumption that AMSTAFF is on to us. An incident in the (KDAFGHAN) operation in the past quarter tends to add weight to our hypothesis. In submitting his November accounting, (KDAFGHAN-1) inadvertently included a bill for a long-distance call to PBRUMEN (Reference B). While this in itself is not enough to convict (KDAFGHAN-1) (or (KDAFGHAN-2), there is no indication on the bill as to which one of them made the call), it is enough to show extreme indiscretion on his part. This prompted the Station to make a complete review of the case and to plan a CI operation designed to show whether or not (KDAFGHAN-1) and/or (KDAFGHAN-2) was under control of, or being monitored by, AMSTAFF. The results are as follows:

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- Distribution:
- ↓ Orig. & 2 - Chief, WHD
 - 1 - COS, WH/Miami - c/p

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 41490	11 January 19[] 09
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-122/3 #16205

to assets (including (KDAFGHAN) photos), there is still a possibility that misuse of (KDAFGHAN) photographs by either JKLANCE or LNERGO over the years may have also been a contributing factor. We note that they were shown to (KDTUCK-4) on various occasions in the past and that he has been recently terminated because of our doubts about him.

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Office of Station Management

Office of Foreign Propaganda Division

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

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FORM 41480

3. The review showed:

- a. The agent was originally a walk-in to the former JKLANCE Station in Havana. He was later referred to this Station. This in itself is enough to make him suspect
- b. He still has close relatives in PBRUMEN and corresponds with these relatives by letter - and probably by telephone. Four of these relatives are the sisters of (KDAFGHAN-2 and the threat of pressure on these would probably be enough to make her subject to AMSTAFF control. Assuming that AMQUAKE controls all mail and telephone calls to PBRUMEN, they would soon come across the fact that (KDAFGHAN-1 and 2 live directly across the street from AMFINK. At the last meeting with (KDAFGHAN-1 he mentioned that they were still corresponding with some twenty relatives in PBRUMEN and they with him. This increases the odds that AMQUAKE has uncovered them. We have no idea how long this correspondence has been going on but assume that it has been long enough to have been uncovered.
- c. Since the incident mentioned in Reference C, we can further assume that AMQUAKE has made some, if not a determined, effort to locate the (KDAFGHAN site. This is confirmed by our recent discovery that AMFINK has been paying the rent on a vacant apartment directly across from their entrance for the past two years. This is a building formerly occupied by (KDAFGHAN-1 and 2. Only within the last two weeks has an AMFINK employee moved into this site. It would also be relatively easy for AMFINK to check all possible OP sites. If they did, and encountered a PBRUMEN exile with family still within PBRUMEN, we are afraid that the conclusion is self-evident. On this particular point we are now particularly struck by (KDAFGHAN-1's repeated and unsolicited assurances that AMFINK has no idea where the (KDAFGHAN site is located. He has backed up this claim with photos of various AMFINK employees and visitors shaking their fists at the former site. Hindsight now leads us also to conclude that it would be a very easy matter to investigate and determine who had moved out of the former site and where they now were. If this has been done, (KDAFGHAN-1 would stick out like the proverbial sore thumb. We now conclude that Reference D was, unfortunately, only too correct.
- d. While it has always been the practice of the Station to sterilize all photographs, given LNERGO or shown to assets (including (KDAFGHAN photos), there is still a possibility that misuse of (KDAFGHAN photographs by either JKLANCE or LNERGO over the years may have also been a contributing factor. We note that they were shown to (KDTUCK-4 on various occasions in the past and that he has been recently terminated because of our doubts about him.

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e. The simple length of time that this agent has been in operation could also be considered as a possible factor in exposing him sooner or later. We also note in passing that his home telephone line shares the same pole distribution box as that of the AMFINK consulate.

f. One item that becomes evident when reviewing (K)DAFGHAN⁰² files is his repeated failure (with some few exceptions) to get photographs of suspects or agents that the Station knows visited AMFINK while he was purportedly on watch.

4. Given the above the Station decided to ⁰²mount an operation designed to determine once and for all if the (K)DAFGHANS were either under control by AMSTAFF or if their activities were being monitored by audio coverage of the Safehouse or OP site. The DCOS designed a sophisticated scenario to be played out by the Case Officer which would, one by one, eliminate or prove each of the above possibilities. No other Station assets were used, this to eliminate any possibility that they might be the source of a leak. Without going into a mass of details, the plan basically involved letting enough information slip bit by bit to (K)DAFGHAN-1 so that he, or some AMSTAFF Case Officer on the other ⁰²end, would draw the wanted conclusion; namely, that 201-327262 was working for us. Unfortunately, just as we got into the preliminary stages of the plan, 201-327262 was recalled. It is our opinion that the operation had not yet gone far enough to consider this recall as proof of our suspicions, but that it was mere coincidence. However, two points that arose during this operation do bother us. At one meeting (K)DAFGHAN-1 mentioned (or let slip) that the AMFINK chauffeur had gone on vacation. While the Station was aware of this we are hard put to understand how he knew it. Then, during the same conversation with the Case Officer (perhaps realizing his mistake?) (K)DAFGHAN-1 began to backtrack and started to talk about how he ⁰²"thought" the chauffeur "might have" gone on vacation. The second point is that he almost invariably reports within a few days when an AMFINK employee drops out of sight. He has yet to mention the departure of 201-327262. This attempt by the Station to resolve the matter having come to an inconclusive end, we are starting over again and will soon begin another similar operation.

5. Plans: We are working under ⁰²the assumption that AMQUAKE/AMSTAFF either looked for and found (K)DAFGHAN-1 or that they found him through checking out his mail and calls to and from relatives in PBRUMEN. ⁰²We are further assuming that they then either doubled him or (K)DAFGHAN-2 or that they are successfully monitoring the operation through a combination of physical and audio surveillance (we note the fairly recent arrival of an AMFINK referred to as "el tecnico" - 201-886735 - whom we believe to be the younger brother of 201-812106. The latter, our records show, was last known to be the ⁰²chief of the JKLANCE section of AMSTAFF.) While ⁰²(K)DAFGHAN-1, and (K)DAFGHAN-2, will obviously have to be terminated, we first intend to do our best to prove our hypothesis. If this can be done, we may be able to put this to our advantage. In the meantime, he will be handled under the strictest of compartmentation. He will be given no further lookout assignments, be given no indications of our particular interests in any individual AMFINKS or their activities and, obviously, we will not proceed with the plans for the audio operation which we suggested in

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paragraphs 14-16 of Reference A. We will start a search for a replacement site and agent as soon as Headquarters indicates that they believe the continuance of such an operation is worthwhile (the Station believes it is). We intend to continue to handle the agent just as before, indicating our greatest confidence in him. We will proceed to improve his equipment and operation and go ahead with the planned technical consultation (Reference E) to demonstrate this. No sensitive equipment or information will be involved. We further intend to SGWIRL this agent at the first opportunity. He was last SWIRLED on 18 April 1967.

6. Other Operational Developments: Other than the above, the operation continued as usual. The Case Officer had another dawn to midnight stay with the Agent to observe AMFINK and its activities and to work with the Agent on improving his production. Quality of the photographs has improved and identification of the PBRUMEN visitors has, with the use of (KDGLACIER) passport photos increased drastically - we are now hitting over eighty percent identification of TDYers and transit personnel. The planned MO studies mentioned in paragraph 12 of Reference A have not been as successful as was hoped for. ⁰² (KDAFGHAN-1 and 2 are so set in the routine they have established over the years that the above mentioned instructions to change their way of operation have met with resistance. This is being overcome. The one outstanding event of the period was our obtaining a photo of (SWCEMENT-6's alternate courier (to which ⁰² (KDAFGHAN-1 had not been alerted).

7. Agent Personnel: No changes. The break in their regular routine occasioned by our requests for more work on their part and by the extra and irregularly scheduled meetings caused by our CI operation seemed to have increased ⁰² (KDAFGHAN-1's already bad state of nerves. The Case Officer sent him on a three day vacation to Acapulco to calm him down - and it did somewhat.

8. Administrative/Finances: No changes.

9. Headquarters Action Required:

- a. Advise if Headquarters concurs with the Station as to the desirability of continuing with this type of operation after the projected termination of the ⁰² (KDAFGHANS.
- b. Please pass this dispatch to the JMROD unit. Their suggestions are solicited.
- c. Please retrace all known relatives of ⁰² (KDAFGHAN-1 and 2 and advise the Station of the results.

Jesse R. Gardalphe
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