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7 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Consideration of the Cuban Matter by the §412
Special Group

1. Attached are my detailed notes made while reading the minutes of the Special Group yesterday. The 12 pp. paper that WH/4 submitted to the Taylor Committee, with two appendices, is also attached in order to facilitate study of the matter. That paper purported to quote the minutes only with reference to the strike force concept. (It should be replaced in the two WH/4 bound volumes of papers furnished the Taylor Committee, at "Part FF.")

2. I call attention to the following new matters, which suggests a number of points that should be reflected in my draft *general* report of 31 August 1961:

a. Parrott was the Assistant to DD/P for Executive Branch Matters (DD/P/EBM). He not only acted as secretary of Special Group, and briefed the DCI beforehand, but took an active role in the discussions, at least from time to time, i.e., at meetings of 8/11, 9/1, 9/8 and 11/16. This introduces still another non-operator echelon in the decision-making, between DCI and Chief, WH/4.

b. These minutes show the extremely detailed reporting by CIA to the Special Group and requests for approval of individual operations, i.e., individual air drops.

c. Note that the detailed reporting to the Special Group was almost always done by Bissell or Barnes, not by the DCI.

d. Note Adm. Burke's statement that Navy ideas were to have 50,000 U.S. military for intervention in Cuba. (3/14/60 meeting)

Query: was this statement in the back of the minds of CIA operators in going ahead, i.e., ^{that} the Cuban Brigade was only a spearhead for (possible) follow-up by U.S. forces? Note in late meetings considerable additional talk of overt intervention.

No - Barnes said that

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e. Note (8/25 meeting) reference to Barnes' assurances to Macy of Budget that it would be "out of question" to mount an invasion without participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the country (Cuba).

f. The words "Special Discussion" e.g., 10/6 meeting, DP/D indicate in my notes discussions of sensitive ~~DP/D~~ activities (PIC). They are described at length in the minutes, but I took no notes on this.

g. Note (11/3 meeting) State's suggesting that the three top Cubans be assassinated.

h. Note CIA was conducting a re-evaluation of the entire situation (which presumably led to the decision to go ahead with a large brigade): Should we not ask Bissell whether any memoranda of this re-evaluation are in existence?

i. There is reference to Cuba being on NSC agenda for early November 1960. Should we inquire what was said at such NSC meeting?

j. Note Barnes' preposterous statement (12/5) that 600 troops (in invasion) would be just as useful as 3000.

k. It is clear that the pressures to get the Cuban trainees out of Guatemala were considered by the Special Group to be real and urgent.

3. Will IG and GD and RBS please make ^{any} additional suggestions, ^{that occur} for inclusion in draft report?



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