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DTIC-R (FOIA 2011-15)

DEC 8 2010

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.



Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This is in response to your email dated November 22, 2010, received in this office November 23, 2010 (enclosure 1) requesting document AD0614988.

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Sincerely,

MICHAEL A. HAMILTON
Acting FOIA Program Manager

2 Enclosures

Akers, Kelly CIV DTIC R

From: John Greenewald, Jr. [john@greenewald.com]
Sent: Monday, November 22, 2010 2:39 PM
To: FOIA
Subject: FOIA REQUEST

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Additionally, I agree to pay fees up to ten dollars.

I respectfully request a copy of:

Accession Number:
AD0614988

Title:
FROM BRIGHT IDEAS TO SOCIAL RESEARCH: THE STUDIES OF THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION,

Report Number(s):

TR-17 (TR17)

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Thank you so much for your time, and I am very much looking forward to your response.

Sincerely,

John Greenewald, Jr.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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AD614988

**FROM BRIGHT IDEAS TO SOCIAL RESEARCH: THE STUDIES OF
THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION**

DUKE UNIV DURHAM NC

MAY 1965

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32 p.

ONR 1181(11) Project NR 177-470

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
FROM BRIGHT IDEAS TO SOCIAL RESEARCH: THE STUDIES OF THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

Kurt W. Back

and

Judith Saravay

Duke University



TISIA B

Some of the computations reported in this paper were carried out at the Duke University Computing Laboratory, which is supported in part by the National Science Foundation. A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Public Opinion Research, Groton, Conn., 1965.

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ABSTRACT

The study of crisis research can give information on two issues in the methodology of social science: the decision to translate a research idea into actual practice, and the nature of the background of the research which preserves the ephemeral data of historical events. The study was done with the social scientists who conducted research on the assassination of President Kennedy and a matched control sample of other social scientists.

The positions and interests of the critical and control groups differed little. In fact, a majority of the control group was interested in crisis research and even had thought about doing a study of the Kennedy assassination. Organizational pressures seemed little effective as a reason for doing research. Descriptions by the critical group of how they engaged in their study showed a strong connection to current research and a quick start of the actual research process.

The principal factor which seems to account for the action taken by the critical group is the evaluation taken of the role of the scientist. The control group is less interested in personal prestige and more in communication. Further the critical group was more inclined to take risks. This showed itself in the attitude toward research techniques, toward basic research as a risk-taking enterprise and in gambling on financial support for their studies.

INTRODUCTION

There are many ways in which the social scientist can obtain his data and many sources which he can use. In this paper we shall be concerned with one special kind of condition in which research can be undertaken. This is the situation in which a unique event or crisis occurs within society which can be used as a starting point for research. We are doing this for two reasons.

1. Study of research in a crisis gives an opportunity for an adequate sample for investigating the start of a research process. The precipitating event which releases possible research ideas is accessible to a whole range of scientists. Casual observation, as well as some data to be reported later, shows that most people trained in the social sciences have interesting ideas at these times which would be followed up. Starting with this common background of many scientists we find that relatively few research studies are actually conducted. In effect, we have here a natural experiment. We are able to study one experimental group (those who did undertake research) and compare it with a control group and thus study the characteristics of these people who make a certain kind of research decision.

2. There is also a substantive interest in the kind of research actually conducted here. The existence of empirical social science gives the possibility for better understanding of current events and the possibility of providing future historians with deeper understanding than is possible now for him with his usual sources. It is important, therefore, that some studies of this kind are undertaken; but, at the same time, the unexpected nature and the sudden demands which events of this kind make of the scientist, restrict the kind of research to a few people who are willing and able to do so. It seems fruitful, therefore, to inquire who the people are and what the conditions are under which this research is undertaken.

The event which we are using in this study is the assassination of President Kennedy. This event had a great immediate impact on the whole society and also, because of its unique coverage through the mass media, lent itself relatively easily to any kind of study of individual or social reactions. In addition, research on this topic was also co-ordinated in part and, therefore, it was possible to identify quickly the people who are conducting research on the event. A conference of some leading social scientists in research organizations was called within one day of the assassination and some major studies were planned at this time. In addition, a clearing house was established, relatively well-publicized, at the Bureau of Social Science Research in Washington, which collected the type of studies done and the names of people interested in these studies. This list provided, therefore, a ready pool of researchers who had undertaken studies in this crisis.

In line with the two-fold purpose of the paper we shall inquire both into the ways in which people did approach these studies and how the studies related to the current work. Further, we shall want to compare the characteristics of the people who did undertake this research with the control sample of people who did not.

Talking generally about the decision to undertake the research, we can look at it as a special instance of undertaking any action. Motivation must be strong enough to overcome all inner and outer obstacles. That is, we would expect people to undertake it who either had very strong motivation or who had less restraint inside them to undertake research of this kind or either support for doing so. Thus, we can identify the motivations for doing this research such as conception of the function of the scientist or

a great motive to acquire knowledge; and, on the other hand, restraints which would prevent a person from doing so, such as worry about funds or somewhat rigid conception of the procedures of social research. Concretely, we should apply this model to the two aims which we have stated before.

METHOD

Questionnaires were sent to all investigators known to be involved in assassination studies. The original base of selection was a list of professionals who had studied the Kennedy assassination or who had expressed interest in these studies. Of the 59 questionnaires sent to these people, 37 were completed and returned. However, four of these questionnaires could not be used in this study because the respondents had been interested in assassination studies but had not completed any themselves. The 33 respondents whose names were included on this list represent 54% of the 39 studies performed by this group. The remaining 10 S's were suggested, on request, by the other respondents. These 43 respondents comprised the "critical" group.

A "control" group was chosen matching the professions of the critical respondents. The organizational directories of the professions of the critical respondents served as the population from which the control respondents were chosen. The procedure used was selecting the name immediately preceding and the name immediately following that of each critical respondent. (in the case of psychology, this procedure was followed using the specific areas of psychology represented by the critical group as the populations rather than all the areas combined.) This selection procedure controlled for professional differences between the critical and control groups, and the selection of two control respondents for each critical respondent assured a sufficiently large comparison group.

The 13-page questionnaire to the critical group included three types of questions: objective, open-ended, and a diary. The first two types were focused on political interests, attitudes toward research, specific interests related to the assassination, the reactions of others to the study undertaken by the respondent, and methodological and situational factors considered in planning the study. The diary provided information concerning the events of November 22, 1963 (the day on which President Kennedy was assassinated) through November 30, 1963. More specifically, this information was related to thoughts and activities regarding the respondent's study as well as his other major activities during this period.

The five-page control questionnaire was adapted from the other questionnaire and included many of the same questions. However, because the control respondents had not performed assassination studies, most of the questions related to these studies were omitted and those that were included were asked hypothetically rather than factually. In addition, there were some questions regarding interest in crisis research.

Sample Composition.

The professional and organizational situations of both the critical and control groups were investigated for two reasons: one, to provide a general picture of the background of the scientists who undertake crises research; and two, to compare them with the control groups to see if there were any dissimilarities which might account for their group's involvement in the assassination studies. This information is presented in Table 1; which deals with the professions, professional positions, and organizational affiliations.

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

These data indicate that the critical respondents were concentrated in the fields of psychology and sociology more than in any other single field and that most of them were university professors.

When comparing the two groups, these data indicate that the method of selection of the control group, which aimed at matching the two groups professionally, resulted in balancing both the professions and the organizational affiliations of the two groups. As observed in Table 1, the largest difference between the two groups on this variable lies in the "director" category. A possible explanation for the small number of directors in the critical group as compared to the number in the control group is that directors are more apt to supervise a study rather than participate directly in the research. In fact, several of the directors included on the original list did not fill out the questionnaire sent to them but had a co-author complete it instead. Although this difference between the two groups is statistically significant, further analysis indicated that the positions of the respondents did not affect the answers to the other questions.

How the Studies were Performed

Before discussing the question of motivation to do the studies and the characteristics of the researchers, let us review the sequences of events which led to the research and the kind of research itself. Not surprisingly, the respondents could not describe exactly the creative process which led to initiation of the research. Reading through the diaries on the questionnaire one finds a pattern, starting with curiosity about some aspect of the

situation after the first shock wore off. At some time, usually fairly soon, this curiosity is translated into an appropriate action. In answer to a direct question, when they began work on the study, fifty-seven percent of the 37 respondents, who gave the relevant information, claimed that they began their studies within three and one-half days after the assassination (i.e., by the end of November 25, 1963), and 89% specified that they took concrete action on their studies within one and one-half weeks after the assassination (i.e., by the end of December 2, 1963). Eleven percent said they began after November 26, but did not give a more precise time. Six of the respondents did not specify when they began work on their studies and are not included in the foregoing percentages.

A variety of approaches was used and the respondents were requested to report the types of samples and methods they employed. The fact that President Kennedy's assassination was a unique and unpredictable event and the fact that most of the studies had little time for planning, as indicated above, might help explain why 66% of the respondents, who answered the relevant question, used subjects which were either involved in other research of the respondent or were part of a convenience sample (e.g., students in an ongoing course). Only 24% of the respondents employed a systematic sample and 10% secondary data. Two of the respondents did not report this information.

The respondents also reported that they employed one or a combination of the methods presented in Table 2. The frequencies represent the number of respondents who used the technique, whether it was used alone or in connection with another method.

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

In a further attempt to determine the manner in which researchers went about to study the assassination, let us examine a direct question which required the respondents to indicate which of four possible reasons was most applicable to his decision. Sixteen percent of the respondents said the study fit into an ongoing research project, 21% said it was related to previous research, 26% said it was of theoretical importance, and 37% said its value was inherent in its uniqueness. The qualitative differences between these reasons can be illustrated by quotes from the diary and the open-ended question concerning the reasons for performing the study.

Ongoing research

082: "I decided to ask some questions of college students about the assassination at the end of the interviews for my current study."

035: "My study was in the field already. Modified questionnaire to cover the assassination."

014: "Felt current research activities in the regulation of aggression were related to the reactions manifested to Oswald and Ruby."

Previous research

084: "Had done previous study in role of personality factors in reactions to Cuban crisis."

048: "For the past few years I have been studying situational anxiety... Somehow I got the idea of giving this questionnaire to my students. I had done this also in the Cuban crisis..."

060: "Decided on a diffusion study since I had done a couple already and was familiar with the literature."

Theoretical importance

011: "Aimed at phenomenology of the events and socio-psychological explanations."

086: "Sometime during the weekend I thought about what impact the assassination of the President and the later killing of Oswald would have on people's ideas of human nature."

022: "Questionnaire partly based on hypotheses in literature on FDR's death."

Uniqueness

010: "We had 'once in a life-time' data to work with."

037: "The opportunity presented itself."

051: "Professional curiosity, take advantage of an unusual event."

The specific problems investigated by the respondents were examined both quantitatively and qualitatively. A forced-choice question revealed that of those who answered the question, behavioral reactions to the assassination and transmission and reception of relevant information were each studied by 17% of the respondents, emotional reactions by 39%, psychological analyses of significant persons involved by 6%, and the resulting changes in attitude by 22%. Seven respondents gave either more than one answer or no answer at all and were not included in the foregoing percentages.

The diary provided additional data describing in more detail the interests which influenced the respondents to perform studies. The following are examples of statements made by the respondents in relation to their study topics:

018: "At the time of the assassination I thought about doing a study... because I am interested in the subject of content selection and distortion of the media."

051: "Desirability of doing a study where the intensity of emotions was so obvious occurred to me."

053: "Thought it would be helpful to obtain a sample of Oswald's handwriting for purposes of personality study."

064: "The research was related to a long-standing interest--personality and political opinions."

050: "I suspect that the sight of the faces standing in line in Washington, D.C., to view the casket, made me want to test certain theories about the occurrence of anomie as much as anything else."

A further question asked whether the original idea was their own or whether they were urged to do the research by someone else. Only four of the respondents claimed that the first suggestion to perform an assassination study came from a superior and of these, two were graduate students and the idea was given to them by professors. One respondent revealed that his decision to perform the study came from reading in the newspaper that others were doing it; and for the remaining 88%, the idea to do a study was originally their own or a colleague's. This indicates that most of the experimental respondents performed the studies as a result of their own initiative and that the data on their motivations, attitudes, etc., can be used as illustrative of those leading to crisis research.

Were there any pressures against doing the assassination study? In general, the respondents did not perceive any pressures, either internal or external, against performing an assassination study. Only two respondents indicated that they felt pressure from their colleagues and none of the respondents indicated that they felt pressure from a superior. Moreover, after discussion of the study with colleagues, most of the respondents received positive feedback. Of those who discussed the study with colleagues, 78% reported receiving reactions of interest and only 22% received negative reactions which indicated that the study was inappropriate at the time. This would seem to imply that social scientists in general did not object to the performing of assassination studies and this, in turn, indicates that there were factors in addition to lack of external pressure which influenced the respondents to perform their respective studies. Another set of these questions asked for personal reasons against doing the study. Forty-five percent of both critical and control groups felt that none of the reasons, such as guilt feelings

or using a calamity for one's own advantage--should deter one from doing a study. Question by question, the respondents who did the study agreed more with the actual negative statements than the control group with hypothetical ones. The highest positive answer was for guilt feelings and 40% of the experimental group acknowledged having experienced some, while only 26% of the control group gave it as a likely deterrent. It is clear that these feelings were not actual deterrents although they may have introduced caution in the actual conduct of the study; e.g., some studies omitted interviewing on the funeral day.

ORGANIZATIONAL PRESSURES AND FACILITATIONS

It might be assumed that the scientists who translated their ideas about assassination studies into reality could do so because of organizational factors, including pressures resulting from the respondent's organizational affiliation or professional position and the availability of finances. Table 1 gives evidence that the first factor is not significantly different between the experimental and control groups and that, therefore, this factor does not explain the reason for the decision to perform the study.

There is data, also, which gives evidence that not all the critical respondents had funds available to do a study and, therefore, that an availability of funds was not a necessary factor for the decision to perform a study. Only 40% of the respondents, who gave the relevant information, had assurance of receiving the necessary funds and 28% reported that at the time they answered the questionnaire for this study (July, 1964 - December, 1964) the costs of their studies had still not been met. The remaining 72% of the respondents financed their studies by one or a combination of the means

specified in Table 3. The availability of funding does not seem to have a decisive influence in starting research. Contrary to expectation, organizational factors do not seem particularly influential in engaging in crisis research. The slight differences which do exist--relative concentration of the experimental group in universities and of the control groups in applied settings--may rather be due to self-selection; i.e., individuals may seek to work in environments which permit them to do certain kinds of research.

INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Individual pressures are another condition which might have been thought to be influential. One of these would be dissatisfaction with ongoing or prior research.² This possibility was investigated and was not found to be significant. Table 4 reveals that very few of the respondents had been dissatisfied with both their ongoing and prior research and that most of the respondents had been satisfied with both.

INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Related to this is the problem of pressures to publish which was investigated in order to discover whether or not the respondents decided to perform an assassination study because they had been looking for a topic to study. Although 37% of the experimental group revealed that they had felt pressure to publish at the time of President Kennedy's assassination, only 5% had been looking for a problem to study and 93% were already involved in a project. These data, plus the finding that on variables related to factors influencing the decision, the respondents who felt pressure to publish did not differ

significantly from those who did not, indicate that the decision to perform the study did not result from a need to publish and a concomitant search for a topic.

SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES OF THE EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL GROUPS

Organizational pressure or facilitation cannot account for the eventual decision to undertake the assassination research. To obtain further clues, we shall look now at the attitudes of the researchers, about the general function of research operations and their own approach to it. We note first that the difference between the critical and the control group does not lie in lack of interest in crisis research on the part of the latter group.

A series of five questions dealing with research interests and activities relates to different crisis events, including the Kennedy assassination, revealed that seven control respondents had no interest in studying any of the events, 35 had been interested in studies done on one or more of the events but did not do any themselves, and 14 studied at least one event. In fact, 39 of the FS control respondents had been interested in doing research on the assassination. The small number of respondents who revealed no interest in crisis research compared to the combined number of respondents who were interested in or performed at least one study indicates that the reasons the control group did not perform studies of the Kennedy assassination did not stem, in general, from a lack of interest.

In addition to research interests, we might ask whether political interests differentiated between the two groups. When asked to report which of nine political activities (e.g., participation in political demonstrations, contribution of research for candidates or political parties, etc.), the mean number of activities in which the respondents had participated was 2.45 for the critical

group and 2.88 for the control group. The difference between these two means is not significant and this indicates that political interests were not significant in influencing the decision to perform the assassination studies. Eighty percent of the critical group and 73% of the control group had voted for Kennedy.

Motivation

We turn now to conditions intrinsic to the role of the scientist and his motivation for doing research. Apart from the motive to obtain knowledge (which we can assume to be common to all scientists), two kinds of commitments and motives are important to distinguish: (a) the need to communicate knowledge, to make knowledge available to the whole scientific community and (b) the desire for recognition and prestige for one's discoveries. The first corresponds to the value called communism by Merton³ or commonality by Storer⁴ as part of the ethos of science, namely that the findings of science are property of the whole community. It can even be said that a fact does not become part of science until it is communicated to one's peers and the nature of science is a social enterprise.⁵ According to Merton,⁶ the second motive is practically a corollary of the first. As the scientist does not obtain any property right on his knowledge, he is trained to work for recognition as reward.⁷ However, too exclusive concentration on this motive may become dysfunctional and hinder research work. Crisis research is a risk-taking venture and the potentiality of furthering prestige is, therefore, more tenuous than in other types of research. We would expect then that the critical group would be more interested in communication and less in individual recognition than the control group.

Different motivation types were formed on the basis of the answers to the following two questions:

1. "If you had the opportunity to discover important facts in your science but could not tell anyone about it, would you be likely to do it?"
2. "If you had the opportunity to discover important facts in your science and could reveal the knowledge but not under your own name, would you be likely to do it?"

These questions were answered by the selection of one of five scaled answers, ranging from "definitely" to "definitely not"; and for purposes of analysis, groups were formed by dichotomizing the answers at the mean. (The means for the two questions fell at different points along the scale.) Thus, the answers to each of the questions were divided into two groups.

It is assumed that the scientists who would perform research, even if they could not tell anyone about it or could not reveal the knowledge under their own names, would be very interested in the attainment of knowledge per se. In other words, this group is characterized by a high motivation to produce knowledge, regardless of the prestige involved or of its contribution to the existing bulk of scientific knowledge, and corresponds with the first type of motivation mentioned above. Because of its characteristic of high drive for the acquisition of knowledge, this group will be referred to as the High Drive for Knowledge group (HIKNO).

The scientists in the second group, would be less likely to do research anonymously than those in the other two groups whether they could tell about it or not. Rather than performing research principally for the sake of acquiring knowledge, they are concerned with the external rewards they will receive and hold the second type of motivation mentioned above. This group will be referred to as the Low Drive for Knowledge group

(LOKNO), and is characterized by concern for prestige resulting from research.

The last group is somewhat more complicated than the other two because it cannot be described by a simple high or low drive for knowledge. This group is motivated to produce knowledge, as indicated by its answer to the anonymity of action but will do so only when it is possible to reveal this knowledge. Thus, this group is motivated to fulfill the functions of science: i.e., discovery of knowledge and the subsequent dissemination of the knowledge and corresponds to the third motivation type mentioned above. Because this group is characterized by a high drive for discovering knowledge which can be used to contradict or modify existing knowledge or scientific theory and to precipitate research for new knowledge, it will be typed as the High Drive for Science group (HISCI).

According to our analysis of motivation we can expect that the motivation for discovering knowledge would be different for the two groups and, thus, that there would be proportionally more critical respondents in the HIKNO and HISCI groups and more control respondents in the LOKNO group. Table 5 reveals that this prediction was borne out and indicates that it was so good that there were no controls in the HISCI group.

INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

An additional question, "I think of myself as a scientist first and a citizen second," provided additional evidence supporting the conclusion that the critical group is more of a science-oriented group than the control group. The respondents were requested to rank, on a five-point scale, from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." Critical respondents agree with this

statement significantly more than the control respondents ($p < .05$). The questions which we have cited, and which discriminate between the groups, show the importance of the conception of one's role as scientist on crisis research.

Research related to crisis events, such as the assassination, does not necessarily manifest any immediate or even potential practical applicability. A crisis event is a sudden and rare if not unique occurrence, and when a social scientist decides to perform a relevant study he has to be aware of the fact that the knowledge he discovers may have no pragmatic value.

Based on this analysis, we can expect that the control group would be more oriented toward research for practical application than the experimental group. This prediction was correct. In response to a question asking what percentage of social science research should be geared toward the solution of practical problems, the means of the critical and control groups differed significantly at the .02 level (t-test) with the mean of the control group being the higher.

The distinction between basic and applied research has been much discussed and used as a basis for some invidious comparisons. For our present purpose we are less interested in the sponsorship or use of each type of research but in the style of executing it. Darwin Cartwright has suggested that basic research should be defined as "that which has a low probability of success, but which yields an enormous pay-off when it is successful."⁸ By contrast, much applied research is variation, under some new conditions, of procedures which are known to yield a reasonable success. We can interpret the preference for applied research by the group in this light and surmise that the critical group is more likely to be risk-takers in research.⁹

The investigation of risk-taking characteristics of the subject population in this study revealed that this assumption is true. The greater risk-taking behavior of the critical respondents as compared to the control respondents is evidenced by a series of questions. The respondents were requested to rank a number of statements from 0 to 4, corresponding to "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." Table 6 presents the means of both groups for four of these statements. As observed in this table, the means consistently follow

INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

the same trend. The statement regarding new methods of research yields a significant difference between the two groups at the .01 level (t-test) and, although the other statements do not provide statistically significant results, they support the conclusion that the critical group is more apt to take risks and to be flexible in their research than is the control group.

Additional data which suggest a greater flexibility in research methods result from a question dealing with the textbook description of the "ideal" way of doing research. The respondents were asked to indicate which steps of this "ideal" method they felt could be eliminated under time pressure. Because the critical respondents had performed Kennedy assassination studies (most of which were done under time pressure) and because analysis had shown, as mentioned above; that they were less rigid in their approach to research; it was predicted that they would feel that more of these steps could be eliminated than would the control group. This prediction was true: the mean of the critical group was 3.55 steps and the mean for the control group was 2.76. A t-test revealed that the difference between these means is

nearly significant at the .05 level ($t = 1.978$). The favorite candidates for omission were: construct a theory (61% of critical and 64% of control group), read the literature (51% of critical and 38% of control group) and, test reliability (55% of critical and 35% of control group).

The differences between the HIKNO and the LOKNO groups when applied to the problem of finances manifest a relationship with risk-taking characteristics. In a question asking whether the respondent had thought that the availability of funds would help or hinder him in carrying out his study, 15 respondents reported that they thought they would be helped and 12 claimed that they thought they would be hindered (the remaining 16 respondents gave no answer). A chi square analysis ($p < .05$) revealed that the respondents who were helped by funds tended to be in the LOKNO group while those who were hindered tended to be in the HIKNO group. Thus, it seems that with a low motivation, an availability of funds was a partial factor in influencing the respondent to do research; whereas with a high motivation, the respondent performed the research even without an availability of funds. If we consider a lack of available funds to provide a risk-taking situation, these results indicate that the scientists with a low motivation will be more likely to do research if there are fewer risks involved, whereas scientists with a high motivation will perform research even when there are obvious risks. This style of research is also manifest in the actual conduct of the research. Only 35% of the respondents claimed that they conducted their study in the time-honored framework of introductory methodology courses "to test a theory." In addition, slightly less than half the respondents acknowledged that they were guided more than usual by intuition and hunches in this research.

The differences between the HIKNO and the LOKNO groups in their attitudes toward research were analyzed in order to better describe the characteristics of these groups. (The HISC1 groups could not be included because of the zero cell in the control group.) When the critical and control groups were controlled for the HIKNO and the LOKNO groups proved to differ significantly in their rankings of two statements regarding reasons for performing scientific research. (In both cases $p < .01$.) The LOKNO group ranked "prestige in the scientific world" higher than the HIKNO group and the direction was reversed in the rankings of "knowledge for its own sake regardless of its application." These results illustrate more fully that HIKNO is a knowledge-oriented group whereas the LOKNO group is interested in research more as a prestige-providing opportunity.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the data collected, we suspect now that practically every social scientist, faced with a sudden crisis in the society, has at least a fleeting feeling to do some research on this event. To at least a minimal degree, means can be found to undertake a study. Thus, by and large, the question of doing the research resolves itself to a problem of individual decision-making, of translating desires into action.

We found principally two personal conditions which distinguish those individuals who do engage in crisis research: perception of his role as a scientist and willingness to assume risks. Undertaking research when a sudden opportunity presents itself is in some respects the prototype of the basic research situation. It cannot have been anticipated or specifically planned beforehand or tied into practical application and is thus primarily a fruit of intellectual curiosity. The insights which any trained scientist

can obtain in casual observation have to be converted into data which can be communicated. Thus, the scientist who accepts the responsibility of his role will be most likely to undertake a formal research project at this juncture. Further studies of this kind must be improvised and practically force the researcher into pioneering by using techniques of theoretical hunches which he cannot be sure about. Thus the willingness of taking risks in research without losing sight of research standards is the second trait which we have identified for crisis researchers.

The manner in which they approached the assassination studies is not too different from their usual way of proceeding and the description of the procedure is probably a somewhat sharpened picture of their usual research style. We can see here the decision to assume the role of social scientist and to look at events through the instruments of scientific methodology and do this among a group who can do this quickly and effectively.

TABLE 1

Professional Position Of Critical And Control Groups

PROFESSIONS	CRITICAL	CONTROL	POSITION	CRITICAL	CONTROL	ORGANIZATION	CRITICAL	CONTROL
Communications Research	1	0	Clinical Psychologist	2	5	Hospital	0	3
Economics	0	1	Director	3	15	Industrial Organization	0	5
Education	0	1	Graduate Student	5	0	Private Practice	1	2
Marketing Research	1	3	Instructor	2	2	Psychological Clinic	1	2
Political Science	8	8	Professor	25	28	Public School	0	2
Psychiatry	0	2	Research Scientist	5	4	Research Institute	8	8
Psychology	18	28	Nonclassifiable	1	2	University	33	31
Social Work	1	2				Nonclassifiable	0	3
Sociology	14	11						
TOTAL	43	56		43	56		43	56

TABLE 2

Methods Used By The Critical Group For The
Collection of Data In the Assassination
Studies

<u>METHOD</u>	<u>NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS</u>
Content Analysis	4
Handwriting Analysis	1
Personal Interview	17
Questionnaire	20
Telephone Interview	6

TABLE 3

Methods Used By The Critical Group
To Finance The Assassination Studies

<u>FUNDS USED</u>	<u>NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS</u>
No funds necessary	10
Funds available at the time	9
Funds acquired through the respondent's organization	8
Funds acquired from grant applications	4
Not specified	2

TABLE 4

Feelings About Research Done At Time Of Assassination
Or Immediately Before the Assassination

<u>FEELINGS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS</u>
Satisfaction with research done Only at time of assassination	2
Satisfaction with research done Only before assassination	8
Satisfaction with both	26
Satisfaction with neither	7

TABLE 5

Motivation Types in Critical And Control Groups

	CRITICAL	CONTROL
Would do research if could not reveal knowledge under own name.		
Definitely	24	23
Would do research if could not reveal knowledge to anybody.		
Definitely or Probably (HIKNO)	16	23
Possibly, doubtful or definitely not (HISCI)	8	0
Probably, possibly, doubtful or definitely not (LOKNO)	19	31
TOTAL	43	54

TABLE 6

Means Of The Critical And Control Groups
On Risk-Taking Statements

<u>STATEMENTS</u>	<u>CRITICAL</u>	<u>CONTROL</u>
"I am impulsive in my work."	1.81	1.45
"If I'm interrupted while doing a study I get upset."	1.26	1.65
"I don't like to try new methods of research."	.54	.95
"I usually plan my studies well in advance."	1.79	2.13

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




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