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SUPPLEMENT TO  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**  
MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY  
BOOK I -- GENERAL  
VOLUME 14 - INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY

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Note: The figure 380 was presumably obtained by adding the number of pages in this supplement (135) to the number of pages in Book I, Volume 14 (249) and omitting 4 title or cover pages, etc.:

$$\begin{array}{r}
 249 \\
 + 135 \\
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 380
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SUPPLEMENT  
 TO  
 MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY  
 BOOK I -- GENERAL  
 VOLUME 14 - INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY

CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED  
 DOE NSI DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW E.O. 12958  
 BY MARK D. [unclear] DOE/SO-70  
 10-14-05

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED  
 DATE 10-17-59  
 For The Atomic Energy Commission  
H. F. Canale  
 Chief, Declassification Branch *fm*

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SECURITY INFORMATION

FOREWORD

This Supplement has been written to complete the History of the Intelligence and Security Division of the Manhattan District which ended officially on 31 December 1946. The original volume incorporated information from the inception of the District to 31 December 1945. In compiling information for inclusion in the Supplement, effort has been made to set forth only those items of major importance which transpired during the year 1946 and to prevent, wherever possible, repetition of events and data previously recorded in the main text.

References, designated in the Supplement, have been included in the Supplements to the Appendix which have been bound at the back of the main text. ~~in front of each Appendix concerned.~~ Supplements to Appendices B, D and E have been omitted for the reason that no additional information has been obtained. Appendix F, Personnel of Intelligence and Security Division, has been revised to include personnel associated with the District during 1946.

14 March 1947

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SUPPLEMENT

TO

MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY

BOOK I -- GENERAL

VOLUME 14 - INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY

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SUMMARY

1. Introduction. - The principal consideration to be borne in mind in order to obtain a clear overall comprehension of the status of District Intelligence and Security activities during 1946 is to remember that effective 7 March 1946 responsibility for such activities was placed upon the various Area Engineers. This resulted in each Area establishing its own Intelligence and Security program with help and advice being furnished by District Headquarters whenever necessary. It may be stated generally that operations were continued in all Sections as they existed in the past with the exception that considerable improvement has been noted as the result of the establishment of new policies and procedures designed to effectuate a more efficient Security and Intelligence program.

2. Counter-Intelligence. - Separation of Counter-Intelligence Corps Agents from the service resulted in curtailment of activities and concentration on cases of major importance, protection of technical information and processes at the various installations. Transfer of investigative activities to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by the Atomic Energy Act caused a question to be raised as to the jurisdictional status of the Counter-Intelligence Corps but counter-intelligence activities were continued.

3. Personnel and Company Clearance.

Various Areas conducted their own personnel investigations when leads were within the Area concerned. Interim clearance was denied new employees when the security risk was determined to be too great. Visitors to installations who were to be granted access to classified information and permanent inter-area transferees were cleared only by Washington Intelligence

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Office. FBI field offices furnished information direct to Area offices. The employment of aliens was discontinued. However, alien-employees were permitted to remain. The P-9 Project, Trail, British Columbia was placed under the jurisdiction of Hanford Engineer Works.

4. Plant Protection. - In absence of recorded history of practices and policies, new standard operation procedures were published. The responsibility was assumed by the Plant Security Section for "Security Completion Surveys" of facilities terminating District contracts. The list of facilities surveyed by the Plant Security Section increased from 300 to 700. Routine inspections at Project plants and Areas totaled over 1000. Additional pre-contractual surveys were made on new contractors and consultants. Continuous training program and on-the-job training were instituted for new Security personnel. No known compromise of classified information or damage to equipment was noted during 1946. Recommendations for improvement of Security involving expenditure of funds and changes in personnel were approved by contractors. Public Proclamation No. 25 was issued by Commanding General Sixth Army, to supersede Public Proclamation No. 18. This Proclamation pertained to trespassing, contraband, etc., on military reservations within the Sixth Army Area and especially the Hanford Engineer Works.

5. Shipment Security. - A new method of shipment of final products from Sites W and X was inaugurated (See separate Top Secret Appendix to this Supplement).

6. Security of Information. - Contract completion security assigned to Plant Protection Section. Use of Polygraph in one of restricted areas

developed security violations. Comprehensive method of accounting for Top Secret documents adopted. Problems related to declassification of technical and scientific information assigned to Declassification and Publications Branch, Research Division. Washington and District Public Relations Offices cleared advertising by industrial concerns of use by Manhattan District of their products. State and Federal Agencies granted access to Restricted information. Central office established for handling of foreign inquiries, purchases and equipment. Instructions pertaining to photographing, sketching, mapping, etc., revised.

7. Organization. - Seven jurisdictional areas of responsibility for general security and intelligence matters established. Separation of army personnel from service caused changes in policy and administration. Operations CROSSROADS office set up in Berkeley Area. Brookhaven National Laboratory and Brookhaven Area activated officially in July and August 1946, respectively. Argonne National Laboratory succeeded the Metallurgical Laboratory on 1 July 1946 as the prime contractor in the Chicago Area. General Electric Company assumed responsibility from E. I. du Pont de Nemours on 1 September 1946 for operation of the Hanford Engineer Works. Los Angeles Area retained identity as sole entity separate from Santa Fe Branch Office. X Sandia Base separated from Site Y on 1 November 1946. Schenectady Area activated on 1 July 1946. General Electric Company became prime contractor of that Area on 1 September 1946. Atomic Energy Act passed 1 August 1946. Commission named on 28 October 1946. First meeting on 13 November 1946. Operation of Manhattan District transferred from War Department to Atomic Energy Committee on 31 December 1946.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY

BOOK I - GENERAL

VOLUME 14 - INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

SUPPLEMENT

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

No revisions to Section I for period ending 31 December 1946

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SUPPLEMENT TO SECTION 2 - COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

S2-4. General.- During the period covered by this Supplement, there was little change in the Counter-Intelligence activities of the Intelligence Section. Generally speaking, the Counter-Intelligence program was slowly revised and aimed more directly at the protection of technical information and processes at the various installations. This change was necessitated by the gradual release of information that had previously been classified. All leads, developed locally and through constant liaison with other investigative and law enforcement agencies, which related to espionage, sabotage, sedition, treason, disaffection, subversion, etc., were carefully followed and reported. Throughout this period, a constant effort was made to strengthen the liaison and contacts of the Intelligence Section throughout its general jurisdictional areas.

The Army discharge policy, the subsequent loss of trained and highly experienced CIC Agents, and the decrease in the volume of cases under investigation, considerably curtailed the activities of the Intelligence Section. Nevertheless, counter-intelligence activities were executed efficiently and were processed to completion. A strong and successful effort was made to rebuild the counter-intelligence section by the employment of additional investigators.

Some confusion existed as to the status of the counter-intelligence section following passage of the Atomic Energy Act, which decreed that all investigative and intelligence work would be performed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This situation existed for some months, during which this section, in the absence of any other instructions, continued its counter-intelligence work.

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SUPPLEMENT TO SECTION 3 - PERSONNEL AND COMPANY CLEARANCE

SS-4. Chicago Area (Illinois) - When the Intelligence and Security functions were combined in March, 1946, the Personnel Clearance program continued to rely almost completely upon investigations conducted by Military Intelligence investigators assigned to the Army areas. Soon it was apparent that budget curtailment and the manpower shortage were seriously delaying the investigations. Action was therefore taken by the Chicago Security Office to conduct its own personnel investigations, if the leads were in greater Chicago or in areas to which other security business took the Office's personnel. From March to December, the Chicago Security Office handled an average of 150 Personnel Clearance investigations (special, routine, or agency) per month.

One of the important changes in Personnel Clearance which resulted from the delays mentioned was that, instead of granting interim clearance to applicants who had minor derogatory facts in their backgrounds and then keeping those employees under surveillance, the Chicago Security Office placed great emphasis on the security risk in hiring the applicants and denied clearances whenever the risk appeared too great. This was an abrupt about-face in the Personnel Clearance policy followed during the War years.

SS-5. Clinton Engineer Works (Tennessee) - The Personnel Security Branch of the Security Division continued to function during 1946 as in previous years except for the following changes:

- (1) On 10 May 1946, an administrative clearance procedure was established which directed clearance by Washington Intelligence Office of all visitors to an installation who were expected to have access to highly classified information and all permanent transfers between areas of persons

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doing highly classified work. Explanation of the administrative details necessary to place the procedure into effect and a further clarification were published subsequently (See Appendix A 8-1 and 8-2).

(2) The Federal Bureau of Investigation on October 18, 1946, authorized its field offices to furnish information direct to Area Security offices. This procedure greatly expedited the completion of preliminary investigations necessary for the granting of interim clearances.

(3) On October 24, 1946, instructions were issued to all offices to discontinue the employment of aliens pending a decision by the Atomic Energy Commission. Aliens already employed were permitted to remain.

83-6. Hanford Engineer Works (Washington) - In September, 1946, the Personnel Clearance procedure at the Heavy Water (P-9) Project at Trail, British Columbia, was revised by the Intelligence and Security Division. Formerly the clearance of P-9 employees had been entirely the responsibility of the Canadian Mining and Smelting Company of Canada Limited. Under the provisions of the change, all personnel employed at the P-9 Project were subjected to background investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and clearance data cards forwarded to the Intelligence and Security Division at the Hanford Engineer Works. Investigative reports were retained by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Clearance records were reviewed by personnel of the Intelligence and Security Division at Hanford Engineer Works.

83-7. Madison Square Area (New York) - Personnel and company clearances increased because of the fact that there was a resurgence in activity on the part of the Manhattan District, particularly in Madison Square Area. Such clearance became increasingly large in scope with the advent of the "Interim

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Clearance", or preliminary check of federal agencies before prospective employees were put to work within the various District facilities.

S3-8. Schenectady Area (New York).- When the contractor first began to submit the names of employees for clearance in May 1946, Personnel Security Questionnaires were forwarded to the Madison Square Area office for loyalty and character investigations by Headquarters First Army, Governor's Island, New York. It was found after submission of 81 names that these investigations took too long. Therefore, after 10 Jun- 1946, all background and loyalty investigations were carried on by the Area Security Office. In all cases where derogatory information was developed, special investigation ensued to determine whether clearance should be granted or denied. Because of a strong local branch of the Communist Party, <sup>and</sup> a union which is believed to be badly infiltrated, and because this area also was the scene of much Bund activity, it was decided that interim clearance would be granted only after a check of local investigative agencies revealed that there was nothing derogatory in their files.

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SUPPLEMENT TO SECTION 4 - PLANT PROTECTION

84-9. District Program. - The year 1948 brought no appreciable change in the objective of Plant Protection. Although interruption of operations lost its war time importance, physical protection of the wealth of information and material represented by the research and production facilities of the Manhattan District justified a physical security program at least equivalent to that conducted previously.

a. Plant Protection. During the first few months of 1948, the Plant Protection personnel underwent an almost complete turnover, from military to civilian, both in the District Office and the Area Offices. The incoming organization found that much of the history of practices and policies had not been recorded and consequently was lost with the departing military personnel. Standard operating procedures were, therefore, developed as interpretation of the existing Security Manual and were directed to all organizations concerned. (See Appendix C S-8). These resulted in a broader definition of facility, a more definite assignment of responsibility and a far more thorough supervision of the minor contractors who had access to classified information but who, through former administrative policies, were frequently not reported to appropriate security agents (See Appendix AS-3 and S-4).

b. Security Completion Surveys. In addition to inspections of active facilities, the Plant Protection organization assumed responsibility for "Security Completion Surveys" of facilities which had terminated their contracts with the District. Through these surveys the contractors were assisted in disposing of classified documents and material, to relieve themselves of the responsibility of further safeguarding classified matter, and where possible to eliminate the need for further security supervision on the part of the Manhattan District.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

To impress each terminating contractor with the continuing importance of security, an acknowledging certificate to that effect was obtained from the responsible representative of his organization. Since the District Records Administrator likewise has the problem of record disposition, he and the Chief of Plant Protection more closely coordinated their activities, as originally directed in the Security Manual (See Appendix AS-5).

The list of facilities being surveyed increased from less than 300 to more than 700 during the year. Routine inspections totaled over 1000. In addition, facility clearances of many new contractors and consultants prior to their being furnished classified data required additional pre-contractual surveys. An estimated 200 of these were conducted. To undertake this load of field work with new personnel required a continuous training program which was accomplished by frequent visits by Security Agents of the District Office to the various Area Offices where they conducted informal conferences and joint inspections. Similar method was followed to educate contractor's security agents with revised Manhattan District policies. Apparent success of the programs is indicated by several results:

First, there was no known compromise of classified information or damage to buildings, equipment, or material which could be attributed to a failure of plant protection measures.

Second, the plant inspectors continuously submitted recommendations for improvement of security which involved expenditure of funds, changes in established policies, and inconvenience to personnel. However, contracting officers and contractor's representatives almost invariably agreed that the improvement outweighed the cost and complied willingly.

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Third, the plant protection program in its entirety has been critically reviewed for the purpose of recommending to what extent it be continued by the Atomic Energy Commission. No change of consequence has been suggested.

c. Manford Engineer Works (Washington) - On 12 November 1946, the Commanding General, Sixth Army issued Public Proclamation No. 26 to supersede Proclamation No. 18. Authority for enforcement of Public Proclamation No. 26 continued to be vested in the District Engineer, Manhattan District. Although the Proclamation was not invoked during this period, of the terms and conditions set out in the Proclamation regarding trespassing, possession of contraband, etc., armed security was the most effective legal weapon and served as a deterrent against trespassing. The lack of concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction, and the handling of 14,000 or more population plus casuals and itinerants on the reservation created law enforcement problems on which state jurisdiction would have been somewhat clouded (See Appendix CS-9).

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SUPPLEMENT TO SECTION 5 - SHIPMENT SECURITY

For the information developed for this Section on the new method of shipment of final product, see the separate Top Secret Appendix to this Supplement.

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SUPPLEMENT TO SECTION 6 - SECURITY OF INFORMATION

**86-6. General** - The activities of the Security of Information Section continued as reported at the end of 1945. During 1946 some of the former activities of the section were reduced or assigned as activities of other offices.

Since Contract Completion Security was a natural succession to the functions of the Plant Protection Section, responsibility for Contract Completion Security was assigned to the Plant Protection Section in April, 1946.

Results from the use of Polygraph equipment which was placed in operation in February 1946, as an aid for the clearance of special personnel at one of the District installations, have indicated a few possible violations of security to which attention has been given.

**86-7. Control of Top Secret Documents** - A check of the procedures used to account for Top Secret documents indicated an urgent need for a more comprehensive method of accounting for such documents in the Manhattan District. The District Security Officer was designated the Top Secret Control Officer to receive reports and maintain complete records of documents authenticated and the disposition of each copy. Provisions were also made for the submission of semi-annual physical inventory reports from authenticating offices and complete monthly reports on documents authenticated and also on such documents the custody or status of which had changed during the period covered by the report. A system of numbering to identify each copy of a document warranting a Top Secret classification was provided. In August 1946, a representative of the Security Division had inspected all Top Secret authenticating offices of the District and had recommended necessary improvements in the accounting for Top Secret documents (See Appendix AS-6).

S6-1. Declassification of Information - In May 1946, Problems related to the declassification of technical and scientific information were referred to the Declassification and Publications Branch of the Research Division. Problems connected with the classification of technical and scientific information, also problems concerned with the classification and declassification of non-technical project information were handled as a supervisory function of the Security Division. Information was issued to clarify matters concerning the classification, declassification, and public release of Manhattan District information. Recommendations for the declassification of certain Manhattan District contracts were made by the Security Division following requests for such declassification when it was anticipated that such contracts would be required for use as exhibits in court proceedings, and if the information contained in the contract documents were of a declassifiable nature (See Appendix AS-7).

a. Contractors - Requests from contractors, manufacturers, and sales agencies to permit the advertising of certain facts concerning the use of their commercial products and services on the Manhattan Project were referred to the Washington and District Public Relations offices for clearance. The Security Division has expedited action in cases where the security of classified technical and scientific information was submitted to the Declassification Organization for clearance.

b. Press and Publications - Limited review coverage of local newspapers and popular periodicals was maintained and subjects of interest to the District were clipped and filed with appropriate index and cross reference. News items reflecting possible breaches of security became subjects for investigation. News items of District interest, but of local origin, were also forwarded to the

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Project Intelligence Office in Washington, D. C., for information. Articles appearing in technical publications were reviewed by the Declassification and Publications Branch of the Research Division. Articles embracing possible classified technical and scientific information developed on the Manhattan Project, and which were released for publication without prior submission to the Declassification Organization for processing, were reported as security of information violations to the Security Division. Subsequent follow-up was conducted through the Security Division by investigation and recommended corrective action.

c. Federal Agencies - Authority was promulgated clarifying a policy permitting State and Federal Agencies and/or their accredited representatives to have access to RESTRICTED Manhattan District information. Accredited representatives of State and Federal Agencies making requests for access to documents classified higher than RESTRICTED were instructed to apply to the Area Engineer concerned to downgrade such documents. The Area Engineer or his authorized representative could downgrade documents to RESTRICTED where such downgrading was consistent with Security provisions. An important obstacle was removed in the processing of fiscal documents which were originally classified higher than RESTRICTED solely to conceal the connection between the contractor and the Manhattan District and where such connection has since become a matter of public knowledge (See Appendix AS-8).

d. International Agencies - A central office was established to receive information concerning foreign inquiries, purchases, and attempted purchases of possible classified material and equipment from Manhattan District contractors (See Appendix AS-9).

Instructions concerning the photographing, sketching, mapping, etc., of Manhattan District and installations were revised to insure enforcement of a Presidential Executive Order and to conform with existing War Department regulations. (See Appendix AS-10).

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SUPPLEMENT TO SECTION 7 - ORGANIZATION

S7-2. Historical Development of Intelligence and Security Division.

b. District Security Division - Two important District Circular Letters affecting the organization of the Security Division were published during 1946. One, effective 7 March 1946, placed responsibility for all Intelligence and Security activities within the respective areas on the Area Engineers. Personnel available in the Branch Intelligence or Security Offices were transferred to the local Area Engineer's staff. The following combinations were effected:

New York Office to the Area Engineer, Madison Square Area.

Chicago Office to the Area Engineer, Chicago Area.

Berkeley Office to the Area Engineer, Berkeley Area.

Pasadena Office to the Area Engineer, Los Angeles Area.

The other, established on 18 June 1946, seven jurisdictional areas of responsibility for general security and intelligence matters throughout the United States. These areas were: Washington Intelligence Office; Commanding Officer, Sity Y; Commanding Officer, CEW; Area Engineer, Madison Square Area; Area Engineer, Chicago Area; Area Engineer, HEW; Area Engineer, Berkeley Area. The office responsible for the administration of the contract was also made responsible for the security and intelligence pertaining to the contract (See Appendix AS-11 and AS-4).

S7-3. Personnel of Intelligence and Security Division - Many internal changes in organization and personnel occurred within the Division and Branches. These were necessitated in part by separation of officers from the Army, changes in policy and administration. The efforts of these experienced men and women,

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who worked with the Manhattan District during the war and remained with the Project during its transition from Army to civilian control, is acknowledged.

d. Organization - The principal changes within the various Area Security Branches have been set forth below. Lack of information on any Area other than those indicated signifies that Security functions were as maintained previously:

(1) Berkeley Area (California) - The Operations CROSSROADS office was set up in Warehouse 2001, Oakland Army Base, from 1 April 1946 to 15 November 1946, under Captain R. J. Buettner. Colonel S.L. Warren was assigned as Chief, Radiological Safety Section. Personnel expansion and lack of operating space in Danner Laboratory resulted in the removal of the Security Office Administrative Staff to Warehouse 2001 in November, 1946. Lt. George B. Daniels was Intelligence and Security Officer. On 1 June, 1946, the Research Branch under Mr. Russell Ball was established as a sub-section of the Berkeley Area.

(2) Brookhaven Area (New York) - The Prime Contractor, Associated Universities, Incorporated, operating the Brookhaven National Laboratory, came into being officially in July 1946. At approximately the same time, Camp Upton, New York, was chosen for the site of the Laboratory. The Area was activated officially on 20 August 1946. The Madison Square Area handled the Security functions of Associated Universities, Incorporated, until October 1946. At that time the Brookhaven Area was set up to function semi-independently, although the Madison Square Area still retained primary responsibility. Keirn C. Brown was designated Chief of the Security and Intelligence Division.

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(3) Chicago Area (Illinois) - The Argonne National Laboratory became the prime contractor in the Chicago Area on 1 July 1946 succeeding the Metallurgical Laboratory, University of Chicago, whose contract expired on 30 June 1946. Mr. John H. Mahoney was appointed Chief, Security Division (See Appendix AS-12, S-13, S-14 and S-15).

(4) Clinton Engineer Works (Tennessee) - The Guard and Review Board Sections were separated from the Clinton Engineer Works Branch on 15 March 1946 and were combined with the Oak Ridge Police and Fire Departments, Military Police and Safety Section to form the Department of Public Safety.

The office of Director was occupied by Major Robert J. McLeod until 25 March 1946 when he was replaced by Lt. Col. David F. Shaw. Colonel Shaw was relieved by Col. Staunton L. Brown on 19 August 1946, and then served as Deputy Director. As a civilian, Mr. Shaw replaced Colonel Brown on 23 December 1946 and Colonel Brown was assigned the duty of Special Assistant to the District Engineer. Appendix AS-16, S-17, S-18, and S-19.

(5) Hanford Engineer Works (Washington) - On 1 September 1946, the E. I. du Pont de Nemours Company, Prime Contractor, completed its contract and the General Electric Company assumed responsibilities under a new contract. The fact that the same policies were retained assisted greatly in continuing security procedures and the change-over presented no difficult problem.

During the fall of 1946, the P-9 Project, Consolidated Mining

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and Smelting Company, Trail, British Columbia, Canada, became the responsibility of the Area Engineer, Hanford Engineer Works. Prior to that time, Lt. Col. E. T. Rogers, Deputy Area Engineer, Hanford Engineer Works had been designated Area Engineer for the P-9 Project. Coincident with the assumption of responsibility for the installation by Lt. Col. F. J. Clarke, the Security role of the Intelligence and Security Division at Hanford Engineer Works was clarified and the Intelligence and Security Officer, HEW, established security procedures at Trail which were somewhat similar to those in effect at HEW. Captain Pearl E. Mountjoy continued in the capacity of Intelligence and Security Officer at the Hanford Engineer Works.

(6) Los Angeles Area (California) - On 18 June 1946, the Los Angeles Area was placed under the jurisdiction of the Santa Fe Branch Office for purposes of Security and Intelligence. This placement was modified on 3 July 1946 to restore Security and Intelligence jurisdiction, with the exception of the State of Arizona, to the Los Angeles Area. Robert S. Killough served as Intelligence Officer until 1 November 1946 when he was relieved by 1st Lt. Clyde L. Burke.

(7) Madison Square Area (New York) - The Boston, New York, Columbia, Tonawanda, Rochester, Murray Hill, Wilmington, St. Louis, and Colorado Areas were merged into Madison Square Area on 1 April 1946. With the exception of the Rochester and St. Louis Areas, the sub-areas mentioned above were inactivated between 30 June and 31 October 1946. The St. Louis Area became a semi-independent area. (See Appendix AS-20).

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ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
U. S. Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

24 May 1946.

EIDMI

DISTRICT CIRCULAR LETTER (MI 46-13)

SUBJECT: Visitor Clearance.

TO: All Concerned.

1. Inclosed for your information and strict compliance is copy of letter from Major General L. F. Groves, dated 10 May 1946, reference EIDM WL-46r, subject as above.
2. In complying with paragraph 2 of that letter, requests for clearance for classified visits will be made through the following channels:
  - a. Requests initiated by contractors or their employees will be made through the appropriate Area Engineer or Operations Officer.
  - b. Area Engineers will forward requests directly to the Project Intelligence Officer, Washington, D. C.
  - c. Operations Officers at the Clinton Engineer Works will forward requests to the Clinton Engineer Works Intelligence Officer at District Headquarters.
3. Visitors for whom this special clearance is required include all persons visiting an installation (a plant, a laboratory, or an office) who are expected to have access to secret or top secret information, or are expected to be permitted entry into areas where such information might be obtained, except the following:
  - a. Employees and consultants regularly assigned to the installation, or specifically cleared for the installation.
  - b. Former employees returning as consultants on work not more comprehensive than encompassed in their original assignments.
  - c. Employees who visit the installation in line of normal duties, such as supervisors of groups of plants, etc.

~~RESTRICTED~~  
Exhibit AS-1

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJECT: Visitor Clearance.

24 May 1946.

4. All are enjoined against any attempt to circumvent the Visitor Control Program by arranging an unclassified visit for any individual, and, after his arrival at an installation, revealing to him classified information

5. All previous instructions in conflict herewith are rescinded.

For the District Engineer:

1 Incl.:  
Cy ltr fr Maj. Gen.  
L.F. Groves, 10 May 46.

*E. H. Marsden*  
E. H. MARSDEN,  
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,  
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

AE  
DH  
E

The following MI Circular Letters are still in effect; all others have been rescinded:

45-9	46-1
45-14	46-2
	46-5
	46-7 & Suppls. 1 & 2
	46-8
	46-9
	46-10
	46-11
	46-12

MAP DEPARTMENT

P. O. BOX 2610

WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

REFER TO FILE NO. EIDM WL-46r

10 May 1946

Subject: Visitor Clearance.

To: The District Engineer, Manhattan District, Oak Ridge, Tenn.  
The Commanding Officer, USEO, Santa Fe, New Mexico

1. Your attention is invited to Sec. VI, AF 38C-5, particularly paragraph 77a, concerning visitor clearance at military installations or contractors' establishments.

2. All visitors who might have access to "Secret" or "Top Secret" information will be cleared by the Washington Intelligence Office. This procedure is not applicable to visitors who are returning to the office of previous employment in consultant capacity on work not more comprehensive than previously embraced unless it is believed that a pertinent reason exists for a clearance on such an individual.

3. Attention is invited to the fact that a minimum of four working weeks in Washington is necessary to evaluate properly such requests for clearance. In emergency a telephonic request to the Washington Intelligence Office will result in expedited action on the request.

4. Reports rendered under the provisions of Sec. VI, AF 38C-5 will be submitted in duplicate to the Washington Intelligence Office with copy to District Headquarters.

5. Visitors Defined: Any person admitted to an installation who is not an employee regularly assigned to that installation is a visitor. Separate plants or offices regardless of location maintained by one contractor and engaged upon the same contract or contracts of identical nature may be considered as single installations and employees required to travel between these plants or locations in the performance of their duties will not be considered visitors in the sense of this letter.

/s/ L R Groves  
L. R. GROVES,  
Major General, U.S.A.

REPRODUCED: Manhattan District, 24 May 1946.

Inclosure to DC/L (MI 46-13), 27 May 1946.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
U. S. Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

12 June 1946.

EIDMI

DISTRICT CIRCULAR LETTER (MI 46-13) (Suppl. 1)

SUBJECT: Visitor Clearance.

TO: All Concerned.

The following message has been received from the Project Intelligence Officer for Major General L. R. Groves in clarification of policy regarding clearances of visitors and transfer of employees for the Manhattan Project. Any previous contradictory instructions are rescinded:

"Project Intelligence Office, Washington, D. C., must grant permission for all persons not employed by Manhattan Project to have access to classified information. Request for visitor clearance must contain sufficient background data to conduct a Central Files Check, must state reason for visit, and must state identity of person requesting the visit.

"Business visits of Manhattan employees and consultants to an installation other than where employed, if necessary for proper transaction of business, can be approved by the two Area Engineers concerned with the exception of visits to Site Y. All business visits to Site Y must be approved by Project Intelligence Office in Washington. Clearance requests for business visits to Site Y must include identifying data and derogatory information available, specific reason for visit and by whose request the visit is made.

"Requests for administrative clearance to transfer, permanently, employees from one installation to another or to reemploy at a different installation must be cleared by Project Intelligence Office in Washington. This request must include clearance date (when and where previously cleared and any derogatory information available); present job of employee, whether he is considered a key man and whether he has had access to highly classified information


~~RESTRICTED~~  
Exhibit AS-2

12 June 1946.

SUBJECT: Visitor Clearance.

at previous location.

"Military Personnel are considered employees as defined above."



E. E. KIRKPATRICK,  
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,  
Deputy District Engineer.

DISTRIBUTION:

AE  
DH  
E

The following MI Circular Letters are still in effect; all others have been rescinded:

- |       |                      |
|-------|----------------------|
| 45-9  | 46-1                 |
| 45-14 | 46-2                 |
|       | 46-5                 |
|       | 46-7 & Suppls. 1 & 2 |
|       | 46-8                 |
|       | 46-9                 |
|       | 46-10                |
|       | 46-11                |
|       | 46-12                |
|       | 46-13                |

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CORPS OF ENGINEERS  
Office of the District Engineer  
MANHATTAN DISTRICT  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

EIDMI

3 September 1946.

DISTRICT CIRCULAR LETTER (MI 47-1)

SUBJECT: Retention of Classified Matter by Individuals.

TO: All Concerned.

1. There have been attempts on the part of former employees of the District to take with them at the time of termination, classified technical reports, memoranda, etc. In some instances requests have been made subsequent to departure from the place of employment, to have such material forwarded to the terminated employee.

2. A terminated employee is not a person authorized to have classified District information, within the meaning of AR 380-5, and Paragraph 3 b, Section III, District Security Manual, dated 26 November 1945. Vigorous action will be taken by all concerned to prevent security violations of the type described in Paragraph 1.

3. The only individuals, other than employees of the District or its contractors, authorized to have in their personal possession classified District documents are those individuals who are legally retained by the District or its contractors as consultants. Such consultants will be reported through security channels and inspected as separate classified "facilities" of the District.

4. There may be instances in which an effort will be made by companies or individuals to have themselves established as consultants, in order to obtain classified District information for their own purposes. Those officials who execute or approve consulting contracts are responsible for carefully reviewing them to insure that no consultant contracts are approved wherein there is no genuine advantage to the District, or wherein the use of the consultant relationship as a means of obtaining classified information for ulterior purposes is discernible.

For the District Engineer:

  
CHARLES C. NOBLE,  
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,  
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

AE

DH

C

Security Division (50)

Exhibit AS-3

3 September 1946.

SUBJECT: Retention of Classified Matter by Individuals.

The following Military Intelligence Circular Letters are still in effect;  
all others have been rescinded:

45-9	46-1
45-14	46-2
	46-5
	46-7 & Suppls. 1 & 2
	46-8
	46-9
	46-10
	46-11
	46-12
	46-13 & Suppl. 1
	46-14

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
U. S. Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

18 June 1946.

EIDMI

DISTRICT CIRCULAR LETTER (MI 46-14)

SUBJECT: Jurisdictional Area - Security and Intelligence.

TO: All Concerned.

1. As concurred in by Project Intelligence Officer, the following geographical areas of responsibility for general security and intelligence matters are established:

a. The Washington Intelligence Office - Washington, D. C., Maryland, Virginia and West Virginia.

b. The Commanding Officer, Site Y - Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Oklahoma, California (south of 36° N. Lat.), Nevada (south of 37° N. Lat.) and Texas.

c. The Commanding Officer, CEW - Kentucky, Tennessee, N. Carolina, S. Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Arkansas and Louisiana.

d. Area Engineer, Madison Square Area - Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont.

e. Area Engineer, Chicago Area - Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Iowa, Indiana, Missouri, N. Dakota, S. Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas.

f. Area Engineer, HEW - Montana, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, and Wyoming.

g. Area Engineer, Berkeley - California (north of 36° N. Lat.), Nevada (north of 37° N. Lat.)

2. The office responsible for the administration of any contract is responsible for the security and intelligence pertaining to that contract. However, in the majority of cases where the contractor's installation is located outside of the jurisdictional area of the officer administering the contract as defined in paragraph 1, the routine security and intelligence

~~Exhibit 98-4~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

18 June 1946.

SUBJECT: Jurisdictional Area, Security and Intelligence.

functions at that installation can be performed by the Area Engineer responsible for the geographical area in which the contractor is located. Arrangements of this nature will be made by mutual agreement between the officers concerned as follows:

a. The officer responsible for administration of a contract will initiate such a request, stating:

- (1) Designation of Contractor.
- (2) Location and Description of Installation.
- (3) Nature of Work.
- (4) The Security Classification.

b. In the event that the Area Engineer having geographical jurisdiction of the area in which the installation is located, accepts the routine security and intelligence functions thereof, the originating office and the District Security Officer will be so notified. In the event the Area Engineer having geographical jurisdiction considers it inadvisable for him to perform such security and intelligence functions, the request of the originating office will be indorsed to the District Engineer for decision, indicating reasons for not desiring to accept these functions.

c. An Area Engineer who has assumed routine security and intelligence functions at such an installation will inform the office of origin of any incidents or pertinent matters other than routine that develop at any time during the period of the contract.

3. The procedure enumerated above, even though pertaining specifically to security at contractors installations, is applicable to investigative cases.

4. Attached is a map showing geographical areas of responsibility, as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

For the District Engineer:

*David F. Shaw*

DAVID F. SHAW,  
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,  
Assistant.

1 Incl.:  
Map - Geographical areas of  
Responsibility.

DISTRIBUTION:

- AE
- S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18 June 1946.

**SUBJECT:** Jurisdictional Area, Security and Intelligence.

The following MI Circular Letters are still in effect; all others have been rescinded;

- |       |                      |
|-------|----------------------|
| 45-9  | 46-1                 |
| 45-14 | 46-2                 |
|       | 46-5                 |
|       | 46-7 & Suppls. 1 & 2 |
|       | 46-8                 |
|       | 46-9                 |
|       | 46-10                |
|       | 46-11                |
|       | 46-12                |
|       | 46-13 & Suppl. 1     |

~~RESTRICTED~~  
ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
United States Engineer Office  
Manhattan District

EIDMI-30

12 February 1946.

DISTRICT CIRCULAR LETTER (MI 46-7)(Suppl. 2)

Subject: Security Manual Revisions.

To: All Concerned.

Reference is made to District Security Manual, dated 26 November 1945, transmitted with District Circular Letter (MI 46-7). Paragraph 5, Section III-B is amended to simplify the disposition of classified records in completion or termination proceedings of contracts. The amendment, which is attached hereto, will be effective immediately.

For the District Engineer:

R. J. McLEOD,  
Major, Corps of Engineers,  
Acting Chief, Security Division.

- 1 Incl.:  
Paragraph 5, Section III-B  
Amended.

Distribution:  
AE, DH and S

The following MI Circular Letters are still in effect; all others have been rescinded:

- 45-9
- 46-1
- 46-2
- 46-5
- 46-7
- 46-7 (Suppl. 1)
- 46-8
- 46-9

Exhibit AS-5

Section III-B

5. Disposition of Classified Records:

a. In order to preserve the security of the project, it is desirable to relieve contractors of as much classified material as possible. It is realized that the ability of the contracting officer to relieve the contractor of drawings, designs, prints, memoranda and other documents is, in many cases, contingent upon contract provisions, obligations imposed by law with respect to war contracts requiring the contractor to retain records, and the desire of the contractor to retain them or place them in the custody of the District Engineer.

b. The classified records possessed by the contractor will fall into the three categories set forth below and shall be handled in accordance with the instructions set forth for each category:

(1) Classified material which the contracting officer or Area Engineer will require for their records, including material title to which is vested in the government by the terms of the contract, (including drawings, designs, specifications, technical data, research reports, and similiar material;) and copies of such classified material which have been furnished to the contractor by the government or copies made or otherwise obtained by the contractor (except such copies specifically approved by the contracting officer for retention by the contractor).

The above items should be screened by the contracting officer and unnecessary and duplicate copies destroyed to avoid the accumulation of unnecessary records for dead storage. The contracting officer will then instruct the contractor:

(a) That copies of research reports prepared and transmitted officially under a research contract or copies of research reports issued to the contractor should be forwarded to the District Research Division.

(b) To forward to the contracting officer all other records of this category.

(c) That a summary of the material referred to in (a) and (b) above be prepared in duplicate indicating the nature of the documents and the information contained therein.

(d) That the transportation or records should be in accordance with instructions set forth in Section III-A, Paragraph 8 h of this manual.

~~SECRET~~

Section III-B

One copy of the summary referred to in (c) above will be for the files of the contracting officer and one copy will be included in the Security Completion Report forwarded to the District Engineer.

(2) Classified material which the contractor will retain for the period required by law with respect to war contracts, or which he is entitled to retain by contract provisions.

The contracting officer will instruct the contractor:

(a) Of the penalties prescribed by the Espionage Act for the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

(b) That classification of any documents, drawings, etc., retained by him will be maintained until such time as the contracting officer shall notify the contractor that classification is reduced or cancelled.

(c) That the contractor shall furnish the contracting officer a statement in duplicate to the effect that he understands and agrees to the provisions of (a) and (b) above.

(d) That the contractor will prepare in duplicate a summary describing the type and amount of material and nature of the information contained therein which is being retained by the contractor indicating their location, classification and the safeguards taken to protect the security thereof, as well as the persons having custody of the material. This summary should be sufficiently detailed to furnish a clear picture of the extent and type of information retained by the contractor. If Top Secret documents are retained, these documents should be listed individually in the summary.

The original of both the statement required in (c) above and the summary required in (d) above will be retained in the files of the contracting officer. The duplicate will be attached to the Security Completion Report.

(3) Classified material which the contractor is required by law or permitted by contract to retain, but which because of its secrecy the contracting officer and contractor agree should be held in custody for the contractor by the District Record Retirement Section

The contracting officer will instruct the contractor:

~~SECRET~~

Section III-B

(a) That the contractor shall furnish the contracting officer with a list in triplicate itemizing, in the order in which they are being packaged, the papers, documents, etc., to be transmitted to the Record Retirement Unit for custody and for which the contractor may have future use.

(b) That each container should have affixed thereto an index of its contents i.e., by folder, drawer, binder, etc., to afford a key to the contents thereof.

(c) That parcels will be addressed to the District Engineer, Attention: Record Retirement Unit; that transportation of records shall be in accordance with instructions set forth in Section III-A, Paragraph 8 h of this manual.

Two copies of the inventory referred to in (a) above will be for the files of the contracting officer (one copy of which is to be included in the Area Engineer's Security Completion Report), and one copy transmitted to the Record Retirement Unit when the material is forwarded.

c. All classified documents, drawings, etc., pertaining to a subcontractor will be handled in accordance with the above prescribed procedure and the prime contractor will be responsible to the contracting officer for carrying out these requirements.

d. In connection with the disposition of records, reference is made to District Circular Letter (Adm. 46-4), dated 22 October 1945.

~~SECRET~~  
ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
U. S. Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

21 June 1946.

EIDMI

DISTRICT CIRCULAR LETTER (MI 46-1) (Suppl. 1).

SUBJECT: Accounting for TOP SECRET Documents.

TO: All Concerned.

Pending revision of the Security Manual the following modifications are made in the procedure for keeping records of TOP SECRET documents. Subparagraphs 8 a and c, District Circular Letter (MI 46-1), dated 26 July 1945, are rescinded, and the procedures outlined in subparagraphs 8 a and c as shown below are substituted therefor.

8. ACCOUNTING.

a. In order to positively ascertain the whereabouts of every TOP SECRET document, a complete inventory will be made as of 30 June 1946, of TOP SECRET documents in possession of all TOP SECRET authenticating offices of the District. As of the same date, a complete report of all documents that have been authenticated to that date by every TOP SECRET authenticating officer will be prepared. Both reports will be submitted as soon as practical to the District Security Officer, who is the designated TOP SECRET control officer for the Manhattan District. After the initial reports have been submitted as of 30 June 1946, physical inventory of documents will be taken and reported as of the 30th of June and the 31st of December of each year, and the report of documents authenticated will be kept current by means of a monthly report as described in paragraph 8 c below.

- (1) In cases where a former TOP SECRET authenticating office has become inactive, the present custodian of the TOP SECRET records of that office will take action and make reports outlined herein.
- (2) Each TOP SECRET document authenticated since 1 August 1945 has been given an identification number as shown in the following example (procedure in effect since 1 August 1945):

~~SECRET~~  
Exhibit AS-6

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
SUBJECT: Accounting for TOP SECRET Documents.

21 June 1946.

Identification No. XX - 12 - 1 a

Wherein: XX is the authenticating office code number,  
12 is the document serial number of that office, and  
1 a is the copy and series number.

- (3) Each TOP SECRET document authenticated before 1 August 1945 will be assigned an identification number by the present authenticating officer at the time of his inventory, as shown in the following example:

Identification No. U - 12 - XX - 1 a

U is an arbitrary symbol indicating authentication prior to 1 August 1945.

12 is the document serial number,  
XX is the authenticating office code number, and  
1 a is the copy and series number.

- (4) Authenticating officers will notify persons having copies of TOP SECRET documents of new identification numbers established at time of inventory, as described in subparagraph 8 a, (3),
- (5) All inclosures classifiable as TOP SECRET, whether or not covered by a letter of transmittal, will be authenticated and considered as separate documents bearing the office code number, document number, and series number.
- (6) Complete records of all TOP SECRET documents will be kept by each authenticating officer and will include the following:
- (a) Description number of the TOP SECRET document.
  - (b) Identification number of the TOP SECRET document (as explained in subparagraphs 2 and 3 above).
  - (c) Date of authentication and name of authenticating officer.
  - (d) Number of copies and reproductions made.
  - (e) Disposition of each copy.

SUBJECT: Accounting for TOP SECRET Documents.

21 June 1946.

Example:

XX-26, 1 a sent to Dr. John Doe, 18 May 1946.  
XX-26, 2 a sent to VII, 18 May 1946.  
XX-26, 3 a retained.

\* \* \* \* \*

c. Each authenticating officer will report to the District Engineer (Attention: District Security Officer) at the end of each month:

- (1) List of TOP SECRET documents authenticated for the month covered by the report, including all data recorded as provided in Paragraph 8 above.
- (2) A list of TOP SECRET documents received, transmitted, destroyed, or reclassified, for the monthly period identified by the complete document number, date of action taken, and office or individual involved.

Example:

XL - 50 - 3 a received from XXI, 18 May 1946.  
U - 43 - IX - 2 b transmitted to XV, 22 May 1946.  
XX - 21 - 2 a sent to Dr. John Doe, 28 May 1946.  
U - 27 - XIII - 3 a destroyed by Maj. Joe Doaks,  
29 May 1946.  
XVI - 33 - 1 a reclassified to "Secret" by Col.  
James Roe, 31 May 1946.  
XVI - 33 - 2 a reclassified to "Secret" by Col.  
James Roe, 31 May 1946.  
XVI - 33 - 3 a reclassified to "Secret" by Col.  
James Roe, 31 May 1946.

- (3) Negative reports will be submitted.

For the District Engineer:

*E. H. Marsden*

E. H. MARSDEN,  
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,  
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

AE  
H  
S

SUBJECT: Accounting for TOP SECRET Documents.

21 June 1946.

The following MI Circular Letters are still in effect; all others have been rescinded;

45-9	46-1	46-9
45-14	46-2	46-10
	46-5	46-11
	46-7 & Suppls. 1 & 2	46-12
	46-8	46-13 & Suppl. 1

~~RESTRICTED~~

ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
U. S. Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

15 May 1946.

EIDMI

DISTRICT CIRCULAR LETTER (MI 46-12)

SUBJECT: Classification of Manhattan District Information.

TO: All Concerned.

1. Pending revision of District Security Manual, the following is published for the guidance of all concerned. District Bulletin, Subject: Reclassification of Manhattan District Information, dated 25 October 1945, is rescinded.

2. For purpose of classification and declassification, all Manhattan District information will be considered as either "Technical and Scientific" or "Non-Technical":

a. Technical and Scientific. Defined as factual data relating to natural sciences and engineering including; research of any kind mathematics, physics and chemistry of processes, design of plants and equipment, process and production techniques, plant operation, etc.

b. Non-Technical. Defined as any information not described above.

3. Classification.

a. Technical and Scientific information will be classified in accordance with the provisions of the Security Manual and AR 380-5; the examples cited in the manual being used as the guide for proper degree of classification. The Manual for the Declassification of Scientific and Technical Matters (See District Circular Letter (D & P 46-1) will not be used as a classification guide.

b. Non-Technical information will also be classified in accordance with the Security Manual and AR 380-5. In general, only the following Non-Technical information will be classified;

- (1) Matter concerning procurement of raw materials.
- (2) Matter revealing overall future plans.
- (3) Matter pertaining to Intelligence and vital security activities such as shipment of classified matter.

Exhibit AS-7

15 May 1946.

SUBJECT: Classification of Manhattan District Information.

- (4) Matter revealing production and capacity of plants.
- (5) Matter, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the interests of, or cause embarrassment, to the Government.

4. Declassification.

a. Technical and Scientific information will be declassified as provided in Manual for the Declassification of Scientific and Technical Matters.

b. Non-Technical information may be declassified by any officer having the authority to classify similar information. Officer declassifying non-technical information will verify the fact that no scientific and technical matter is contained therein, obtaining the advice of technically qualified personnel if necessary for such verification.

5. Public Release.

a. Public release of declassified Technical and Scientific Information will be accomplished as set forth in Manual for the Declassification of Scientific and Technical Matters.

b. Non-Technical information intended for publication will be cleared by District Public Relations Officer prior to publication. Reprints, digests and extracts for publication, speeches and the like that draw all of their content from sources already officially released, or embrace only information previously officially released, need not be cleared by District Public Relations Officer prior to publication, but copies of such matter will be forwarded to District Public Relations Officer for record purposes, insofar as possible.

For the District Engineer:

*E. H. Marsden*  
E. H. MARSDEN,  
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,  
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

AE

DH

The following MI Circular Letters are still in effect; all others have been rescinded:

45-9	46-1	46-7 & Suppl. 1 & 2	46-10
45-14	46-2	46-8	46-11
	46-5	46-9	

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CORPS OF ENGINEERS  
Office of the District Engineer  
MANHATTAN DISTRICT  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

EIDMI

5 September 1946.

DISTRICT CIRCULAR LETTER (MI 47-2)

SUBJECT: Availability of Classified Documents to State and Federal Agencies.


TO: All Concerned.

1. Fiscal documents of a classification of RESTRICTED may properly be made available to representatives of State and Federal Agencies authorized by statute to have access to such documents. Under such conditions, and for such purposes, State and Federal Agencies and/or their accredited representatives will be considered as persons duly authorized to have access to RESTRICTED Manhattan District information, within the meaning of Paragraph 2 h, Section III, Security Manual, dated 26 November 1945, and Paragraph 8, AR 380-5, dated 6 March 1946.

2. Should accredited representatives of State or Federal Agencies request access to documents classified higher than RESTRICTED, application will be made to the Area Engineer to downgrade the documents concerned. The Area Engineer or his authorized representative will review the document concerned and downgrade them to RESTRICTED where such downgrading is consistent with the provisions of the Security Manual and District Circular Letter (MI 46-12) after which the provisions of Paragraph 1 will be applicable. In general documents which may be downgraded to RESTRICTED are those originally classified solely to conceal the connection between the contractor and the Manhattan District and where such connection is now a matter of general knowledge. Vouchers, invoices and other documents containing information that should retain a higher classification than RESTRICTED will not, of course, be downgraded.

3. Area Engineers will bring the contents of this letter to the attention of all contractors, and will request its dissemination to all tiers of subcontractors.

For the District Engineer:



CHARLES C. NOBLE,  
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,  
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

AE  
DH  
E  
Security Division (50)

Exhibit AS-8

3 September 1946.

SUBJECT: Availability of Classified Documents to State and Federal Agencies.

The following Military Intelligence Circular Letters are still in effect; all others have been rescinded:

45-9	46-1	47-1
45-14	46-2	
	46-5	
	46-7 & Suppls. 1 & 2	
	46-8	
	46-9	
	46-10	
	46-11	
	46-12	
	46-13 & Suppl. 1	
	46-14	

~~SECRET~~  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CORPS OF ENGINEERS  
Office of the District Engineer  
MANHATTAN DISTRICT  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

EIDMI

4 December 1946.

DISTRICT CIRCULAR LETTER (MI 47-4)

SUBJECT: Collection of Information on Foreign Purchases of Classified Material from Manhattan District Contractors.

TO: All Concerned.

1. District Circular Letter (MI 46-11), dated 10 April 1946, subject as above, is rescinded.

2. Many reports are being received concerning attempted purchases of, or requests for quotations on, classified materials or equipment from Manhattan District contractors. In some cases inquiries have been made concerning materials or equipment that might well be used in the atomic energy programs of foreign nations, and some of the inquiries have come from foreign agents.

3. It is essential that all such information be reported immediately to the Washington office. Consequently, any reports coming to the attention of your offices which indicate attempts by unauthorized persons, particularly by foreign or possible foreign purchasers, to acquire material or equipment identical with or similar to classified Manhattan District material or equipment will be forwarded directly to The Commanding General, P. O. Box 2610, Washington, D. C. Attention: Major Alton P. Donnell. Direct communication will be used. Preliminary information will be given by telephone whenever prompt notification is deemed advisable.

*E. E. Kirkpatrick*  
E. E. KIRKPATRICK,  
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,  
Deputy District Engineer.

DISTRIBUTION:

AE

H

Security Division (20)

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

Exhibit AS-9

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~ NO. \_\_\_\_\_ OF SERIES A

4 December 1946.

SUBJECT: Collection of Information on Foreign Purchases of Classified Material from Manhattan District Contractors.

The following Military Intelligence Circular Letters are still in effect; all others have been rescinded:

- |       |                      |      |
|-------|----------------------|------|
| 45-9  | 46-1 & Suppl. 1      | 47-1 |
| 45-14 | 46-2                 | 47-2 |
|       | 46-5                 | 47-3 |
|       | 46-7 & Suppls. 1 & 2 |      |
|       | 46-8                 |      |
|       | 46-9                 |      |
|       | 46-10                |      |
|       | 46-12                |      |
|       | 46-13 & Suppl. 1     |      |
|       | 46-14                |      |

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CORPS OF ENGINEERS  
Office of the District Engineer  
MANHATTAN DISTRICT  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

EIDMI

20 November 1946.

DISTRICT CIRCULAR LETTER (MI 47-3)

SUBJECT: Photographing, Sketching, Mapping, etc., of Defensive Installations.

TO: All Concerned.

1. Reference is made to WD Memorandum No. 380-5-3, dated 7 October 1946.
2. These instructions are applicable to all places subject to the jurisdiction of the Manhattan District.
3. The Chief, Department of Public Safety, CEV; Commanding Officers, Area Engineers, and Unit Chiefs of K-25, Y-12 and X-10, will establish procedures and issue the necessary instructions to all concerned within their respective areas to insure the enforcement of the Presidential Executive Order as outlined in AR 380-10.
4. Photographs, maps and sketches outside of fenced restricted areas are authorized, such as:
  - a. Commercial Establishments.
  - b. Housing Units.
  - c. General Town Layouts.
  - d. Grounds, Entrances and Open Areas.
  - e. Any Individual or Groups of Individuals.
  - f. Any Ceremony, Military or Civilian.
5. District Circular Letter (P.S. 43-15), dated 23 October 1942, subject: Regulations under Public Law 627 (Photographs, etc., of Public Works) is hereby rescinded.

For the District Engineer:

*E. H. Marsden*  
E. H. MARSDEN,  
Executive.

DISTRIBUTION:

AE  
DH

Exhibit AS-10

20 November 1946

SUBJECT: Photographing, Sketching, Mapping, etc., of Defensive Installations.

The following Military Intelligence Circular Letters are still in effect; all others have been rescinded:

45-9	46-1	47-1
45-14	46-2	47-2
	46-5	
	46-7 & Suppls. 1 & 2	
	46-8	
	46-9	
	46-10	
	46-11	
	46-12	
	46-13 & Suppl. 1	
	46-14	

ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
U. S. Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

1 March 1946.

EIDMI

DISTRICT CIRCULAR LETTER (MI 46-10)

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Intelligence and Security Functions.

TO: All Concerned.

1. Reference is made to District Circular Letter (MI 46-5) dated 4 September 1945, Subject: Separation of Intelligence and Security Functions.
2. Effective 7 March 1946 all Intelligence and Security activities within the respective areas will be the responsibility of Area Engineers. As indicated in paragraph 5 of the above referred to letter, this responsibility will include conducting investigations of subversive allegations against project personnel, sabotage and major SMI violations. Where a Branch Intelligence or Security Office has in the past conducted activities concerning an area office other than the area with which the branch office is being combined, the area taking over the branch will continue all such activities until by mutual agreement between the Area Engineers concerned and approved by the District Engineer he is relieved of such responsibilities.
3. The following combinations of the principal Intelligence Offices will be affected:  

New York Office to the Area Engineer, Madison Square Area  
Chicago Office to the Area Engineer, Chicago Area  
Berkeley Office to the Area Engineer, Berkeley Area  
Pasadena Office to the Area Engineer, Los Angeles Area
4. Such personnel as may be available in Branch Intelligence and/or Security Offices will be transferred to the local Area Engineer's staff to assist him in performing these additional functions. All records will be transferred to the Area Engineers concerned.
5. Reports concerning Intelligence matters will be forwarded by Area Engineers to The Commanding General, Attention: Captain Fred B. Rhodes, with information copies to the District Engineer, Attention: District Security Officer.

Exhibit AS-11

1 March 1946.

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Intelligence and Security Functions.

6. Area Engineers may request other Area Engineers to conduct investigations and furnish investigative reports. Copies of these reports will be furnished the District Engineer, Attention: District Security Officer, and The Commanding General, Attention: Captain Fred B. Rhodes!

*E. E. Kirkpatrick*  
E. E. KIRKPATRICK,  
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,  
Deputy District Engineer.

DISTRIBUTION:

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The following MI Circular Letters are still in effect; all others have been rescinded:

45-9      46-1  
          46-2  
          46-5  
          46-7 & Suppl. 1 & 2  
          46-8  
          46-9

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~  
SECURITY DIVISION

Supervises Manhattan District Intelligence and Security activities in North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana and Ohio.

1st Lt. J. H. Mahoney  
1 CAF-4 Clerk-Steno. (Partial)  
1 CAF-4 Clerk (Partial)

## PERSONNEL

OFFICERS	7
ENL	2
P	
S P	
CAF	12
CPC	18
MISCL	
VAC	2
TOTAL	40

INTELLIGENCE SECTION

Responsible for all intelligence and counter intelligence activities. Supervises all investigations made by the Chicago Area Office as office of origin and for other Area Security Offices in the Manhattan District. Supervises activities of Centerline Area Section.

1st Lt. R. W. Collins  
C. L. Shaping, Jr., S/A  
2 CAF-4 Clerk-Steno. (Partial)  
1 CAF-4 Clerk (Partial)  
2 CAF-3 Clerk-Steno. (Vac.)

FILE SECTION

Responsible for administration and maintenance of all Security Division files.

Miss E. D. Herre CAF-4 Clerk-Steno. (Partial)  
1 CAF-3 Clerk-Steno.  
1 CAF-3 Clerk

CENTERLINE AREA

Handles all Security Division activities at the office of the Centerline Area Resident Engineer (a Site Y installation) as well as those within the State of Michigan.

W. J. McElreath, S/A

SHIPMENT SECURITY SECTION

Responsible for all guarded shipments of NED materials originating in the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Service Commands while enroute from point of origin to ultimate destination; makes shipment surveys within the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Service Commands; handles all courier movements either originating out of this office or trans-shipment courier movements; transmits top secret documents and materials from Chicago to their ultimate destinations.

1st Lt. D. A. Metzger  
1st Lt. T. D. Guilfoyle  
1st Lt. H. Koranda  
1st Lt. R. G. Madson  
1 CAF-5 Clerk  
1 CAF-3 Clerk-Steno.  
13 CPC-7 Patrolman  
4 CPC-8 Patrolman

TRANSPORTATION UNIT

Responsible for safe operating condition of those vehicles assigned to Shipment Security Section; delivers mail between Shipment Security Section and Chicago Area Office; makes daily scheduled trips to Post Office.

Mr. R. Watson CPC-4 Chauffeur (Mech. Rep.)

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECTION

Responsible for sending and receiving all classified and unclassified teletype messages. Responsible for cryptographic security pursuant to AR 300-5 in transmission and reception of messages.

Miss E. M. Popovits CAF-4 Teletype Operator

PERSONNEL CLEARANCE & VISITOR CONTROL SECTION

Responsible for personnel and firm clearance, clearance of transfers on personnel employed on NED work for Chicago Area, Site Y and related installations. Administers the issuance of visitor permits for intra-District visits; maintains close liaison with Contractors in visitor control; keeps record of visitors; reports to District Office on foreign visitors.

1st Lt. B. M. Fry  
1 CAF-4 Clerk-Steno.  
1 CAF-3 Clerk-Typist  
Mrs. H. M. Brown CAF-4 Clerk-Steno.  
1 CAF-3 Clerk-Steno.

PLANT SECURITY SECTION

Responsible for inspection of all facilities engaged in NED work under Chicago Area contracts. Writes reports for transmission to District Office on inspections. Makes recommendations for improvement of security conditions at each installation when deemed necessary.

1st Lt. B. M. Fry  
1 CAF-4 Clerk-Steno. (Partial)

EXHIBIT AS-12

ORGANIZATION CHART  
MANHATTAN DISTRICT

UNIT Security Division, Chicago Area

SUBMITTED *John H. Jones* DATE 4-1-46

RECOMMENDED DATE

APPROVED *L. L. ...* DATE 5/1/46

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

**SECURITY DIVISION**

Supervises Manhattan District Intelligence and Security activities in North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana and Ohio.

- Mr. J. E. Mahoney CAP-12 Security & Intelligence Officer  
 1 CAP-11 Investigator (Sec. & Intel.) (New)  
 1 CAP-4 Clerk-Steno.  
 1 CAP-4 Clerk

PERSONNEL

OFFICERS 4  
 ENL .....  
 P .....  
 SP .....  
 CAP 14  
 CPC 19  
 MISCL .....  
 VAC .....  
 New .....  
 TOTAL 63

**SHIPMENT SECURITY SECTION**

Responsible for all guarded shipments of MED materials originating in the Fifth Army when enroute from point of origin to ultimate destination; makes shipment surveys within the Fifth Army; handles all courier movements; transmits Top Secret documents and materials from Chicago to their ultimate destinations.

- 2nd Lt. T. L. Atan  
 2nd Lt. E. E. Doty  
 1st Lt. R. G. Madan  
 1 CAP-5 Clerk  
 1 CAP-3 Clerk-Steno.  
 4 CFC-6 Patrolman  
 14 CFC-7 Patrolman  
 1 CFC-4 Chauffeur (Mech. Rep.)

**INVESTIGATIVE SECTION**

Responsible for all intelligence and counter intelligence activities. Supervises and conducts all investigations made by the Chicago Area Office as office of origin and for other Area Security Offices in the Manhattan District. Supervises activities of Resident Security Officer in Centerline Area.

- Mr. D. J. Harley CAP-11 Investigator (Sec. & Intel.)  
 2 CAP-10 Investigator (Sec. & Intel.) (New)  
 3 CAP-4 Clerk-Steno. (Partial)  
 S. Gelber, S/A  
 C. C. Castiglione, S/A

**FILE AND MAILING SECTION**

Responsible for administration and maintenance of all Security Division files. Responsible for collection and dispatch of all Security Division mail. Keeps pending mail system for Security Division. Screens current newspapers for news pertinent to security of Chicago Area.

- 1 CAP-4 Clerk-Steno. (Partial)  
 1 CAP-3 Clerk-Steno.  
 1 CAP-3 Clerk

**PLANT SECURITY SECTION**

Responsible for inspection of all facilities engaged in MED work under Chicago Area prime and sub-contracts. Writes reports for transmission to District Office on inspections. Makes recommendations for improvement of security conditions at each installation when deemed necessary. Responsible for contract termination security surveys.

- 2 CAP-4 Clerk-Steno. (Partial)

**PERSONNEL CLEARANCE SECTION**

Responsible for personnel and firm clearances, clearance for transfers on personnel employed on MED work for Chicago Area, Site Y and related installations.

- 2 CAP-4 Clerk-Steno. (Partial)  
 1 CAP-3 Clerk-Steno.

**CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECTION**

Responsible for sending and receiving all classified and unclassified teletype messages. Responsible for cryptographic security pursuant to AR 380-5 in transmission and reception of messages.

- 1st Lt. E. S. Phillips  
 1 CAP-4 Teletype Operator  
 1 CAP-4 Clerk-Steno. (Partial)  
 1 CAP-3 Clerk (Partial)

**VISITOR CONTROL SECTION**

Administers the issuance of visitor permits for intra-District visits; maintains close liaison with Contractors in visitor control; keeps records of visitors; reports to District Office on foreign visitors.

- 1 CAP-4 Clerk-Steno. (Partial)

EXHIBIT AS-13

**ORGANIZATION CHART  
 MANHATTAN DISTRICT**

UNIT SECURITY DIVISION, CHICAGO AREA  
 SUBMITTED *Archie...* DATE 7-1-66  
 RECOMMENDED *Archie...* DATE 7/1/66  
 APPROVED *William Dwyer* DATE 7/1/66

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

SECURITY DIVISION

Supervises Manhattan District Security and Intelligence activities in North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana and Ohio.

Mr. J. H. Mahoney, CAP-12 Security & Intel. Officer  
 1 CAP-11 Investigator (Intel. & Sec.)  
 1 CAP-4 Clerk-Steno.

PERSONNEL	
OFFICERS	4
ENL	
P	
S P	
CAP	14
CPC	19
MISCL.	
VAC.	2
TOTAL	39

VISITOR CONTROL SECTION BRANCH

Administers the issuance of visitor permits to Intra-District visitors; maintains close liaison with Contractors in visitor control; keeps records of visitors; reports to District Office on foreign visitors.

Mr. J. J. Lamm, CAP-11 Investigator (Intel. & Sec.)  
 1 CAP-4 Clerk-Steno. (Partial)

PLANT SECURITY SECTION BRANCH

Responsible for inspection of all facilities engaged in MED work under Chicago Area prime and sub-contracts. Writes reports for transmission to District Office on inspections. Makes recommendations for improvement of security conditions at each installation when deemed necessary. Responsible for contract termination security surveys.

Mr. E. W. Healy, CAP-10 Investigator (Sec. & Intel.)  
 1 CAP-4 Clerk-Steno.

MAIL & FILE SECTION

Responsible for administration and maintenance of all Security Division files. Responsible for collection and dispatch of all Security Division mail. Keeps pending mail system for Security Division. Screens current newspapers for news pertinent to security of Chicago Area.

Miss E. Berro, CAP-4 Clerk-Steno.  
 1 CAP-3 Clerk-Steno. (Vac.)  
 1 CAP-3 Clerk (Partial)

INVESTIGATIVE SECTION BRANCH

Responsible for all intelligence and counter-intelligence activities. Supervises and conducts all investigations made by the Chicago Area Office as office of origin and for other Area Security Offices in the Manhattan District. Supervises activities of Resident Security Officer in Centerline Area.

Mr. D. J. Harley CAP-11 Intel. & Sec. Officer  
 1 CAP-10 Investigator (Intel. & Sec.)  
 1 CAP-4 Clerk-Steno. (Vac.)  
 1 CAP-4 Clerk-Steno. (Partial)

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECTION BRANCH

Responsible for sending all classified and unclassified teletype messages. Responsible for cryptographic security pursuant to AR 380-5 in transmission and reception of messages.

1st Lt. H. S. Phillips  
 1 CAP-4 Teletype Operator  
 1 CAP-4 Clerk-Steno. (Partial)  
 1 CAP-3 Clerk (Partial)

SHIPMENT SECURITY SECTION

Responsible for all guarded shipments of MED materials originating in the Fifth Army when enroute from point of origin to ultimate destination; makes shipment surveys within the Fifth Army; handles all courier movements; transmits top secret documents and materials from Chicago to their ultimate destinations.

2nd Lt. T. L. Aten  
 2nd Lt. H. E. Doty  
 1st Lt. E. F. Dinsie  
 1 CAP-5 Clerk  
 4 CPO-8 Patrolman  
 14 CPO-7 Patrolman  
 1 CPC-4 Chauffeur (Mech. Dep.)

PERSONNEL CLEARANCE SECTION BRANCH

Responsible for personnel and firm clearance for transfers on personnel employed on MED work for Chicago Area, Site Y and related installations.

Mr. J. J. Lamm CAP-11 Investigator (Intel. & Sec.)  
 2 CAP-4 Clerk-Steno. (1 partial)  
 1 CAP-3 Clerk-Steno.

EXHIBIT AS-14

ORGANIZATION CHART  
 MANHATTAN DISTRICT

UNIT SECURITY DIVISION, CHICAGO AREA

SUBMITTED *William H. ...* DATE 10-1-46

RECOMMENDED DATE

APPROVED *W. C. ...* DATE 10-1-46

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~RESTRICTED~~  
SECURITY DIVISION

Supervises Manhattan District Security and Intelligence activities in North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana and Ohio.

Chief - Sec. & Intel. Officer, CAF-12, Chic. 250  
(Mr. J. H. Mahoney)  
1 Investigator (Intel. & Sec.), CAF-11  
2 Clerk-Steno., CAF-4 (1a)

PERSONNEL

OFFICERS	3
ENL.	
P	
S.P	
CAF	17
CPC	19
MISCL	
VAC.	1
TOTAL	40

VISITOR CONTROL BRANCH

Administers the issuance of visitor permits to intra District visitors; maintains close liaison with Contractors in visitor control; keeps records of visitors; reports to District Office on foreign visitors.

Chief - Investigator (Intel. & Sec.), CAF-11, Chic. 294  
(Mr. J. J. Lannon)  
1 Clerk-Steno., CAF-4 (Partial)

PLANT SECURITY BRANCH

Responsible for inspection of all facilities engaged in MED work under Chicago Area prime and sub-contracts. Writes reports for transmission to District Office on inspections. Makes recommendations for improvement of security conditions at each installation when deemed necessary. Responsible for contract termination security surveys.

Chief - Investigator (Sec. & Intel.), CAF-10, Chic. 350  
(Mr. E. W. Healy)  
1 (V) Clerk-Steno., CAF-4 (NR) \*\*

MAIL & FILE BRANCH

Responsible for administration and maintenance of all Security Division files. Responsible for collection and dispatch of all Security Division mail. Keeps pending mail system for Security Division. Screens current newspapers for news pertinent to security of Chicago Area.

Chief - Clerk-Steno., CAF-4, Chic. 35 (Partial)  
(Miss E. D. Berro)  
1 Clerk-Typist, CAF-3  
1 Clerk, CAF-3 (Partial)

INVESTIGATIVE BRANCH

Responsible for all intelligence and counter-intelligence activities. Supervises and conducts all investigations made by the Chicago Area Office as office of origin and for other Area Security Offices in the Manhattan District. Supervises activities of Resident Security Officer in Centerline Area.

Chief - Intel. & Sec. Officer, CAF-11, Chic. 293  
(Mr. D. J. Harley)  
1 Investigator (Intel. & Sec.), CAF-10  
1 Clerk-Steno., CAF-4 (Partial)  
1 Clerk-Steno., CAF-3

CRYPTOGRAPHIC BRANCH

Responsible for sending all classified and unclassified teletype messages. Responsible for cryptographic security pursuant to AR 380-5 in transmission and reception of messages.

Chief - 1st Lt. H. B. Phillips, Cryptographic Officer  
1 Teletype Operator, CAF-4  
1 Clerk-Steno., CAF-4 (Partial)  
1 Clerk, CAF-3 (Partial)

SHIPMENT SECURITY BRANCH

Responsible for all guarded shipments of MED materials originating in the Fifth Army when enroute from point of origin to ultimate destination; makes shipment surveys within the Fifth Army; handles all courier movements; transmits top secret documents and materials from Chicago to their ultimate destinations.

Chief - 1st Lt. T. L. Atom  
1st Lt. H. K. Doty  
1 Clerk, CAF-6  
1 Clerk-Typist, CAF-4  
4 Patrolman, CPC-8  
14 Patrolman, CPC-7  
1 Chauffeur (Mech. Exp.), CPC-4

PERSONNEL CLEARANCE BRANCH

Responsible for personnel and firm clearance for transfers on personnel employed on MED work for Chicago Area, Site Y and related installations.

Chief - Investigator (Intel. & Sec.), CAF-11, Chic. 294  
(Mr. J. J. Lannon)  
2 Clerk-Steno., CAF-4 (1 partial)  
1 Clerk-Steno., CAF-3

- \* Detailed to PN HQ2 for a period of 6 months.
- \*\* Allocation of grade CAF-4 presently under question. Duties being performed by Lillian J. Horvat who is holding PN 69 (Clerk-Steno., CAF-3 in Personnel Clearance Branch).

~~RESTRICTED~~  
EXHIBIT AS-15

ORGANIZATION CHART

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

UNIT SECURITY DIVISION, CHICAGO AREA

SUBMITTED *John D. ...* DATE 1-1-47  
RECOMMENDED *Robert ...* DATE 1-1-47  
APPROVED *W.C. ...* DATE 1-10-47

~~RESTRICTED~~


PERSONNEL

OFFICERS	66
ENL.	2
P.	
S.P.	
C.A.P.	36
C.P.S.	26
MISCL.	2
WAC	1
TOTAL	68

**SECURITY BRANCH**

Supervise all branch activities.

Col. J. J. Parsons, Chief  
 Capt. J. A. King, Branch Officer  
 1st Lt. A. A. Nella, Asst. Branch Officer  
 1 W. A. C.  
 1 CPT & CIB-Officer.



**EXHIBIT AS-16**

**ORGANIZATION CHART  
MANHATTAN DISTRICT**

UNIT SECURITY BRANCH

SUBMITTED [Signature] DATE Jan. 1, 1949

RECOMMENDED [Signature] DATE


APPROVED [Signature] DATE [Signature]

PERSONNEL	
OFFICERS	16
ENL.	7
P.	
S P.	
CAP.	36
GPC.	8
MISCL.	
VAC.	7
TOTAL	74

**SECURITY DIVISION**

Lt. Col. David P. Shaw, District Security Officer  
 Elisabeth Kendrick, Clerk-Steno., CAP-8

Lt. Col. S. F. Winick, Deputy Security Officer  
 1 Clerk-Steno., CAP-8



**INTELLIGENCE BRANCH**

Supervises all intelligence activities at CEW.

Major J. J. Jackson, Chief.

**ADMINISTRATIVE AND PERSONNEL CLEARANCE BRANCH**

Supervises administration of civilian personnel and supervises operation of mail and records Section.

Supervises personnel clearance procedures and policies and operates Visitor Control.

J. I. O'Gara, Chief.

**INFORMATION SECURITY BRANCH**

Supervises the formulation and evaluation of SMI policies and procedures; evaluates and maintains records of SMI violations; supervises security education; reviews and evaluates publicity and keeps records of top secret material in the District.

Capt. Chas. D. Salyers, Chief

**PRODUCTION SECURITY BRANCH**

Organizes, coordinates, and supervises security program for the protection of production and research facilities. Supervises contract completion security.

Walter L. Diets, Chief.

**SHIPMENTS SECURITY BRANCH**

Supervises shipment of classified materials and documents. Provides courier service for top secret shipments.

A. V. E. Wolff, Chief.

**EXHIBIT AS-17**

**ORGANIZATION CHART  
 MANHATTAN DISTRICT**

UNIT SECURITY DIVISION

SUBMITTED *David P. Shaw* DATE 7/1/46

RECOMMENDED DATE

APPROVED DATE

PERSONNEL

OFFICERS	15
ENL.	5
P.	---
SP	---
CAP	43
CPC	5
MISCL.	---
VAC.	5
TOTAL	77

**STAFF ASSISTANT**

Handles legal aspects of security, contract security and is District TS control officer.

Capt. Chas. D. Salvers  
(P-4 Proposed)  
1 Clerk-Steno, CAP-4 1-17

**SECURITY DIVISION**

Col. S. I. Brown, District Security Officer  
(CAP-15 Proposed)  
Lt. Col. David P. Shaw, Deputy District Security Officer  
(CAP-16 Proposed)  
Lt. Col. S. F. Winiker, Executive Officer  
(CAP-18 Proposed)  
1 Clerk-Steno, CAP-5 (CAP-6 Proposed) 1-12  
1 Clerk-Steno, CAP-3 (CAP-4 Proposed) 1-120

**INTELLIGENCE BRANCH**

Supervises CPW Intelligence, District Intelligence files and District CIC Detachment.

Major J. J. Jackson, Intelligence Officer  
(CAP-12 Proposed)  
1st Lt. A. L. Rydzanski, Ass't. Intelligence Officer  
(CAP-11 Proposed)  
1 Clerk-Steno, CAP-4 1-118

**ADMINISTRATIVE AND PERSONNEL CLEARANCE BRANCH**

Performs all personnel clearance, visitor clearance and office administration. Supervises administration of civilian personnel and operation of mail and records section.

J. L. O'Hara, Chief, CAP-9 1-123  
(CAP-10 Proposed)

**PROTECTION AND SHIPMENT SECURITY BRANCH**

Supervises security inspection and investigative activities. Supervises Manhattan District Shipments.

1 CAP-12 Proposed  
1 Clerk-Steno, CAP-4 1-40

**INVESTIGATORS SECTION**

Performs all intelligence investigations, security education, etc.

(2 CAP-11 Proposed)  
(1 Clerk-Steno, CAP-3 Proposed)  
(1 Clerk-Typist, CAP-2 Proposed)

**CIC HEADQUARTERS SECTION**

Performs administration of District CIC Detachment.

CWO Raymond E. Lee, Chief  
1 Clerk, CAP-4 1-182  
5 Enlisted Personnel

**PLANT INVEST. AND INSPECT. SECTION**

Responsible for security program at all facilities under direct contract with Manhattan District. Advise and assist Area Security Officers.

Walter Dietz, Chief, CAP-11 1-8  
2 CAP-9 Investigators 1-124, 1-125  
1 CAP-7 Investigator 1-140  
(3 CAP-11 Proposed)  
1 Clerk-Steno, CAP-3 (Vac) 1-27  
1 Clerk-Typist, CAP-2 (Proposed)  
Presently Filled by 1-121  
~~1 Enlisted CAP-3 Enlisted 1-121~~

**SHIPMENT SECURITY SECTION**

Arranges shipments, supervises and provides guards and officer couriers.

A. V. B. Wolff, Chief, CAP-11 1-129  
1st Lt. J. S. Kendall  
(CAP-10 Proposed)  
1 Clerk-Steno, CAP-4 (Vacant) 1-26  
1 Clerk-Typist, CAP-3 1-124  
(CAP-3 Proposed)  
(1 CPC-8 Proposed)  
1 CPC-8 Patrolman 1-94  
7 CPC-7 Patrolman 1-95  
7 1st Lts. Couriers

**RECORDS SECTION**

Operates and supervises filing of PQP's, data cards, terminations and classified records for Security Div. and Dept. of Public Safety.

1 CAP-5 Clerk 1-12  
(CAP-6 Proposed)  
3 CAP-3 Clerks 1-31, 33, 35, 41 and 43  
3 CAP-3 Clerks 1-48, 50, 52, 56, 58, and 59  
3 CAP-3 Clerks (Temporary appointments) 1-121, 1 & 3

**PERSONNEL CLEARANCE SECTION**

Supervises personnel clearance procedures and policies in all Branch Security Offices and CPW and operates Visitor Control.

1 CAP-5 Clerk 1-8  
(CAP-7 Proposed)  
3 CAP-4 Clerks 1-14, 20, 22, 25  
3 CAP-3 Clerks 1-28, 34 & 37  
1 CAP-3 Clk-Typ. 1-33  
1 CAP-3 Clerk (Vac) 1-34  
1 CAP-3 Clk-Typ. 1-50  
1 CAP-3 Clk-Typ. 1-120 (detached from Records Section)

**ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION**

Processes appointments, separations, promotions; approves leave and maintains records of civilian personnel of Division. Supervises receiving, routing and recording of incoming and outgoing mail. Operates Steno Pool for Div.

1 CAP-6 Clerk 1-71  
(CAP-7 Proposed)  
1 Clerk-Typist (VAC.) 1-44  
1 Clerk, CAP-3 1-112  
1 Clerk, CAP-3 1-48  
1 Clerk-Typ. (Temp. Appt.) 1-122

**EXHIBIT AS-18**

**ORGANIZATION CHART  
MANHATTAN DISTRICT**

UNIT Security Division

SUBMITTED \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
RECOMMENDED *S. I. Brown* DATE *20 Oct 46*  
APPROVED *D. H. Jones* DATE *1 Oct 46*

PERSONNEL

OFFICERS	11
ENL.	1
P	
S P	
S CAP	48
S P C	8
(PP)	17
MODEL	
VAC	
TOTAL	89

**SECURITY DIVISION**

David F. Shaw, Director of Security, I-171, CAP-14  
 Capt. Chas. D. Salyers, Executive Officer  
 1 Clk-Steno. CAP-5 (CAP-4 Proposed) I-12  
 1 Clk-Steno. CAP-5 (CAP-4 Proposed) I-128

**INTELLIGENCE BRANCH**

Supervises CEW Intelligence, District Intelligence files and District CIC Detachment.  
 Major J. J. Jackson, Intelligence Officer (CAP-12 Proposed)  
 1 Clk-Steno. CAP-3 (CAP-4 Proposed) I-164

**ADMINISTRATIVE AND PERSONNEL CLEARANCE BRANCH**

Performs all personnel clearance, visitor clearance and office administration. Supervises administration of civilian personnel and operation of mail and records section.  
 J. L. O'Dara, Chief, CAP-9, I-125 (CAP-10 Proposed)

**PRODUCTION AND SHIPMENT SECURITY BRANCH**

Supervises security inspection and investigative activities. Supervises Manhattan District Shipments.  
 1 CAP-12 Proposed  
 1 Clk-Steno. CAP-4, I-60

**INVESTIGATORS SECTION**

Performs all intelligence investigations, security education, etc.  
 3 Investigators CAP-11, I-180, I-150-1, I-150-2.  
 1 Clk-Steno. CAP-4, I-17 (1 Clk-Steno. CAP-3 Proposed)

**CIC HEADQUARTERS SECTION**

Performs administration of District CIC Detachment.  
 CWO Hayward E. Lee, Chief  
 1 Clk-Steno. CAP-2, I-178  
 5 Enlisted Personnel

**PLANT INVST. AND INSPECT. SECTION**

Responsible for security program at all facilities under direct contract with Manhattan District. Advise and assist Area Security Officers.  
 W. L. Diets, Chief, CAP-11, I-81  
 3 CAP-9 Investigators, I-124, I-124-1, I-128 (3 CAP-11 Proc.)  
 1 CAP-7 Investigator, I-160  
 1 Clk-Typist, CAP-3, I-27  
 1 Clk-Typist, CAP-2 (Proposed presently filled by I-121 detailed from Records Section)

**SHIPMENT SECURITY SECTION**

Arranges shipments, supervises and provides guards and officer carriers.  
 1st Lt. R. S. Kendall, Chief  
 Vacant CAP-11, I-121  
 1 Clk-Steno. CAP-4, I-161  
 1 CPC-8 (Proposed)  
 1 CPC-8 Patrolman I-94  
 7 CPC-7 Patrolman I-95  
 7 1st Lts. Couriers

**RECORDS SECTION**

Operates and supervises filing of PSQ's, data cards, terminations and classified records for Security Div. and Dept. of Public Safety.  
 1 CAP-6, Clerk I-15 (CAP-6 Prop.)  
 5 CAP-3, Clerks, I-33, 35, 41, 183, & 45.  
 6 CAP-2, Clerks, I-63 Vacant, I-80, 82, 85, 86 & 89 Vacant.  
 3 CAP-2, Clerks, I-161, 161-1, 161-2 (Tempo. Assignments)  
 1 CAP-2, Clk-Typist, I-113

**PERSONNEL CLEARANCE SECTION**

Supervises personnel clearance procedures and policies in all Branch Security Offices and CPW and operates Visitor Control.  
 1 CAP-7, Clerk, I-170  
 5 CAP-4, Clerks, I-16, 20, 25  
 2 CAP-3, Clerks, I-38, & 34  
 1 CAP-3, Clk-Typist, I-38  
 2 CAP-3, Clk-Typist, I-105 & 100  
 1 CAP-3, Clerk, I-108

**ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION**


Processes appointments, separations, promotions; approves leave and maintains records of civilian personnel of Division. Supervises receiving, routing and recording of incoming and outgoing mail. Operates Steno Pool for Division.  
 1 CAP-6 Clerk, I-71 (CAP-7 Pro.)  
 1 CAP-3 Clk-Typist I-44  
 1 CAP-3 Clerk, I-112  
 1 CAP-3 Clk-Typist, I-178  
 1 CAP-2 Clerk I-48  
 Steno Pool Varies

**EXHIBIT AS-19**

**ORGANIZATION CHART  
 MANHATTAN DISTRICT**


UNIT SECURITY DIVISION

SUBMITTED \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 RECORDED *David F. Shaw* DATE *21 Jan 47*  
 APPROVED *W. L. Diets* DATE *12-2-47*



Vacancies CAP-11, I & S CAP-5 Clerk-Typist, File Clerk

#1



Vacancies CAF-11, I & S CAF-3 Clerk-Typist, File Clerk

EXHIBIT AS-20

~~RESTRICTED~~

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

Personnel:

- Sec. Head - Chief Investigator
- Administrative NCO
- Clerk-Stenographer

Duties:

- Control of I&S Section.
- Authenticate TC Documents.
- Investigate disaffected personnel and incidents of sabotage, espionage, subversive activities
- Set forth policy on I&S procedures at Sandi
- Advise CO and Staff on all measures pertaining to I&S.

CLASSIFIED FILES SECTION:

Personnel:

- Section Head
- 1 - Clerk-typist
- 1 - Messenger

Duties:

- Insure proper classification, reclassification, declassification, destruction and transmission of classified documents.
- Insure proper shipment of classified material.
- Maintain classified files.
- Determine need for military maps, procure and maintain maps.
- Regulate dissemination of information to the public.

PERSONNEL SECURITY SECTION

Personnel:

- Section Head
- Asst. Section Head
- 3 - Typists
- 1 - File Clerk

Duties:

- Control badge section.
- Obtain proper clearances of all personnel.

BADGE SECTION:

Personnel:

- NCO in charge and 5 EM

Duties:

- Make badges.
- Maintain visitors Pass Office

EXHIBIT "A"

~~RESTRICTED~~

ANNEX HC. 15

#1

**INTELLIGENCE OFFICER**

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

Personnel:  
Head - Chief Investigator  
Administrative NCO  
Clerk - Stenographer  
  
Role of I&S Section.  
Authenticate TC Documents.  
Investigate disaffected personnel and incidents of sabotage, espionage, subversive activities.  
Forth policy on I&S procedures at Sandia Base.  
Inform CO and Staff on all measures pertaining to I&S.

PERSONNEL SECURITY SECTION

Personnel:  
Section Head  
Asst. Section Head  
3 - Typists  
1 - File Clerk  
  
Duties:  
Control badge section.  
Obtain proper clearances of all personnel.

BADGE SECTION:

Personnel:  
NCO in charge and 5 EM  
  
Duties:  
Make badges.  
Maintain visitors Pass Office

PHYSICAL SECURITY SECTION:

Personnel:  
Section Head  
3 - CIO Assistants  
1 - Clerk-Stenographer  
  
Duties:  
Insure proper safeguarding of military information.  
Recommend proper security measures to be placed in effect.  
Conduct continuous security inspections.  
Investigate disaffected personnel and incidents of sabotage-espionage, subversive activities.

**EXHIBIT AS-21**

~~RESTRICTED~~

#2

**CHIEF**  
 Vernon K. Schumann - CAF-12\*  
 Mrs. Irene Clute  
 Clerk-Steno. - CAF-4

**DEPUTY CHIEF**  
 Gustav V. Edlund - CAF-11\*

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~  
**CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY**  
 Henry Dumas - CAF-4  
 nTeletype Operator

PERSONNEL	
OFFICERS	.....
ENL.	.....
P.	.....
S.P.	.....
CAF	.....
S.P.C.	.....
MISCL.	.....
VAC.	.....
TOTAL	.....

**Clearance & Investigative Branch**  
 Gustav V. Edlund\*  
 Chief, CAF-11  
 Arthur G.S. Sarnowski\*  
 Investigator, CAF-7  
 Elsie M. Jubinville  
 Clerk-Typist, CAF-2

**PLANT PROTECTION BRANCH**  
 John Vinciguerra - Chief\*\*\*  
 CAF - 9\*\*  
 Paul F. Schuster, Inspector\*\*  
 CAF-9  
 Eleanor Rohaley \*\*\*  
 Clerk-Steno., CAF-3

**RESIDENT AGENT, HANFORD, WASH.**  
 Responsible for security of HEN, Branch of G.E. Research Laboratory. Reports to Schenectady on all security matters affecting this branch.  
 Employee administered by HEN.

\*Investigator, Intelligence & Security  
 \*\*Inspector, Plant Protection  
 \*\*\*Located in Cleveland, Ohio

**EXHIBIT AS-12**

**ORGANIZATION CHART**  
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
 UNIT Security Division,  
Schenectady Area  
 SUBMITTED \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 RECOMMENDED \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 APPROVED \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

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SUPPLEMENT  
TO  
MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY  
BOOK I -- GENERAL  
VOLUME 14 - INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY  
APPENDIX "C"  
MISCELLANEOUS - FORMS, MANUALS, ETC.

No.

- CS-1 Receipt of Material Form
- CS-2 Courier Receipt Form
- CS-3 Record of Film Badges Form
- CS-4 Instructions - Security Completion Report
- CS-5 Security Completion Report
- CS-6 Check Sheet - Security Survey Report
- CS-7 Security Survey Report
- CS-8 Security Manual, Manhattan District, dated 26 November 1946.
- CS-9 Public Proclamation No. 26, dated November 12, 1946, Headquarters Sixth Army.
- CS-10 Public Law 585, approved August 1, 1946, entitled: An Act for the Development and Control of Atomic Energy.
- CS-11 Executive Order 9816, dated December 31, 1946, Subject: Providing for the transfer of properties and personnel to the Atomic Energy Commission.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
 U. S. ENGINEER OFFICE  
 MANHATTAN DISTRICT  
 OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE

TO:

RE: Receipt of Material.

Original to be signed personally by the recipient and returned to the sender.  
 Duplicate to be retained by the recipient.  
 Triplicate retained by sender for suspense file.

I have personally received from (sender) \_\_\_\_\_  
 (sender's address) \_\_\_\_\_, the material as identified below.

I assume full responsibility for the safe handling, storage, and transmittal elsewhere of this material in accordance with existing regulations. The material, including inclosures and attachments, is identified as follows: (In identifying material avoid any reference which might cause the receipt form to become CLASSIFIED.)

SUBJECT:

Description (Check or indicate)	Date of Document or Letter of Transmittal	From	Reference or File No.	Addressed To	Date Mailed
Letter _____ Drawing _____ Report _____ Other _____ (Indicate) No. and Nature*of Copies: SO _____ CO _____ FC _____ TC _____ Other _____ Number and Nature _____  Number of Inclosures and attachments _____					

\*SO: Signed Original; CC: Carbon Copy; PC Photostatic Copy; TC: Typed Copy

\_\_\_\_\_  
 (Signature)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 (Date)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 (Postal Registry Number)

PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN ORIGINAL RECEIPT IMMEDIATELY

Exhibit CS-1

Receipt No. \_\_\_\_\_

### COURIER RECEIPT FORM

AEC Form 60 (Feb. 13, 1947)

I acknowledge that on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ I received from \_\_\_\_\_  
(date) (time) (name)

the items described below for delivery from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
(sender) (addressee)

Witness \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Receipt No. \_\_\_\_\_

### COURIER RECEIPT FORM

AEC Form 60 (Feb. 13, 1947)

I acknowledge that on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ I received from \_\_\_\_\_  
(date) (time) (name)

the items described below for delivery from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
(sender) (addressee)

Witness \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Receipt No. \_\_\_\_\_

### COURIER RECEIPT FORM

AEC Form 60 (Feb. 13, 1947)

I acknowledge that on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ I received from \_\_\_\_\_  
(date) (time) (name)

the items described below for delivery from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
(sender) (addressee)

Witness \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Receipt No. \_\_\_\_\_

### COURIER RECEIPT FORM

AEC Form 60 (Feb. 13, 1947)

I acknowledge that on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ I received from \_\_\_\_\_  
(date) (time) (name)

the items described below for delivery from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
(sender) (addressee)

Witness \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Exhibit CS-2

Receipt No. \_\_\_\_\_

### COURIER RECEIPT FORM

ARC Form 60 (Feb. 13, 1947)

I acknowledge that on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ I received from \_\_\_\_\_  
(date) (time) (name)

the items described below for delivery from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
(sender) (addressee)

Witness \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Receipt No. \_\_\_\_\_

### COURIER RECEIPT FORM

ARC Form 60 (Feb. 13, 1947)

I acknowledge that on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ I received from \_\_\_\_\_  
(date) (time) (name)

the items described below for delivery from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
(sender) (addressee)

Witness \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Receipt No. \_\_\_\_\_

### COURIER RECEIPT FORM

ARC Form 60 (Feb. 13, 1947)

I acknowledge that on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ I received from \_\_\_\_\_  
(date) (time) (name)

the items described below for delivery from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
(sender) (addressee)

Witness \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Receipt No. \_\_\_\_\_

### COURIER RECEIPT FORM

ARC Form 60 (Feb. 13, 1947)

I acknowledge that on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ I received from \_\_\_\_\_  
(date) (time) (name)

the items described below for delivery from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
(sender) (addressee)

Witness \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Receipt No. \_\_\_\_\_

### COURIER RECEIPT FORM

ARC Form 60 (Feb. 13, 1947)

I acknowledge that on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ I received from \_\_\_\_\_  
(date) (time) (name)  
the items described below for delivery from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
(sender) (addressee)

Witness \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Receipt No. \_\_\_\_\_

### COURIER RECEIPT FORM

ARC Form 60 (Feb. 13, 1947)

I acknowledge that on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ I received from \_\_\_\_\_  
(date) (time) (name)  
the items described below for delivery from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
(sender) (addressee)

Witness \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Receipt No. \_\_\_\_\_

### COURIER RECEIPT FORM

ARC Form 60 (Feb. 13, 1947)

I acknowledge that on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ I received from \_\_\_\_\_  
(date) (time) (name)  
the items described below for delivery from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
(sender) (addressee)

Witness \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Receipt No. \_\_\_\_\_

### COURIER RECEIPT FORM

ARC Form 60 (Feb. 13, 1947)

I acknowledge that on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ I received from \_\_\_\_\_  
(date) (time) (name)  
the items described below for delivery from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
(sender) (addressee)

Witness \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

INSTRUCTIONS

COURIER RECEIPT FORM

1. Sender will prepare in triplicate.

2. Original receipts will be detached by each individual in the chain of custody and retained for personal record, the first to be retained by the sender.

3. Duplicate and triplicate copies will remain intact until delivered to the addressee who will retain the duplicate and return the triplicate to the sender.

4. A receipt number will be allocated by the sender which will consist of the serial letter assigned to the authenticating officer followed by the serial number of the receipt. It will be placed on each of the four individual receipts and on the copies.

5. The receipt number will be marked on the outer envelope of the document and/or wrapping of the material covered by the receipt.

6. Where documents or materials are transmitted by the same courier to different addresses, a separate set of receipts will be prepared for each addressee.

COURIER RECEIPT FORM

I acknowledge that on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ I received from \_\_\_\_\_ the items described below for delivery from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

Witness Signature

COURIER RECEIPT FORM

I acknowledge that on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ I received from \_\_\_\_\_ the items described below for delivery from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

Witness Signature



SECURITY COMPLETION REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

10 October 1946.

Reports to be prepared in narrative form covering the following items:

I. Classified documents or materiel.

a. State disposition of classified documents or materiel.

b. Describe storage location for all matter (documents or materiel), classified confidential or higher, retained by the contractor including:

(1) Repositories - (files, 3-way combination safes, etc.)

(2) Physical protection and guarding.

(3) Extent of segregation of Manhattan District records from other records.

(4) Extent of restricted on access to Manhattan District matter.

II. Personnel Security.

a. Describe compliance with requested execution of Secrecy Agreement.

b. Describe steps taken by contractor to instruct personnel concerned as to the necessity for continued security and that the national Espionage Act continues to apply.

c. Attach to report copy of statement furnished by the contractor in accordance with Section III-B, 5b, (2c), of the Security Manual.

III. General Information.

a. Report status of security relative to facility's contracts with other Areas or Divisions of the District.

b. Describe any specific instructions given to contractor's representative covering further security requirements.

IV. Comments and Recommendations: Include recommendations as to frequency with which facility should be inspected.

Exhibit CS-4

SECURITY COMPLETION REPORT

MANHATTAN DISTRICT

\_\_\_\_\_ Area

Date of Report \_\_\_\_\_

Facility \_\_\_\_\_

Location \_\_\_\_\_  
(Street) (City) (State)

Security Agent \_\_\_\_\_ Contract No. \_\_\_\_\_

Contract Classification \_\_\_\_\_ Highest Classification of  
Work or Documents \_\_\_\_\_

Outline of MED Work:

Synopsis of Report:

Representative (s) on Completion Negotiations:

Contractor's

Manhattan District's

Approved by \_\_\_\_\_  
Area Engineer

Submitted by \_\_\_\_\_

Exhibit CS-5

SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE PROTECTION

COMPOSITE RATING \_\_\_\_\_

**A. Physical Protection**

Fencing & Gates \_\_\_\_\_

Doors \_\_\_\_\_

Window Screens \_\_\_\_\_

Partition Walls \_\_\_\_\_

Protective Lighting \_\_\_\_\_

Burglar Alarm \_\_\_\_\_

Skylights, Manholes, etc. \_\_\_\_\_

Restricted Areas \_\_\_\_\_

Vital Equipment \_\_\_\_\_

Power, Fuel, & Water \_\_\_\_\_

Supplies \_\_\_\_\_

RATING \_\_\_\_\_

**B. Guard Force**

Total Strength \_\_\_\_\_

On MD Work \_\_\_\_\_

First Shift \_\_\_\_\_

Second Shift \_\_\_\_\_

Third Shift \_\_\_\_\_

Physical Qualifications \_\_\_\_\_

Equipment \_\_\_\_\_

Training \_\_\_\_\_

Supervision \_\_\_\_\_

Efficiency \_\_\_\_\_

Location of Posts \_\_\_\_\_

Patrol Coverage \_\_\_\_\_

Restricted Areas \_\_\_\_\_

Communications \_\_\_\_\_

RATING \_\_\_\_\_

**C. Identification**

EMPLOYEES

Badge (photo-number) \_\_\_\_\_

Pass (photo-number) \_\_\_\_\_

Personal Recognition \_\_\_\_\_

Special Identification \_\_\_\_\_

For Restricted Areas \_\_\_\_\_

Enforcement \_\_\_\_\_

VEHICLES

Truck Register \_\_\_\_\_

Drivers Identified \_\_\_\_\_

Contents Inspected \_\_\_\_\_

Escort \_\_\_\_\_

RATING \_\_\_\_\_

**D. Visitor Control**

CASUAL VISITORS

Visitor Register \_\_\_\_\_

Identification \_\_\_\_\_

Badge or Pass System \_\_\_\_\_

Escort \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED VISITORS

Visitor Register \_\_\_\_\_

Identification \_\_\_\_\_

Badge or Pass System \_\_\_\_\_

Escort \_\_\_\_\_

MD COMPLIANCE

Clearance \_\_\_\_\_

Reports \_\_\_\_\_

RATING \_\_\_\_\_

**E. Personnel Clearance**

Total Employees \_\_\_\_\_

On MD Work \_\_\_\_\_

On Classified MD Work \_\_\_\_\_

Company Clearance Date \_\_\_\_\_

EMPLOYER INVESTIGATION

Application Form \_\_\_\_\_

Check Previous Employers \_\_\_\_\_

Check Personal References \_\_\_\_\_

Check Credit Company \_\_\_\_\_

MD COMPLIANCE

Submission of Forms \_\_\_\_\_

(PHS, PSQ, Data Cards, \_\_\_\_\_

Alien Questionnaire) \_\_\_\_\_

Proof of Citizenship \_\_\_\_\_

Interim Clearance \_\_\_\_\_

Procedure \_\_\_\_\_

RATING \_\_\_\_\_

**F. Shipment Security**

Shipment by common carrier \_\_\_\_\_

Shipment by Government \_\_\_\_\_

Vehicle \_\_\_\_\_

Shipment by Courier \_\_\_\_\_

Other \_\_\_\_\_

Safety Precautions \_\_\_\_\_

Records - Receipts \_\_\_\_\_

RATING \_\_\_\_\_

**G. Storage of Classified Materials**

Location \_\_\_\_\_

Physical Protection \_\_\_\_\_

Guarding \_\_\_\_\_

Inventory \_\_\_\_\_

RATING \_\_\_\_\_

**H. Safeguarding Military Information**

Management's Knowledge of Manhattan District Requirements \_\_\_\_\_

Interest Displayed by Management \_\_\_\_\_

Familiarity of Employees with Manhattan District Requirements \_\_\_\_\_

Use of Secrecy Agreements and Security Interviews \_\_\_\_\_

Continuing Educational Program \_\_\_\_\_

Storage Facilities for Classified Documents and Usage \_\_\_\_\_

Preparation, Handling, and Transmittal of Classified Documents \_\_\_\_\_

Accounting Practices (receipts, records, inventories) \_\_\_\_\_

Practices for Destroying Classified Materials \_\_\_\_\_

Action taken re losses, violations, and loose talk \_\_\_\_\_

Control of Project Publicity \_\_\_\_\_

RATING \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: Each item should be rated Poor, Fair, Good, Excellent, None or DNA (Does not apply)

ml

SECURITY SURVEY REPORT  
MANHATTAN DISTRICT

Area Engineer or \_\_\_\_\_ Date of Survey \_\_\_\_\_  
Operations Officer

Facility \_\_\_\_\_

Location \_\_\_\_\_  
(Street) (City) (State)

Rating of Importance \_\_\_\_\_ Facility Security Agent \_\_\_\_\_  
(A, B, C, or D)

Engineer Contract No(s) \_\_\_\_\_

Highest Classification of Contract, Work, or Material \_\_\_\_\_

Composite Rating for Sabotage & Espionage Protection \_\_\_\_\_  
(Poor, Fair, Good, Excellent)

Previous Survey and Rating \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date) (Rating)

---

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Description of Premises and Vicinity

Outline of Manhattan District Interest

DISTRIBUTION: Area Engineer  
District Security Officer  
Other

Submitted by \_\_\_\_\_

Exhibit CS-7

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# SECURITY MANUAL



*MANHATTAN DISTRICT*  
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE  
26 November 1945



EXHIBIT CS-8

SECURITY MANUAL

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[REDACTED] ON

SECTION I

SECTION I - GENERAL

1. Security Objective; Although the initial goal of the Manhattan District has been accomplished, national interest dictates that the highest degree of security be maintained to prevent espionage, unauthorized disclosures of classified information, and sabotage or related production interruptions at vital project installations. It is essential that details of processes and research which have not been officially released remain classified and protected and that current operations of the District be unimpeded. The accomplishment of this objective is of utmost importance to the National Welfare and requires a vigorous security program.

2. Responsibility; Area Engineers and Operations Officers (hereinafter referred to as Area Engineers) are responsible to the District Engineer for maintaining security at all installations under their supervision. Security Officers transferred from the District Security Division to the Staffs of the Area Engineers will assist in handling this important responsibility. All individuals, firms, corporations or institutions engaged in work with this project have security responsibilities either assumed as obligation under contract or imposed by the various federal statutes affecting national defense. Each of the principal contractors, therefore, should have its own security agent and security department to provide an effective security program which would meet the approval of the Area Engineer.

3. Principal Elements; The accomplishment of the Security Objective requires attention to five principal elements, each of which is the subject of a separate section of this manual;

Selection and Clearance of Personnel (Section II)

Safeguarding Classified Information and Material (Section III)

Visitor Control (Section IV)

Plant Protection (Section V)

Shipment Security (Section VI)

Basic requirements and procedures are outlined under the foregoing sections to assist the Area Engineer and his security staff in providing effective security programs at their installations. In view of the wide differences in the organization, management, and physical aspects of individual facilities, no stereotyped security measures which will be practicable can be established.

In establishing requirements for security at a particular facility, consideration will be given the following factors;

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Section I

a. The amount and type of classified information and material the facility.

b. The effect which loss of production at the facility would have upon the overall program.

c. The prevention of loss or damage to Government property.

4. Facility Lists:

a. A current list of the various facilities of interest to the Manhattan District will be maintained by the Security Division as a general source of information and reference concerning all locations where the District has important work or classified information. It will be the responsibility of each Area Engineer to keep the Security Division informed as to the location, nature, classification, and relative importance of all activities under his jurisdiction.

b. Since the present mission of the Manhattan District is to continue to produce a supply of material and to conduct research for improvement in the processes and uses, the various facilities will continue to be listed according to their relative importance as "A", "B", or "C". A "D" symbol will be assigned to those facilities where the contracts have been terminated but classified matters retained. In addition to the relative importance, the Facility List will indicate the highest classification of the contract, work to be performed, and documents handled or stored; viz., Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, Restricted, or Unclassified. While it is not feasible to follow rigid standards for the evaluation of the exact importance of these facilities, four categories, as a guide, have been established:

(1) Class "A" Facilities

Those at which the interruption of operations would seriously hamper the present mission of the Manhattan District.

(2) Class "B" Facilities,

Those at which the interruption of operations would cause a minor interference with the OVERALL District program.

(3) Class "C" Facilities

Those facilities which are important but at which the interruption of operations would not delay the overall program. All facilities, not "A" or "B", having classified material or documents should be included in this category, even though their production or research is not considered essential.

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Section I

(4) Class "D" Facilities

Those facilities where classified contracts have been completed but where documents or material classified "Confidential" or higher have been retained and the classification is still applicable.

In general, the principal operating process plants will probably remain in the "A" category. Those facilities supplying feed materials and important replacement equipment are also in this category. Where 90-day or longer stock piles of these items have been accumulated in a secure warehouse, a "B" or even "C" rating might be justified, if the facility is quickly replaceable or if an alternative facility is readily available.

The urgency of construction is now less acute so that facilities furnishing construction supplies and new operating equipment can possibly be placed in a "B" or "C" category.

Research installations may be classified as "B" or even "A" facilities if the importance of the work justifies.

5. Security Surveys; Since the Area Engineer is responsible to the District Engineer to provide an adequate security program at all installations under his supervision, he should adopt positive measures to insure that each Contractor (1) understands his security responsibility (2) is given advice and assistance in providing necessary security measures, and (3) is inspected at intervals, to insure adequate security.

At most installations these objectives can be accomplished best by making periodic security surveys of all the principal elements of security. (See Paragraph 3, above.) At major sites, complete security surveys may be difficult to accomplish within a reasonable period of time, and it may be preferable to make separate surveys of individual buildings or sub-divisions or of particular elements or phases of security. The frequency and extent of such surveys should depend upon the relative importance of the installation, classification of work performed, local conditions affecting security and changing conditions. Normally, security surveys should be conducted by Security Officers or Agents on the staff of the responsible Area Engineer.

To be of maximum value a security survey should be made with full consideration of the following principles:

a. Previous to making a security survey, the Security Officer should thoroughly familiarize himself with the nature of the work being performed at the installation, its classification and its relative importance to the project. He should also determine the name of the person he is to contact upon arrival at the facility. Prior to conducting a

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urvey, the Security Officer should review previous survey reports covering the installation to be surveyed. If peculiar conditions with which is not sufficiently familiar are indicated on these reports he should seek information and advice from his superior officer. Upon request further assistance will be provided by the District Engineer.

b. In planning a visit to a facility, sufficient time should be allocated to make a thorough survey. Insofar as possible conditions could be determined by observation rather than questioning. It is recognized that much information necessary to complete a good survey must be developed through discussions with individuals concerned with security.

c. All work and locations connected with the activities being surveyed should be examined together with surrounding buildings or other areas which might affect security.

d. Upon completion of a survey any recommendations of a maintenance nature which the surveying officer or agent may make should be discussed with a responsible executive, and efforts should be made to secure an agreement that this will be accomplished.

e. Unsatisfactory conditions requiring a major change, or improvements requiring a considerable outlay of funds may be discussed at the time of survey. However, any recommendations covering such conditions should be submitted to the Contractor in writing by the responsible Area Engineer. In some instances, it may be preferable to only point out the deficiency and allow the Contractor to determine the correction most acceptable to him.

f. All security surveys except visits for a special or limited purpose should be reported in writing. Forms for this purpose may be secured from the District Security Division (see Exhibit VI). Copies of survey reports will be forwarded to the District Security Officer for information and review.

g. Each original survey should be fully reported. In addition to rating the items affecting security, special hazards and unsatisfactory conditions should be fully explained. On reports of subsequent surveys, comments may be limited to important conditions affecting security, recent changes, and the status of previous recommendations.

h. Security ratings (excellent, good, fair, and poor) should be based on a comparison with highest obtainable standards. Recommendations for any changes, however, will take into consideration the degree of security necessary for the particular facility in question.

i. The composite rating is not intended to be a mathematical average of all minor ratings. One or two outstanding deficiencies can

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reflect adversely upon the security of the installation so as to warrant a low "as a whole" rating, even though most factors may be favorable.

j. All unsatisfactory ratings should be fully explained in the survey report.

k. The primary value of a survey lies in the recommendation upon which corrective measures can be based. Frequently, however, a Security Officer or Agent should have no recommendations since he will have secured necessary minor corrections and improvements while conducting the survey.

l. Minor recommendations with which the facility has not fully concurred and major recommendations requiring expenditures of funds should be submitted after giving due consideration to the following:

(1) Recommendations should be made only after a thorough study of all factors involved. Reports should include supporting data and reasons justifying each recommendation so that there can be no question as to why it was made. Where an expenditure of funds is necessary an estimate thereof should also be included in the survey report.

(2) If an unsatisfactory condition is found during the survey, the correction of which could not be justified because of excessive cost, near completion of work or other extenuating circumstances, no recommendation should be made. The facts should, however, be reported in the survey report with costs and other pertinent data to show why no action has been taken.

m. The degree of security provided at facilities will depend to a large degree upon the thoroughness of a security survey program. Thus a very great share of the responsibility for securing the necessary protection for the project falls upon the Security Officers and Agents who will conduct these surveys.

Personnel of the District Security Division will visit and consult with the various Area Engineers and their Security Officers and Agents to determine if the procedures established are meeting the desired security objectives.

6. Reports:

a. Current Reports: The Area Engineer will notify the District Security Officer immediately, by teletype, telephone, or the most rapid method of incidents, situations, or information (1) which may jeopardise the security of the project or its installations, (2) which will interfere with the continuity of production at those places where continuity of production remains important, and (3) which result in the destruction of or

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represent a threat to government property. Under this provision, immediate reports will be transmitted on major fires, strikes or threatened strikes, suspected subversive activities on the part of any employee, any indication of an attempt to defraud the government, potential disclosure of any project information, etc.

b. Monthly Security Summary: Each Area Engineer will submit to the District Security Officer, in sufficient time to reach the District Office by the fifth day of each month, a Monthly Security Summary covering the preceding calendar month in accordance with the following schedule:

(1) Personnel and Company Clearance:

(a) Summation of Personnel Investigation:

No. FBI Criminal File Checks requested \_\_\_\_\_

No. Opened No. Closed No. Pending

Special Investigations

Service Command  
Branch Intelligence  
Office

Routine Investigations

Service Command  
By Area Engineer  
Branch Intelligence  
Office

Agency Checks

Service Command  
By Area Engineer  
Branch Intelligence  
Office

(b) Cases Referred to Intelligence Division: (See Paragraph 8, below.) Give subject and brief summation of each case referred to Intelligence Division for investigation.

(c) Company Clearances: Names and address of each company on which clearance was initiated and each company on which clearance was completed.

(d) Personnel Changes: Attach a list of employees who have been terminated or transferred from the jurisdiction of the Area office. If a termination is for cause,

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state reason. In case of transfer to another Manhattan District facility, state name and location thereof.

(2) Safeguarding Military Information;

(a) Security of Information, Education, and Instructions; Summarize the activities with respect to this topic, including utilization of employment and termination interviews, secrecy declarations, SMI instructions, lectures, posters, handbills, etc., by the Area Office and the Contractors' office. Include a statement indicating which of the activities were undertaken and carried out by each of the contractors and evaluate the effectiveness of each Contractor's organization in prosecuting the program.

(b) Violation and Dispositions;

(1) Include nature and disposition of procedural violations. Include a statement indicating the responsible factors; inadequate instructions in SMI procedures, inadequate storage facilities, inadequate comprehension of Top Secret procedures, etc.,

(2) Summarize briefly all violations resulting from indiscreet talk and unauthorized publications.

(3) Plant Protection;

Status of Security; Include for each installation the following information;

(a) Name.

(b) Status of work, i.e. expected completion date.

(c) Number of employees on classified work.

(d) Date of last survey.

(e) Brief statement of status of security.

(f) Number of guards, including Auxiliary Military Police and any general information pertaining to guard activities.

c. Copies of Security Survey Reports (see Paragraph 8f, above).

d. Contract Completion Report (see Section III-B, Paragraph 8).

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7. Reclassification of Documents and Materiel: The problem of reclassification of documents and materiel will become of increasing importance and will determine, to a large extent, the amount of protection that will be afforded the various installations. A study of the problem, from the standpoint of the District as a whole, has been undertaken and policy governing reclassification will be provided in separate bulletins as it is formulated. In the meanwhile, proposals for lowering the classification of contracts will be submitted to the District Engineer for approval. Likewise proposals for lowering the classification of materiel in accordance with the definitions contained in Section III-A, Paragraph 1, will be submitted to the District Engineer for approval, although such approval is not required for the necessary lowering of classification of documents.

8. Investigative Functions: All incidents, reports, and rumors which concern subversive activities, interruption to production, or compromise of security will require immediate investigation. Cases determined to involve serious SMI violations, suspected espionage and sabotage and other subversive activities should be referred without delay to the local Branch Office of the Intelligence Division. The District Security Officer should be advised of the details of any such cases. Cases involving suspected fraud against the government and other cases requiring investigation beyond the means of the Area Engineer and his staff will be referred immediately to the District Security Officer.

Section II

SECTION II - SELECTION AND CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL.

1. General: The purpose of personnel clearance is to assure the assignment to Manhattan District work only persons of demonstrated loyalty and the rejection and elimination of those who are potentially disloyal, disaffected, subversive, or who lack the character or discretion to protect the security of classified information disclosed to them.

2. Applicability of Personnel Clearance Procedure.

a. Personnel to whom the District clearance procedure applies may be categorized as follows:

- (1) Military personnel.
- (2) Civil Service personnel.
- (3) Contractors' employees.
- (4) Consultants.

b. Definitions:

(1) The term "classified employee", as used in this section, refers to all persons, excluding military personnel, engaged on classified work or having access to classified work areas of interest to the Manhattan District.

(2) The term "unclassified employee", as used in this section, refers to persons, other than military personnel, directly connected with work of interest to the Manhattan District but who do not have access to classified information or classified work areas. This definition is intended to include clerical personnel, construction workers, concessionaires, and other individuals at the Clinton Engineer Works, the Hanford Engineer Works, and other installations who, though not having access to classified documents, materiel, or equipment, are in daily contact with large groups of classified workers and consequently acquire, through observation and association, information which becomes classified through collection and association with unclassified information previously obtained. The term "unclassified employee" is not intended to include the great mass of workers who, by virtue of their employment by a private concern under contract with the District or one of its private associates, manually work on unclassified materiel or equipment which becomes classified upon final assembly, where the worker has no knowledge of the unusual character of the materiel or equipment, its potential use, or its ultimate consignee.

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(3) The term "employee", as used in this section, refers to all classified employees and those unclassified employees to whom the personnel clearance procedure is applicable. (See Section II, Paragraph 5b).

(4) The term "classified information", as used in this section, includes all information of a classified nature regardless of its form, substance, or mode of transmission, i.e., documents, materiel, equipment, etc.

3. Clearance Forms Required:

a. Proof of Citizenship - Prior to employment each employee (except aliens) will furnish proof of citizenship. Aliens will furnish proof of alien registration and will be processed in accordance with specific instructions hereinafter outlined. The following are acceptable as evidence of citizenship:

(1) Birth Certificate.

(2) Baptismal Certificate, indicating date and place of birth.

(3) Honorable Discharge from the United States Army, Navy or Marine Corps providing same does not bear notation of alien status at time of discharge.

(4) Naturalization Certificate.

(5) Declaration of Citizenship, providing (1), (2) or (3) cannot be furnished.

Military personnel who are aliens are not subject to assignment to the Manhattan District. Citizenship of military personnel will be presumed unless the individual's Personal History Statement or Service Record discloses information to the contrary.

b. Data Card - A data card will be prepared for each employee. Blank cards will be supplied by the District Security Office upon request.

c. Questionnaire - Officers will execute Personal History Statement. All other personnel subject to Manhattan District clearance procedure will execute WD AGO Form 19-105, revised Personnel Security Questionnaire. The Personal History Statement may supplement this form within the discretion of the Area Engineer.

d. Fingerprint Chart - All employees, including Civil Service personnel, will be fingerprinted on the National Defense Fingerprint Chart. The former policy of separately fingerprinting Civil Service personnel on the Civil Service Fingerprint Chart has been discontinued (War Department Personnel Circular No. 34, 26 March 1945). Military personnel will not be fingerprinted.

4. Screening of Forms Prior to Employment: Although desirable, investigation prior to assignment to classified work is in many instances impractical, in view of the volume of work involved and the immediate need for the services of certain types of employees. It is the responsibility of the Area Engineer, however, to provide the highest possible degree of personnel security a mer consideration has been given to all attending circumstances and operational purposes. Whenever possible, therefore, investigation should be made and the minimum standards of clearance set forth in paragraph 5 should be applied prior to assignment of any employee to classified work. In all cases, however, all pertinent forms of a given individual will be carefully screened. No person who has been a consultant or employed on District Work will be re-employed in Category I or II (see Paragraph 6c below) without approval from the District Security Section based upon a check of District files. No individual in the following categories will be assigned to classified work until the Area Engineer has assured himself, by reason of sufficient investigation, that the individual will not be a menace to project security:

a. Minors under 18 years of Age (Reference District Circular Letter (Pers. 34-19) dated 21 March 1944, Subject: Employment of Minors under 18 years of age).

b. Aliens.

c. Individuals not born in the United States or one of its territories.

d. Individuals whose background indicates that they may possess affinity for a foreign government. Indications to be considered are:

(1) Visits to a foreign country.

(2) Close relative who reside in or are to owe allegiance to a foreign country.

(3) Service in the Army of a foreign country, etc.

e. Individuals having membership in organizations known to have been enemy sponsored or otherwise subversive or committed to the violent overthrow of the Government of the United States, or to adherence to the interest of any foreign power to the detriment of the interest of the United States.

5. Basic Principles of Personnel Clearance:

a. The following are basic principles of personnel clearance:

(1) Each classified employee should be subject to careful and conscientious original selection.

(2) The identity of each classified employee should be positively established prior to his assignment to classified work.

(3) The loyalty, honesty, character and discretion of each classified employee should be established by investigation prior to his assignment to classified work.

These principles represent the desirable objective in personnel security; they should not be interpreted as the minimum standard for clearance. As a security objective, they should constantly be borne in mind and should be applied insofar as they are applicable to clearance of personnel at a unit or installation when all existing circumstances have been given careful consideration.

b. Where unclassified employees acquire some classified information through observation and association, and where criminal tendencies of employees of this group may adversely affect the work of the project, limited investigation is believed necessary. The extent to which the provisions of the personnel clearance procedure will be applied, if at all, to unclassified employees, is left to the discretion of the Area Engineer.

6. Minimum Standards for Clearance: The minimum standards for clearance are outlined below. The scope of investigation indicated under each category constitutes the minimum investigation required and should be supplemented by additional information when, in the opinion of the Area Engineer, further inquiry is believed advisable.

a. Military Personnel.

(1) Clearance of military personnel will be based on a three-way central file check, routine investigation (mail investigation conducted by the Area Engineer Office or Service Command routine investigation), and FBI criminal file check. A Service Command special investigation will supplement or be conducted in lieu of the routine investigation for military personnel having access to TOP SECRET information.

(2) Inasmuch as the majority of the military personnel assigned to the District originally report to Oak Ridge for duty, primary responsibility for their clearance is assumed by the District Security Officer. Area Engineers must take

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positive action, however, to insure that all military personnel within their areas have been cleared, and where clearance has not been granted by the District Security Office (where the individual is transferred directly to an area office) immediate action will be taken. For officer personnel, Personal History Statements will be forwarded to the District Security Office, which will take all necessary action. When enlisted SED and WAC personnel, transferring into the District, report directly to area offices without having been cleared by the District Office, all action to effect formal clearance will be taken by the appropriate Area Engineer.

b. Clearance of Naval Personnel. - Clearance investigations of Naval Personnel assigned to work of interest to the Manhattan District will be conducted by the District Security Office. Upon the assignment of a Naval Officer to the Manhattan District a Personnel Security Questionnaire, Form #W.D., A.G.O. 19-105 will be transmitted immediately to the District Security Office where clearance will be initiated. Investigation will consist of a local agency check excluding ONI, a check of FBI, MID & ONI central files and personal interviews with at least three unprejudiced individuals, be conducted by Manhattan District Personnel.

c. Civilian Personnel - Civil Service personnel and contractors' personnel will be categorized as follows:

- (1) Group I - Classified employees having access to (a) TOP SECRET information, or (b) SECRET information reflecting the overall program of the District or of any major subdivision, or (c) detailed information concerning the processing and development of end products.
- (2) Group II - All classified employees not included in Group I.
- (3) Group III - Unclassified employees.

Minimum requirements for clearance are as follows:

Group I - Special Service Command investigation (Service Command or Manhattan District investigation), FBI subversive file check, and FBI fingerprint check.

Group II - Routine investigation (Service Command or mail investigation conducted by the contractor, or Area Engineer's office), FBI fingerprint check, and central FBI subversive file check.

Group III - Central FBI subversive file check and fingerprint check.

7. Transmission of Records:

a. Intra-District

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(1) Proof of Citizenship and Secrecy Agreement (see Section III-A, Paragraph 14) will be retained in the contractors' file subject to inspection. Declaration of Secrecy executed by military personnel upon transfer will become a part of the individual's 201 file.

(2) Intelligence files (201) of officer personnel will be maintained at the District Security Office and will not be forwarded upon inter-area transfer. Intelligence files of contractors' personnel, Civil Service personnel, and enlisted personnel will be maintained by the Area Engineer's office having jurisdiction over the employing contractor or station and will be forwarded upon transfer of the individual to another Manhattan District station or contractor.

(3) A data card will be forwarded to the District Security office immediately upon assignment or employment of each individual and will reflect type of investigation initiated. When investigation of military and Civil Service personnel is completed the District Security Office will be advised so that the proper notation can be made on the master data card. It will not be necessary to notify the District office when the investigation of individuals other than the foregoing is completed unless derogatory information of a serious nature is developed, in which case complete information will be forwarded. Notification to the District Security Office that investigation has been favorably completed will not be necessary in the case of contractors' employees unless there is a change in the individual's clearance status, i.e., a restriction is placed or a previous restriction is removed. On all contractors' employees, this office will assume that initial clearance is in effect unless specifically advised to the contrary.

b. To Outside Agencies

(1) Upon transfer of District Civil Service personnel to other Government agencies, Intelligence files will be carefully screened and forwarded to the unit to which the employee is transferred. Upon the release or termination of contractors' employees or upon the separation, as distinguished from transfer, of Civil Service personnel, Intelligence files will be retained in the office of the Area Engineer and will not be forwarded to the Discontinued Projects Branch. (District Circular Letter, Civilian Personnel 45-11, dated 6 December 1944).

(2) Part I of ASF Circular No. 403, dated 11 December 1944, requires that an entry be made on the Service Record of an enlisted man or woman or on the Qualification Card, WD AGO Form 66-1, of an officer or warrant officer, indicating the extent, results and date of loyalty investigation or check

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conducted. The notation required by this circular will be made on the Service Record or Form 66-1 of Manhattan District military personnel when the individual is transferred from the District. All transfers from the Manhattan District are processed through the District Military Personnel Section and in each case the files of this office are checked and the proper entry is made. In view of this procedure, Circular No. 403 requires no action on the part of the Area Engineer. Intelligence files of military personnel will not be forwarded.

8. Transfer or Re-employment of Personnel:

a. Contractors' Personnel - Employees within group I (see this section Paragraph 6c) will not be transferred from one phase of the project to another phase unless transfer of such individual is specifically approved by the Area Engineer having jurisdiction over the unit to which the transfer is being made and by the Area Engineer having jurisdiction of the unit from which the transfer is proposed. In the event the individual's file contains derogatory information the approval of the District Engineer will be obtained before the transfer is effected. Request for such approval will be directed to the District Engineer, Attention: District Security Officer, and will include a recommendation by the foregoing Area Engineers as to whether approval should be granted, and if the individual is transferring from an installation other than CEW, this request will include a statement of the date and type of the individual's clearance. Decision as to transfer of other employees will be the responsibility of the Area Engineer having jurisdiction over the unit to which the transfer is to be made. Factors to be considered in approving such transfers are (1) the advantage to the District in accomplishing the transfer, (2) the hazards to security resulting from the individual obtaining information about another phase of the project, and (3) the information contained in the transferees intelligence file and employment record.

b. Civil Service Personnel - Provisions of a. above do not apply to the transfer of Civil Service employees. Prior to the transfer of a Civil Service employee, the approval of the Area Engineer and the District Executive Officer must be obtained.

c. Military Personnel - All transfers of military personnel emanate from the District Military Personnel Section which assumes full responsibility for compliance with general security policy.

9. Aliens:

a. Paragraph 61, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, provides that no alien shall be employed on a classified war contract unless consent has first been obtained from the Secretary of War. To expedite the granting of consent in cases of alien employment, this authority has been delegated to the Commanding Generals of the Service Commands.

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Consent for employment of an alien is actually granted by the Commanding Officer of the Service Command upon the recommendation of the Director, Security and Intelligence Division.

b. Aliens to be employed on classified Manhattan District work will furnish proof of alien registration and execute WD PMGO Form No. 301, in sextuplicate, which will be forwarded to the Director, Security and Intelligence, of the Service Command having jurisdiction over the employing facility, with a request that consent be granted for the alien's employment. Assignment to classified work prior to the receipt of this consent is prohibited.

c. Security of Manhattan District work requires clearance standards for aliens which are higher than those normally applied by the Service Command; consequently, letters transmitting Alien Questionnaires should specifically request that a special investigation be conducted and that a copy of the report of investigation be transmitted with the letter of consent to the requesting Area Engineer's office. Immediate arrangements to procure this additional service should be made with the Service Command inasmuch as the procedure is not in accordance with the Service Command's present operating policy.

d. It should be noted that consent for the employment of an alien by "X" company does not authorize the employment of the same alien by "Y" company within the same or another Service Command. When consent is desired for the alien's employment by a new employer, a new Alien Questionnaire must be submitted to the Service Command in which the new employer is located and new consent must be obtained. If however, consent has been granted for the alien's employment by the "X" company in "X" Service Command, temporary consent can normally be obtained by TWX for his employment by "Y" Company in "Y" Service Command, if the name of the original employer, the date of the original consent and alien registration number are furnished.

10. Master Reference List: Each area office will submit to this office and to all other area offices lists of undesirables in accordance with letter dated 8 October 1945, Subject: Compilation of Master Reference List.

11. Termination or Separation of Potential Subversives: No action be taken to terminate or separate any person for reason of their being potentially subversive without first submitting copies of reports of investigation and all information concerning the case to the District City Officer for review and approval.

12. Types of Investigations and Investigative Channels:

## Section II

a. Service Command Investigations.

(1) Special Investigations - This type of investigation is based upon local agency checks and background investigation by investigators of the Security and Intelligence Division of the Service Commands. The extent of the investigation is determined by the Service Command acting as the office of origin as the investigation progresses. Appropriate leads in other Service Commands are included in the special investigation as a routine investigative procedure.

(2) Routine Investigations - This type of investigation includes a local FBI and police check together with a limited verification of the data submitted by the subject on Personnel Security Questionnaire. Routine investigations are automatically converted into special investigations if derogatory information is developed.

(3) Submission of Requests - Requests for Service Command investigations, accompanied by three copies of the PSQ, will be forwarded to the Security and Intelligence Division of the Service Command in which the forwarding area office is located. For investigation of military personnel, general Service Command policy requires the submission of loyalty check sheet forms, in quadruplicate, in lieu of the Personnel Security Questionnaire. However, exceptions have been made by the First, Second and Third Service Commands inasmuch as the PSQ is preferred. In every case, the local Service Command's preference should be determined and followed in the submission of these requests.

b. Central FBI Subversive File Checks.

(1) This type of investigation consists of a check of central subversive files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the absence of positive information, no report is received by the requesting area office. Where derogatory information is disclosed, a summary of information or a copy of the report is furnished.

(2) Requests for central FBI subversive file checks will be forwarded to the Intelligence Officer, Washington Branch Office. Personnel Security Questionnaires for each individual to be checked, bearing a red border stamped at the bottom of the form in order to insure priority in processing, will be forwarded with a letter of transmittal, alphabetizing the PSQs submitted. Positive reports will be forwarded to the requesting office through the District Security Office.

c. Three-Way Central File Checks. This type of investigation consists of a check of the central files of the FBI, ONI, and MID. Requests will be forwarded on loyalty check sheet forms, in quadruplicate, to Major E. M. Scherer, Office of the A. C. of S., G-2,

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Who's Who Branch, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C., who will conduct all three checks. If immediate action is desired, the loyalty check sheet form should bear an EXPEDITE stamp to insure priority in processing. When expedite checks are requested by TWX, identifying information will include full name, date and place of birth and permanent address.

d. Service Command Agency Checks. This type include checks of the subversive files of the Headquarters, SID, District Headquarters, ONI, appropriate FBI field office, and local police. One copy of the Personnel Security Questionnaire should be forwarded for each agency to be checked. For military personnel, general Service Command policy requires the submission of loyalty check sheet forms in lieu of the PSQ. If there is an urgent need for an expedite agency check it will be requested of the nearest Branch Intelligence Office, with the facts indicating the urgency requiring expedite handling and sufficient identifying information. This type of check should be held to an absolute minimum.

e. FBI Criminal Fingerprint Checks (Civilian). This type of investigation consists of a fingerprint check against the criminal files of the FBI. National Defense Fingerprint Charts will be forwarded by the Area Engineer to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C., Attention: Mr. S. W. Reynolds. T-2 criminal records will be returned directly to the requesting office.

f. FBI Criminal File Checks (Military). Criminal record checks for military personnel are available and requests will be forwarded to the Washington Branch Office for transmission to the FBI. Requests for criminal record check will state the individual's given name, middle initial or initials, last name, and Army Serial Number (original serial number will be given if the number has been changed). To facilitate expeditious handling by the FBI, the 3" x 5" form, (Exhibit I), will show in the upper right hand corner the requesting office indicated as follows: Manhattan District \_\_\_\_\_ Area. Reports will be returned to the requesting office through the Washington Branch Intelligence Office.

g. Investigations Conducted by Contractors. Mail investigations conducted by contractors and investigations conducted by credit agencies, when supplemented by the central FBI subversive file check or Service Command agency check and an FBI criminal check, will be considered equivalent to the routine investigation normally conducted by the Service Command.

h. Investigations by Intelligence Division, Manhattan District. There may be instances when, because of the importance of the Subject, or the position, or because of information previously

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developed, it will be desirable to supplement a previous investigation or have the whole personnel clearance investigation conducted by the Intelligence Division, Manhattan District. In such cases the request, accompanied by any previous report of investigation, will be forwarded to the District Security Officer.

13. Company Clearance Procedure: It will be the responsibility of the Area Engineer to initiate the clearance of any company with which a contract is made to provide material or services, classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher. The Area Engineer will obtain sufficient identifying data from the Company to form the basis of a request for agency checks on the company and on its key personnel. (Dun and Bradstreet, Moody's Register, and Poor's Register will frequently be found helpful).

a. Request for checks of the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, and Military Intelligence Division will be made on the company and key personnel in the same manner as agency checks are made for the clearance of personnel, and in the absence of derogatory information these checks will normally suffice for clearance. If, however, in the opinion of the Area Engineer, further investigation is considered necessary a request for such investigation will be directed to the office of the District Security Division which, in turn, will complete the investigation.

b. Upon clearance of a company the files of investigation made will be forwarded to the District Security Division.

14. Distribution of Section II: It will be necessary for the Area Engineer to extract, supplement, and distribute pertinent portions of this section to instruct contractors in the proper methods of initiating clearance for its employees.



Section III.

SECTION III - SAFEGUARDING MILITARY INFORMATION

A. Security of Information

. . General: These regulations, based on the rules and intent of Regulations 380-5 entitled "Safeguarding Military Information", with such amendments deemed applicable to the Manhattan District project, which is prosecuted mainly by civilian personnel, govern operations pertaining to classified Manhattan District information.

. . Definitions: To facilitate an understanding of the contents of this section, the following terms are defined:

a. Classified Information: Information, officially designated as TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL or RESTRICTED.

b. Document: The term "Document" includes printed, mimeographed, typed, photostated, and written matter of all kinds; maps, photomaps, drawings, notes, and blueprints, or photostatic copies thereof; photographs and photographic negatives; correspondence and plans; and all similar matter.

c. Engineering Data: The term "engineering data" comprises drawings, prints, photostats, photographs, mathematical calculations, formulae, processes, and similar information which can be reduced to documentary form.

d. Materiel: The term "materiel" comprises all equipment, devices, and supplies, both complete and in process of development and construction, including models that show features in whole or in part, machines, apparatus, fixtures, and all components or accessories thereof.

e. Top Secret: Certain Secret documents, information, and materiel, the security aspect of which is paramount, and whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave danger to the nation, shall be classified TOP SECRET. (For examples see District Circular Letter (MI 46-1), dated 26 July 1945, Subject: District Regulations for TOP SECRET material.)

f. Secret Matter: Information or features contained therein, the disclosure of which might endanger national security, cause serious injury to the interest or prestige of the nation or any governmental activity, or be of great advantage to a foreign nation, is classified SECRET. The following are examples of items which shall be classified SECRET:



~~SECRET~~

Section III.

(1) Documents containing specific design details (diagrammatic or descriptive) of complete basic or key equipment, apparatus, instruments, or machinery employed in a critical stage of the processing and production of end products, or the methods of manufacture (where unique to the Manhattan District) of such items; also, the materiel itself, as described above.

(2) Documents containing complete uncoded flow sheets, diagrams, or reactions, including specific pressures, temperatures, voltages, rates, formulae, and other operating details not described in the Smyth\* Report, specifically related to a critical step in the preparation, processing, separation, or purification of basic feed materials, and principal end products.

(3) Documents containing unique nuclear, physical, and chemical characteristics of end products, and critical process materials (including, for example, barrier material and neutron moderators), and also details of the manufacture (where unique to the District) of such materials. Also the products and materials themselves when they disclosed such information.

(4) Documents showing the meaning of a name or symbol used as a code, where the code name or symbol refers to matters classifiable as SECRET.

(5) Documents pointing out the existence of unique operational or production hazards, their nature and solution.

(6) Details pertaining to features of special shipping containers, routes and schedules of shipments of Secret materials, except as classified TOP SECRET.

g. Confidential Matter: Information, or features contained therein, the disclosure of which although not endangering the national security, might be prejudicial to the interest or prestige of the United States, a governmental activity, or an individual, or be of advantage to a foreign nation, is classified CONFIDENTIAL. Confidential shall include items of the following nature:

(1) Documents containing specific design details (diagrammatic or descriptive) of incomplete components of basic or key equipment, apparatus, instruments, or machinery employed in a critical stage of the processing and production of end products, or the methods of manufacture (where unique to the District) of such items. Also the materiel itself, as described above.

\*"Atomic Energy for Military Purposes" by H. D. Smyth, 1945.

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(2) Documents containing incomplete uncoded flow sheets, diagrams or reactions; or specific pressures, temperatures, voltages, rates, formulae, and other operating details related to a non-critical step in the preparation, processing, separation, or purification of basic feed materials, and principal end products where not described in the Smyth\* Report.

(3) Documents containing unique physical and chemical characteristics of special materials not pertaining to the product material or process but used to overcome operational problems unique to the District. Also critical details of the manufacture of such materials and the materials themselves. (Examples: special lubricants, seals, and solvents.)

(4) Documents showing the meaning of code names or symbols used to refer to Confidential information.

(5) Documents relating to special investigations, clearance, or assignment of personnel who will have knowledge of, or access to, classified information wherein adverse information is reflected.

(6) Details pertaining to features of special shipping containers, routes and schedules of shipments of confidential materials.

h. Restricted Matter: Information, or features contained therein, which is for official use only, or when disclosure should be limited for reasons of administrative privacy, or denied the general public, is classified RESTRICTED. The following are examples of items which shall be classified as RESTRICTED:

(1) Documents concerning relatively unimportant administrative and personnel matters which should not be disclosed to the general public except on a controlled basis.

e.g., Allotments of money; personnel; organization; salary scales; requests for deferments; regulations and working conditions of employees; personnel clearance investigations developing adverse information;

(2) Documents concerning relatively unimportant technical and operating information which should not be disclosed to be general public except on a controlled basis.

e.g., routine repetitive log sheets, chemical control forms which refer to a small portion only of a process; technology design and fabric of certain non-technical equipment and apparatus where specific application to a process is not indicated.

\*"Atomic Energy for Military Purposes" by H.D. Smyth, 1945.

~~RESTRICTED~~  
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3. Responsibility:

a. General: The safeguarding of classified information is the responsibility of all military personnel and civilian employees of the War Department, and of THE MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEES OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMERCIAL FIRMS engaged on this work. The officer or civilian in charge of each organization so engaged is responsible that all military personnel and civilian employees are familiar with these regulations. Contractors are responsible that all sub-contractors or agents allotted classified work are informed of these regulations.

b. Right to Possess Classified Information: Two cardinal rules govern the right to possess classified information:

(1) The person must be authorized to have the information (i.e., must require the information in connection with official duties and in performance of his work.)

(2) If the person is authorized to have classified information, then he is entitled to only so much as is necessary for him to perform his job. Thus, no person in the military service, person employed by the War Department or by contractors engaged on this project is entitled to classified information solely by virtue of his commission or official position.

c. Loss or Subjection to Compromise: Any individual connected with this project in any way whatsoever who may have knowledge of the loss or subjection to compromise of a classified document or article of material shall promptly report that fact to the responsible custodian, who shall, in turn, report such information to his superiors for transmittal to the Area Engineer supervising the installation involved.

4. Reproduction:

a. Top Secret: See District Circular Letter (MI 46-1), dated 26 July 1945. Subject: District Regulations for TOP SECRET Material.

b. Secret: Will be reproduced by permission of originating office except in cases of emergency where circumstances will not permit time for such request. In these cases notice will be given to the originator as soon as possible. Extracts which will bear a classification lower than Secret may be made from Secret documents without securing permission of the originator. (See also Paragraph 9 b, this section - Accounting, Secret).

c. Confidentials: May be reproduced by persons authorized to classify Confidential. Copies will have same classification and care as the original.

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~~RESTRICTED~~

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d. Restricted: May be reproduced by persons authorized to classify Restricted. Copies will have same classification and care as the original.

e. General: When necessary to reproduce classified documents through the use of an organization's general facilities or those of an outside concern, the authority directing the reproduction will insure the careful handling of the material and disposal of notes, manuscripts, plates, stencils, negatives and wastage incident thereto in a manner which will safeguard the secrecy of the information being reproduced and insure return of all material.

f. The making of abstracts, notes, photographs, sketches, or other copy of classified District documents, models or work by any personnel employed on the project, including scientific or consultant personnel, for personal files or records is strictly prohibited.

5. Classification:

a. By Whom:

(1) TOP SECRET (See District Circular Letter MI 46-1.)

(2) Secret: By any commissioned officer, by the head of an organization performing MED work, and by limited number of others designated by him whose responsibility it will be to insure that all material bears the proper classification and receives the proper care.

(3) Confidential: Same as for Secret.

(4) Restricted: Any Project worker.

b. Marking: The classification of a document shall be indicated preferably by stamped impression of letters (red if possible) not less than one-quarter inch in height. Stencils and similar items may be marked with the typewriter provided capitals are used and the classification is underscored in such a manner that it will be as conspicuous as possible. The classification on tracings and other items to be reproduced shall be similarly underscored. Except as noted below, each separate page or sheet of a document will be marked at the top and bottom.

(1) Classified books and pamphlets, the pages of which are permanently and securely fastened together, shall be marked on the front of cover, title page, first page and back of cover. Three staples, or the equivalent, provided the

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pages are of such quality as to offer adequate resistance to tearing, shall be considered permanent and secure fastening.

(2) Classified photographic negatives, drawings, or tracings shall carry a legend of the proper classification in such position that it will be reproduced on all copies made therefrom or clearly marked at top and on the back with the proper classification.

(3) Contracts for the manufacture of classified material shall be plainly and conspicuously marked, not typed, with the proper classification on the first page.

(4) Classified maps and photomaps shall be appropriately marked under the scale.

c. Additional Marking: Classified documents furnished or accessible to persons other than those of the military or naval services and their civilian employees will, in addition to being marked, Top Secret, Secret, Confidential or Restricted, bear the following notation (preferably by rubber stamp) which will be placed in a conspicuous place on the document.

"This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

6. Dissemination:

a. When Given to Authorized Persons not Subject to Military Law: Such persons shall be made thoroughly acquainted with all pertinent regulations and specifically instructed that transmission of classified information to any unauthorized individual is strictly prohibited by law. See also Additional Marking, Paragraph 5 c, this section.

b. Oral Discussion: Either public or private discussion of classified information with or in the presence of unauthorized persons is strictly forbidden. Since employees must necessarily discuss problems related to the work in the performance of their duties, it is advisable to invent fictitious terms or code names, which are not descriptive, for reference to secret or confidential matters which it is necessary to discuss. The invention of such language is left to the individual organization so that the terms used will not be uniform throughout all phases of the general project.

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c. Negotiations and Consultations with Outsiders: In the event it becomes necessary or advisable to discuss classified project information with consultants, experts, manufacturers, or other persons not directly connected with the project and not properly cleared, authority shall be secured from the District Engineer or the Area Engineer serving the contractor. It is necessary that the contractors obtain the written approval of the District Engineer or his authorized representative prior to entering negotiations involving classified information with prospective sub-contractors.

Requests for such approval shall be directed to the Area Engineer serving the prime contractor. After authority has been received from the District Engineer or his authorized representative and prior to the dissemination of any classified information, notice in accord with Paragraph 5 c, this section, Additional Marking, will be made.

d. Security Procedure for Consultants: Further, in order to obviate breaches of security by indiscreet talk by consultants having access to classified information, the officer responsible for the installation by which the consultant is engaged will assure himself that the following procedure is accomplished whenever it becomes necessary to enlist the services of consultants:

(1) Clearance will be accomplished in accordance with Section II, Paragraph 6.

(2) An appropriate oral caution should be given concerning the necessity for protecting all technical information gained about the Manhattan District.

(3) Declaration of Secrecy I (See Exhibit II) should be signed at the completion of the consulting period.

7. Cancellation or Change of Classification:

a. It is the obligation of all authorities to keep classified matter constantly under review and to downgrade it as soon as conditions permit. (See Section I, Paragraph 7.)

b. By Whom:

(1) TOP SECRET (See District Circular Letter MI 46-1)

(2) Secret: By any commissioned officer of the MED, who will thereupon notify all other recipients of copies of the change.



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is required containing no classified information. It will be signed by receiver and returned as soon as possible to sender.

(2) Between Installations :

- (a) Form - Transmitted in an inner and outer cover with typewritten matter protected from direct contact with inner cover. The inner envelope shall be sealed with wax protected by scotch tape and shall be addressed in the usual manner and marked SECRET so that the classification will be seen immediately when the outer envelope is removed. The outer envelope shall be carefully sealed and addressed in the ordinary manner and shall bear no indication of the classified nature of its contents.
- (b) Means - Within the United States, between authorized personnel either personally or by an especially trustworthy person who has been properly cleared. Otherwise transmittal shall be accomplished by U.S. Registered mail.
- (c) Caution - When it is necessary to transport classified material personally or by messenger away from an office, an inventory reflecting appropriate identification of the classified papers taken will be made, and a copy of the inventory, properly classified, will be retained in the office of the responsible officer or other person transporting the documents, until the documents are accounted for.

Thus, in the event such classified documents are lost, immediate notice of exactly what information has been compromised may be given to the appropriate security officer.

- (d) Receipts - For Documents: Will be prepared in triplicate; the original to be signed by the recipient and returned to the sender; the duplicate will be retained by the recipient, and the triplicate will be held in sender's suspense file. Copies will be inclosed with the documents and will reflect the date, serial or file number and the number of inclosures or indorsements in space provided.

Sample copy of receipt form is attached to District Circular Letter (Corresp. 44-8), 19 April 1944.

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- (e) Receipts - For Registered Mail: The use of Post Office Department return receipt (Form No. 3811) attached to the outer cover of Secret and Confidential matter sent by registered mail in addition to classified document receipts is unnecessary except in transmission of Secret and Confidential matter to and from United States installations in Canada and in those cases in which the time element or other special circumstances are such as to make it desirable that information of the arrival of the document or other matter at its destination should reach the addressor at the earliest possible moment.

d. Confidential Documents:

(1) Intra Office - Covered by a protective sheet, addressed to person authorized to receive the documents delivered by an authorized messenger. Receipt is optional with sender.

(2) Between Installations :

- (a) Form ) Same as for Secret documents  
(b) Means ) except that when in the opinion of the transmitting officer no serious consequences will be entailed by their loss such documents may be transmitted by ordinary mail.

(c) Receipt - Receipt forms are not required unless sender considers matter of special importance; in such cases, receipt forms are same as those used for Secret documents.

e. Restricted Documents: Transmittal may be accomplished by authorized messenger or by ordinary mail. The receipt form is not required and double envelopes are unnecessary.

f. Caution: When transmitted to authorized civilians other than those of military or naval services, classified documents will bear the additional warning stamp described in Paragraph 5 c, above.

g. Transmittal Letters:

(1) A letter of transmittal or cover letter will be classified no lower than the highest classification carried by any of the inclosures. It should be noted that in some

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cases a letter may be deserving of a higher classification than any of its inclosures.

(2) In transmitting a group of documents, attachments, or inclosures to a letter, each document, attachment or letter will carry its own independent classification.

h. Records and Files: (See also Section VI, Paragraph 4.) Instances such as contract terminations, closing of offices, etc., requiring transmission of a quantity of classified files or records, the following means of shipping shall be used:

(1) TOP SECRET - (See District Circular Letter MI 46-1.)

(2) SECRET.

(a) Registered mail.

(b) Railway express or money way bill with carrier's guards.

(c) Ordinary railway express, commercial air express, rail freight service, motor truck freight or water freight service - if, in each case, accompanied by military guards.

(3) CONFIDENTIAL.

(a) Any of above means.

(b) Ordinary mail.

(c) Sealed freight or express cars.

(d) Sealed truck.

(4) RESTRICTED.

(a) Any of above means.

(b) Express.

(c) Freight.

Accounting:

a. Top Secret: (See District Circular Letter MI 46-1)

b. Secret: A strict system of accounting for all Secret material originated or received shall be established. Only the

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minimum number of copies required will be made.

(1) Number of Separate Copies - Each separate copy of Secret document shall bear a notation in the upper right-hand corner of the first page indicating the number of pages or sheets of which the document consists, the series designation for that particular group of copies, and the number of that copy within the group. The series designation shall be by capital letter beginning with the letter "A". For example, when three copies of an original document consisting of five pages are produced, the first copy is marked as follows:

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This document consists of 5 pages.  
No. 1 of 3 copies, Series A.

---

The second copy will be "No. 2 of 3 copies, Series "A"; and the third, "No. 3 of 3 copies, Series "A". In computing the number of copies, the ribbon copy shall be considered as one copy; i.e. one ribbon and two carbon copies shall be counted as three copies. If, after original preparation, additional copies of a document are required, subsequent series shall be designated "B", "C", "D", etc.

(2) File Record - The originator or writer shall record on his retained file copy of each Secret document the complete distribution of each series. In the event the recipient of a copy of such document requires additional copies he shall request them from that originator. (Also see Paragraph 4b, this section, Reproduction, Secret.)

(3) Verification of Receipt.

(a) Receipt File - To verify the receipt of Secret documents by addressees, signed receipts as indicated in Paragraph 8c (2) (d), this section, shall be required and filed upon return. When transmitting a Secret document the triplicate copy of the receipt form shall be retained in an abeyant file to insure return of signed copy by the addressee. Upon receipt by the addressee, he shall sign and return to the sender the original form and file the duplicate copy. The original receipt form shall be permanently filed by the sender upon return and the triplicate copy may be removed from the abeyant file and destroyed. In this manner, through the medium of receipts, an accurate check is possible at any time to

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determine whether or not Secret documents have been safely delivered to the addressees.

- (b) In large organizations where a central mailing and receiving section is established for handling classified material, a record book shall be maintained to indicate for each Secret document, the date, copy number, serial letter, names of sender and addressee, reference or file number, postal registry number, and date of receipt or mailing. When the signed receipt for outgoing mail is returned, the date of receipt by the addressee shall be noted in the book to complete the record. When such a record book is maintained centrally, the receipt records required above shall be maintained by the central file, in which case only two copies of the receipt may be required, both forwarded to the recipient.

c. Confidential: When in the opinion of the sender - based on importance of the information contained in the document - necessary to number each separate copy, the procedure out-for Secret documents will be followed.

d. Restricted: No accounting required.

Storage:

a. General:

(1) Rules - Classified documents received by or transmitted within the Project shall not be handled unsealed by the regular administrative employees. Secret or Confidential material shall never be left on desks or locked in desks, when not actually in use or under the care of the individual responsible for its storage. Classified documents shall not be taken away from the offices for any reason without the express permission, in each case, of the person responsible for their custody.

(2) Charge Slips When Secret or Confidential documents are removed from the files for issuance to authorized employees, where practical, the custodian shall prepare a memorandum charge slip containing a description of the documents, the name of employee to whom issued, and the date. At the close of business each day, the custodian should check the charge slips to determine whether or not all documents have been returned. In the event any document is not returned, the custodian shall check immediately to insure that prior authority was obtained for retention of the document.

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(3) Appointment and Function of Duty Officer - The officer in charge of each section, or in the case of civilians the responsible authority for each section, shall designate a "Duty Officer" for each day who shall be charged with the responsibility of checking at the close of each day's business all safes and files in his section to see that classified information is properly secured. He will certify to same on a Duty Sheet.

b. TOP SECRET - Will be stored in a three-combination safe to which only persons entitled to receive the information and designated confidential secretaries will have access. (See District Circular Letter MI 46-1.)

c. Secret and Confidential Documents - Will be stored in the most secure files available, preferably a three-way combination safe. The following will be prominently displayed on the inside of every safe or combination file:

- names, addresses and telephone numbers of persons to be advised if the repository is found open after hours.
- names, addresses and telephone numbers of persons knowing the combination.
- date on which the combination was last changed.

If a key repository must be used, keys therefor will be possessed only by the responsible executive and his designated assistant.

Each safe combination shall be regularly changed at least twice each year and immediately upon reasonable suspicion that it has become known to unauthorized persons or when an authorized employee possessing the combination leaves the Project. Cabinet file locks shall be immediately changed upon loss of a key.

d. Restricted Documents - Will be stored in such a manner as to insure a reasonable degree of security.

11. Destruction:

a. TOP SECRET - See Confidential District Circular Letter (MI 46-1), 26 July 1945.

b. Secret and Confidential - shall be shredded and burned by the custodian in the presence of a disinterested, responsible person, preferably an officer, or turned over to the Classified Files Section to destroy.

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Certificate of destruction will be signed by the witnessing civilian or officer and sent to the officer or chief directing the destruction.

c. Restricted Documents - Will be torn to shreds or burned or otherwise destroyed by an authorized employee so as to render them useless.

d. Disposal of Waste - Classified waste, including all work sheets, drafts, carbon paper, stenographic notes, imperfect copies, stencils, etc., shall be torn into small pieces and safeguarded until burned under the supervision of a trusted employee who has been properly cleared to handle classified information. Under no circumstances shall cleaning people or other service employees be given access to restricted areas until proper disposition has been made of waste materials. If it is desirable to retain any of the above items, they shall be given the same classification and safeguarded in the same manner as the material produced from them.

12. Transmission of Classified Teletype Messages: Area Engineers insure that all personnel are informed of current instructions for ration and transmission of cryptographic messages.

13. Publicity: Questions pertaining to the public release of information should be referred to Public Relations Officers of the act.

14. Declaration of Secrecy, Civilian Personnel:

a. All civilian personnel, U.S.E.D. and employees of classified contractors, of the Manhattan District will be required to execute one of the following Secrecy Declaration forms upon employment:

(1) Declaration I (See Exhibit II) will be accomplished by all physicists, chemists, consultants, and other employees of similar scientific caliber upon entering employment.

(2) Declaration II (See Exhibit III) will be accomplished by all other personnel upon employment engaged upon classified work, such as technicians, machinists, electricians, draftsmen, stenographers, clerks, laborers.

b. Reference is made to Paragraphs 15b, (2) (a) and (b), this section, Subject: Exit Interviews, etc., which requires employees again to sign the appropriate declaration of secrecy form upon termination of employment after receiving an exit interview.

c. The responsibility for the accomplishment of these declarations of secrecy will rest with individual contractors and appropriate U.S.E.D. personnel. The executed declaration will be retained in the individual's personal file maintained by the

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contractor or by U.S.E.D. civilian personnel sections. These declaration forms may be reproduced locally or supplies may be obtained from the District Office.

d. Area Engineers and supervising officers will take necessary steps to bring the above requirements to the attention of classified contractors.

15. Exit Interviews for Military and Civilian Personnel:

a. All military personnel who are relieved from assignment to the Manhattan District, U.S.E.D. Civilian Personnel, and personnel of classified contractors, upon termination of employment from work of interest to the District will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them the importance of maintaining the security of the project and warning them of their obligations in this regard and of the laws and statutes which apply.

b. Exit interviews are mandatory and will be accomplished as follows:

(1) Military Personnel.

(a) Officer Personnel - Exit interviews will be given by Colonel K. D. Nichols or designated assistants. In the areas of the District, the Area Engineer or his designated representative will administer the interview. Upon the occasion of these interviews, the officer being relieved will execute the letter, Subject: Safeguarding Information (See Exhibit IV). These forms will be forwarded to the District Office, Attention: Military Personnel Section; except that Site Y will retain the forms accomplished by officer personnel not carried on the Manhattan District rolls.

(b) Enlisted Personnel - Exit interviews will be given by commanding officer of Special Engineer Detachment, the appropriate Area Engineer or some other officer specifically designated by him. Upon the occasion of such interviews, the enlisted man will execute the letter, Subject: "Safeguarding Information" (See Exhibit IV). These forms will be forwarded to the District Office, Attention: Military Personnel Section, except that Site Y will retain the forms accomplished by enlisted personnel not carried on the Manhattan District rolls.

(2) Civilian Personnel:

(a) U.S.E.D. Personnel - Exit interviews will be

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given by division or section heads of the Manhattan District, CEW, HEW, or by appropriate Area Engineers or their designated representatives. At the end of the interview, the employee will again sign the appropriate secrecy declaration which he signed upon employment. In connection with the signing of the secrecy declaration at the end of the exit interview, the official witnessing the signing of the declaration will include the following certification:

"I certify that the importance of safeguarding military information and penalties of the Espionage Act for violation of this declaration were stressed orally to this employee prior to his affixing signature hereto upon separation from employment."

These statements will be forwarded with the other forms required by Paragraph 6, District Circular Letter (Civilian Personnel 45-17), dated 15 May 1945 to the District Office, Attention: Civilian Personnel Section; except that Site Y, HEW, and MSA will retain secrecy forms accomplished by civilian personnel.

(b) Classified Contractor Personnel - Exit interviews will be given upon severance of employment by appropriate persons designated by individual contractors. At the end of the interview, the employee will again sign the appropriate declaration of secrecy executed upon employment. In connection with the signing of the Declaration of Secrecy at the time of the exit interview, the official witnessing the signing of the declaration will include the certification set forth in Paragraph b, (2), (a) above. The executed declaration will be retained in the individual's personnel file maintained by the contractor.

c. Local reproduction of the letter, (Exhibit IV), Subject: "Safeguarding Information", is authorized. Duplicate copies of the letter should be given to the individual signing same.

d. Area Engineers and supervising officers will take necessary steps to bring the above requirements to the attention of classified contractors.

Security Education: An active Security Education Program will be instituted at all facilities doing classified District work to insure maximum security of information. The object of security education is to alert and instruct personnel, particularly scientific and technical personnel, concerning what project information is classified under what policies, the continuing need for protecting classified information, and the mechanics for safeguarding same. This demands a program

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that is realistic as to what matters are to be protected and the categories of persons concerned. It is suggested that maintaining a realistic policy and insuring its maximum success can best be accomplished by a close alliance of security officials with management and "on the job" superintendents, foremen and supervisors, including frequent meetings with such groups for discussions of security problems. Security officials can thus maintain their perspective as to what remains to be protected and formulate instruction and security reminders from a more wholesome viewpoint with the assistance of such supervisory personnel. Also by working closely with these people, security officials can obtain technical advice regarding information that is to be protected as well as encourage the understanding of security by persons in a position to be an example and thus capitalize on the "boss says so" psychology. This approach, of working with management and supervisory personnel as much as possible, is advocated in preference to general security lectures but not to supplant the continued use of billboards, posters, payroll inserts, and other reminder material.

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Section III-B

SECTION III - SAFEGUARDING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

B: CONTRACT COMPLETIONS AND TERMINATIONS

1. Foreword: Completion or termination of a classified contract does not necessarily conclude District interest in that particular contract. Steps must be taken to insure that the security of classified information, documents, and materiel pertaining to work performed under the contract is maintained as long as the classification is in effect.

2. Responsibility: The disposition of classified documents and materiel upon the completion or termination of Manhattan District contracts is the responsibility of contracting officers. Prime contractors handling the completion of contracts, subcontracts, or purchase orders managed by them should also be assisted and advised where necessary on security matters by the officer to whom the prime contractor is responsible.

3. Plan of Action:

a. Successful completion proceedings on any contract from a security standpoint will depend, to a great extent, upon the preparation of a comprehensive plan of action by the contracting officer to be carried out without delay. Security personnel must keep themselves advised of impending completions and terminations and coordinate their activities with those of the other administrative and technical staff members to accomplish this.

b. Prior to taking any action, security personnel must thoroughly familiarize themselves with the provisions of the contract and should also be familiar with security survey reports and other pertinent records so that a thorough understanding of the security requirements of each contract concerned is obtained.

c. Consideration should be given to reduction in or removal of classification of a contract or the papers pertaining to it. If such action be deemed feasible, recommendation to that effect should be forwarded to the District Engineer.

d. In many cases contracts for standard items of manufacture have been classified to protect information relative to the volume of orders or to prevent the association of certain items with the Manhattan District. Such contracts may be readily completed since the disposition of classified materiel is not involved and the number of classified documents will be few. A letter from the contracting officer to the contractor pointing out the necessity for continued security of information and requesting return of classified documents other than essential

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records of the contractor may be the only action necessary to satisfy security requirements. What was done to complete the contract should be briefly indicated in the Security Completion Report. (See Paragraph 6, below.)

e. Where several contracts are being performed at one location, it may be desirable to delay completion negotiations until work under all contracts has been completed.

4. Disposition of Classified Materiel upon Termination or Completion of Contracts: District Circular Letter (C. and C. 45-16), dated 2 February 1945, sets forth the administrative procedures to be followed in disposing of classified materiel upon termination or completion of contracts. The Area Engineer will assure himself that during these proceedings there is no compromise to the security of the project.

5. Disposition of Classified Documents, Drawings, Prints, Designs, etc., Upon Completion or Termination of a Classified Contract:

a. In order to preserve the security of the project, it is desirable to relieve contractors, whose contracts have terminated, of all classified documents, drawings, prints, designs, etc. It is realized that the ability of the contracting officer to relieve the contractor of these items is, in many cases, contingent upon the contract provisions, and obligations imposed upon the contractor by law to retain them, and the desire of the contractor to retain them or place them in the custody of the District Engineer.

b. Provided the terms of the contract are not inconsistent with the instructions contained in this sub-section of the manual, the contracting officer will, in writing, instruct the contractor:

(1) To prepare for transmittal to the District Engineer all classified papers, documents, plans, specifications, drawings, models, etc., relating to the contract, or to any subcontract title to which items vests in the government or which are otherwise required to be turned over to the government in accordance with the contract provisions. These items should be screened by the contracting officer and duplicate or non-essential items destroyed.

(2) To prepare for transmittal to the District Engineer all other classified papers, documents, plans, specifications, drawings, models, etc., which are not necessary for retention by the contractor. The items should be screened by the contracting officer and will be disposed of by destruction in accordance with existing security regulations or, if

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preservation for future use by the contractor is necessary, by transmitting the same to the District Engineer properly labeled and packaged.

(3) To take necessary steps in accordance with sub-paragraph f. hereunder to safeguard those items retained.

c. The contractor shall furnish the contracting officer with a list in triplicate itemizing, in the order in which they are packaged, the papers, documents, etc., being transmitted in accordance with the preceding sub-paragraph b. This list shall be transmitted separately from the packages of papers, etc. The contracting officer will have the responsibility of distributing the list as follows:

(1) Two copies for the files of the contracting officer (one copy to be included in the Area Engineer's Security Completion Report).

(2) One copy to the office of the District Engineer, Attention: Record Retirement Unit.

d. The procedure set forth below shall be followed in transporting and delivering the items referred to in sub-paragraph b of this paragraph:

(1) Each parcel should contain, on the inside, an inventory of its contents.

(2) Parcels will be addressed to the District Engineer, Attention: Record Retirement Unit.

(3) Transportation of records shall be in accordance with instructions set forth in Section III-A, Paragraph 8h of this manual.

e. When the contractor retains classified documents, drawings, etc., the contracting officer, or his authorized representative, will advise the contractor (1) of the penalties prescribed by the Espionage Act for the unauthorized disclosure of classified information and (2) that classification of any documents, drawings, etc., retained by him will be maintained until such time as the contracting officer shall notify the contractor classification is reduced or cancelled.

f. The contractor shall furnish the contracting officer with:

(1) A statement, in duplicate, that he understands and agrees to the provisions of e above, and

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Section III-B

(2) A list, in duplicate, of classified documents and other items retained by the contractor, indicating their location, classification, and safeguards taken to protect the security thereof.

The original of both the statement and list, required above, will be retained in the files of the contracting officer. The duplicate will be attached to the Security Completion Report.

g. In exception to the above procedure, contracting officers will insure that copies of any research reports prepared and submitted officially under a research contract, or any copies of research reports issued to the contractor directly or indirectly by the Research Control Section, when transmitted to the District are segregated and marked for the attention of the Research Control Section, rather than the Records Retirement Unit.

h. All classified documents, drawings, etc., pertaining to a subcontractor will be handled in accordance with the above prescribed procedure and the prime contractor will be responsible to the contracting officer for carrying out these requirements.

i. In connection with the disposition of records, reference is made to District Circular Letter (Adm. 46-4), dated 22 October 1945.

6. Security Completion Report: A report on the security aspects of completion proceedings on all classified contracts or contracts under which classified work has been performed will be prepared on a Security Completion Report form (see Exhibit V). At the earliest practicable date after conclusion of completion proceedings, this report will be forwarded to the District Engineer, Attention: District Security Officer. The report will describe completion proceedings, and as indicated by the information requested on the instruction sheet appended to the report form, will include the results of a security inspection to be made at those installations retaining documents and materiel classified Confidential or higher.

## SECTION IV - VISITOR CONTROL

1. Purpose: With the establishment of positive measures to investigate and control persons employed on classified work it is essential that equally effective measures be adopted to prevent unauthorized closure of information by other individuals. The many related functions of installations within the District and the frequent need of vice and assistance from outside agencies necessitates permitting persons other than employees of a given installation to enter its restricted areas or to discuss classified matters. Such persons, present a serious security problem; consequently, a District Visitor Control has been adopted with the following objectives:

a. Insure that visits are limited to those which contribute to the advancement of the work.

b. Determine that all visitors allowed access to classified information are properly cleared.

c. Fully advise the unit to be visited of what information may be disclosed to the visitor.

2. Visitors Defined: Any person admitted to an installation who is not an employee regularly assigned to that installation is a visitor. Separate plants or offices regardless of location maintained by one contractor and engaged upon the same contract or contracts of identical nature may be considered as single installations and employees required to travel between these plants or locations in the performance of their duties will not be considered visitors.

a. Classified Visitor - Any visitor allowed access to CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET information or admitted to restricted areas in which CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET work is performed.

b. Casual Visitor - Any visitor not allowed access to classified information or restricted areas.

3. Conditions for the Admission of Visitors

a. Casual Visitors - The admission of casual visitors is the responsibility of officials in charge of individual installations. However, all visitors should be registered and accompanied while on the premises. No visitor should be admitted except for legitimate and necessary business.

b. Classified Visitors - The admission of classified visitors to installations engaged upon Manhattan District work is a responsibility of the Area Engineer or Operations Officer supervising

SECTION IV

the respective installations. Contractors are not permitted to admit classified visitors without the written approval of the responsible Area Engineer or Operations Officer. Normally this written approval should be in the form of the standard "Manhattan Engineer District Visitor Permit". However, if local conditions justify written approval may be granted in the form of letter, authentication of a pass requisition or issuance of a signed local pass.

c. Identification Proof - All visitors should carry credentials which will positively establish their identity. An identification card displaying photograph; fingerprint of one or both thumbs, or index finger; signature of the holder; a description of his personal characteristics; and personally signed by the holder's employer is considered adequate identification. Social security cards, draft registration cards and drivers' licenses may also be considered in establishing one's identity. Military personnel of the Manhattan District carry Manhattan District Identification Cards.

4. Conditions for the Clearance of Classified Visitors - Prior to the issuance of written approval for a CLASSIFIED VISIT, the issuing officer should;

a. Determine that proposed visit is necessary to the advancement of the project.

b. Check Loyalty of Visitor

(1) If visitor is employed on some other phase of the project he has probably already been cleared for access to classified information. In each instance, nevertheless, personnel files should be checked since many employees are limited as to the degree of classified information which they may receive.

(2) If visitor is not already employed on some phase of the project, he should be "cleared" in accordance with the procedure established for classified employees.

c. Check Citizenship of Visitor - Request for visits by aliens must be submitted to the District Engineer for approval by AC of S G-2. (See pp 70, AR 380-5).

d. Check Special Instructions - From time to time special instructions are issued by the Commanding General and the District Engineer governing visits to certain installations and the disclosure of certain categories of classified information. Each officer will be responsible for full compliance with all special instructions.

## 5. Special Cases

a. Project Executives - The following Manhattan District officers shall be admitted to any facility as a CLASSIFIED VISITOR upon presentation of their official War Department identification card (W.D. A.G.O. Form 65):

Major General L. R. Groves  
Brigadier General T. F. Farrell  
Colonel K. D. Nichols  
Colonel E. E. Kirkpatrick  
Colonel E. H. Marsden  
Colonel S. L. Brown  
Colonel W. B. Parsons

The above may also authorize visits to any installation of the Manhattan District.

b. Area Engineers and Operations Officers may be admitted as Classified Visitors to installations under their jurisdiction upon presentation of their official War Department identification.

6. Use of Standard Visitor Permit - Wherever practical, written authorization for visits should be made on the standard Manhattan District Visitor Permit Form. This form is intended to serve as (1) an application or permission to visit and (2) after being signed by the responsible officer, as a permit authorizing the visit. Previous instructions on the distribution of copies of this form are rescinded. Hereafter, distribution should be:

a. Original (white) and duplicate (yellow) should be forwarded to installation to be visited in the most convenient manner, i.e., by mail, messenger, or carried by the visitor.

b. Triplicate (green) should be retained by the issuing officer.

Visitor requests originating at an installation outside the jurisdiction of the responsible Area Engineer should continue to be forwarded through the local Area Engineer in order that he may indicate approval by signing the form on the line "Approved by". Visitor requests originating at an installation under the jurisdiction of the same Area Engineer as the installation to be visited require no approval other than the signature of the responsible Area Engineer or Operations Officer.

7. Records - Each Area Engineer will maintain a record of all classified visitors to the installations under their supervision. This record will consist of monthly visitor reports made by all facilities and will include:

a. Name of Visitor

b. Organization

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- c. Date and time of arrival and departure
- d. Name of person contacted

SECTION V - PLANT PROTECTION

1. General. An aggressive plant protection program designed to provide a high degree of physical protection is essential to the present security objective of the Manhattan District. The safeguarding of vital installations from espionage and other hazards to the security of information resulting from unauthorized or uncontrolled movement of personnel into and within plant areas continues to be of utmost importance. Present protection measures now in force to accomplish this end must be maintained. In addition, the necessity of providing an uninterrupted flow of production requires the continuance of the present protection against sabotage and related interferences with normal operation at the principal process plants. At other installations, however, measures intended primarily for protection against sabotage should be re-evaluated in view of the termination of hostilities and the improbability of enemy inspired acts. Expensive and burdensome anti-sabotage protection may be reduced or in some cases eliminated. With the completion of major construction, key installations will normally be able to maintain adequate stock piles of replacement parts and operating supplies without requiring continuous production of these items at supply facilities. Consequently, if a facility's rating of importance is lowered the likelihood of interruption to District operations from sabotage is proportionately less serious, and protection against sabotage can be relaxed accordingly. At many facilities producing unclassified equipment and supplies only normal peace-time protection against sabotage, malicious mischief, and related hazards need be provided.

2. Physical Control - The protection of a facility against unauthorized entry is of first importance. Access must be so arranged that intruders may be excluded, employees properly identified, and visitors controlled.

- a. Fencing is the most effective barrier. The facility should, where possible, be completely inclosed by a "manproof" fence at least six feet high with not less than three strands of barbed wire at the top, preferably inclined toward the outside. Where fencing is not practicable, as along sides of buildings adjoining sidewalks, substantial screening should be used on all vulnerable windows, skylights, ventilators, or other small openings.
- b. Entrances, either gates or doors, should be kept at a minimum number and locked or guarded at all times. Manholes, unscreened windows, and similar openings should also be kept locked when unattended. No physical barrier is effective against a determined intruder unless supplemented by observation, on the part of either employees or guards.

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Fence, yard and interior lighting can be provided to aid in this observation and also to discourage intruders. At small facilities with a limited number of doors and windows, a burglar alarm system may be installed in lieu of guards or as an added precaution in conjunction with one or more guards.

3. Guard Force - The guard force normally will be the principal enforcement agency to prevent unauthorized entry. Guards should be required at all unlocked gates or doors to control all persons entering or leaving. Roving guards should be provided to patrol all other vulnerable points of possible entry.

The use of guard towers for constant fence line protection, while desirable, is no longer as essential as previously when sabotage would have been disastrous. During the day, when employees working inside a fenced area and traffic on the outside tend to retard intruders, irregular but frequent guard patrols of the fence line constitute adequate protection. Along remote sections of fencing or at night, the use of guard towers is often desirable. Consideration can also be given to locking all doors into a building except where they can be observed from a fixed guard post.

Guards should be required to patrol the interiors and exteriors of all important buildings at night and on non-operating days. The use of a portable watchclock aids in the supervision of the guards and, with properly located clock stations, assures that all points of the plant and yard will come under the observation of a guard or watchman on each round. The guards should be required to check that all safes and file cabinets containing classified information as well as gates, doors and windows, are locked at night and during holidays.

Guards should be in good physical condition and preferably have previous experience. Uniforms and sidearms are obviously desirable. A competent guard chief should be responsible for the organization, supervision, and training of the guard force. New guards should be carefully instructed in their duties and all guards required to attend periodic instruction classes and revolver practice. Detailed guard orders should be provided for each post, and the sergeants and squad leaders should determine that all guards know their orders.

4. Identification System - An identification system whereby guards and other employees may quickly and positively recognize unauthorized persons entering or inside restricted areas is essential. In some small installations, this may be accomplished by personal recognition, but in larger plants, a positive employee identification system will require the following:

- a. Individual identification - The most practical method is by identification card or badge. A badge pinned to the clothing is preferred and is essential in large plants. It is visible at all times and is less liable to be lost. The badge system should meet the following minimum requirements:

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- (1) The badge itself should be of tamper-proof design.
  - (2) The make-up and issue should be rigidly controlled to minimize counterfeiting or theft and to insure return upon termination of service.
  - (3) Every employee should wear his badge at all times within the plant area.
  - (4) Badges should always be worn in a uniform place on the clothing.
  - (5) Badges should include a clear and large photograph and descriptive information sufficient to identify readily and positively the badge with its wearer.
  - (6) The guards at all entrances to the restricted areas should be required to carefully check each badge with its wearer.
  - (7) A badge exchange system is often advantageous for the entire plant or for an inner restricted area.
  - (8) Visitors should be issued special badges or passes to readily identify them as non-employees.
- b. Movement Restrictions - Foreign agents, in spite of careful clearance procedure and badge control, may be within Manhattan District plants as presumably "loyal" employees, with an identification card or badge. Restriction of movement is therefore necessary as an added precaution. In very large or vital plants, an individual badge should be valid only for one shift or for one section of the plant. A badge system using different colored backgrounds, for example, will help spot an employee not in his own department, or in the plant during an unauthorized period. Such an employee should be challenged by the nearest person and required to show authorization for being in the area. An employee entering or leaving at off-shift hours may be controlled in a similar manner.
- c. Enforcement - No identification system is better than its enforcement. It is probable that a clever intruder will be revealed, not by a glaring fault, but by an otherwise minor error. Rigid enforcement is, therefore, a requirement. Although this is a primary responsibility of the plant guards and foremen, each employee must do more than his share towards maintaining strict compliance.

Visitor Control - The control of visitors rests primarily with management of the facility. All visitors should be required to sign a register, to properly identify themselves as represented, to wear a pass while in the facility, and to be escorted at all times by a guard or other responsible person.

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Where classified work is done, or classified information discussed, visitors should be handled according to the requirements outlined in Section IV, Visitor Control. No visitors should be admitted to any facility where classified information might be obtained except for a legitimate and necessary purpose.

6. Vehicle Control - Drivers of motor vehicles from outside concerns should be registered and the make and license number of each vehicle should be indicated. Where drivers are permitted inside the yard area to visit the plant frequently, it would be advisable to clear them in the same manner as regular employees having access to the area. If not cleared, the automobile or truck should be escorted by a guard or other responsible person while in the area.

Motor vehicles and railroad cars should be checked carefully by the guards for unauthorized persons. In some of the more important plants, it is advisable to check all entering vehicles and cars for sabotage devices.

Parking lots preferably should be outside the plant yard; but if within or adjacent to plant areas, they should be separated by fencing so that all employees will have to enter the plant through the pedestrian entrances. If persons enter the plant areas by automobile, they should be positively identified; and, in case of any doubt, the contents of the automobiles should be carefully checked.

7. Special Restricted Areas - Restricted areas should be established to protect classified information and material, especially where regular plant employees working outside these areas are not cleared. Such separate areas are also very desirable even where all employees are cleared, as a means of restricting such information and material to the fewest persons possible. Areas to be considered for such restrictions are special process plants, laboratories, offices, and warehouses.

Restricted areas also serve a useful means of preventing sabotage by limiting the number of persons having access to power plants, compressor rooms, switch and transformer rooms, gas meter rooms, and other vital equipment.

The use of special fencing, locked doors, additional guards, special badges, badge exchange, clothes change, arrangements for material control, and the inspection of lunch boxes, packages, and brief cases will depend on the conditions at each facility but should be given careful consideration depending on the factors involved.

8. Reference - For the guidance of Security Officers and Security Agents in considering the various aspects of protection needed against sabotage and espionage, reference is made to War Department Pamphlet No. 32-1, "Plant Protection for Manufactures", dated 1 May 1943. Copies of this pamphlet are available from the District Security Division.

9. Conclusion - The requirements for good protection at one facility may not be applicable to another; and, while basic standards for pro-

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tion, as outlined above should be recognized, their application will vary according to local conditions. This requires that the security needs of each facility be thoroughly and frequently analyzed by competent representatives of the Area Engineers and Operations Officers in collaboration with management. Upon request, assistance in the solution of unusual and peculiar problems will be provided by the District Security Division.

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SECTION VI

SECTION VI - SHIPMENT SECURITY

1. General: There is within the Manhattan District a continual flow of materials, many of which, because of their critical importance or unusual characteristics, are classified. One of the functions of the Security Division is to advise responsible Area Engineers and Operations Officers as to the proper security measures to be taken in the shipment of these materials. In addition, this Division has been delegated the duty of handling the transmittal of certain vital materials and in these shipments it assumes a responsibility to properly execute the movement. The Area Engineer shipping the materials retains his overall responsibility of insuring delivery of the materials to the consignee.

2. Purpose: Set forth herein are the major factors to be considered in determining a method of shipment and the principles of shipping procedure. It is not considered desirable to establish set methods of shipment for various materials. Materials will be shipped in greatly different quantities, security considerations will change and approved methods would quickly become obsolete. Shipping methods should be worked out by Area Engineers based on the considerations affecting that particular shipment. Plans for important shipments should be submitted to higher authority for approval of the proposed method of shipment. Existing shipping methods should be constantly reviewed to determine that the most practical means conforming to security requirements are being used.

3. Considerations Determining Methods of Shipments: The following considerations should be carefully evaluated in order to properly determine the most suitable method of shipment:

a. Classification: For general rules of classification see Section III, Paragraph 2. The matter of classifying ores or materials frequently present specific problems that should be solved by considering (1) the classification of the contract governing them, (2) their essentiality to the operation of the project, and (3) the stage of their refinement. It should be borne in mind that the classification of material to be shipped will normally determine the method of shipment in accordance with Army Regulation 380-5. Some materials, however, regardless of classification, will require the highest degree of protection during the shipping process either because of their monetary value or for some reason apart from their military classification.

b. Continuity of Production: Before setting up a method of shipment, the essential considerations of maintaining continuity of production, inventory position and meeting the delivery time must be considered. In general, the more secure methods of shipment insure more rapid delivery and the considerations of security and continuity of production should not be in conflict. In connection with the maintenance of inventory position, the availability of other sources of material

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the proximity thereof should be considered. In certain instances, additional security precautions may be justified in order to guarantee special delivery of materials, particularly when production of a facility or operating area will slow or stop entirely in the absence of that shipment. The questions "when" and "in what quantity" the material is required are always important.

c. Origin and Destination: Because of the secrecy of certain projects in the District and the necessity to conceal the government's interest in research projects the origin and destination of a shipment must be considered in order to determine if the method adopted will reveal information about the project or research study to the general public. It will be necessary in some instances to arrange for the transportation of materials in order to conceal the connection between the consignor and consignee, and bills of lading must be made out so as to withhold this information from employees of the consignor, the consignee and carrier. To conceal the government's connection with certain research, experimental work, government trucks and military personnel, identifiable as such, must not be sent to places doing this work and government bills of lading cannot be used.

d. Government Regulations: The shipment of materials by common carrier is controlled by government regulations, particularly of the Interstate Commerce Commission. These regulations restrict the shipment of certain materials by commercial means by requiring particular marking, packing and handling and the use of conspicuous and distinctive labels. Shipments must comply with government regulations to protect the District from legal liability and injurious publicity in the event that a shipment is wrongly labelled or packed causes personal injury or property damage. In the event it is believed compliance will conflict with security requirements, transportation under the complete control of the government must be used.

e. Characteristics: Certain materials transported in connection with project activities present peculiar hazards to life and property. In addition to compliance with government regulations as to their shipment, care must be taken to protect the personnel engaged in transporting them. Thorough consideration of the hazards will be made before determining a method of shipment.

f. Size and Weight: These considerations will limit the use of certain means of transportation. A courier cannot carry more than 100 pounds by hand without arousing general curiosity. An automobile is limited to about 500 pounds. Limitations on size and weight must be closely followed in shipment by air. Shipments of unusual weight in comparison with size will unduly interest the employees of common carriers.

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g. Monetary Value: A declaration of value will not be placed on Government Bills of Lading covering classified material. In shipments of high monetary value, the advisability of using Government transportation should be considered as a means of protecting the financial investment of the Government. Considerable difficulty is involved, because of the nature of the material shipped by the District, in bringing a suit against a common carrier to recover the monetary value of a shipment lost or destroyed.

h. Cost: In setting up shipping procedures, the responsible officer must be prepared to justify the additional cost of a particular method of transportation. Consequently, when alternate methods of transportation offer adequate security and speed of transmittal, that method which would result in the lowest cost to the Government will be used.

#### 4. Methods of Shipments:

a. Shipment by Courier: In accordance with Army regulations and District directives, materials classified Top Secret will be transported by couriers who must be commissioned officers of the Manhattan District. In the transmittal of other classified materials, military personnel and District civilian guards may be used as couriers. Shipment by courier should be limited to Top Secret materials and classified materials which have unusual characteristics or which have to be expedited.

Officer-couriers are stationed at Oak Ridge, Chicago and Hanford. Whenever possible, travelling District officers should be called upon to serve as couriers. Civilians who have been employed by the District as guards are in some instances used as couriers of Secret and lower graded materials. A pool of guards is maintained at Chicago for this purpose. (For specific instructions on the transmission of Top Secret material, see District Circular Letter 46-1, 26 July 1945. For instructions to couriers on the handling of classified materials, see District Letter, dated 10 May 1945, Subject: Instructions to Couriers.")

b. Transmittal by Mail: The use of registered mail is authorized, including Air Mail, for the transmittal of Secret materials and ordinary mail is authorized for the transmittal of Confidential materials when in the opinion of the forwarding officer no serious consequences will be entailed by their loss. However, it is advisable that only registered mail be used for the transmittal of classified materials of the District. Air Mail is inappropriate in many cases because under postal regulations, parcels over four ounces in weight are subject to inspection. (See Section III, Paragraph 8).

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c. Military Aircraft (Air Transport Command): The Air Transport Command (M-A-T) Domestic Cargo Service provides cargo airplanes in the United States as a premium form of transportation reserved for the movement of highly urgent traffic. However, because of possible damage to aircraft or hazard to personnel, transportation of certain classes of material, including chemicals, is subject to approval of the Operating Division or Air Transport Command Wing Commanders. (See Army Forces Technical Order OO-25-9, and War Department Commercial Traffic Bulletin #19, dated 11 April 1945; also Adjutant General's Letter 400.22, June 1943, APP 18). Classified cargo will be carried by the Air Transport Command either when Army courier services are utilized or when classified traffic receipt is used. (See Paragraph 8 g., Chapter 8, Reg. 75-1). It is not necessary to describe the contents of the shipment on the airway bill but the word "classified" will be marked across its face to show the nature of the shipment. For type of airway bill and air lot label to be used, see AAF Regulation 15-95 (ATC Regulation 1, APP 50-1). In the determination of the use of military aircraft, special considerations such as the change of atmospheric pressure as a result of elevation and danger from fire or explosion in the air must be considered.

d. Railway Express: Secret or Confidential shipments may be shipped via the Railway Express Agency, Inc., after advance arrangements have been made for the carrier to guard the material from the time it comes into the hands of the consignor until delivered to the consignee. This service is referred to as "money bill" and is furnished the Government without extra charge. The restrictions as to contents and regulations as to marking and labelling laid down by the Interstate Commerce Commission must be followed. Shipments by Railway Express will show no valuation.

Materials may be shipped in sealed carload lots but the shipper must pay for at least 12,000 pounds. Special rates are available to the Government for carload lots. If from 12,000 to 20,000 pounds are consigned, the rate is 95% of the base (available to any commercial shipper); if from 20,000 pounds to 30,000 pounds are shipped, the rate is 75% and if over 30,000 pounds are shipped, the rate is 65%. When over 40,000 pounds are sent by express, the approval of the Chief of Transportation must be obtained.

In special instances, Confidential and Secret material protected by military guards may be transported by ordinary Railway Express.

e. Air Express via Commercial Airline: Shipment by Air Express is an expeditious method of moving Secret and Confidential materials. However, regulations for inspection and restrictions as to contents and marking set up by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the danger of loss of valuable cargo through accident limit this method of transmittal. Shipments must be guarded by armed guards of the carrier or military guards.

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f. Rail Freight: Shipments by Rail Freight are covered by the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Shipments of Confidential material may be made in sealed cars and careful inspection of these seals should be made by the consignee to determine whether they have been broken. Shipments of Secret material by Rail Freight should be accompanied by guards. In long freight movements, arrangements may be made with the railroads so that a driver's car will be supplied by the railroad for the use of guards. In important shipments, every attempt should be made to obtain freight cars from rigidly-inspected pools which are maintained in large centers. Rail freight rates are determined by the nature of the commodity being shipped together with its weight as opposed to Railway Express rates which are determined by weight only. It is important, therefore, in a classified shipment to bill the item under an appropriate commodity rating so that the specific item, when it is classified, is not revealed to the carrier.

g. Motor Truck: Materials may be moved by either (1) commercial carrier or (2) government vehicle. When commercial carrier is utilized, Secret shipments should be protected by military guard or by civilian guards employed by the District or contractor. These guards should be cleared by the Manhattan District and instructions issued to them to not leave their truck unattended at any time and to notify the responsible Area Engineer or Operations Officer immediately in the event of accident, theft or any unusual incident. Confidential materials may be transported in sealed truck. The use of Army vehicles accompanied by District guards for the shipment of Secret materials has the advantage that they can be closely controlled by the District, the trucks can be inspected by Army personnel, and they will not be held up by strikes. The use of Government trucks is also advantageous where Interstate Commerce Commission regulations require special labelling and should be used when possible in order to conceal the nature of the shipment.

5. Summary of Considerations Determining Shipping Methods:

- a. Classification.
- b. Continuity of Production - Delivery Time.
- c. Origin and Destination.
- d. Government and Commercial Restrictions.
- e. Peculiar Hazards.
- f. Size, Weight and Volume.
- g. Monetary Value.
- h. Cost of Shipment.
- i. Conservation of ~~Material~~

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Approved Shipping Methods:

- TOP SECRET**
- SECRET**
- Officer Courier
  - Courier
  - Registered, Regular or Air Mail
  - Military Aircraft
  - Railway Express (Carrier's Guards)
  - Ordinary Railway Express (Mil. Guards)
  - Air Express Via Com. Lines (Mil. Guards)
  - Rail Freight Service (Mil. Guards)
  - Motor Truck Freight (Mil. Guards)
  - Water Freight Service (Mil. Guards)
  - Authorized Messenger
  - Ordinary Mail
  - Protected Express
  - Sealed Freight or Express Car
  - Sealed Truck Under Own Power
  - Flat Car (Materials Sealed or Locked and Protected from View)
- 
- Express
- 
- Freight

REQUEST FOR CRIMINAL FILE CHECK ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, D. C.  
Attn: Identification Division

Return Address

It is requested that a criminal file check be conducted on the following:

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
(Last Name) (First Name) (Middle Initial)

Army Ser. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
(Original Number)

P.O. box 2610  
Washington, D. C.

FRED B. RHODES, JR.,  
Captain, Corps of Engineers,  
Branch Intelligence Officer.

(EXHIBIT I)

Declaration of Secrecy I  
Designed for Execution by all Physicists, Chemists,  
and other Employees of Similar Professional or  
Scientific Caliber

In consideration of the vital interest which the United States of America has in the successful accomplishment of the work being carried on here at \_\_\_\_\_: and

In further consideration of my employment by \_\_\_\_\_ in connection with such work:

I hereby affirm, without mental reservation, that I bear true faith and allegiance exclusively to the United States of America, that I have secured in the past and will secure in the future to the Government of the United States of America the sole benefit of any developments, experiments, discoveries or inventions here made by me or any information here obtained by me, to the exclusion of any other country, company, party, organization, or person whatever, except as covered by provisions of any patent agreements entered into between myself and \_\_\_\_\_. Upon the truth of this statement I stake my personal and scientific reputation.

Recognizing the importance to the national welfare of safeguarding all classified information that has not been officially released pertaining to this project or to related work, I hereby agree that I will neither communicate nor transmit, to any person, the performance of whose duties does not require the same, any classified information, documents, notes, memoranda, drawings, photographs, blueprints, plans, maps, models, materials or equipment connected with the project that would convey classified information.

I further affirm that I have not taken or utilized and will not take or utilize any of the classified items listed in the preceding paragraph, other than for official purposes, and then only in accordance with the established rules of the Manhattan District.

I fully understand that a failure on my part willfully or through gross negligence to adhere to the foregoing may involve a violation of the Federal Espionage Act and thereby subject me to punishment thereunder by imprisonment for not more than ten years and, in the discretion of the court, by fine of not more than \$10,000.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Witness

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature Upon Employment

I certify that the importance of safeguarding military information and penalties of the Espionage Act for violation of this declaration were stressed orally to this employee prior to his affixing signature here-  
to upon separation from employment.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature Upon Separation  
From Employment.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Official Giving Exit  
Interview.

Declaration of Secreay "II"  
Designed for Execution by all Employees Having Access  
to Classified Information other than Scientific Personnel

In consideration of the vital interest which the United States of America has in the successful and expeditious prosecution of the work being carried on here at \_\_\_\_\_; and

In further consideration of my employment by \_\_\_\_\_ in connection with such work:

I hereby affirm, without any mental reservation whatsoever, that I bear true faith and allegiance exclusively to the United States of America and that I have secured in the past and will secure in the future to the Government of the United States of America the sole benefit of any information of value to the project which I have or may obtain to the exclusion of all other countries, persons or organizations whatever.

Recognizing the importance to the national welfare of safeguarding all classified information that has not been officially released pertaining to this project or to related work and realizing that my continued employment in connection with this project is dependent upon conduct on my part consistent with same, I hereby agree that I will neither communicate nor transmit to any person the performance of whose duties does not require the same, any classified information, documents, notes, memoranda, drawings, photographs, blueprints, plans, maps, models, materials or equipment connected with the project that would convey classified information.

I further affirm that I have not taken or utilized and agree that I will not take or utilize any of the classified items listed in the preceding paragraph, other than for official purpose, and then only in accordance with the established rules of the Manhattan District.

I further understand that a failure on my part willfully or through gross negligence to adhere to the foregoing may involve a violation of the Federal Espionage Act and thereby subject me to punishment thereunder by imprisonment for not more than ten years and, in the discretion of the court, by fine of not more than \$10,000.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Witness

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature Upon Employment

I certify that the importance of safeguarding military information and penalties of the Espionage Act for violation of this declaration were stressed orally to this employee prior to his affixing signature here-  
to upon separation from employment.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature Upon Separation  
from Employment.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Official Giving Exit  
Interview.

ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
U. S. Engineer Office  
Manhattan District  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

EIDMY

(Date)

Subject: Safeguarding Information.

To:

1. The development of the atomic bomb for use against aggressors has made available to the United States a weapon of unparalleled destructive power. Should the secrets of producing this weapon fall into unauthorized hands, national and world security might be endangered.

2. The intent of this letter is to call to your attention your grave responsibility in safeguarding classified information of the Manhattan District. No question of your personal integrity or discretion is intimated or implied.

3. After relief from assignment to the Manhattan District, you will not make any unauthorized disclosure of any classified information concerning this district to anyone regardless of status, grade, or rank, under the penalties provided by the Articles of War and the Statutes of the United States. Any violations will be viewed as serious.

4. Information which has been officially released is now unclassified. All other previously classified information continues to retain its classification. A few examples of information over which security will be maintained at present level are:

a. Information on material and equipment developed by the District which may be regarded as reflecting detailed design and operating procedures.

b. Information on stocks and consumption of basic raw materials, and all facts or plans concerning their procurement.

c. Information on quantity, quality and characteristics of end products, and on shipping procedures.

d. Characteristics of the bomb.

e. Information which will reveal defensive tactics which may be employed against the weapon or its effects.

f. Information on research methods, results, or plans.

g. Patented processes.

( Exhibit IV )

Subject: Safeguarding Information.

(Date)

5. Prior clearance of this office is required prior to publication of any technical data pertaining to the District.

6. Present classifications of certain information may in the future be removed from time to time. It is your responsibility to assure yourself that a change in classification has been made by proper authority before revealing such information.

---

(Interviewing Officer)

1st Ind.

To: The District Engineer, Manhattan District, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

I certify that I have read and understand the above order and will comply therewith, and that I am aware of the penalties provided for the violations thereof.

SECURITY COMPLETION REPORT

MANHATTAN DISTRICT

\_\_\_\_\_ Area

Date of Report \_\_\_\_\_

Facility \_\_\_\_\_

Location \_\_\_\_\_

(Street)

(City)

(State)

Security Agent \_\_\_\_\_

Contract No. \_\_\_\_\_

Contract Classification \_\_\_\_\_

Highest Classification of  
Work or Documents \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Outline of MED Work:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Synopsis of Report:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Representative (s) on Completion Negotiations:

Contractor's

Manhattan District's

\_\_\_\_\_  
Approved by \_\_\_\_\_

Area Engineer

Submitted by \_\_\_\_\_

## INSTRUCTIONS

Reports to be prepared in narrative form covering the following items:

### I. Classified documents or materiel.

a. State disposition of classified documents or materiel. (Attach duplicate of list submitted in accordance with Section III-B, 5f Security Manual.)

b. Describe principal storage location for all matter (documents or materiel), classified confidential or higher retained by the contractor including:

(1) Repositories - (files, 3-way combination safes, etc.)

(2) Physical protection and guarding.

(3) Extent of segregation of Manhattan District records from other records.

(4) Extent of restriction on access to Manhattan District matter.

c. Describe likewise other locations of the contractor where such classified matter is retained.

### II. Personnel Security.

a. Describe compliance with requested execution of Secrecy Agreement.

b. Describe steps taken by contractor to instruct personnel concerned as to the necessity for continued security and that the national Espionage Act continues to apply.

c. Attach to report copy of statement furnished by the contractor in accordance with Section III-B, 5f (1) of the Security Manual.

III. General Information: Describe any specific instructions given to contractor's representative covering further security requirements.

IV. Comments and Recommendations: Include recommendations as to frequency with which facility should be inspected.

SECURITY SURVEY REPORT  
MANHATTAN DISTRICT

Area Engineer or \_\_\_\_\_ Date of Survey \_\_\_\_\_  
Operations Officer

Facility \_\_\_\_\_

Location \_\_\_\_\_  
(Street) (City) (State)

Rating of Importance \_\_\_\_\_ Facility Security Agent \_\_\_\_\_  
(A, B, C, or D)

Engineer Contract No(s) \_\_\_\_\_

Highest Classification of Contract, Work, or Material \_\_\_\_\_

Composite Rating for Sabotage & Espionage Protection \_\_\_\_\_  
(Poor, Fair, Good, Excellent)

Previous Survey and Rating \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date) (Rating)

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Description of Premises and Vicinity

Outline of Manhattan District Interest

DISTRIBUTION: Area Engineer  
District Security Officer  
Other

Submitted by \_\_\_\_\_

*COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS:*

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY  
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

PUBLIC PROCLAMATION NO. 26

*November 12, 1946*

**T0:** The people within the States of Washington, Oregon, California, Montana, Idaho, Utah, Arizona and Nevada, and the Public Generally.

WHEREAS, The Secretary of War, on 2 May 1946, designated the Commanding General, Sixth Army, as the Military Commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by Presidential Executive Order No. 9066, dated 19 February 1942, for that portion of the United States embraced within the geographical limits of the Sixth Army command and directed that all orders, proclamations and amendments thereto, presently in effect, issued pursuant to the said Executive Order by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, were to remain in full force and effect unless and until modified or cancelled by the Commanding General, Sixth Army or other competent authority; and

WHEREAS, That portion of the United States lying within the States of Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Washington, Oregon and California is within the geographical limits of the Sixth Army Command; and

WHEREAS, Despite the cessation of hostilities, a state of war and the emergencies created thereby continue to exist which require the maintenance of military measures for protection against espionage and sabotage in order that the objectives thus far achieved by our arms may be secured and that the said state of war be successfully concluded; and

WHEREAS, Important national defense materials, premises and utilities are located in the vicinity of Hanford, State of Washington, which are endangered by sabotage and espionage conducted in connection therewith, and by Public Proclamation No. 18, Headquarters Western Defense Command, the area wherein the said materials, premises and utilities are located was established and designated as "Total Exclusion Area No. 3"; and

WHEREAS, In order to prevent such sabotage and espionage, military necessity requires that the said area be continued as a Military Area, that two sections of land be added thereto, and that restrictions imposed upon the rights of persons to enter, remain in, or leave the said area be continued.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE P. HAYS, Major General, U. S. Army, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the President of the United States and by the Secretary of War and my powers and prerogatives as Commanding General, Sixth Army, do hereby declare and proclaim that:

1. Pursuant to the determination and statement of military necessity and authority above set forth, the following described area, formerly designated as "Total Exclusion Area No. 3", is hereby established as a Military Area and designated "Hanford Military Area":

Beginning at the North East corner of Section 20, T15N, R27E, in Grant County, Washington, thence:

West along the North line of Sections 20, 19, T15N, R27E, 24, 23, 22, T15N, R26E, to the North West corner of Section 22, thence:

South along the West line of said Section 22, to its South West corner, thence:

West along the North line of Section 28, T15N, R26E, to its North West corner, thence:  
 South along the West line of said Section 28, to its South West corner, thence:  
 West along the North line of Section 32, in said township, to its North West corner, thence:  
 South along the West line of said Section 32, to its South West corner, thence:  
 West along the North line of Section 6, T14N, R26E, to its North West corner, thence:  
 South along the West line of said Section 6, to its South West corner, thence:  
 West along the North line of Section 12, T14N, R25E, to its North West corner, thence:  
 South along the West line of said Section 12, to its South West corner, thence:  
 West along the North line of Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, T14N, R25E, to the North West corner of said Section 18, thence:  
 South along the West line of said Section 18, to its South West corner, thence:  
 West along the North line of Section 24, T14N, R24E, to its North West corner, thence:  
 South along the West line of said Section 24, to its South West corner, thence:  
 West along the North line of Section 26, T14N, R24E, to its North West corner, thence:  
 South along the West line of Sections 26, 35, T14N, R24E, and Section 2, T13N, R24E, to the South West corner of Section 2, thence:  
 West along the North line of Sections 10, 9, 8, 7, T13N, R24E, to the North West corner of said Section 7, thence:  
 North along the East line of Section 1, T13N, R23E, to its North East corner, thence:  
 West along the North line of Sections 1, 2, 3, T13N, R23E, to the North West corner of said Section 3, thence:  
 South along the West line of said Section 3, to its South West corner, thence:  
 East along the South line of said Section 3, to the South East corner of said Section 3, thence:  
 South along the West Line of Section 11 to the South West corner of said Section 11, thence:  
 East along the South line of Sections 11 and 12 to the South East corner of said Section 12, thence:  
 South along the West line of Section 18, T13N, R24E, to the South West corner of said Section 18, thence:  
 East along the South line of Sections 18, 17, 16, 15, T13N, R24E, to the West line of the West half of said Section 15, thence:  
 South along the West line of the East half of Section 22, T13N, R24E, to its North line of Section 27, in said township, thence:  
 East along the South line of said Section 22 to its South East corner, thence:  
 South along the West line of Sections 26, 35, T13N, R24E, Sections 2, 11, 12, 13, 23, 26, 35, T12N, R24E, and Sections 2, 11, 14, T11N, R24E, to the North West Corner of Section 14, last mentioned, thence:  
 East along the South line of said Section 14 to its South East corner, thence:  
 South along the West line of Section 24, T11N, R24E, to its South West corner, thence:  
 East along the South line of Section 24, T11N, R24E, and along the South line of Sections 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, T11N, R25E, to the South East corner of said Section 23, thence:  
 South along the West line of Section 25, T11N, R25E, to its South West corner, thence:

East along the South line of said Section 25 to its South East corner, thence:

South along the West line of Section 31, T11N, R26E, to its South West corner, thence:

East along the South line of said Section 31 to its South East corner, thence:

South along the West line of Section 5, T10N, R26E, to its South West corner, thence:

East along the South line of Sections 5 and 4, T10N, R26E, to the South East corner of said Section 4, thence:

South along the West line of Section 10, T10N, R26E, to its South West corner, thence:

East along the South line of said Section 10 to its South East corner, thence:

South along the West line of Section 14, in said township to its South West corner, thence:

East along the South line of Sections 14, 13, T10N, R26E, to the South East corner of said Section 13, thence:

South along the West line of Section 19 to the South West corner of Section 19, T10N, R27E, thence:

East along the South line of said Section 19 to the North or left bank of the Yakima River, thence:

North Easterly and South Easterly, through Sections 19, 20, 17, 16, 9, 4, 3, T10N, R27E along the North or left bank of the Yakima River to the South line of Section 3 in said township and range, thence:

East to the South East corner of said Section 3, thence:

North along the East line of said Section 3 to the center line of the Richland-White Bluffs Highway, thence:

South Easterly through Sections 11, 12, T10N, R27E, Sections 7, 18, 17, T10N, R28E along the center line of said highway to its intersection with the East line of Section 17, T10N, R28E, thence:

South along the West lines of Sections 16, 21, 28, 33, in said township and range and along the West line of Section 4, T9N, R28E, to the North or left bank of the Yakima River, thence:

Southerly along the North or left bank of the Yakima River, passing through Sections 4, 5, 9, 16, 15, 22, 23, 24, T9N, R28E, to a point on the North or left bank of the Yakima River on the West line of Section 19, T9N, R29E, thence:

Along the South East end of a peninsula formed by the Yakima and Columbia Rivers in said Section 19 and thence in a general northerly direction along the West or right bank of the Columbia River and passing through Sections 19, 18, T9N, R29E, Sections 13, 14, 11, 2, 1, T9N, R28E, Sections 36, 25, 24, 23, 14, 11, 2, T10N, R28E, Sections 35, 26, 23, 14, 11, 2, T11N, R28E, Sections 35, 26, T12N, R28E, to the North line of said Section 26, thence:

East along the North lines of Sections 26 and 25, T12N, R28E, and along the North line of Section 30, T12N, R29E, to the North West corner of said section, thence:

North along the East line of Section 19, T12N, R29E to the North East corner of said Section 19, thence:

West along the North line of said Section 19 to its North West corner, thence:

North along the East line of Sections 13, 12, 1, T12N, R28E, to the North East corner of said Section 1, thence:

West along the township line common to Townships 12 and 13 North, Range 28 East to the South East corner of Section 36, T13N, R28E, thence:

North along the East line of Sections 36, 25, T13N, R28E, to the North East corner of said Section 25, thence:

West along the North line of said Section 25 to its North West corner, thence:

North along the East line of Section 23, T13N, R28E, to its North East corner, thence:

West along the North line of said Section 23 to its North West corner, thence:

North along the East line of Section 15, T13N, R28E, to its North East corner, thence:

West along the North line of said Section 15 to its North West corner, thence:

North along the East line of Section 9, T13N, R28E, to its North East corner, thence:

West along the North line of said Section 9 to its North West corner, thence:

North along the East line of Section 5, T13N, R28E, to its North East corner, thence:

North along the East line of Section 32, T14N, R28E, to its North East corner, thence:

West along the North line of said Section 32 to its North West corner, thence:

North along the East line of Sections 30, 19, T14N, R28E, to the North East corner of said Section 19, thence:

West along the North line of said Section 19 to its North West corner, thence:

North along the East line of Sections 13, 12, T14N, R27E, to the North East corner of said Section 12, thence:

West along the North line of said Section 12 to its North West corner, thence:

North along the East line of Section 2, T14N, R27E, to its North East corner, thence:

West along the North line of said Section 2 to its North West corner, thence:

North along the East line of Section 34, T15N, R27E to its North East corner, thence:

West along the North line of said Section 34 to its North West corner, thence:

North along the East line of Section 28, T15N, R27E, to its North East corner, thence:

West along the North line of said Section 28 to its North West corner, thence:

North along the East line of Section 20, T15N, R27E, to its North East corner to the "point of beginning".

1. No person shall have the right or shall be permitted to enter, remain or leave the above described "Hanford Military Area" except on permission by and in accordance with terms and conditions prescribed by the District Engineer, Manhattan District, Office of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army. All orders and restrictions presently in effect, issued pursuant to Public Proclamation No. 18, Headquarters Western Defense Command, by the District Engineer shall apply to "Hanford Military Area" as hereby established and shall remain in full force and effect unless and until modified or cancelled by the said District Engineer.

2. Any person violating the provisions of this proclamation, or any of its terms or conditions prescribed in accordance with paragraph 2 for entering, remaining in, or leaving the said "Hanford Military Area" will be subject to the criminal penalties provided in Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress approved March 21, 1942, entitled, "An Act to Provide a Penalty for Violation of Restrictions or Orders with Respect to Persons Entering, Remaining in, Leaving or Committing any Act in Military Areas or Zones." (Stat. 173, 18 U.S.C., Sec 97a), as well as to prosecution under applicable Federal and State laws against loitering or trespassing.

Pursuant to the authority granted by Executive Order No. 9066, the Commanding General will enforce compliance with all orders and restrictions now in effect or to be issued pursuant to this proclamation by all lawful military means within his command, including the use of troops.

The following public proclamations issued by the Commanding General,

Western Defense Command, are hereby rescinded:

- (a) Public Proclamation No. 1, dated March 2, 1942, which established Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2, as changed by Public Proclamations Nos. 9, 13, 14, 16 and 21;
- (b) Public Proclamation No. 2, dated March 16, 1942, which established Military Areas Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6, as changed by Public Proclamations Nos. 13, 16 and 21;
- (c) Public Proclamation No. 18, dated July 14, 1943, which established Total Exclusion Area No. 3.

6. This proclamation shall not affect any offense heretofore committed nor any conviction or penalty incurred because of violations of the provisions of the said Public Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2, as changed, or those of the said Public Proclamation No. 18, nor shall it affect the validity of any orders previously issued under the said proclamations.


7. The effect of the rescission of Public Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2 by paragraph 5 hereof is to abolish Military Areas Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 which were established in the territory embraced by the States of Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada and Utah and to remove all restrictions and controls applicable to those areas as such. The only restrictions and controls now in force and effect are those which are applicable to "Hanford Military Area" as provided herein.

8. This proclamation shall become effective at midnight December 2, 1946.

GEORGE P. HAYS  
Major General, U. S. Army  
Commanding

# HANFORD MILITARY AREA

Established by  
 PUBLIC PROCLAMATION NO. 26  
 HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY  
 November 12, 1946



(Public Law 585-79th Congress)

(Chapter 724-2d Session)

(S. 1717)

AN ACT

For the development and control of atomic energy.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

## DECLARATION OF POLICY

Section 1. (a) Findings and Declaration.—Research and experimentation in the field of nuclear chain reaction have attained the stage at which the release of atomic energy on a large scale is practical. The significance of the atomic bomb for military purposes is evident. The effect of the use of atomic energy for civilian purposes upon the social, economic, and political structures of today cannot now be determined. It is a field in which unknown factors are involved. Therefore, any legislation will necessarily be subject to revision from time to time. It is reasonable to anticipate, however, that tapping this new source of energy will cause profound changes in our present way of life. Accordingly, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the people of the United States that, subject at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and security, the development and utilization of atomic energy shall, so far as practicable, be directed toward improving the public welfare, increasing the standard of living, strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and promoting world peace.

(b) Purpose Of Act.—It is the purpose of this Act to effectuate the policies set out in section 1 (a) by providing, among others, for the following major programs relating to atomic energy:

(1) A program of assisting and fostering private research and development to encourage maximum scientific progress;

(2) A program for the control of scientific and technical information which will permit the dissemination of such information to encourage scientific progress, and for the sharing on a reciprocal basis of information concerning the practical industrial application of atomic energy as soon as effective and enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes can be devised;

(3) A program of federally conducted research and development to assure the Government of adequate scientific and technical accomplishment;

(4) A program for Government control of the production, ownership, and use of fissionable material to assure the common defense and security and to insure the broadest possible exploitation of the fields; and

(5) A program of administration which will be consistent with the foregoing policies and with international arrangements made by the United States, and which will enable the Congress to be currently informed so as to take further legislative action as may hereafter be appropriate.

## ORGANIZATION

Sec. 2. (a) Atomic Energy Commission.—

(1) There is hereby established an Atomic Energy Commission (herein called the Commission), which shall be composed of five members. Three members shall constitute a quorum of the Commission. The President shall designate one member as Chairman of the Commission.

Exhibit CS-10

(2) Members of the Commission shall be appointed by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. In submitting any nomination to the Senate, the president shall set forth the experience and the qualifications of the nominee. The term of office of each member of the Commission taking office prior to the expiration of two years after the date of enactment of this Act shall expire upon the expiration of such two years. The term of office of each member of the Commission taking office after the expiration of two years from the date of enactment of this Act shall be five years, except that (A) the terms of office of the members first taking office after the expiration of two years from the date of enactment of this Act shall expire, as designated by the president at the time of appointment, one at the end of three years, one at the end of four years, one at the end of five years, one at the end of six years, and one at the end of seven years, after the date of enactment of this Act; and (B) any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed, shall be appointed for the remainder of such term. Any member of the Commission may be removed by the president for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. Each member, except the Chairman, shall receive compensation at the rate of \$15,000 per annum; and the Chairman shall receive compensation at the rate of \$17,500 per annum. No member of the Commission shall engage in any other business, vocation, or employment than that of serving as a member of the Commission.

(3) The principal office of the Commission shall be in the District of Columbia, but the Commission or any duly authorized representative may exercise any or all of its powers in any place. The Commission shall hold such meetings, conduct such hearings, and receive such reports as may be necessary to enable it to carry out the provisions of this Act.

(4) There are hereby established within the Commission—

(A) a General Manager, who shall discharge such of the administrative and executive functions of the Commission as the Commission may direct. The General Manager shall be appointed by the president by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$15,000 per annum. The Commission may make recommendations to the president with respect to the appointment or removal of the General Manager.

(B) a Division of Research, a Division of Production, a Division of Engineering, and a Division of Military Application. Each division shall be under the direction of a Director who shall be appointed by the Commission, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 per annum. The Director of the Division of Military Application shall be a member of the armed forces. The Commission shall require each such division to exercise such of the Commission's powers under this Act as the Commission may determine, except that the authority granted under section 3 (a) of this Act shall not be exercised by the Division of Research.

(b) General Advisory Committee.—There shall be a General Advisory Committee to advise the Commission on scientific and technical matters relating to materials, production, and research and development, to be composed of nine members, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the president. Each member shall hold office for a term of six years, except that (1) any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed,

shall be appointed for the remainder of such term; and (2) the terms of office of the members first taking office after the date of the enactment of this Act shall expire, as designated by the President at the time of appointment, three at the end of two years, three at the end of four years, and three at the end of six years, after the date of the enactment of this Act. The Committee shall designate one of its own members as Chairman. The Committee shall meet at least four times in every calendar year. The members of the Committee shall receive a per diem compensation of \$50 for each day spent in meetings or conferences, and all members shall receive their necessary traveling or other expenses while engaged in the work of the Committee.

(c) Military Liaison Committee.—There shall be a Military Liaison Committee consisting of representatives of the Departments of War and Navy, detailed or assigned thereto, without additional compensation, by the Secretaries of War and Navy in such number as they may determine. The Commission shall advise and consult with the Committee on all atomic energy matters which the Committee deems to relate to military applications, including the development, manufacture, use, and storage of bombs, the allocation of fissionable material for military research, and the control of information relating to the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons. The Commission shall keep the Committee fully informed of all such matters before it and the Committee shall keep the Commission fully informed of all atomic energy activities of the War and Navy Departments. The Committee shall have authority to make written recommendations to the Commission on matters relating to military applications from time to time as it may deem appropriate. If the Committee at any time concludes that any action, proposed action, or failure to act of the Commission on such matters is adverse to the responsibilities of the Departments of War or Navy, derived from the Constitution, laws, and treaties, the Committee may refer such action, proposed action, or failure to act to the Secretaries of War and Navy. If either Secretary concurs, he may refer the matter to the President, whose decision shall be final.

(d) Appointment of Army and Navy Officers.—Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1222 of the Revised Statutes (U.S.C., 1940 edition, title 40, sec. 576), section 212 of the Act entitled "An Act making appropriations for the Legislative Branch of the Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933, and for other purposes", approved June 30, 1932, as amended (U.S.C., 1940 edition, title 5, sec. 59a), section 2 of the Act entitled "An Act making appropriations for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-five, and for other purposes", approved July 31, 1894, as amended (U.S.C., 1940 edition, title 5, sec. 62), or any other law, any active or retired officer of the Army or the Navy may serve as Director of the Division of Military Application established by subsection (a) (4) (B) of this section, without prejudice to his commissioned status as such officer. Any such officer serving as Director of the Division of Military Application shall receive, in addition to his pay from the United States as such officer, an amount equal to the difference between such pay and the compensation prescribed in subsection (a) (4) (B) of this section.

## RESEARCH

Sec. 3. (a) Research Assistance.--The Commission is directed to exercise its powers in such manner as to insure the continued conduct of research and development activities in the fields specified below by private or public institutions or persons and to assist in the acquisition of an ever-expanding fund of theoretical and practical knowledge in such fields. To this end the Commission is authorized and directed to make arrangements (including contracts, agreements, and loans) for the conduct of research and development activities relating to--

- (1) nuclear processes;
- (2) the theory and production of atomic energy, including processes, materials, and devices related to such production;
- (3) utilization of fissionable and radioactive materials for medical, biological, health, or military purposes;
- (4) utilization of fissionable and radioactive materials and processes entailed in the production of such materials for all other purposes, including industrial uses; and
- (5) the protection of health during research and production activities.

The Commission may make such arrangements without regard to the provisions of section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (U.S.C., title 41, sec. 5) upon certification by the Commission that such action is necessary in the interest of the common defense and security, or upon a showing that advertising is not reasonably practicable, and may make partial and advance payments under such arrangements, and may make available for use in connection therewith such of its equipment and facilities as it may deem desirable. Such arrangements shall contain such provisions to protect health, to minimize danger from explosion and other hazards to life or property, and to require the reporting and to permit the inspection of work performed thereunder, as the Commission may determine; but shall not contain any provisions or conditions which prevent the dissemination of scientific or technical information, except to the extent such dissemination is prohibited by law.

(b) Research By The Commission.--The Commission is authorized and directed to conduct, through its own facilities, activities and studies of the types specified in subsection (a) above.

## PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL

Sec. 4. (a) Definition.--As used in this Act, the term "produce", when used in relation to fissionable material, means to manufacture, produce, or refine fissionable material, as distinguished from source materials as defined in section 5 (b) (1), or to separate fissionable material from other substances in which such material may be contained or to produce new fissionable material.

(b) Prohibition.--It shall be unlawful for any person to own any facilities for the production of fissionable material or for any person to produce fissionable material, except to the extent authorized by subsection (c).

(c) Ownership and Operation of Production Facilities.--

(1) Ownership of Production Facilities.--The Commission, as agent of and on behalf of the United States, shall be the exclusive owner of all facilities for the production of fissionable material other

than facilities which (A) are useful in the conduct of research and development activities in the fields specified in section 3, and (B) do not, in the opinion of the Commission, have a potential production rate adequate to enable the operator of such facilities to produce within a reasonable period of time a sufficient quantity of fissionable material to produce an atomic bomb or any other atomic weapon.

(2) Operation of the Commission's Production Facilities.--

The Commission is authorized and directed to produce or to provide for the production of fissionable material in its own facilities. To the extent deemed necessary, the Commission is authorized to make, or to continue in effect, contracts with persons obligating them to produce fissionable material in facilities owned by the Commission. The Commission is also authorized to enter into research and development contracts authorizing the contractor to produce fissionable material in facilities owned by the Commission to the extent that the production of such fissionable material may be incident to the conduct of research and development activities under such contracts. Any contract entered into under this section shall contain provisions (A) prohibiting the contractor with the Commission from subcontracting any part of the work he is obligated to perform under the contract, except as authorized by the Commission, and (B) obligating the contractor to make such reports to the Commission as it may deem appropriate with respect to his activities under the contract, to submit to frequent inspection by employees of the Commission of all such activities, and to comply with all safety and security regulations which may be prescribed by the Commission. Any contract made under the provisions of this paragraph may be made without regard to the provisions of section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (U.S.C., title 41, sec. 5) upon certification by the Commission that such action is necessary in the interest of the common defense and security, or upon a showing that advertising is not reasonably practicable, and partial and advance payments may be made under such contracts. The President shall determine at least once each year the quantities of fissionable material to be produced under this paragraph.

(3) Operation of Other Production Facilities.--Fissionable material may be produced in the conduct of research and development activities in facilities which, under paragraph (1) above, are not required to be owned by the Commission.

(d) Irradiation of Materials.--For the purpose of increasing the supply of radioactive materials, the Commission and persons lawfully producing or utilizing fissionable material are authorized to expose materials of any kind to the radiation incident to the processes of producing or utilizing fissionable material.

(e) Manufacture of Production Facilities.--Unless authorized by a license issued by the Commission, no person may manufacture, produce, transfer, or acquire any facilities for the production of fissionable material. Licenses shall be issued in accordance with such procedures as the Commission may by regulation establish and shall be issued in accordance with such standards and upon such conditions as will restrict the production and distribution of such facilities to effectuate the policies and purposes of this Act. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to require a license for such manufacture, production, transfer, or acquisition incident to or for the conduct of research or development activities in the United States of the types specified in section 3, or to prohibit the Commission from manufacturing or producing such facilities for its own use.

## CONTROL OF MATERIALS

### Sec. 5. (a) Fissionable Materials.--

( ) Definition.--As used in this Act, the term "fissionable material" means plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 235, any other material which the Commission determines to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of energy through nuclear chain reaction of the material, or any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing; but does not include source materials, as defined in section 5 (b) (1).

(2) Government Ownership of All Fissionable Material.--All right, title, and interest within or under the jurisdiction of the United States, in or to any fissionable material, now or hereafter produced, shall be the property of the Commission, and shall be deemed to be vested in the Commission by virtue of this Act. Any person owning any interest in any fissionable material at the time of the enactment of this Act, or owning any interest in any material at the time when such material is hereafter determined to be a fissionable material, or who lawfully produces any fissionable material incident to privately financed research or development activities, shall be paid just compensation therefor. The Commission may, by action consistent with the provisions of paragraph (4) below, authorize any such person to retain possession of such fissionable material, but no person shall have any title in or to any fissionable material.

(3) Prohibition.--It shall be unlawful for any person, after sixty days from the effective date of this Act to (A) possess or transfer any fissionable material, except as authorized by the Commission, or (B) export from or import into the United States any fissionable material, or (C) directly or indirectly engage in the production of any fissionable material outside of the United States.

(4) Distribution of Fissionable Material.--Without prejudice to its continued ownership thereof, the Commission is authorized to distribute fissionable material owned by it, with or without charge, to applicants requesting such material (A) for the conduct of research or development activities either independently or under contract or other arrangement with the Commission, (B) for use in medical therapy, or (C) for use pursuant to a license issued under the authority of section 7. Such material shall be distributed in such quantities and on such terms that no applicant will be enabled to obtain an amount sufficient to construct a bomb or other military weapon. The Commission is directed to distribute sufficient fissionable material to permit the conduct of widespread independent research and development activity, to the maximum extent practicable. In determining the quantities of fissionable material to be distributed, the Commission shall make such provisions for its own needs and for the conservation of fissionable material as it may determine to be necessary in the national interest for the future development of atomic energy. The Commission shall not distribute any material to any applicant, and shall recall any distributed material from any applicant, who is not equipped to observe or who fails to observe such safety standards to protect health and to minimize danger from explosion or other hazard to life or property as may be established by the Commission, or who uses such material in violation of law or regulation of the Commission or in a manner other than as disclosed in the application therefor.

(5) The Commission is authorized to purchase or otherwise acquire any fissionable material or any interest therein outside the United States, or any interest in facilities for the production of fissionable material, or

in real property on which such facilities are located, without regard to the provisions of section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (U.S.C., title 41, sec. 5) upon certification by the Commission that such action is necessary in the interest of the common defense and security, or upon a showing that advertising is not reasonably practicable, and partial and advance payments may be made under contracts for such purposes. The Commission is further authorized to take, requisition, or condemn, or otherwise acquire any interest in such facilities or real property and just compensation shall be made therefor.

(b) Source Materials.--

(1) Definition.--As used in this Act, the term "source material" means uranium, thorium, or any other material which is determined by the Commission, with the approval of the President, to be peculiarly essential to the production of fissionable materials; but includes ores only if they contain one or more of the foregoing materials in such concentration as the Commission may by regulation determine from time to time.

(2) License for Transfers Required.--Unless authorized by a license issued by the Commission, no person may transfer or deliver, receive possession of or title to, or export from the United States any source material after removal from its place of deposit in nature, except that licenses shall not be required for quantities of source materials which, in the opinion of the Commission, are unimportant.

(3) Issuance of Licenses.--The Commission shall establish such standards for the issuance, refusal, or revocation of licenses as it may deem necessary to assure adequate source materials for production, research, or development activities pursuant to this Act or to prevent the use of such materials in a manner inconsistent with the national welfare. Licenses shall be issued in accordance with such procedures as the Commission may by regulation establish.

(4) Reporting.--The Commission is authorized to issue such regulations or orders requiring reports of ownership, possession, extraction, refining, shipment, or other handling of source materials as it may deem necessary, except that such reports shall not be required with respect to (A) any source material prior to removal from its place of deposit in nature, or (B) quantities of source materials which in the opinion of the Commission are unimportant or the reporting of which will discourage independent prospecting for new deposits.

(5) Acquisition.--The Commission is authorized and directed to purchase, take, requisition, condemn, or otherwise acquire, supplies of source materials or any interest in real property containing deposits of source materials to the extent it deems necessary to effectuate the provisions of this Act. Any purchase made under this paragraph may be made without regard to the provisions of section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (U.S.C., title 41, sec. 5) upon certification by the Commission that such action is necessary in the interest of the common defense and security, or upon a showing that advertising is not reasonably practicable, and partial and advance payments may be made thereunder. The Commission may establish guaranteed prices for all source materials delivered to it within a specified time. Just compensation shall be made for any property taken, requisitioned, or condemned under this paragraph.

(6) Exploration.--The Commission is authorized to conduct and enter into contracts for the conduct of exploratory operations, investigations, and inspections to determine the location, extent, mode of occurrence, use, or

conditions of deposits or supplies of source materials, making just compensation for any damage or injury occasioned thereby. Such exploratory operations may be conducted only with the consent of the owner, but such investigations and inspections may be conducted with or without such consent.

(7) Public Lands.--All uranium, thorium, and all other materials determined pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection to be peculiarly essential to the production of fissionable material, contained, in whatever concentration, in deposits in the public lands are hereby reserved for the use of the United States subject to valid claims, rights, or privileges existing on the date of the enactment of this Act: *Provided, however,* That no individual, corporation, partnership, or association, which had any part, directly, or indirectly, in the development of the atomic bomb project, may benefit by any location, entry, or settlement upon the public domain made after such individual, corporation, partnership, or association took part in such project, if such individual, corporation, partnership, or association, by reason of having had such part in the development of the atomic bomb project, acquired confidential official information as to the existence of deposits of such uranium, thorium, or other materials in the specific lands upon which such location, entry, or settlement is made, and subsequent to the date of the enactment of this Act made such location, entry, or settlement or caused the same to be made for his, its, or their benefit. The Secretary of the Interior shall cause to be inserted in every patent, conveyance, lease, permit, or other authorization hereafter granted to use the public lands or their mineral resources, under any of which there might result the extraction of any materials so reserved, a reservation to the United States of all such materials, whether or not of commercial value, together with the right of the United States through its authorized agents or representatives at any time to enter upon the land and prospect for, mine, and remove the same, making just compensation for any damage or injury occasioned thereby. Any lands so patented, conveyed, leased, or otherwise disposed of may be used, and any rights under any such permit or authorization may be exercised, as if no reservation of such materials had been made under this subsection; except that, when such use results in the extraction of any such material from the land in quantities which may not be transferred or delivered without a license under this subsection, such material shall be the property of the Commission and the Commission may require delivery of such material to it by any possessor thereof after such material has been separated as such from the ores in which it was contained. If the Commission requires the delivery of such material to it, it shall pay to the person mining or extracting the same, or to such other person as the Commission determines to be entitled thereto, such sums, including profits, as the Commission deems fair and reasonable for the discovery, mining, development, production, extraction, and other services performed with respect to such material prior to such delivery, but such payment shall not include any amount on account of the value of such material before removal from its place of deposit in nature. If the Commission does not require delivery of such material to it, the reservation made pursuant to this paragraph shall be of no further force or effect.

(c) Byproduct Materials.--

(1) Definition.--As used in this Act, the term "byproduct material" means any radioactive material (except fissionable material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the processes of

producing or utilizing fissionable material.

(2) Distribution.--The Commission is authorized to distribute, with or without charge, byproduct materials to applicants seeking such materials for research or development activity, medical therapy, industrial uses, or such other useful applications as may be developed. In distributing such materials, the Commission shall give preference to applicants proposing to use such materials in the conduct of research and development activity or medical therapy. The Commission shall not distribute any byproduct materials to any applicant, and shall recall any distributed materials from any applicant, who is not equipped to observe or who fails to observe such safety standards to protect health as may be established by the Commission or who uses such materials in violation of law or regulation of the Commission or in a manner other than as disclosed in the application therefor.

(d) General Provisions.--The Commission shall not--

(1) distribute any fissionable material to (A) any person for a use which is not under or within the jurisdiction of the United States, (B) any foreign government, or (C) any person within the United States if, in the opinion of the Commission, the distribution of such fissionable material to such person would be inimical to the common defense and security.

(2) license any person to transfer or deliver, receive possession of or title to, or export from the United States any source material if, in the opinion of the Commission, the issuance of a license to such person for such purpose would be inimical to the common defense and security.

#### MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Sec. 6 (a) Authority.-- The Commission is authorized to--

(1) conduct experiments and do research and development work in the military application of atomic energy; and

(2) engage in the production of atomic bombs, atomic bomb parts, or other military weapons utilizing fissionable materials; except that such activities shall be carried on only to the extent that the express consent and direction of the President of the United States has been obtained, which consent and direction shall be obtained at least once each year.

The President from time to time may direct the Commission (1) to deliver such quantities of fissionable materials or weapons to the armed forces for such use as he deems necessary in the interest of national defense or (2) to authorize the armed forces to manufacture, produce, or acquire any equipment or device utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy as a military weapon.

(b) Prohibition.--It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, produce, transfer, or acquire any equipment or device utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy as a military weapon, except as may be authorized by the Commission. Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to modify the provisions of section 4 of this Act, or to prohibit research activities in respect of military weapons, or to permit the export of any such equipment or device.

## UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Sec. 7. (a) License Required.--It shall be unlawful, except as provided in sections 5 (a) (4) (A) or (B) or 6 (a), for any person to manufacture, produce, or export any equipment or device utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy or to utilize fissionable material or atomic energy with or without such equipment or device, except under and in accordance with a license issued by the Commission authorizing such manufacture, production, export, or utilization. No license may permit any such activity if fissionable material is produced incident to such activity, except as provided in sections 3 and 4. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to require a license for the conduct of research or development activities relating to the manufacture of such equipment or devices or the utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy, or for the manufacture or use of equipment or devices for medical therapy.

(b) Report to Congress.--Whenever in its opinion any industrial, commercial, or other nonmilitary use of fissionable material or atomic energy has been sufficiently developed to be of practical value, the Commission shall prepare a report to the President stating all the facts with respect to such use, the Commission's estimate of the social, political, economic, and international effects of such use and the Commission's recommendations for necessary or desirable supplemental legislation. The President shall then transmit this report to the Congress together with his recommendations. No license for any manufacture, production, export, or use shall be issued by the Commission under this section until after (1) a report with respect to such manufacture, production, export, or use has been filed with the Congress; and (2) a period of ninety days in which the Congress was in session has elapsed after the report has been so filed. In computing such period of ninety days, there shall be excluded the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days.

(c) Issuance of Licenses.--After such ninety-day period, unless hereafter prohibited by law, the Commission may license such manufacture, production, export, or use in accordance with such procedures and subject to such conditions as it may by regulation establish to effectuate the provisions of this Act. The Commission is authorized and directed to issue licenses on a nonexclusive basis and to supply to the extent available appropriate quantities of fissionable material to licensees (1) whose proposed activities will serve some useful purpose proportionate to the quantities of fissionable material to be consumed; (2) who are equipped to observe such safety standards to protect health and to minimize danger from explosion or other hazard to life or property as the Commission may establish; and (3) who agree to make available to the Commission such technical information and data concerning their activities pursuant to such licenses as the Commission may determine necessary to encourage similar activities by as many licensees as possible. Each such license shall be issued for a specified period, shall be revocable at any time by the Commission in accordance with such procedures as the Commission may establish, and may be renewed upon the expiration of such period. Where activities under any license might serve to maintain or to foster the growth of monopoly, restraint of trade, unlawful competition, or other trade position inimical to the entry of new, freely competitive enterprises in the field, the Commission is authorized and directed to refuse to issue such license or to establish such conditions to prevent these results as the Commission, in consultation with the Attorney General, may determine. The Commission shall report promptly to the Attorney General

any information it may have with respect to any utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy which appears to have these results. No license may be given to any person for activities which are not under or within the jurisdiction of the United States, to any foreign government, or to any person within the United States if, in the opinion of the Commission, the issuance of a license to such person would be inimical to the common defense and security.

(d) Byproduct Power.--If energy which may be utilized is produced in the production of fissionable material, such energy may be used by the Commission, transferred to other Government agencies, or sold to public or private utilities under contracts providing for reasonable resale prices.

### INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Sec. 8. (a) Definition.--As used in this Act, the term "international arrangement" shall mean any treaty approved by the Senate or international agreement hereafter approved by the Congress, during the time such treaty or agreement is in full force and effect.

(b) Effect of International Arrangements.--Any provision of this Act or any action of the Commission to the extent that it conflicts with the provisions of any international arrangement made after the date of enactment of this Act shall be deemed to be of no further force or effect.

(c) Policies Contained in International Arrangements.--In the performance of its functions under this Act, the Commission shall give maximum effect to the policies contained in any such international arrangement.

### PROPERTY OF THE COMMISSION

Sec. 9. (a) The President shall direct the transfer to the Commission of all interests owned by the United States or any Government agency in the following property:

(1) All fissionable material; all atomic weapons and parts thereof; all facilities, equipment, and materials for the processing, production, or utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy; all processes and technical information of any kind, and the source thereof (including data, drawings, specifications, patents, patent applications, and other sources (relating to the processing, production, or utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy; and all contracts, agreements, leases, patents, applications for patents, inventions and discoveries (whether patented or unpatented), and other rights of any kind concerning any such items;

(2) All facilities, equipment, and materials, devoted primarily to atomic energy research and development; and

(3) Such other property owned by or in the custody or control of the Manhattan Engineer District or other Government agencies as the President may determine.

(b) In order to render financial assistance to those States and localities in which the activities of the Commission are carried on and in which the Commission has acquired property previously subject to State and local taxation, the Commission is authorized to make payments to State and local governments in lieu of property taxes. Such payments may be in the amounts, at the times, and upon the terms the Commission deems appropriate, by the Commission shall be guided by the policy of

not making payments in excess of the taxes which would have been payable for such property in the condition in which it was acquired, except in cases where special burdens have been cast upon the State or local government by activities of the Commission, the Manhattan Engineer District or their agents. In any such case, any benefit accruing to the State or local government by reason of such activities shall be considered in determining the amount of the payment. The Commission, and the property, activities, and income of the Commission, are hereby expressly exempted from taxation in any manner or form by any State, county, municipality, or any subdivision thereof.

### CONTROL OF INFORMATION

Sec. 10. (a) Policy.—It shall be the policy of the Commission to control the dissemination of restricted data in such manner as to assure the common defense and security. Consistent with such policy, the Commission shall be guided by the following principles:

(1) That until Congress declares by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been established, there shall be no exchange of information with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes; and

(2) That the dissemination of scientific and technical information relating to atomic energy should be permitted and encouraged so as to provide that free interchange of ideas and criticisms which is essential to scientific progress.

(b) Restrictions.—

(1) The term "restricted data" as used in this section means all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power, but shall not include any data which the Commission from time to time determines may be published without adversely affecting the common defense and security.

(2) Whoever, lawfully or unlawfully, having possession of, access to, control over, or being entrusted with, any document, writing, sketch, photograph, plan, model, instrument, appliance, note or information involving or incorporating restricted data—

(A) communicates, transmits, or discloses the same to any individual or person, or attempts or conspires to do any of the foregoing, with intent to injure the United States or with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life (but the penalty of death or imprisonment for life may be imposed only upon recommendation of the jury and only in cases where the offense was committed with intent to injure the United States); or by a fine of not more than \$20,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both;

(B) communicates, transmits, or discloses the same to any individual or person, or attempts or conspires to do any of the foregoing, with reason to believe such data will be utilized to injure the United States or to secure an advantage to any foreign nation, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.

(3) Whoever, with intent to injure the United States or with intent to

secure an advantage to any foreign nation, acquires or attempts or conspires to acquire any document, writing, sketch, photograph, plan, model, instrument, appliance, note or information involving or incorporating restricted data shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by death or imprisonment for life (but the penalty of death or imprisonment for life may be imposed only upon recommendation of the jury and only in cases where the offense was committed with intent to injure the United States); or by a fine of not more than \$20,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.

(4) Whoever, with intent to injure the United States or with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation, removes, conceals, tampers with, alters, mutilates, or destroys any document, writing, sketch, photograph, plan, model, instrument, appliance, or note involving or incorporating restricted data and used by any individual or person in connection with the production of fissionable material, or research or development relating to atomic energy, conducted by the United States, or financed in whole or in part by Federal funds, or conducted with the aid of fissionable material, shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life (but the penalty of death or imprisonment for life may be imposed only upon recommendation of the jury and only in cases where the offense was committed with intent to injure the United States); or by a fine of not more than \$20,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years or both.

(5) (A) No person shall be prosecuted for any violation under this section unless and until the Attorney General of the United States has advised the Commission with respect to such prosecution and no such prosecution shall be commenced except upon the express direction of the Attorney General of the United States.

(B) (i) No arrangement shall be made under section 3, no contract shall be made or continued in effect under section 4, and no license shall be issued under section 4 (e) or 7, unless the person with whom such arrangement is made, the contractor or prospective contractor, or the prospective licensee agrees in writing not to permit any individual to have access to restricted data until the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have made an investigation and report to the Commission on the character, associations, and loyalty of such individual and the Commission shall have determined that permitting such person to have access to restricted data will not endanger the common defense or security.

(ii) Except as authorized by the Commission in case of emergency, no individual shall be employed by the Commission until the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have made an investigation and report to the Commission on the character, associations, and loyalty of such individual.

(iii) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraphs (i) and (ii), during such period of time after the enactment of this Act as may be necessary to make the investigation, report, and determination required by such paragraphs: (a) any individual who was permitted access to restricted data by the Manhattan Engineer District may be permitted access to restricted data and (b) the Commission may employ any individual who was employed by the Manhattan Engineer District.

(iv) To protect against the unlawful dissemination of restricted data and to safeguard facilities, equipment, materials, and other

property of the Commission, the President shall have authority to utilize the services of any Government agency to the extent he may deem necessary or desirable.

(C) All violations of this Act shall be investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice.

(6) This section shall not exclude the applicable provisions of any other laws, except that no Government agency shall take any action under such other laws inconsistent with the provisions of this section.

(c) Inspections, Records, and Reports.--The Commission is--

(1) authorized by regulation or order to require such reports and the keeping of such records with respect to, and to provide for such inspections of, activities and studies of types specified in section 3 and of activities under licenses issued pursuant to section 7 as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this Act;

(2) authorized and directed by regulation or order to require regular reports and records with respect to, and to provide for frequent inspections of, the production of fissionable material in the conduct of research and development activities.

### PATENTS AND INVENTIONS

Sec. 11. (a) Production and Military Utilization,

(1) No patent shall hereafter be granted for any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the production of fissionable material or in the utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy for a military weapon. Any patent granted for any such invention or discovery is hereby revoked, and just compensation shall be made therefor.

(2) No patent hereafter granted shall confer any rights with respect to any invention or discovery to the extent that such invention or discovery is used in the production of fissionable material or in the utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy for a military weapon. Any rights conferred by any patent heretofore granted for any invention or discovery are hereby revoked to the extent that such invention or discovery is so used, and just compensation shall be made therefor.

(3) Any person who has made or hereafter makes any invention or discovery useful in the production of fissionable material or in the utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy for a military weapon shall file with the Commission a report containing a complete description thereof, unless such invention or discovery is described in an application for a patent filed in the Patent Office by such person within the time required for the filing of such report. The report covering any such invention or discovery shall be filed on or before whichever of the following is the latest: (A) The sixtieth day after the date of enactment of this Act; (B) the sixtieth day after the completion of such invention or discovery; or (C) the sixtieth day after such person first discovers or first has reason to believe that such invention or discovery is useful in such production or utilization.

(b) Use of Inventions for Research.--No patent hereafter granted shall confer any rights with respect to any invention or discovery to the extent that such invention or discovery is used in the conduct of research or development activities in the fields specified in section 3. Any rights conferred by any patent heretofore granted for any inven-

tion or discovery are hereby revoked to the extent that such invention or discovery is so used, and just compensation shall be made therefor.

(c) Nonmilitary Utilization.--

(1) It shall be the duty of the Commission to declare any patent to be affected with the public interest if (A) the invention or discovery covered by the patent utilizes or is essential in the utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy; and (B) the licensing of such invention or discovery under this subsection is necessary to effectuate the policies and purposes of this Act.

(2) Whenever any patent has been declared, pursuant to paragraph (1), to be affected with the public interest--

(A) The Commission is hereby licensed to use the invention or discovery covered by such patent in performing any of its powers under this Act; and

(B) Any person to whom a license has been issued under section 7 is hereby licensed to use the invention or discovery covered by such patent to the extent such invention or discovery is used by him in carrying on the activities authorized by his license under section 7.

The owner of the patent shall be entitled to a reasonable royalty fee for any use of an invention or discovery licensed by this subsection. Such royalty fee may be agreed upon by such owner and the licensee, or in the absence of such agreement shall be determined by the Commission.

(3) No court shall have jurisdiction or power to stay, restrain, or otherwise enjoin the use of any invention or discovery by a licensee, to the extent that such use is licensed by paragraph (2) above, on the ground of infringement of any patent. If in any action for infringement against such licensee the court shall determine that the defendant is exercising such license, the measure of damages shall be the royalty fee determined pursuant to this section, together with such costs, interest, and reasonable attorney's fees as may be fixed by the court. If no royalty fee has been determined, the court shall stay the proceeding until the royalty fee is determined pursuant to this section. If any such licensee shall fail to pay such royalty fee, the patentee may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such royalty fee, together with such costs, interest, and reasonable attorney's fees as may be fixed by the court.

(d) Acquisition of Patents.--The Commission is authorized to purchase, or to take, requisition, or condemn, and make just compensation for, (1) any invention or discovery which is useful in the production of fissionable material or in the utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy for a military weapon, or which utilizes or is essential in the utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy, or (2) any patent or patent application covering any such invention or discovery. The Commissioner of Patents shall notify the Commission of all applications for patents heretofore or hereafter filed which in his opinion disclose such inventions or discoveries and shall provide the Commission access to all such applications.

(e) Compensation Awards, and Royalties.--

(1) Patent Compensation Board.--The Commission shall designate a Patent Compensation Board, consisting of two or more employees of the Commission, to consider applications under this subsection.

(2) Eligibility.--

(A) Any owner of a patent licensed under subsection (c) (2) or any licensee thereunder may make application to the Commission for the

determination of a reasonable royalty fee in accordance with such procedures as it by regulation may establish.

(B) Any person seeking to obtain the just compensation provided in subsections (a), (b), or (d) shall make application therefor to the Commission in accordance with such procedures as it may be regulation establish.

(C) Any person making any invention or discovery useful in the production of fissionable material or in the utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy for a military weapon who is not entitled to compensation therefor under subsection (a) and who has complied with subsection (a) (3) above may make application to the Commission for, and the Commission may grant, an award.

(D) Any person making application under this subsection shall have the right to be represented by counsel.

(3) Standards.--

(A) In determining such reasonable royalty fee, the Commission shall take into consideration any defense, general or special, that might be pleaded by a defendant in an action for infringement, the extent to which, if any, such patent was developed through federally financed research, the degree of utility, novelty, and importance of the invention or discovery, and may consider the cost to the owner of the patent of developing such invention or discovery or acquiring such patent.

(B) In determining what constitutes just compensation under subsection (a), (b), or (d) above, the Commission shall take into account the considerations set forth in paragraph (A) above, and the actual use of such invention or discovery, and may determine that such compensation be paid in periodic payments or in a lump sum.

(C) In determining the amount of any award under paragraph (2) (C) of this subsection, the Commission shall take into account the considerations set forth in paragraph (A) above, and the actual use of such invention or discovery. Awards so made may be paid by the Commission in periodic payments or in a lump sum.

(4) Judicial Review.--Any person aggrieved by any determination of the Commission of an award or of a reasonable royalty fee may obtain a review of such determination in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia by filing in such court, within thirty days after notice of such determination, a written petition praying that such determination be set aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith served upon the Commission and thereupon the Commission shall file with the court a certified transcript of the entire record in the proceeding, including the findings and conclusions upon which the determination was based. Upon the filing of such transcript the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction upon the record certified to it to affirm the determination in its entirety or set it aside and remand it to the Commission for further proceedings. The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. The court's judgment shall be final, subject, however, to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of certiorari on petition therefor under section 240 of the Judicial Code (U.S.C., title 28, sec. 347), by the Commission or any party to the court proceeding.

## GENERAL AUTHORITY

Sec. 12. (a) In the performance of its functions the Commission is authorized to--

- (1) establish advisory boards to advise with and make recommendations to the Commission on legislation, policies, administration, research, and other matters;
- (2) establish by regulation or order such standards and instructions to govern the possession and use of fissionable and byproduct materials as the Commission may deem necessary or desirable to protect health or to minimize danger from explosions and other hazards to life or property;
- (3) make such studies and investigations, obtain such information, and hold such hearings as the Commission may deem necessary or proper to assist it in exercising any authority provided in this Act, or in the administration or enforcement of this Act, or any regulations or orders issued thereunder. For such purposes the Commission is authorized to administer oaths and affirmations, and by subpoena to require any person to appear and testify, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place. No person shall be excused from complying with any requirements under this paragraph because of his privilege against self-incrimination, but the immunity provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893 (U.S.C., title 49, sec. 46), shall apply with respect to any individual who specifically claims such privilege. Witnesses subpoenaed under this subsection shall be paid the same fees and mileage as are paid witnesses in the district courts of the United States;
- (4) appoint and fix the compensation of such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Commission. Such officers and employees shall be appointed in accordance with the civil-service laws and their compensation fixed in accordance with the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, except that to the extent the Commission deems such action necessary to the discharge of its responsibilities, personnel may be employed and their compensation fixed without regard to such laws. The Commission shall make adequate provision for administrative review of any determination to dismiss any employee;
- (5) acquire such materials, property, equipment, and facilities, establish or construct such buildings and facilities, and modify such buildings and facilities from time to time as it may deem necessary, and construct, acquire, provide, or arrange for such facilities and services (at project sites where such facilities and services are not available) for the housing, health, safety, welfare, and recreation of personnel employed by the Commission as it may deem necessary;
- (6) with the consent of the agency concerned, utilize or employ the services or personnel of any Government agency or any State or local government, or voluntary or uncompensated personnel, to perform such functions on its behalf as may appear desirable;
- (7) acquire, purchase, lease, and hold real and personal property as agent of and on behalf of the United States and to sell, lease, grant, and dispose of such real and personal property as provided in this Act; and
- (8) without regard to the provisions of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 or any other law, make such disposition as it may deem desirable of (A) radioactive materials, and (B) any other property the special disposition of which is, in the opinion of the Commission, in the interest of the national security.

(b) Security.--The President may, in advance, exempt any specific action of the Commission in a particular matter from the provisions of law relating to contracts whenever he determines that such action is essential in the interest of the common defense and security.

(c) Advisory Committees.--The members of the General Advisory Committee established pursuant to section 2 (b) and the members of advisory boards established pursuant to subsection (a) (1) of this section may serve as such without regard to the provisions of sections 109 and 113 of the Criminal Code (48 U.S.C., secs. 198 and 203) or section 19 (e) of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, except insofar as such sections may prohibit any such member from receiving compensation in respect of any particular matter which directly involves the Commission or in which the Commission is directly interested.

### COMPENSATION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY ACQUIRED

Sec. 13. (a). The United States shall make just compensation for any property or interests therein taken or requisitioned pursuant to sections 5 and 11. The Commission shall determine such compensation. If the compensation so determined is unsatisfactory to the person entitled thereto, such person shall be paid 50 per centum of the amount so determined, and shall be entitled to sue the United States in the Court of Claims or in any district court of the United States in the manner provided by sections 24 (20) and 145 of the Judicial Code to recover such further sum as added to said 50 per centum will make up such amount as will be just compensation.

(b) In the exercise of the rights of eminent domain and condemnation, proceedings may be instituted under the Act of August 1, 1888 (U.S.C., title 40, sec. 257), or any other applicable Federal statute. Upon or after the filing of the condemnation petition, immediate possession may be taken and the property may be occupied, used, and improved for the purposes of this Act, notwithstanding any other law. Real property acquired by purchase, donation, or other means of transfer may also be occupied, used, and improved for the purposes of this Act, prior to approval of title by the Attorney General.

### JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

Sec. 14. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 12 of the Administrative Procedure Act (Public Law 404, Seventy-ninth Congress, approved June 11, 1946) which provide when such Act shall take effect, section 10 of such Act (relating to judicial review) shall be applicable, upon the enactment of this Act, to any agency action under the authority of this Act or by any agency created by or under the provisions of this Act.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), no provision of this Act shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.

(c) As used in this section the terms "agency action" and "agency" shall have the same meaning as is assigned to such terms in the Administrative Procedure Act.

### JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

Sec. 15. (a) There is hereby established a Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to be composed of nine Members of the Senate to be appointed by the

President of the Senate, and nine Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In each instance not more than five members shall be members of the same political party.

(b) The joint committee shall make continuing studies of the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission and of problems relating to the development, use, and control of atomic energy. The Commission shall keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to the Commission's activities. All bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or the House of Representatives relating primarily to the Commission or to the development, use, or control of atomic energy shall be referred to the joint committee. The members of the joint committee who are Members of the Senate shall from time to time report to the Senate, and the members of the joint committee who are Members of the House of Representatives shall from time to time report to the House, by bill or otherwise, their recommendations with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of their respective Houses which are (1) referred to the joint committee or (2) otherwise within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.

(c) Vacancies in the membership of the joint committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The joint committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

(d) The joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words. The provisions of sections 102 to 104 inclusive, of the Revised Statutes shall apply in case of any failure of any witness to comply with a subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section.

(e) The joint committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary and advisable, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties. The committee is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government.

#### ENFORCEMENT

Sec. 16. (a) Whoever willfully violates, attempts to violate, or conspires to violate, any provision of sections 4 (b), 4 (e), 5 (a) (3), or 6(b) shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, except that whoever commits such an offense with intent to injure the United States or with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by death or imprisonment for life (but the penalty of death or imprisonment for life may be imposed only upon recommendation of the jury and only in cases where the offense was committed with intent to injure the United States); or by a fine of not more than \$20,000 or by imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.

(b) Whoever willfully violates, attempts to violate, or conspires to violate, any provision of this Act other than those specified in subsection (a) and other than section 10 (b), or of any regulation or order prescribed or issued under sections 5 (b) (4), 10 (c), or 12 (a) (2), shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than \$5,000 or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, except that whoever commits such an offense with intent to injure the United States or with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than \$20,000 or by imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.

(c) Whenever in the judgment of the Commission any person has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of any provision of this Act, or any regulation or order issued thereunder, it may make application to the appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing compliance with such provision, and upon a showing by the Commission that such person has engaged or is about to engage in any such acts or practices a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or other order may be granted.

(d) In case of failure of refusal to obey a subpoena served upon any person pursuant to section 12 (a) (3), the district court for any district in which such person is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by the Commission, shall have jurisdiction to issue an order requiring such person to appear and give testimony or to appear and produce documents, or both, in accordance with the subpoena; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.

## REPORTS

Sec. 17. The Commission shall submit to the Congress, in January and July of each year, a report concerning the activities of the Commission. The Commission shall include in such report, and shall at such other times as it deems desirable submit to the Congress, such recommendations for additional legislation as the Commission deems necessary or desirable.

## DEFINITIONS

Sec. 18. As used in this Act--

(a) The term "atomic energy" shall be construed to mean all forms of energy released in the course of or as a result of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation.

(b) The term "Government agency" means any executive department, commission, independent establishment, corporation wholly or partly owned by the United States which is an instrumentality of the United States, board, bureau, division, service, office, officer, authority, administration, or other establishment, in the executive branch of the Government.

(c) The term "person" means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, the United States or any agency thereof, any government other than the United States, any political subdivision of any such government, and any legal successor, representative, agent, or agency of the foregoing, or other entity, but shall not include the Commission or officers or employees of the Commission in the exercise of duly authorized functions.

(d) The term "United States", when used in a geographical sense, includes

all Territories and possessions of the United States and the Canal Zone.

(e) The terms "research and development" means theoretical analysis, exploration, and experimentation, and the extension of investigative findings and theories of a scientific or technical nature into practical application for experimental and demonstration purposes, including the experimental production and testing of models, devices, equipment, materials, and processes.

(f) The term "equipment or device utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy" shall be construed to mean any equipment or device capable of making use of fissionable material or peculiarly adapted for making use of atomic energy and any important component part especially designed for such equipment or devices, as determined by the Commission.

(g) The term "facilities for the production of fissionable material" shall be construed to mean any equipment or device capable of such production and any important component part especially designed for such equipment or devices, as determined by the Commission.

#### APPROPRIATIONS

Sec. 19. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act. The Acts appropriating such sums may appropriate specified portions thereof to be accounted for upon the certification of the Commission only. Funds appropriated to the Commission shall, if obligated by contract during the fiscal year for which appropriated, remain available for expenditure for four years following the expiration of the fiscal year for which appropriated. After such four-year period, the unexpended balances of appropriations shall be carried to the surplus fund and covered into the Treasury.

#### SEPARABILITY OF PROVISIONS

Sec. 20. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.

#### SHORT TITLE

Sec. 21. This Act may be cited as the "Atomic Energy Act of 1946".  
Approved August 1, 1946.

Providing for the Transfer of Properties and Personnel to  
The Atomic Energy Commission

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy, it is hereby ordered and directed as follows:

1. There are transferred to the Atomic Energy Commission all interests owned by the United States or any Government agency in the following property:

a. All fissionable material; all atomic weapons and parts thereof; all facilities, equipment, and materials for the processing, production, or utilization of fissionable material or Atomic Energy; all processes and technical information of any kind, and the source thereof (including data, drawings, specifications, patents, patent applications, and other sources) relating to the processing, production, or utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy; and all contracts, agreements, leases, patents, applications for patents, inventions and discoveries (whether patented or unpatented), and other rights of any kind concerning any such items.

b. All facilities, equipment, and materials, devoted primarily to atomic energy research and development.

2. There also are transferred to the Atomic Energy Commission all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, including records, owned by or in the possession, custody or control of the Manhattan Engineer District, War Department, in addition to the property described in paragraph 1 above. Specific items of such property, including records, may be excepted from transfer to the Commission in the following manner:

a. The Secretary of War shall notify the Commission in writing as to the specific items of property or records he wishes to except; and

b. If after full examination of the facts by the Commission, it concurs in the exception, those specific items of property or records shall be excepted from transfer to the Commission; or

c. If after full examination of the facts by the Commission it does not concur in the exception, the matter shall be referred to the President for decision.

3. The Atomic Energy Commission shall exercise full jurisdiction over all interests and property transferred to the Commission in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, in accordance with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

4. Any Government agency is authorized to transfer to the Atomic Energy Commission, at the request of the Commission, any property,

Exhibit CS-11

real or personal, tangible or intangible, acquired or used by such Government agency in connection with any of the property or interests transferred to the Commission by paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

5. Each Government agency shall supply the Atomic Energy Commission with a report on, and an accounting and inventory of, all interests and property, described in paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 above, owned by or in the possession, custody, or control of such Government agency, the form and detail of such report, accounting and inventory, to be determined by mutual agreement, or, in case of nonagreement, by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

6. a. There also are transferred to the Atomic Energy Commission, all civilian officers and employees of the Manhattan Engineer District, War Department, except that the Commission and the Secretary of War may by mutual agreement exclude any such personnel from transfer to the Commission.

b. The military and naval personnel heretofore assigned or detailed to the Manhattan Engineer District, War Department, shall continue to be made available to the Commission, for military and naval duty, in similar manner, without prejudice to military or naval status of such personnel, for such periods of time as may be agreed mutually by the Commission and the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy.

7. ~~The assistance and the services,~~ personal or other, including the use of property, heretofore made available by any Government agency to the Manhattan Engineer District, War Department, shall be made available to the Atomic Energy Commission for the same purposes as heretofore and under the arrangements now existing until terminated after 30 days notice given by the Commission or by the Government agency concerned in each case.

8. The Commission is authorized to exercise all of the powers and functions vested in the Secretary of War by Executive Order No. 9001, of December 27, 1941, as amended, in so far as they relate to contracts heretofore made by or hereby transferred to the Commission.

9. Such further measures and dispositions as may be determined by the Atomic Energy Commission and any Government agency concerned to be necessary to effectuate the transfers authorized or directed by this order shall be carried out in such manner as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget may direct and by such agencies as he may designate.

10. This order shall be effective as of midnight, December 31, 1946.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,

December 31, 1946

MANHATTAN DISTRICT  
Composite Roster of  
Intelligence and Security Personnel

18 March 1947

COLONEL

- Brown, Staunton L.
- Consodine, William A.
- Lansdale, John, Jr.
- Parsons, William B.
- Shaw, David F.

LT. COLONEL

- Minikes, Solette E.
- Williams, Donald G.

MAJOR

Block, Lloyd R. ·  
Calvert, Horace K. ·  
Cowan, James H. ·  
De Silva, Peer ·  
Gillette, Kirby M. ·  
Jackson, Joseph J. ·  
Johanneson, Royden E. ·  
Jones, Thomas O. ·

· Mathe, Robert E.  
· McKinney, Russell L.  
· McLeod, Robert J.  
· Rhodes, Fred B., Jr.  
· Salyers, Charles D.  
· Sergeant, William T.  
· Thompson, Grover C.  
· Uanna, William L.

CAPTAIN

Barnes, Guy E. ·  
Brown, Emmons B. ·  
Clark, Curtis L. ·  
Cook, Robert R. ·  
Cooper, Murray M. ·  
Copps, James F. ·  
Davis, George B., Jr. ·  
Davies, John L. ·  
Del Genio, Nicholas ·  
Finch, Robert F. ·  
Furney, Russel H. ·  
Grizzell, R. A. ·  
Haley, James W. ·  
Hall, Howard F. ·  
Hayes, Arthur J. ·  
Horan, John A. · - *Shocou as 1st Lt.*  
Johnson, Lyall E. ·  
King, John A., Jr. ·  
Kirkman, Robert W. ·

· Leonard, George B.  
· McClenahan, Henry I.  
· Meder, Joseph F.  
· Menke, Bernard W.  
· Mountjoy, Pearl B.  
· Murray, James S.  
· Remsen, George W.  
· Shaw, Robert T.  
· Simons, Foyle W.  
· Simpson, William J.  
· Southerland, James E.  
· Stansbury, Max E.  
· Sterling, Thomas A.  
· Tait, Robert  
· Teeple, David S.  
· Volpe, Joseph, Jr.  
· Webb, Martin  
· Whitaker, Albert E., Jr.  
· White, Charles V.  
· Winstead, Charles B.

18 March 1947

WARRANT OFFICER

Lee, Maynard E.

1st LIEUTENANT

Adam, Francis O., Jr.  
Allen, George S.  
Ambrose, Wayne A.  
Anderson, Andrew J., Jr.  
Anderson, Wilbur S.  
Anderson, William A., Jr.  
Aton, Thomas J.  
Aylor, John H.  
Azevedo, Daniel (NMI)  
Barge, Richmond I.  
Barnett, Oval C.  
Baskin, John R.  
Beerman, Fred L.  
Belcher, Philip F.  
Bennett, Alfred  
Bolton, Frederick H.  
Brady, Max (NMI)  
Brock, Lawrence V.  
Burke, C. L.  
Burnham, Bryson P.  
Bush, Robert H.  
Cabaza, Jose E.  
Calleghan, Francis P.  
Cameron, Chester L.  
Carr, Joseph F.  
Cater, William D.  
Clancy, James F.  
Clarke, Charles F., Jr.  
Clayton, Samuel S.  
Collins, Burton W.  
Connors, Harold P.  
Cooley, Larry E.  
Cooper, Murray M. — Capt  
Crawford, Walter R.  
Crowley, John T.  
Dailey, Daniel H.  
Daniels, George B.  
D'Alfonso, Daniel V.  
Dazzo, Nicholas C.  
De Franco, Frank J.  
Deily, Robert E.  
Devlin, William J.  
Dinius, Earl F.

Dunn, Jack H.  
Eckberg, Carlton R.  
Edwards, Robert W.  
Eisenhart, William S.  
Eurkin, Edward  
Fell, Philip S. P.  
Flowers, Harry C.  
Forkner, Thomas F.  
Folts, William D.  
Fry, Bernard M.  
Gahan, Patrick J.  
Geary, Richard L.  
Gregg, Wayne D.  
Grizzell, Roy A. — Capt  
Guilfoyle, Thomas D.  
Hart, Herbert S.  
Hitchcock, Glenn E.  
Hodges, G. H.  
Holland, Harrison H.  
Horan, John A.  
Huiaking, William W.  
Houston, Leonard O.  
Hull, John W.  
Jackson, Rupert C.  
Jett, Shelby K.  
Johnson, Charles L.  
Kendall, Raymond S.  
Killough, Robert S.  
King, William A.  
Koranda, Hugo  
Lannon, John J.  
Leahy, Thomas H.  
May, James P.  
McAdam, Richard G.  
McCaskill, Elmer A.  
McMullen, William E.  
Madigan, Arthur R.  
Maguire, John J.  
Mahoney, John H.  
Marsh, Harold (NMI)  
Metsger, Donald A.  
Miskulin, Mike (NMI)  
Murphy, Elmer F., Jr.  
Neverick, Alfred A.  
Nolan, James E.

shown as Capt.

1st LIEUTENANT (Cont'd)

O'Brien, Charles H.  
 O'Connell, John J.  
 O'Gara, John L.  
 Olson, Edwin G.  
 Orfalea, George A.  
 Padgett, Arthur A., Jr.  
 Peterson, John H.  
 Phillips, H. B.  
 Pickett, Winston H.  
 Redenius, Josephine L.  
 Rendleman, John C.  
 Richardson, Vaughan E.  
 Riley, William T.  
 Robertson, Sudenham B.  
 Robinson, George O.  
 Rogers, Max E.  
 Rolander, Carl A.  
 Rosenman, Bernard M.  
 Rydzewski, Adolph L.  
 Sandham, Ervin M.  
 Schaecher, George P.  
 Schumann, Vernon K.

Seminara, Louis A.  
 Simpson, Omer R.  
 Smith, Arthur E.  
 Smith, Harvey R.  
 Smith, Lawrence D.  
 Sulerud, John C.  
 Taylor, Robert A., Jr.  
 Thompson, Francis S.  
 Titus, John L.  
 Traver, Robert W.  
 Vaughan, Spruill J., III  
 Vettel, Charles T.  
 Voiniguerra, John V.  
 Waldner, Paul F.  
 Walsh, Harry R.  
 Weingarten, John L.  
 Wells, Algie A.  
 Wendt, Charles F.  
 Warner, William L.  
 White, Harold R.  
 Wulff, Albert V. R., Jr.  
 Zindle, Harold J.

2nd LIEUTENANT

Baird, Floyd M.  
 Baut, Harry S.  
 Blauvelt, Robert W.  
 Grooms, James A.

Kelley, Robert H.  
 Rhodes, Harris C.  
 Schwartz, Samuel

MASTER SERGEANT

Addison, Artie A., Jr.  
 Averill, Roswell P.  
 Beasley, C. W.  
 Boch, Alfred L.  
 Burns, Lee G.  
 Burrall, Charles L., Jr.  
 Cooley, Richard P.  
 Cullins, Phillip G.  
 Cunningham, John J.  
 Davis, Henry G., Jr.  
 Deitz, Walter L.  
 Detweiler, Charles B.  
 Driscoll, Florence J.  
 Foley, Richard J.  
 Frye, Herbert H.  
 Furney, Lester C.  
 Gleaves, Raymond L.  
 Goldston, Joseph C.  
 Goodman, Philip M.  
 Herrington, James T., Jr.  
 Hoyt, James L.  
 Joyce, Herbert M.  
 Jung, Anthony T.

Kusefang, William E.  
 Kilgore, James A.  
 Lamb, Louis J.  
 Larcom, Charles C.  
 Lynch, John  
 Marinucci, James R.  
 Miller, John O.  
 Nally, Charles M.  
 Nolan, Richard H.  
 Oliff, Hershel  
 Rathman, George J.  
 Rubard, James J.  
 Russell, Edwin O.  
 Stout, Patrick  
 Thomas, Robert F.  
 Wagner, Emil C.  
 Wagener, William S.  
 Walker, Andrew A.  
 Walsh, Edward D.  
 Wheaton, George W.  
 Zimmer, Willard H.

18 March 1947

TECHNICAL SERGEANTS

Bernacchi, Julian N.  
Burke, William A.  
Callahan, Francis W.  
Campbell, Charles I.  
Christie, Charles B.  
Crowley, William A.  
Daerr, Robert L.  
Ebinger, Robert F.  
Edlund, Gustav V.  
Flourney, Copley W.  
Finneran, Michael J.  
Foor, Richard A.  
Fraser, Felician  
Gleason, Edwin J.  
Graves, Harold P.  
Henderson, John B.  
Harris, William J.  
Hawkins, Howard G., Jr.  
Hensley, Charles D.  
Hoyt, James L.  
Hand, Francis M.  
Harvey, Sam B.  
Jensen, Harold H.  
Kemendo, Joseph P.  
Lamb, Louis J.

Linde, Arthur W.  
Longbotham, Miller P.  
Lowenhaupt, Henry S.  
Ludwig, Donald P.  
Lynch, John J.  
Mayer, George A.  
Melton, Horace J.  
McGuire, Peter J.  
McElwreath, William J.  
Miller, Arnold R.  
Morgan, William H.  
Murphy, Peter C.  
Nadeau, Raymond L.  
Nolan, Walter H.  
O'Malley, Joseph M.  
Pare, Joseph  
Phillips, Jack H.  
Ream, Harold D.  
Reno, James W.  
Safferstein, Nathan C.  
Schriver, Oliver M.  
Shanley, John F.  
Smith, Richard M.  
Staruski, Anthony  
Stevens, Alan  
Wilson, Paul W.

STAFF SERGEANTS

Arrington, Kenneth H.  
Asciutto, Alfred S.  
Bailey, Howard L.  
Baudino, John M.  
Brater, Donald C.  
Bloom, Phillip  
Chilecte, Lynn E.  
Christopher, Lloyd R.  
Cole, Clinton S.  
Curran, John E.

Karoz, Frank R.  
Kelley, William T.  
Kelly, James A.  
Kockritz, Herman  
Kulesh, William E.  
Milligan, John  
Moffat, Henry C.  
Mountford, Horatic C.  
Myers, James X.  
Myers, William T.

18 March 1947

STAFF SERGEANTS (Cont'd)

- Dauphin, Edward L.	- Nichols, Gene A.
- Dillard, Jack W.	- Noel, Robert O.
- Dzimianski, John W.	- Oates, Peter F.
- Eggers, Harvey H.	- Oland, Harold J.
- Finnell, John E.	- Platou, William R.
- Fitzroy, Roland V., Jr.	- Porter, Lee
- Foote, Hillis C.	- Ryan, Alvin F.
- Forgatch, Joseph	- Ryan, Earl F.
- Gagen, Norbert R.	- Sanford, Logan H.
- Game, Morgan F.	- Scaife, Oliver F.
- Gaughan, John J.	- Schivers, Rufus W.
- Gillett, Lee E.	- Shuping, Clarence L.
- Grow, Kenneth A.	- Tatur, Henry J.
- Harley, Donald J.	- Thompson, Frank D.
- Hennessey, Matthew J.	- Toomey, Raymond
- Johnson, Carl A. B.	- Valentine, William I.
- Johnston, Joe B.	- Whitehead, Vincent O.
- Kadlec, Walter H.	

SERGEANTS

- Anderson, John H.	- O'Neill, Cornelius B.
- Anderson, John Harold	- Poling, John P.
- Campbell, Albert M.	- Riley, Arthur E.
- Eby, G. Hershey	- Rudisill, Edward L.
- Engel, Charles E.	- Ryan, James C.
- Ennis, Frederick T.	- Sentiff, Harry J.
- Hammond, William P.	- Sperry, Lawrence
- Hoeffel, Donald E.	- Spohn, William W.
- Hollan, John V.	- Stein, Raymond B.
- Hoover, Harold E.	- Sturdevant, Clinton T.
- Hutton, Levi F.	- Summer, Isidor H.
- Keltie, James A.	- Troy, Francis J.
- Kuchar, Keith	- Walsh, Thomas F.
- Landon, Edward F.	- Wilkes, James G.
- Loescher, Richard R.	- Wingren, Richard H.
- Nelson, Robert A.	- Zumwalt, Dean E.
- O'Brien, James A.	- Cowan, John H.

TECHNICIAN FIFTH GRADE

- Larmon, Leigh R.  
- Welker, William W.

CORPORAL

- Egan, John M.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

- Good, James I.  
- Nelson, Paul E.

18 March 1947

PRIVATE

Ames, Albert T.

WAC's

Amenta, Jane  
Bernard, Alice  
Bristow, Grace N.  
Creed, Maurine  
Evans, Helen Granger  
Francis, Lois Kenny  
Glancey, Ruth D.  
Gray, Wilma D.  
Guth, Geraldine F.

Jordan, Myrtle L.  
Laurent, Frances M.  
Loveday, Helen Spriggs  
Lowenhaupt, Sara Koetetz  
Palmer, Edith I.  
Sharp, Virginia Ackerman  
Shields, Eileen M.  
Weeks, Sallie M.  
Willis, Lena J.

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Boucher, John F.  
Braden, Jesse  
Brown, Keirn C.  
Coats, Floyd B., Jr.  
Collins, William  
Davis, Richard T.  
Duffy, Edward T.  
Eldridge, Lonzo  
Fleming, John C., Jr.  
George, William  
Georgi, Richard  
Goodman, James  
Hanson, Ellwood  
Hatmaker, Joseph  
Healy, E. W.  
Kirksey, Wayne  
Kiser, Myron H.

McHale, Francis J.  
Mills, Harvey  
Murphy, Paul  
Parcell, James R.  
Phillips, Andrew  
Pitts, Samuel  
Sarnowski, Arthur G. S.  
Schuster, Paul F.  
Seiber, Owen  
Thomas, Clarence  
Thornton, Wendall J.  
Walker, Robert C.  
Ward, John J.  
Welch, Max  
White, Walter F.

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