



# THE BLACK VAULT

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Security Research Staff

DATE: 26 January 1955

FROM :

[Redacted] A

SUBJECT: Security Inspection and Special Assignment at [Redacted]

H-B/B

*Notes  
As a check  
of retrieving  
topics & keep  
them when  
you get them.*

1. On 10 and 11 January 1955, the writer visited [Redacted] for purposes of carrying out a special identification problem at the request of [Redacted] and making a security inspection involving certain missing documents at [Redacted].

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2. On 10 January 1955, between 9:30 AM and 12:00 noon, the writer worked with [Redacted] of the [Redacted] on an identification problem involving several hundred feet of micro-film which [Redacted] had in her custody while at [Redacted]. [Redacted] was very co-operative and made full and positive identification of the material. An informal report in this connection was given to [Redacted] by the writer.

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3. On the same day, starting at approximately 1:00 PM, the writer and [Redacted] of [Redacted] examined all documents contained in all safes at the [Redacted] office in an effort to locate certain missing cables which had disappeared from the "personal" files of [Redacted]. These cables, approximately eight in number and of Secret classification, were in connection with a trip made by [Redacted] the writer [Redacted] late summer of 1953. The search through the safes was completely unsuccessful; the documents were not in any of the safes. Later in the afternoon, the writer personally examined the entire fourth floor of the house at [Redacted] where [Redacted] had his living quarters while assigned to [Redacted]. This search, which consisted of examining chests, dressers, closets, cupboards, etc., was also unsuccessful. The writer acknowledges, however, that the search was superficial as he was not in position to take up the carpets or thoroughly examine furnishings, bedding, etc.

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4. For matter of record, it should be noted that several days later at Headquarters Washington, [Redacted] stated to the writer that he had, after a conference with [Redacted] on [Redacted], obtained a certified statement from [Redacted] that [Redacted] had burned the documents to prevent them from being discovered by unauthorized personnel in [Redacted]. [Redacted] stated he and [Redacted] were satisfied with the statement of [Redacted]. The writer informed [Redacted] he would so inform [Redacted] since the matter was obviously of security importance.

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5. In addition to the extensive search for the missing documents, the writer made a general inspection of the property, examining locking

[Redacted]

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mechanisms, fire-fighting equipment and technical apparatus installed at [redacted]. In so doing, one of the cleared employees, in reply to a question concerning recording tapes, informed the writer there was a pile of boxes of tapes in a small closet, the nature of which was unknown to her. The writer examined these tapes and discovered they were apparently the entire taped recordings of highly classified interviews held by [redacted] Board the [redacted] with [redacted]

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[redacted] on a special project carried out for this Agency in late summer of 1953. Positive identification was made of the tapes because the writer himself had recorded the tapes and his handwriting appeared on each individual box containing a roll of tape. This material, which is classified at the Secret level and is regarded as highly sensitive was found in one of the main offices, second floor rear of the [redacted] house lying in an unlocked and entirely unguarded cabinet. The writer, without disclosing the true nature of the tapes but informing the cleared personnel present they were of a highly classified nature, placed them in one of the safes and gave specific instructions they were not to be moved or played pending their removal to Headquarters, Washington. The writer obtained an oral statement from [redacted] cleared employee, that as far as she knew, the tapes had been placed there by [redacted] and had been there for months. She herself knew nothing of the contents thereof. This same statement was confirmed by both [redacted] and [redacted]. (note: The writer could not play the tapes at [redacted] obvious reasons but identity appears certain.)

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6. At the present time, the tapes as well as other classified material that requires being brought to Washington are being kept in a safe at [redacted] pending a visit to [redacted] by [redacted] who is to further examine [redacted] material for return to Washington. The writer, with the consent of [redacted] informed [redacted] what when the entire material was assembled for transportation to Washington, Security would arrange safe transportation of it. No date has yet been set for removal of this material but it is expected to be taken out within the next two weeks.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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1. TSS and TSS operations at [redacted] and [redacted] may present a problem. [redacted] knows many men who are TSS consultants, most of whom would be on the covert side and it is possible that we may have a flap on this because sooner or later TSS will probably find out about the project. In addition, it probably would be a good idea to cut TSS in or at least selected personnel since they may have some new chemicals for tests, possibly of interest to us.

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Go ahead  
this

2. I believe we should cut [redacted] into the project. He is very valuable on research and is devoting almost all of his time now to psycho-chemicals. He is fully cut into ARTICHOKE and I believe we can control him completely.

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3. If offices are established in [redacted] they must be fully equipped B/3 for monitoring purposes. This is the type of work that we should do since we may want tapes on significant conversations.

out

4. I have discussed the situation in very general terms with [redacted] A and I believe he would be definitely interested in the clinical psychiatrist assistance on the project at [redacted] I believe we should push this B/3 since it will place [redacted] in a key position where he can watch the situa- A tion from our point of view and he has a <sup>perfect</sup> project natural cover.

[redacted]

5. In our discussions, we have failed to point out the fact we will probably need a [redacted]-speaking individual in addition to [redacted] on the Staff at the [redacted]. This is important for a great many reasons and might be very valuable if the "students" were not aware that the person in question spoke and understood [redacted]. I believe this employee should be a staff employee of the Agency.

6. I am still somewhat concerned over the bringing together of agent candidates all at [redacted]. This may be a security hazard and unless our cover is extraordinarily good, it may blow the project. This needs a very careful study. [redacted] told me that there are no bodies available now that he knows about in the [redacted] area for test purposes.

7. It is my opinion that the proposed three hypnotic consultants may be a bad idea and may possible drive [redacted] out of the picture. Certainly we should check this with [redacted] as soon as possible. As you know, [redacted] has a large contempt for the college instructor type hypnotist and his objections in many ways are valid. We must talk to [redacted] about [redacted] as soon as possible. [redacted] is completely inexperienced now and I wonder where he will get experience, particularly on [redacted] and under what cover will this be attempted. As you know, [redacted] arranged [redacted]s first case a week or two ago and I am absolutely certain that [redacted] gave [redacted] a well-condition subject.

8. Details concerning the trip into the [redacted] for test purposes are still very, very vague. In my opinion, [redacted] will have to have a fairly sizable representation at these tests—Exclusive of physical [redacted]

We will want to see this

out of present

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OK

A security which probably will be handled by [redacted] out of [redacted] Al- F  
though we have discussed this before, I feel that we should probably have on  
our team, in addition to you and I, [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted].

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9. We have not yet discussed technical details as you know. We are not at  
all certain as to whether or not [redacted] knows anything about hypnotism or  
for that matter, [redacted] of course, has had no experience and we  
do not know if [redacted] speaks enough [redacted] to work II on [redacted] subjects.

At the present time, we do not yet know how [redacted] et al  
propose to bring II to bear on the "students." How this will be done and  
what cover will be used is of vital concern to us for many reasons.

*conditioning*  
10. The continuing process of the students in [redacted] and the subjects  
in the [redacted] on the test if of vital interest to us. We would like to  
know what the views of [redacted] and [redacted] etc. are on length of time  
required, techniques, covers, methods, etc., etc. We would also like to  
know would it be possible to test new chemicals under some pretext or  
other at the project in [redacted]

11. Whereas I believe we should give [redacted] all the technical equipment  
he needs, we certainly should have some say in the purchase of it and  
I personally would not be in favor of buying technical equipment for Wolff  
merely for non-pertinent experimental reasons.

12. We have not as yet been briefed by [redacted] as to  
specifically what they intend to do, what they intend to look for in the

way of subjects and how he proposes to go about the conditioning process. Since we must be responsible for security in these matters, I feel we must have full knowledge for any work such as this. A flap in this matter might be very serious.

13. In connection with the special testing in the [redacted] area this fall, what has been proposed to date? (Doesn't yet make sense) to me. F

A. [redacted] says there are no bodies for testing. A

B. [redacted] and [redacted] suggested we would need 10 selected subjects. C A

C. Selected by whom and would these subjects be witting, unwitting, prisoners, volunteers, or what?

D. Who is going to choose them? It was proposed that [redacted] choose these 10 subjects but how can we expect [redacted] to correctly choose them. Or should we send [redacted] to assist prior to the arrival of the team? A A

E. If time is short for the testing we are certainly going to have to use chemicals. We should discuss this in detail.

F. Also this may be an opportunity to test a few new chemicals and this should be considered since the expense involved would not add anything more to the overall cost.

PROBABLE  
OUTCOME:

The Committee in its report will almost certainly recommend that no further regular meetings of the Committee be held, but called when fresh information requiring interpretation becomes available. It is also likely that the Committee will recommend that \_\_\_\_\_ designate or assign an individual to act as clearing house for all information in the area of the Committee's interest and brief the Committee as indicated.

We will comment on the Committee's final report when it is completed.

COMMENTS ON  
COMMITTEE:

- 1) All of the members of the Committee are largely without personal experience in this area with the exception of the Chairman, \_\_\_\_\_ who carried out a number of studies for OSS in WW II. As a consequence, the statements in the final report will be largely ex cathedra and based upon the scientific outlook of the individuals as applied to interpretation of the very limited material offered in the briefings. The Committee is composed of competent scientists well able to evaluate finished work or to guide enterprises which have advanced sufficiently to provide quantitative data for discussion.
- 2) Attitudes: Both \_\_\_\_\_ are actively engaged in work under contract and are naturally anxious to pursue it.