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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

FOIA Case: 75791A
30 March 2015

JOHN GREENEWALD
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of 23 November 2013, which was received by this office on 25 November 2013, for "a copy of all records pertaining to the William H. Martin and Bernon Mitchell Scandal of the 1960s." As previously provided, your request has been assigned Case Number 75791. For purposes of this request and based on the information you provided in your letter, you are considered an "all other" requester. As such, you are allowed 2 hours of search and the duplication of 100 pages at no cost. Some of the documents you requested are enclosed (via CD), which were located using your two free hours of search. Certain information, however, has been deleted from the enclosures.

Some of the withheld information has been found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 13526. The information meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Subparagraphs (c), (d), and (g) of Section 1.4 and remains classified SECRET as provided in Section 1.2 of Executive Order 13526. The information is classified because its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. The information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Section 3.3(b)(1), (3), (6), and (8) of E.O. 13526. Because the information is currently and properly classified, it is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the first exemption of the FOIA (5 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(1)).

This Agency is authorized by various statutes to protect certain information concerning its activities. We have determined that such information exists in these documents. Accordingly, those portions are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the third exemption of the FOIA, which provides for the withholding of information specifically protected from disclosure by statute. The specific statutes applicable in this case are Title 18 U.S. Code 798; Title 50 U.S. Code 3024(i) (formerly Title 50 U.S. Code 403-1(i)); and Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605).

Some of the information has been deleted from the enclosures pursuant to the fifth exemption of the FOIA. This exemption applies to inter-agency or intra-

agency memoranda or letters which would not be available by law to a party in litigation with the agency, protecting information that is normally privileged in the civil discovery context, such as attorney-client privileged information.

In addition, personal information regarding other individuals, as well as personal information regarding Messrs. Martin and Mitchell, has been deleted from the enclosures in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6). This exemption protects from disclosure information that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. In balancing the public interest for the information you request against the privacy interests involved, we have determined that the privacy interests sufficiently satisfy the requirements for the application of the (b)(6) exemption.

The Department of Justice (DoJ) has asked that we protect information pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C). Those deletions have been marked with the code OGA (Other Government Agency). Any appeal of the denial of DoJ information should be directed to that agency.

Regarding the enclosed documents and their redactions, as noted above, we have provided these as they were released in 2007; we apologize for the quality of some of the data, but these are the best available copies. You may request a re-review of these documents, in lieu of an appeal, but be aware that our review queue is voluminous and any new release determination, as applicable, would involve much time, possibly years. However, if you choose to request a re-review for any of the enclosed documents, please notify us within 30-days of the date of this letter. You may use the FOIARSC@nsa.gov email address to request a re-review. Please include the document title and DOCID that appear at the top of each page.

There are also documents mentioning Martin and Mitchell on the NSA.gov web site, e.g., within the 60th Anniversary Book. Others are within the Crypto Almanac series. We consider this data to be publically accessible and are not providing as part of this response.

As mentioned above, we have expended your two free hours of search and some responsive records are enclosed. We estimate that the costs involved to further search for material responsive to your request will be approximately \$1,848.00. Fees are assessed in accordance with DoD Regulation 5400.7-R. Search fees are computed at \$44.00 an hour.

Please be advised that your agreeing to incur this fee will not necessarily result in the disclosure to you of any additional information you seek. If additional records are found which are responsive to your request, a detailed review to determine the releasability of the information would follow. It has been our experience that any records responsive to your request if such records exist, may be classified or otherwise exempt from release in accordance with the

exemption provisions of the FOIA. The application of these exemptions to NSA information has been consistently approved by the Federal Judiciary.

This is only an estimate. If, as we continue the search, we determine that fees will be greater than the estimate, we will so notify you before searching further. In addition, please be aware that an estimate for duplication fees is not included in the above amount because we cannot determine the number of pages to be released until the entire case has been processed.

If you would like us to proceed with the continued search for information responsive to your request, we request that you remit to the FOIA office (see below for address) a check or money order made payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of \$924.00. This amount represents one-half of the total search estimate. Since this is only an estimate, our procedure is to request half of the estimated search costs up front, allowing us to charge any remaining difference upon completion of the entire request. Please include the number assigned to your case on any correspondence to ensure that your account is properly credited. If we do not hear from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, we will assume that you are no longer interested in pursuing this request, and we will administratively close your case with no further processing.

Correspondence related to your request should include the case number assigned to your request, which is included in the first paragraph of this letter. Your letter should be addressed to National Security Agency, FOIA Office (DJ4), 9800 Savage Road STE 6248, Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755-6248, or may be sent by facsimile to 443-479-3612. If sent by fax, it should be marked for the attention of the FOIA office. The telephone number of the FOIA Office is 301-688-6527.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "P. Blaskowski" with a stylized flourish at the end.

PAUL J. BLASKOWSKI
Chief
FOIA/PA Office

Encl:
a/s

Non - Responsive

Although some good for the United States resulted from the defection of Mitchell and Martin, it was obvious that in the end it was the Soviet Union that benefited most. The USSR gained not only an invaluable amount of information concerning the operations of the National Security Agency, they also had won an important propaganda battle, indeed a momentous one.

Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin themselves seem to hold the key today as to the real explanation for their ultimate decision to defect to the Soviet Union. Perhaps they believed that the USSR would allow them a life-style which they believed the United States had denied them. Perhaps they feared the consequences of some yet un-revealed "acts" which they may have committed. Today, we can only guess the reasons for their epochal act of turning against the United States. As one investigator for the House Un-American Activities Committee remarked, the mystery of "Why?" may never be solved.

Today, Mitchell lives quietly in Leningrad, writing occasional letters to friends and relatives in the United States. The most recent information concerning Mitchell is that he wishes to return to the United States, an unlikely event. As for Martin, he lives in Moscow, occasionally introducing himself to Western news correspondents. It has been reported that he has changed his name to attract less attention from his neighbors. He has been married to a Russian woman for some time.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: 19 JUN 1978

REPLY TO: M5 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin

THRU: D/DIR, GC *WBS*

TO: DIR

[redacted] A/Ch, M54, 8001s

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide current information on William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell, NSA employees who defected to the Soviet Union in July 1960. A summary of their activities from defection through 1975 is attached at TAB A.

2. In the past several years, each has made contact with U.S. Consular officials inquiring about a possible return to the United States. The most recent contact by Mitchell was reported by the Washington Post on 14 June 1978, a copy at TAB B.

3. In June 1977, Martin's father corresponded with the Counsel for the President to determine if Federal charges were pending against his son, copy at TAB C. The letter was referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and this Agency was contacted. As a result, you asked the General Counsel if Martin and Mitchell could be prosecuted if they returned to U.S. jurisdiction. On 28 July 1977, Mr. Roy Banner opined [redacted]

[redacted]

A copy of Mr. Banner's correspondence to you is attached at TAB D. Subsequently, the DOJ advised Mr. Martin in August 1977, that no criminal charges were pending against his son, copy at TAB E. The activities of Martin and Mitchell so closely parallel each other that we believe that the DOJ advice to Mr. Martin would apply equally in Mitchell's case.

(b)(5)

4. In response to a concurrent request by M5, the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) drafted an evaluation on the possible impact on Agency operations resulting from Martin's and Mitchell's disclosures. The DDO indicated that there was no evidence of damage in terms so conclusive as to be the basis for prosecution, copy at TAB F.

5. On 13 June 1978, Mr. Dan Silver, NSA General Counsel, asked if M5 had any matters of security concern so compelling as to justify [redacted]

[redacted] Martin and/or Mitchell.

Mr. Silver was advised that although numerous security questions remain unanswered, [redacted]

~~Downgrade to CONFIDENTIAL upon
removal of inclosures and physical
removal of caveat notation.~~

Incls:

a/s

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

Deputy Chief, M5

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U.S. Government Printing Office: 1976-241-530/3018

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
REV. 7-76
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112



Approved for Release by NSA on
01-29-2007, FOIA Case # 17515



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SUMMARY

William Hamilton Martin
DPOB - 27 May 1931; Columbus, Georgia

Bernon Ferguson Mitchell
DPOB - 11 March 1929; San Francisco, California

William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell met while both were serving in Japan with the Naval Security Group from 1951 to 1954. Martin, whose home was in Ellensburg, Washington, is the eldest of three sons of John Hamilton ("Ham") Martin and Nelle Wright Martin. "Ham" Martin was an officer in an Ellensburg meat packing firm. Mitchell, whose home was in Eureka, California, is the youngest of three sons of Emery Ferguson Mitchell and Helen Harris Mitchell. Emery Mitchell is an attorney and Helen Mitchell was an educator.

Following military service, both young men returned to college and both were graduated in the Spring of 1957; Martin from the University of Washington and Mitchell from Stanford. They were recruited at their respective schools and both entered on duty at NSA in July 1957. They were assigned as Mathematicians to REMP-1, a predecessor organization to the present R Group. Both received additional schooling at Agency expense at George Washington University, and also received appreciable training and exposure to sensitive SIGINT activity. In the Fall of 1959, Martin was sent on an Agency fellowship to the University of Illinois to work on a graduate degree. Mitchell remained on duty at NSA Ft. Meade.

In December 1959, when Martin returned to this area on the Christmas academic break, he and Mitchell went on an unannounced and unapproved trip to Cuba and Mexico, commenting on it to their families and some acquaintances after the fact. The trip never came to the attention of their supervisors or the Office of Security during the time they remained in this country.

In June 1960 Martin and Mitchell went on vacation together, announcing that they were going to the West Coast to visit their families and would return to duty in mid-July. On 26 July they were reported to be overdue returning from leave. Inquiry revealed they had never gone home, but in fact had flown to Mexico City on 25 June 1960, and from there to Havana, Cuba on 1 July. Access to the safe deposit box of Bernon Mitchell in the State Bank of Laurel was obtained by court order on 2 August 1960. In it was found a "Parting Statement" dated 22 June 1960 and addressed to "Whom it May Concern," the opening sentence of which reads, "We hope to explain to our relatives, friends, and others who may be interested, why we have sought citizenship in the Soviet Union." (Tab A)

On 6 September 1960, Martin and Mitchell appeared before a press conference in Moscow, USSR, where over Russian television and in the presence of correspondents from many nations they read a lengthy

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~~SECRET~~(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-E.O. 86-36

statement reiterating the statement left in the safe deposit box in Laurel and adding to it [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] They again announced their intentions of becoming Soviet citizens, and responded to questions from the press. The TASS news release on the press conference and a list of the press correspondents in attendance are at Tab B.

Tasked and coordinated by NSA, six federal investigative and intelligence agencies cooperated in an exhaustive investigation which revealed that the defection appeared to be the idea of Martin and Mitchell themselves, and not a part of a conspiracy involving other NSA employees or U.S. citizens insofar as could be determined.

Since that time reports concerning the activities of Martin and Mitchell have been received from various sources who have talked with one or the other of them in the USSR. Both worked in Leningrad in duties described as involving mathematics, computer programming and cryptography. Both married Soviet citizens, but Martin divorced his wife in about July 1963 after moving to Moscow. Recurring reports concerning them have described each as being thoroughly dissatisfied and desirous of leaving the USSR. In July 1975 Martin was described by one source as being "totally on the skids," an "Incurable alcoholic," and as being surrounded by degenerates and devoted to the practice of sexual perversions.

During reported conversations, Martin and Mitchell have allegedly revealed that their ultimate defection had been planned as long as a year before it was accomplished. Their vacation trip to Cuba and Mexico in December 1959 was in fact an attempt to defect which was turned back by the Russians pending further preparations. They have each revealed that they underwent intensive debriefing concerning their knowledge of NSA after arriving in Russia. Mitchell is quoted as saying that the debriefing was conducted with intensity for about a year before it eased up. Each has also been quoted as stating that he has "helped" the Russians to make their communications more secure against U.S. attack.

The activities of Martin and Mitchell since their defection [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] are summarized as follows. Greater detail is set out in Tabs C through L.

(b) (1)

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SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES SINCE DEFECTION

20 June 1962 - Martin met Benny Goodman and Terrence Catherman in Leningrad. Goodman said Martin approached him and stated he needed a lawyer badly. Martin asked how to reach Dr. Harold Berman, Harvard Law professor and specialist in Soviet studies, who was a visiting lecturer at Moscow University. Catherman advised Martin to leave a note for Berman at his hotel.

22 June 1962 - Martin had a three-hour interview with Theodore Shabad, press correspondent. Said he had been living in Leningrad since November 1960 under the name of Vladislav Antonovich Sokolovsky. He married a 29-year old Russian girl in October 1960. Martin stated he was working at the Steklov Mathematics Institute while studying for his doctorate in mathematics at Leningrad University. Martin stated, in reference to his defection, that he was not ashamed of the step he took. He realized it was a fool-hardy thing to do but he wasn't sorry. However, he thinks now he might have taken another form of protest. Martin stated he speaks fluent Russian, which he began learning at the University of Illinois in 1959-1960. He said even then he had decided to come to the Soviet Union. He described the campaign which he and Mitchell had waged against the U-2 flights long before anyone outside a small inner circle knew about them. He said he thought this policy was morally wrong. He stated that the falsity of the U.S. position with respect to the U-2 was already known when he and Mitchell came to the Soviet Union. The reason they came anyway was that they had already committed themselves to leaving.

June 1962 - Dr. Harold Berman stated that he had spoken to Martin on two occasions in June 1962 in Leningrad. He said the information given to him by Martin corresponded almost exactly with that given to Shabad. He stated also he did not feel inclined to make any additional disclosures of information furnished to him by Martin. He pointed out that while he does not consider himself Martin's attorney, he does feel that Martin consulted him for advice and that he, in turn, should not mention certain portions of what Martin told him for fear that it eventually might reach the Russians and be used against Martin. Berman placed Theodore Shabad in touch with Martin without himself being present at the interview. Berman said Martin didn't go into any great detail concerning plans made by Mitchell and himself for defecting to the USSR. He recalled that Martin stated it was approximately one year before the time of his actual defection that he approached an unnamed Congressman and expressed to him his resentment at the U-2 flights over the USSR and requested the Congressman's help in having those flights abandoned. Berman stated that when the Congressman failed to act on Martin's plea, Martin and Mitchell thereafter proceeded on one occasion to Mexico City and visited the Soviet Embassy at that point.

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The Russian Embassy personnel, at that time, were reluctant to deal with Martin and Mitchell. It was his understanding that Martin and Mitchell actually went to Mexico to defect, but that when the Russian officials in Mexico City apparently did not show too much interest in them, they then returned to the U.S. and made additional plans to defect. Martin said that the propaganda effects of the defection were lessened considerably when full publicity was given to the Powers' shootdown. However, Martin stated that inasmuch as he and Mitchell had already told the unnamed congressman of the U-2 flights and had already talked to Russian Embassy personnel in Mexico City concerning defection, there could be no retracing their steps since they had already committed crimes against the U.S. government; hence, they were afraid of staying in the U.S. and persisted in their plans to defect. Berman stated he had no knowledge what these plans were.

Martin told Berman that on his arrival in the USSR, he was intensively interrogated on all aspects of his work with NSA and on all related U.S. security agencies. Martin stated he was currently working at the Institute of Mathematics in Leningrad as a statistician but that apparently the Soviets do not trust him for he is under constant surveillance by them and given work only of the lowest order of priority. Martin obviously wants to leave the USSR badly and he is most unhappy with his present position there.

June 1962 - George Syvertsen, AP correspondent, accompanied Benny Goodman to Leningrad. While there he learned that Martin was residing in that city under the name Vladimir Sokolodsky. He contacted Martin by phone and arranged to interview him. Martin did not discuss with him what information he had turned over to the Russians or how he reached Russia from the United States; however Syvertsen assumed from the conversation that he had traveled to Russia via Mexico. Martin was definitely upset psychologically and expressed dissatisfaction with his living conditions. Martin said he had met and married a Russian girl. Martin explained that he and Mitchell were idealistic employees of NSA and became disillusioned upon learning of the U-2 flights and other U.S. activities against Russia which they believed were morally wrong. Martin said he had gone to a Congressman and registered an official complaint, but received no satisfaction. As a result, he began thinking of defecting to Russia as a means of impressing others with his idealistic views. He said he had read a lot about Russia in the USSR magazine. Martin expressed a desire to make contact with someone in the American Embassy and asked Syvertsen to contact the embassy in his behalf. Syvertsen complied with this request, but does not believe the Embassy took any action. Syvertsen was again in Leningrad in December 1962. Martin said the Soviets had threatened to withdraw his special privileges if he again communicated with U.S. personnel. He again saw Martin in Moscow on 10 June 1963. Martin said he was living and working in Moscow and had been told again not to associate with foreigners.

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28 August 1962 - While sightseeing on Nevskiy Prospekt in Leningrad, two ONI sources were approached by an individual who introduced himself as William H. Martin. Martin first approached the one source thinking he was a newsman. He stated he defected to the USSR as a protest against the U.S. government for the U-2 flights and the seizure of Russian propaganda material by the U.S. Post Office. He stated he was married to a Russian citizen and was in the process of becoming a USSR citizen. He stated he had wanted to work in Moscow but had been denied the opportunity. He was presently working in Leningrad as a mathematician and his work was in no way related to the Russian space program. He earned the equivalent of \$500 per month. He stated he was free to travel anywhere within the USSR but had been denied, on several occasions, a visit to Finland. He stated he had previously given his story to a U.S. newsman in Leningrad in hope his story would receive wide circulation and recognition, but was disappointed with the news releases that appeared in U.S. newspapers on 24 June 1962. In the source's opinion Martin was greatly disillusioned and disappointed with what he found in the USSR and was looking for outside help to leave Russia. Martin stated that he "wanted to get out of Russia" and that he could be of use to the U.S. if he were able to return to this country. On his arrival in Russia, Martin stated he had given information to the Russian government pertaining to "foreign codes" but had disclosed no information pertaining to U.S. codes. He stated Mitchell was working as a mathematician but could provide no additional information concerning Mitchell's life in Russia.

December 1962 - A reliable source advised that Martin and his wife, Inessa moved from Leningrad to Moscow in December 1962. Since the move he has been working for an unnamed leading institute in the field of mathematics and computer programming, similar to his work in Leningrad.

November 1963 - Dr. Roscoe White and Dr. George Renninger, assigned to Lebedev Academy of Sciences on a fellowship, were approached by Vladimir Anatolovich Sokolovskiy in the cafeteria. Sokolovskiy explained he was actually William H. Martin. During subsequent contacts, Martin asked them if there were any way in which they could assist him in leaving the Soviet Union legally or otherwise. He subsequently introduced them to Alla Kozlova, a 20-21 year old Russian girl. Some time during the latter part of January 1964, White began dating "Alla." She was aware of Martin's true identity, and seemed interested in White's Soviet friends. White asked a Soviet friend to find out what he could about Alla, and the friend subsequently advised White to stop dating Alla. White visited her apartment [REDACTED]

(b) (6) [REDACTED] He believes her father, whom he never met, works for the KGB. Martin discussed his impending divorce, and in July White learned that Martin had received his divorce. Martin denied emphatically that either he or Mitchell were homosexuals. He said he had some sex problems, but that he was certainly not a homosexual. With regard to his defection, Martin stated he had contacted someone prior to his defection. White understood that no money was involved and that Martin had not been an in-place agent.

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May 1965 - Dr. Claude Shannon and Bernard M. Oliver, President of Hewlett-Packard Company met Mitchell in Leningrad, after a lecture by Shannon at the Electro Technical Institute in Leningrad. Mitchell said he was working for the Soviet equivalent of the FBI. He wanted to talk to Shannon about symbolic logic and computer programming. They supposed, from his questions, that Mitchell was engaged in work of a cryptographic nature. Mitchell stated he had been married about two years to a Russian girl, a piano teacher who has also given concert. Mitchell queried Shannon about the "Tree Searching Problem" a mathematical probability concept which has an application in communications. Mitchell stated that his debriefing by the Soviets about NSA covered a period of about a year of intensive debriefing, after which they let up. He stated he helped the Soviets make Soviet codes more secure against efforts by the U.S. to break them, but was of no help to the USSR in breaking U.S. codes. It was the impression of Oliver and Shannon that Mitchell was not happy with his life in the Soviet Union. When asked how he had defected, Mitchell said "you just defect."

January 1968 - Martin requested the assistance of a Canadian press correspondent in Moscow in determining whether he might get Canadian consent to a rendezvous with his parents in Vancouver. Martin reportedly considers himself "inadmissible" to the United States, but wished to see his parents for compassionate reasons.

The Canadian Correspondent, William Buckley, had met Martin at the apartment of one Howard Rausch, Moscow correspondent for McGraw-Hill Publications. Buckley interpreted Martin's request to reflect that the Russians know of his interest in getting out of the Soviet Union to see his parents. Buckley commented that he didn't really know what to make of Martin, who was rather outspoken in his discussion of the shortcomings of life in the USSR. Buckley felt, however, that Martin is not interested in getting in trouble with the Russians or doing anything which they might consider underhanded.

May 1974 - Donald A. Duffy, Vice-President and Manager of Kaiser Industries, Washington, D.C., met Martin in Moscow in May 1974 at the National Hotel. Duffy, who was in Moscow to arrange a conference sponsored by the Stanford Research Institute in cooperation with the Soviet Ministry of Science and Technology, was approached by Martin while preparing to have his dinner, and asked if he might join him. Martin and Duffy discussed the "Watergate" events during the meal, at the conclusion of which Martin spoke of his and Mitchell's defection. He described what they had learned about U.S. duplicity in its intelligence activities, and told of how they had unsuccessfully tried to interest Congressman Wayne Hays in doing something about it. Thereafter they had decided to defect.

During their conversation, Martin denied to Duffy that he was a homosexual or a spy. He insisted that he had been well treated by the Russians and claimed to be working in laser beam research. He expressed encouragement at the outcome of the "Ellsberg Trial," and said that he would like to return to the U.S., but not if it meant being given a jail term.

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Martin complained to Duffy about being short of "hard currency." Duffy described his appearance as "seedy" and weighing over 200 pounds, sweating profusely despite a comfortable temperature. Martin refused the offer of a drink, claiming that he did not indulge. After two hours of conversation, Martin paid for his own dinner in rubles, and departed.

1973 - 1975 - In 1973 Rudolf Sheptolevich Tenenbaum, a Jewish emigrant from the Soviet Union who was then teaching English in Leningrad, sought an American who could speak to some of his language classes. He was introduced to Bernon F. Mitchell at the house of a student, and thereafter visited Mitchell several times at Mitchell's apartment. Mitchell is married to a woman named Galina, who is dean of the piano faculty at Leningrad Conservatory. They have no children.

Tenenbaum described Mitchell as very unhappy, drinking a lot, regretting his defection, and desirous of returning to the U.S. or some other English-speaking country. He dislikes Soviet life, speaks little Russian, and is unable to read Russian books. He receives a pension of about 500 rubles a month, and has regular visits from the KGB. In May 1975, when Tenenbaum last saw him, Mitchell was morose, and asked about how he could leave the USSR illegally.

September 1975 - Dr. Hans Kunov, professor at the University of Toronto, met William Martin in September 1975 while doing research at the USSR Academy of Sciences under a USSR/Canada General Exchange Agreement. Martin approached Kunov during a coffee break, identified himself, and spoke openly about his past. He claimed to be a consultant to Kunov's group but stated that he did much of his work "at home."

Martin told Kunov he wanted to get out of the USSR even if he had to run certain risks. He told Kunov that Mitchell feels the same and has said so to Soviet authorities. Kunov expressed Martin's desires to the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. He subsequently met Martin on two other occasions, during which Martin warned Kunov not to get personally involved, as it would be "bad news."

Martin gave Kunov his address and phone number. He reported that Mitchell was never adjusted to Soviet life and is now very desperate. Martin said Mitchell is willing to divorce his wife and take any risks to get out of the USSR. Mitchell has openly asked Soviet authorities for permission to leave and return to the U.S. but, according to Martin, has been met by a "wall of silence."

Martin is unmarried, feels he has adjusted to the Soviet life and is accepted in the USSR, he says. He told Kunov he doesn't want to return to the U.S. but would like to get out of the USSR. He said he would not consider trying to escape, but would have "quite a story" to tell about his life in Russia and would not hesitate to tell "all about the Russians." He complains of constant harassment by Soviet officials, and wishes he could talk to American journalists.

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ny interest in Martin and Mitchell other
n" reasons, but feels that they are suffering
em.

- Another Soviet emigre, Lev Yakovlevich Maksimov,
rtin as a neighbor beginning in 1968-69, but at
from that which Martin gave Hans Kunov. Martin
ill Sokolovskiy at first, but later told Maksimov

hat about three years before this interview Soviet
p on Martin, allotted him a monthly subsidy of about
him to stay out of trouble. Maksimov described
the skids," an incurable alcoholic, surrounded
and others, and "totally devoted to his all-con-
schism."

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TAB
B



United Press International

Martin, left, and Mitchell shown after their defection in 1950.

U.S. Defector Eyes Return Home

LENINGRAD, U.S.S.R. (UPI) — Bernon F. Mitchell, a cryptographer at the super-secret U.S. National Security Agency who defected to Moscow 18 years ago, evidently wants to come home, informed sources report.

Mitchell, 40, and a colleague, William H. Martin, 47, were employed as junior mathematicians in the NSA's cryptography department at Fort Meade, Md., when they defected in 1950.

After turning up in Moscow, they said they had defected "for moral and political reasons," and that they were disenchanted with U.S. intelligence methods.

Their defection caused an uproar in U.S. defense circles because it was believed that they had information about NSA's inner workings.

NSA is concerned mainly with breaking foreign codes and protecting American codes. It also intercepts foreign communications.

A U.S. Consulate official in Leningrad said that Mitchell, of Eureka, Calif., had contacted

American officials to explore the possibility of returning to the United States.

Informed sources said Mitchell visited the American Consulate in Leningrad three times this year to ask about legal questions regarding possible prosecution for espionage if he returned.

They said during the first two visits there were substantial discussions, but that on the third visit, Mitchell, who had to wait a few minutes until the consular official was free, suddenly got up and left without meeting the diplomat.

The sources said the fact that Mitchell got past the Soviet guard outside the consulate indicated Soviet authorities knew about the visits.

Mitchell lives in Leningrad and teaches at Leningrad University. Martin, of Ellensburg, Wash., also lives and works in Leningrad.

They said Martin, upon hearing that Mitchell might leave the Soviet Union, "got very angry and has been trying to talk him out of it."

TAB
C

June 11, 1977

Mr. Robert Lipschultz
Counsel for the President
White House Office
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.,
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Lipschultz:

May I please ask your help in determining and advising me whether there are any Federal charges or convictions against William H. Martin and/or Bernon Mitchell who were said to have defected from our National Security Agency to the Soviet Union in August, 1960.

(b) (6) [redacted] He was born in Columbus, Georgia May 27, 1931, served four years in the U. S. Navy in Japan along with Mitchell from 1951 to 1955, then was employed by the NSA in 1957. They sent him to the University of Illinois where I thought he was preparing for his doctorate up until the time he and Mitchell disappeared in June, 1960. [redacted] have tried but have never been able to learn the real truth of this mysterious disappearance. Without going into details I will say that we couldn't seem to get straight answers from the NSA or other high officials in our government.

There is no question that [redacted] is in Moscow. [redacted]

[redacted]

(b) (6)

He has indicated that he can get permission from the Russian authorities to come [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] He has apparently inquired and was told on the one hand that it would be allright for him to visit the United States, and then someone over there said that he and Mitchell were tried in absentia and sentenced to 20 years.

We would very much like to know the truth as the record stands, if it is correct, so that we can tell him whether it will be possible for him to visit [redacted] He has suggested a meeting in Cuba as an alternative, but I question the advisability of this under present circumstances.

(b) (6)

Thank you very much for your consideration and advice.

Yours very truly,

[redacted]

[redacted]

TAC
D

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum



TO : DIRECTOR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR

DATE: 28 July 1977

FROM : GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: Criminal Liability of Martin and Mitchell

1. This responds to your request for advice as to whether Martin and Mitchell could be successfully prosecuted should they become subject to U.S. jurisdiction.





(b) (5)



5010-110

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Serial: GC/178/77



ROY R. BANNER
General Counsel

(b) (5)
(b) (1)
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Encl. 2

THB
E

Department of Justice
Washington 20540

August 15, 1953

(b) (6)
(b) (7) (C)
OGA

DoJ

Dear [REDACTED]

Your recent letter to Mr. Robert Lipshutz, Counsel to the President, concerning [REDACTED] William H. Martin, who left this country for the Soviet Union in 1960, and now wishes to return to the United States, has been referred to the Department of Justice for consideration and response. You ask whether there are any criminal charges pending against him.

No Federal criminal charges associated with his defection are currently pending against [REDACTED]. He has not been indicted by the United States, and the statement that he was tried in absentia and sentenced to a term in prison is not true. However, should he desire to return to the United States, this Department would be interested in having him interviewed by the FBI for information relating to possible violations of Federal law in connection with his defection and alleged unauthorized disclosures of classified information.

Very truly yours,

Benjamin R. Civiletti
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

By:

Donald L. Nelson
Deputy Assistant
Attorney General

cc: Mr. Gerard Burke

TAB
F


UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ADLA, MS

DATE:

FROM : DDO

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
(b) (1)
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-50 USC 403SUBJECT: Martin and Mitchell 

5010-112



~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~~~SECRET~~

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Incl 4

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-50 USC 403

~~SECRET~~



ROBERT E. DRAKE
Deputy Director, Operations
NSA/CSS

Incl:
a/s


(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
(b) (5)

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THE SECURITY PROGRAM OF
AFSA AND NSA
1949 — 1962

Historical Study by



October 1963

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

NSA Historian
Office of Central Reference
(C317)

Approved for Release by NSA on
01-29-2007, FOIA Case # 17515

~~SECRET~~

The intention of the two missing employees to defect to the Soviet Union was disclosed on 2 August 1960. At NSA's request, the Maryland State Police obtained a court order to open Mitchell's safe deposit box in the State Bank of Laurel. In it was found a "Parting Statement to the American People" by the two defectors, explaining why they intended to seek asylum in the USSR and to apply for Soviet citizenship. The Department of Defense decided not to release the statement for publication, as intended by its authors (the key to the safety deposit box was left where it was sure to be found in Mitchell's apartment). The statement itself required investigation, as a possible hoax, and there was no desire to give nation-wide publicity to the distorted and twisted views expressed in it. *

* SECRET Summary.

Upon the discovery of the statement, an intensive but futile effort was made to intercept the two men before they could reach their destination. The Department of Defense acknowledged on 5 August that the missing employees had probably slipped behind the iron curtain. Confirmation came on 6 September 1960 when the two defectors appeared at a Moscow press conference and gave a doubtless well-rehearsed explanation for their action. They denounced the United States in the same distorted manner as in the statement planted in the safe deposit box in the State Bank of Laurel. *

* SECRET Summary.

The backgrounds, personality and character of the two men were similar in many respects. Both had come to the Agency in 1957 through NSA's program for the recruitment of scientific personnel, conducted in universities and colleges, and both were eventually assigned to the Office of Research and Development. Each met NSA's high personnel selection and clearance standards. Their personnel and security files gave hints, but few positive indications, of the

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deficiencies in character and personality that had much to do with their decision to defect to the Soviet Union. *

* SECRET Summary.

The biographies of the two men came under careful scrutiny. Bernon F. Mitchell, born on 11 March 1929 at San Francisco of a respected, middle-class family, received his education at Humboldt State College, September 1948 - June 1949; California Institute of Technology, September 1949 - December 1950; and Stanford University, January 1955 - June 1957, graduating from the latter with the degree of B.S. in statistics in 1957.

Mitchell's studies were interrupted by active duty in the U.S. Navy, from January 1951 to November 1954, during which he acquired field experience in cryptology and some familiarity with computers. His fateful friendship with William H. Martin began while both were stationed in Japan. Upon completing the requirements for his degree at Stanford, Mitchell accepted NSA's offer of employment as a GS-7 Mathematician, reporting for duty on 8 July 1957. Two weeks later he was granted an interim clearance for COMINT, followed six months later by a final clearance, on 23 January 1958. He was described by acquaintances as honest, trustworthy, reliable and loyal, but his personnel file also contained the significant appraisal "---very retiring, ---at times, anti-social---." Mitchell reported to the Office of Research and Development for assignment as a Crypto-Mathematician on 27 January 1958. *

* SECRET Summary.

The second defector, William H. Martin, was born at Columbus, Georgia, on 27 May 1931. His education included attendance at Central Washington College, September 1949 - December 1950, and September 1955 - June 1956, and the University of Washington, September 1948 - 1949, and July 1956 - June 1957, graduating from the latter with a B.S. degree in mathematics in 1957. He obtained experience in cryptography while in the Navy, 1951-1955, and following his discharge in Japan in 1955 he continued in that field for nearly a year as a

Department of the Army employee. Martin accepted an NSA offer of employment as a Mathematician, GS-7, on 2 May 1957, reporting for duty at NSA on 8 July 1957, the same day as Mitchell. He was granted an interim clearance for COMINT on 14 August 1957. Before his final clearance on 12 May 1958, he reported for duty in the Office of Research and Development on 27 January 1958 -- the same day that Mitchell also reported to that Office. According to Martin's investigative reports, he was considered to be trustworthy, but some persons regarded him as "an insufferable egotist," and questioned his emotional maturity and sense of responsibility. There were indications in his personnel and security files that he had emotional problems. During the 1959-1960 school year Martin attended the Graduate School of the University of Illinois under an NSA fellowship, earning an M.A. degree in mathematics. While at the University of Illinois, it was later discovered, he had associated with persons alleged to be communists and fellow travellers. *

* SECRET Summary.

2. Investigation of the Case

a. Scope of the Investigative Effort

The dramatic appearance of Martin and Mitchell at the Moscow press conference was the signal for a comprehensive and intensive investigation of all aspects of the case. Why had the two men renounced the United States and defected to the USSR? How had they made their way to the USSR? Did they have confederates who were accessories to the act of defection? Was the affair engineered by Communists, particularly by Soviet agents? What information about NSA's sensitive operations could be obtained by the USSR from the defectors? What weaknesses in NSA's personnel security program might have made this incident possible by not discovering the unsuitability of both men for employment in NSA? *

* SECRET Summary; SECRET Report of Review of NSA Security Procedures and Status, Part I, Section 2.

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B. The Martin and Mitchell Case~~SECRET~~1. The Defection of Martin and Mitchell

The failure of two Agency employees to return from annual leave in the summer of 1960 precipitated NSA's most serious and most sensational security case. The two employees, William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell left on annual leave, 24 June 1960, ostensibly to visit their parents residing on the West Coast, but actually to carry out a nefarious scheme to defect to the Soviet Union. On 18 July 1960, three days after the two employees were due to return, their supervisor notified his division chief that they were absent without leave. Concerned by the unexplained absence of the two men, their supervisor tried, without success, to reach them at their local addresses and at their parents' homes on 25 July. Official notification of the unauthorized absence of the two employees was sent to PERS that same day and to SEC on the following morning. *

* SECRET Summary of Investigative Effort in the Martin and Mitchell Case, 25 Jul 60 - 1 Feb 61, (SEC Records).

The Office of Security Services began its investigation by questioning supervisor and co-workers about the vacation plans of the missing employees. Their parents advised SEC on 26 July that neither of the two had been seen or heard from since they began their leave. Two days later the Maryland State Police, at NSA's request, issued an all-points missing persons "no publicity" bulletin for distribution throughout the United States. Later that day SEC learned that Martin and Mitchell had departed from National Airport, Washington, D. C., on an Eastern Airlines flight to Mexico City on 25 June, and that on 1 July they had continued from Mexico City to Havana, Cuba. There the trail was lost. The FBI and the CIA were informed of the case and were asked to assist in the hunt. The former declined a request by the Secretary of Defense to take over the investigation of the case on 26 July, but expressed its desire to provide assistance. *

* SECRET Summary of Investigative Effort in the Martin and Mitchell Case, 25 Jul 60-1 Feb 61 (SEC Records), cited hereafter as SECRET Summary; SECRET Report of Review of National Security Agency Security Procedures and Status, Part I, Section 2; UNCLASSIFIED Office of Security Services Briefing on Investigative Results of the Martin and Mitchell Case, n.d. 1961.

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The Special Operations Division's entire staff of 22 investigators was assigned to the case. Extensive assistance was provided in the United States and abroad by the investigative resources of the Department of Defense, specifically the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Air Force's Office of Special Intelligence (OSI), and the Army's Counterintelligence Corps (CIC). The FBI and the CIA were kept posted on the progress of the investigations, and each answered specific requests for assistance. The former, for example, conducted laboratory tests and checked its files for information on persons who had had any contact with the two defectors. The investigations were carried out as unobtrusively as possible to minimize the disclosure of more information detrimental to national security.

Searching inquiries were made into the backgrounds, associations, activities, interests, habits and contacts of the defectors. Within NSA, 185 persons who had had any contact with either Martin or Mitchell - professional, social, recreational or otherwise - were identified and interviewed. The families of both men were first questioned at length and then frequently asked supplementary specific questions. Approximately 450 persons who had ever been associated with either Martin or Mitchell were interviewed to gain whatever information they could provide. Included were professors, classmates and social associates at the various schools they had attended.

The service records of both men were examined. As many of their former Naval associates as possible were located throughout the world and questioned. All physicians, psychiatrists, dentists and other practitioners known to have examined or treated either man were interviewed for information on their medical histories, emotional stability and personality traits. The financial records of both men were combed for evidence of unexplained income or irregular financial activities. Their personal effects were subjected to laboratory tests by the FBI. Most of the passengers, stewardesses and crews of the flights used by Martin and Mitchell during their defection were located and interviewed. The search extended to the records of utility companies, libraries, credit agencies and insurance companies. Every lead, no matter how unpromising or trivial, was fully exploited. Although the major investigative task was

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completed by February 1961, the case was not regarded as closed because of the many puzzling aspects and unexplained questions that remained.

b. Findings

The intensive investigation revealed that some of the worst fears aroused by the case were groundless, but established no clear motive for the defection. Nothing was found to indicate that Martin and Mitchell had previously engaged in espionage activities or that they had been assisted by collaborators, confederates or accessories. No evidence showed that the defection was the climax of a Moscow-directed espionage operation or that it was the work of an espionage apparatus in the United States. The accumulated evidence indicated that the defection was an impulsive, self-generated act, conceived and initiated without outside prompting or assistance, and that the two men received no outside assistance until they had left the United States. *

* SECRET Report of Review of NSA Security Procedures and Status, Part I, Section 2.

The investigators were particularly concerned with uncovering all hints or clues that might have provided a forewarning. The findings on that score were meager and inconclusive. Martin may have disclosed his intention to defect to an intimate associate outside of NSA. An unsupported allegation from a questionable source indicated that Martin had been planning to defect for years, and had hoped to gain sufficient information through employment at NSA to induce the Soviet Union to grant him asylum. Martin and Mitchell may have visited Mexico and Cuba in December 1959 or January 1960, but nothing definite could be learned about that trip, and it was not at all certain that it ever took place. The possibility that Martin had developed contacts with communists while at the University of Illinois was explored. That he had associated with alleged communists and fellow travellers while at the University was established, but there were no indications that he became involved in undercover or subversive arrangements or activities. The investigation of the case confirmed that Martin and Mitchell had carefully concealed their intention to defect and that, in the

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absence of forewarning, it was virtually impossible to stop them from carrying out their plans. *

* SECRET Summary.

The most plausible explanations for the defection attributed it to personal abnormalities, as shown below. Detailed investigations into the lives of the two revealed that they were egotistical, arrogant and insecure young men whose place in society was much lower than they believed they deserved. Both had greatly inflated opinions concerning their intellectual attainments and talents, and both reportedly expressed bitter resentment that they had not yet received the recognition they were sure they deserved as up-and-coming young scientists. *

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

* SECRET Summary; CONFIDENTIAL information furnished by
10 Jan 63.

The mental arrogance displayed by the two men apparently was in compensation for serious and obvious personality deficiencies. To those who knew them, they were "socially awkward," and Mitchell in particular was described as extremely unsophisticated and naive. While they were in Naval service, Martin apparently was Mitchell's only friend. The latter was described as weak, insecure and susceptible to the influence of persons who met his intellectual standards. Their neighbors, who described them as odd young men who kept to themselves, suspected them of homosexuality. The suspicion of homosexuality was also voiced by a psychiatrist visited several times by Mitchell in 1960, but no substantiating evidence was found by the investigators. *

* SECRET Summary of Investigative Effort in the Martin and Mitchell Case.

Comprehensive and painstaking investigations of an intensity not possible in routine processing of applicants later disclosed that the two men had attitudes

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known. The negative attitudes and qualities of both men were particularly striking.

They rejected, to the point of contempt, prevailing standards of morality and social mores; for example, they were especially critical of marriage laws and moral restrictions. Both showed little interest or concern for their families and disregarded family advice. With regard to religion, they professed atheism, and they ridiculed the religious convictions of others. In recent years, they had been increasingly critical of the U.S. Government and its policies, and they had objected to various aspects of the national intelligence effort. *

* UNCLASSIFIED SEC Briefing on Investigative Results of the Martin and Mitchell Case.

Indications of mental instability and abnormality appeared in their backgrounds. Psychological tests taken by Martin early in his college career indicated abnormal tendencies and emotional immaturity traits which his subsequent actions tended to confirm. Mitchell, who visited a local psychiatrist twice in May 1960 and again early in June, was distraught to the point of panic on the last occasion but did not disclose why. *

* SECRET Summary.

The findings in the Martin and Mitchell case strongly confirmed the importance of testing suitability during the security clearance process. No derogatory information of a disqualifying nature had been uncovered in the normal processing of their security clearances. The essential unsuitability of each for employment in NSA was revealed only by the intensive investigation following their defection. The case demonstrated that sufficient information for a valid judgment of suitability could be difficult to obtain, the more so when the individual concerned deliberately concealed derogatory facts. The resources of psychiatry appeared to be necessary to help resolve security clearance cases when mental factors were involved. *

* SECRET Report of Investigative Effort in the Martin and Mitchell Case.

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~~SECRET~~3. Department of Defense and Congressional Inquiries Into the Casea. Actions by the Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense met the news of the defection of Martin and Mitchell by preparing for inevitable inquiries by Congressional committees and by launching his own investigation of security practices and procedures in NSA. For both purposes the Office of the Secretary of Defense required comprehensive information from NSA. Accordingly, late in August 1960, the General Counsel, OSD, Mr. J. Vincent Burke, Jr., as the representative of the Secretary of Defense, submitted 229 questions, some specifically concerned with the Martin and Mitchell case and others with security policies, practices and procedures in NSA. The answers provided by the Office of Security Services required some 166 pages, exclusive of reference materials.

Mr. Burke used the materials provided by SEC to prepare a comprehensive, 35-page briefing covering the Martin and Mitchell case and NSA's personnel security program. He delivered his prepared statement before the Special Subcommittee for Investigation of Intelligence Matters of the House Armed Services Committee (the so-called "Kilday Committee") on 15 September 1960, and to the House Un-American Activities Committee (Representative Francis E. Walter, Chairman) on the following day. Mr. Burke's briefings were merely the opening chapter of the extended and searching Congressional inquiries into security in NSA.

The Secretary of Defense also requested the Inspector-General of the U.S. Air Force, Lt. Gen. Joseph Carroll, to act as his personal representative, for the purpose of conducting another, more stringent, evaluation of security practices and procedures in NSA. General Carroll, with a survey team of his own choosing, visited the Agency during the period 17 October - 2 November 1960.

Special significance was attached to the oral comments and recommendations made by individual members of the survey team, since, if General Carroll ever submitted a written report on his inspection visit, no copy was furnished to NSA. The lack of written criticisms and recommendations by the survey team worried the Office of Security Services, since it was uncertain whether it had acted on all of General Carroll's suggestions or whether more criticisms based on that survey would be forthcoming. The Director, NSA, Vice Admiral L. H. Frost, held several

personal conferences with General Carroll in an effort to secure an understanding on further observations or findings that might result from the survey. A detailed report itemizing the changes made as a result of General Carroll's survey was submitted by the Director, NSA, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on 14 November 1960. *

* UNCLASSIFIED DIRNSA (Lt. Gen. John A. Samford, USAF,) Memo for the Sec Def (Attn: Gen G. B. Erskine), Serial: N4333, 14 Nov 60, sub: Current NSA Security Policies, (in Rubel Report, Part I, Sec 2).

The impact of General Carroll's survey on personnel and physical security practices and procedures in NSA has been narrated in the chapters of this history devoted to those programs. Thus, the concern he expressed over the Agency's practice of granting interim clearances for COMINT on the basis of a favorable National Agency Check and a personal interview confirmed by a polygraph test led to termination of that practice in October 1960. In line with General Carroll's suggestions, the review of all security files containing unresolved derogatory information of any kind was intensified.

Another change was the abandonment of the policy of withholding information verified by a polygraph test unless it was related to serious criminal or subversive activities. In accordance with General Carroll's suggestion, investigative leads derived from polygraph interviews were provided to the Military Agencies conducting background investigations for NSA.

In the physical security area, General Carroll expressed concern over unsupervised access to areas containing classified materials by members of the char force and other GSA personnel. His suggestions influenced changes in the requirements for the wearing of blue badges and in the supervision of GSA and concessionaire personnel. A number of other procedural changes, including many that were of a minor nature, reflected the influence of the survey team. *

* SECRET Report of Review of NSA Security Procedures and Status, Part I, Sec 3; CONFIDENTIAL NSA Security Manual, 14 Sep 60.

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~~SECRET~~b. Probes by Congressional Committees

The U. S. Congress was shocked and deeply disturbed by the defection to the Soviet Union of two employees of an extremely sensitive agency intimately connected with national security. The Martin and Mitchell episode posed serious questions that had to be answered. How were the Communists able to achieve this success? Had they actually succeeded in penetrating NSA? How vulnerable were the security measures that shielded the Agency's sensitive activities? The disastrous defection with all its benefits to the Communists seemed scandalous, and required an explanation. A careful scrutiny of security conditions at NSA was believed necessary to uncover undisclosed penetrations of the Agency that might have been achieved by the Communists, and to correct weaknesses that they could exploit. The task of probing the Martin and Mitchell case and of closely examining security conditions at NSA was undertaken by both the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the "Kilday Committee," the former conducting the more intensive investigation. *

* SECRET Report of Review of NSA Security Procedures and Status, Part I, Sec 2, 1962; Report by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Eighty-Seventh Congress, Second Session, 13 Aug 62, sub: Security Practices in the National Security Agency (Defection of Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin).

The Un-American Activities Committee began a preliminary investigation of the case following the public announcement on 1 August 1960 that the two men were missing. The Committee authorized a formal investigation and hearings on the National Security Agency on 7 September 1960, the day after the Moscow press conference which confirmed the defection of Martin and Mitchell. In the investigation and hearings that followed, the Committee recognized and respected the sensitive nature of NSA's operations. *

* Report by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 13 Aug 62.

The two Congressional inquiries probed deeply into many aspects of NSA's security program, past and present. NSA answered numerous separate requests for information, either through the Department of Defense or directly.

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Before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, the Director and Deputy Director, the Chiefs, Office of Security Services and Office of Personnel Services, and less frequently other NSA officials appeared. The preparation of materials required by the inquiries was time-consuming, and sometimes difficult, and diverted the Security Staff from its normal duties at a time when they were increasingly burdensome. *

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

* SECRET Report of Review of NSA Security Procedures and Status Part I
 Sec 2, 1962; SECRET information furnished by
 30 Nov 62.

Security restrictions hindered the investigative efforts of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and denied to its staff much of the information it desired. The question of what information could be made available to the Committee was crucial. The Department of Defense sought to act as intermediary, furnishing carefully prepared data to the Committee through suitable channels. The latter, however, brushed aside the formal briefing on the Martin and Mitchell case presented by the General Counsel, OSD, and tried to obtain the information it required directly from Agency officials. Some requests had to be refused as contravening Presidential directives or injurious to national security. The Committee, for example, requested NSA to identify the security evaluators who had approved Martin's and Mitchell's access to COMINT so that they could be requested to appear for questioning. The Department of Defense steadfastly refused, but eventually agreed that the three evaluators concerned could prepare written responses to written questions submitted by the Committee. The questions were forwarded to the General Counsel, OSD, by letter in September 1961. Before the evaluators were permitted to compose their answers they were interviewed by the General Counsel. On another occasion (in August 1961) the Chairman of the Committee requested the names and dates of interim and final clearances of 26 employees dismissed by NSA (for sexual deviations) as a result of the review of personnel security files following the defection of Martin and Mitchell --- a

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request that also had to be denied. *

* UNCLASSIFIED Ltr., Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., Director Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Reps to Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, General Counsel, DOD, 5 Sep 61 (in SECRET Report of Review of NSA Security Procedures and Status, Part I, Sec 2); Report by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 13 Aug 62.

The inability of the Committee to obtain the information it required because of security considerations was frustrating at first. The Committee complained that at the outset of its probe, "the Defense Department which has jurisdiction over NSA exhibited great reluctance to cooperate." The Chairman of the Committee and the Secretary of Defense eventually agreed upon a plan of cooperation in February 1961 which greatly facilitated the investigation. At the end, in its summation of the probe, the Committee commended the Department of Defense and NSA for the manner in which they had assisted the investigation and for their actions to correct deficiencies revealed during the inquiry. *

* Report by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 13 Aug 62.

The Committee's report on "Security Practices in the National Security Agency" published on 13 August 1962 found much to criticize in the Agency's personnel recruitment and security clearance practices. It contended that the Agency had not complied with the intent of Department of Defense directives pertaining to the hiring of employees and the granting of interim clearances. Starting in 1951, the Agency had invoked the emergency provisions of the DOD directives which permitted the hiring of persons before their National Agency Checks were completed. That practice, begun because of the Korean War emergency and continued until 1960, was contrary to the limitation that security requirements for hiring employees could be waived only for specified positions, after a finding that the action was necessary for national defense. *

* Ibid.

The Agency had also invoked the emergency provisions of the Defense Department regulations which authorized the granting of an interim clearance to a new employee before the completion of a full field investigation. Instead of granting such clearances to individual emergency appointees, the Agency, since 1951, had given interim clearances to all new employees who passed a National Agency Check and a polygraph interview. The report contended that the departure from the spirit and intent of the appointment and interim clearance regulations "had the effect of vitiating their effectiveness as security measures even while there was technical compliance with them." *

* Report by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 13 Aug 62.

NSA was criticized for overemphasizing and misusing the polygraph by relying on it primarily for adjudication rather than for investigative leads. It was contended that the Agency placed far too much reliance on the accuracy of the polygraph interview as a means of conclusively determining an employee's suitability for a security clearance. The report quoted Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's views that the polygraph was merely an investigative aid, and by itself was not a conclusive determinant of guilt or innocence. The charge was made that NSA did not utilize the polygraph interview in its proper role as an investigative aid. The Office of Security Services restricted access to reports and records of polygraph interviews to its own members, thus depriving PERS of information that could have a direct bearing on an applicant's suitability for employment.

Recognition by NSA of the polygraph's real value in providing "investigative direction" might have changed the results of the background investigation of Mitchell. Lacking his polygraph admissions of sex deviations as a youth -- admissions which the clearance evaluator had decided were not of a disqualifying nature -- the Air Force investigators were denied leads into an area of considerable significance for determining Mitchell's suitability for employment. The Committee's criticism made no allowances for NSA's policy of assuring applicants that their polygraph interviews would be treated as

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confidential in return for voluntarily submitting to the procedure.

The Committee found that, at the time that Martin and Mitchell were hired, sometimes the judgment of only one medium grade (GS-9) evaluator determined whether the results of a background investigation or polygraph interview were favorable or not. If everything appeared to be in order, he was not required to obtain concurrence in his judgment from anyone else. In a few instances, the same evaluator reviewed all investigative findings pertaining to an employee, and thus was the only person to pass judgment on his security acceptability. The Committee concluded that the Director, Security, had delegated too much authority to the security evaluators.

The Committee charged that NSA's security procedures were faulty in that they did not prevent the hiring of persons who were security risks -- a charge that was substantiated by the dismissal of the 26 employees previously discussed. The Committee contended that prior to its investigations, NSA did not understand the security threat posed by employees who were homosexuals or sex deviates.

As its final criticism, the Committee cited the failure of the Agency to notify the FBI when its employees were transferred to other locations (NSA routinely reported the names of new employees to the FBI). Thus when NSA sent Martin to the University of Illinois in the Fall of 1959 the FBI was not notified. The FBI consequently could not know that the William H. Martin, who, the Committee alleged, had associated with Communists while attending the University of Illinois during 1959 and 1960, was an NSA employee. *

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

* [redacted] OSS, challenges the implication that the FBI knew that a William Martin at the University of Illinois was associated with Communists. A check of Martin's name in the indices of the FBI field office serving the University of Illinois area was negative. SECRET information furnished by [redacted] 10 Jun 63; Report by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 13 Aug 62.

The Committee's report of 13 August 1962 did not conclude its interest in security policies and procedures in NSA. Another aspect of the Committee's

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activities was its sponsorship of legislative proposals designed to strengthen security in the Agency. *

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- * Report by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 13 Aug 62; SECRET Report of Review of NSA Security Procedures and Status, Part I, Sec 2; CONFIDENTIAL information furnished by Roy R. Banner, Legal Advisor, NSA, 30 Nov 62.
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4. Proposed Legislation for NSA

The possibility of strengthening security in NSA through legislation was explored by the Agency, the Department of Defense, and the House Un-American Activities Committee. With the status of the CIA in mind, NSA officials proposed that Congress directly underwrite the authority of NSA in a Federal statute that would exempt NSA from the termination procedures prescribed by Public Law 733 and from the U. S. Civil Service Commission's authority (under the Performance Rating Act of 1950) to inspect NSA's administration of performance rating plans, including appeals to the USCSC.

The initial impetus for proposing such legislation for NSA was provided by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. In response to its request, the Director, NSA, on 18 September 1960, submitted recommendations for strengthening security in NSA in the light of the Martin and Mitchell case. The Director's views were reflected in the following recommendations by the Board, submitted to the President on 4 October 1960: (1) that assurances be provided that no individual be employed or retained by NSA unless his employment is clearly consistent with national security; (2) that the Secretary of Defense or his designee be granted full discretionary authority to terminate the services of an employee; (3) that NSA be exempted from certain Civil Service requirements when justified by security reasons. The Board's proposals obviously would require legislative action. *

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- * SECRET Report of Review of NSA Security Procedures and Status, Part I, Sec 2.
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The President requested (31 October 1960) the views of the Secretary of Defense on the Board's proposals, and the latter, in turn, asked (9 November 1960) the Director, NSA, for his comments. In stating the Agency's position the Acting Director, NSA, Dr. Louis W. Tordella, strongly endorsed the Board's recommendations. * The standard in the Board's first recommendation,

* UNCLASSIFIED Memo, Acting Director, NSA (Dr. Louis W. Tordella) for the Sec Def, (Attn: Gen. G. B. Erskine, USMC-Ret, Ass't to the Sec Def, Special Ops) 18 Nov 60, Serial N 4504, sub: Recommendation of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (in SECRET Report of Review of NSA Security Procedures and Status, Part I, Sec 2, 1962).

of course, was currently being followed, but the standard would be even more authoritative if Congress established it. The second recommendation "would overcome certain inadequacies in termination authority." Public Law 81-733 authorized the Secretary of Defense to terminate employment in the interest of national security, but procedural requirements and other safeguards provided to employees tended to emasculate the effectiveness of that authority. For example, NSA might have to disclose highly classified information in a hearing or judicial proceeding. Legislation that bestowed full discretionary authority on the Director, NSA, to terminate employment, consequently was highly desirable. Finally, with regard to the third recommendation, Public Law 86-36 (29 May 1959) provided NSA some relief from Civil Service requirements, but certain "undesirable restrictions" remained. NSA positions were under Schedule A, and consequently were subject to review by the Civil Service Commission. Relief from both restrictions was desirable. Dr. Tordella concluded by urging that consideration be given to providing express Congressional statutory authority for the establishment of NSA, in the event that the Board's proposals were acceptable to the Congress. *

* SECRET Report of Review of NSA Security Procedures and Status, Part I, Sec 2.

The Secretary of Defense recognized the advantages of the proposed legislation for NSA, but he believed they were outweighed by certain disadvantages.

He was particularly concerned over the likelihood that efforts to institute summary termination of employment for reasons of national security would arouse widespread criticism for denying to any employee so discharged his "day in court." On 15 December 1960, the Secretary of Defense opposed proposing such a law at that time, but left the door open for such action in the future if it was regarded as necessary. On 9 January 1961, the Director, NSA, requested that the Secretary of Defense reconsider NSA's requirements for legislation, and submitted a draft bill. The matter was tabled, however, pending clarification of the interest of the "Kilday Subcommittee" of the House Armed Services Committee in initiating such legislation. *

* UNCLASSIFIED Memo, Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, Deputy Ass't to the Sec Def (Special Ops) for the Executive Secretary, NSC, 15 Dec 60, sub: Seventh Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated October 4, 1960; UNCLASSIFIED DIRNSA Memo for the Sec Def (Attn: Gen. G.B. Erskine, USMC-Ret, Ass't to Sec Def (Special Ops), 9 Jan 61, (Serial: N0083) sub: Legislation for the NSA, (both in Rubel Report, Part I, Section 2).

The project was revived by a communication from the General Counsel, DOD, on 9 May 1961, stating his desire to resume action in the Department of Defense on NSA's request for legislation, since it appeared that the anticipated hearings of the "Kilday Subcommittee" would not be scheduled. Three days later, the Director, NSA, submitted a revised request for legislation. The principal change would assign to the Secretary of Defense rather than to the Director, NSA, authority to terminate employment in the Agency for reasons of national security without the need to follow the procedures prescribed by PL 733. *

* UNCLASSIFIED DIRNSA Memo, for Sec Def (Attn: Gen. G.B. Erskine), 12 May 61, (Serial: N1512) sub: Legislation for the NSA, (Rubel Report, Part I, Sec 2).

The plan for strengthening security in NSA eventually received the powerful support of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The Chairman of the Committee, Representative Francis E. Walter, on 8 February 1962, introduced a bill (H.R. 10174) designed "to achieve maximum security for the

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Agency and to strengthen the Director of NSA in providing it." Following a hearing on that bill in an executive session attended by representatives of all interested departments and agencies, a revised or "clean bill" was introduced by Mr. Walter on 12 June 1962 as H.R. 12082. *

* Report by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 13 Aug 62, sub: Security Practices in the NSA; H.R. Report No. 2120 (87th Congress, 2nd Session) 2 Aug 62, sub: Amending the Internal Security Act of 1950 to Provide for Maximum Personnel Security in the NSA.

The bill (H.R. 12082) would amend the Internal Security Act of 1950 by adding a Title IV - "Personnel Security Procedures in National Security Agency." The first of the six sections of the bill (Section 401) affirmed the intent of Congress that strict security standards should govern employment and access to classified information in NSA. The Secretary of Defense was to prescribe regulations to ensure that employment and access to classified information in NSA was "clearly consistent with the national security." The next provision (Section 402) established as a requirement for employment in NSA, the favorable appraisal of a full field investigation of each applicant. To assist the Secretary of Defense and the Director, NSA, in handling cases where doubt existed about the granting of final clearances, or eligibility for continued access, the establishing of one or more boards of appraisal was prescribed. No person could be granted access to classified information contrary to the recommendations of such a board. *

* H.R. Report No. 2120 (87th Congress, 2nd Session), 2 Aug 62, sub: Amending the Internal Security Act of 1950.

The bill would authorize the Secretary of Defense summarily to terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he determined that procedures prescribed in applicable laws for that purpose could not be invoked for reasons of national security (Section 403). An employee terminated under that section retained the right to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the government, if he was

declared eligible by the Civil Service Commission. The Committee defended its stand by reaffirming the findings of the Commission on Government Security in a report to the President and Congress dated 21 June 1957. The Commission concluded that "the security interests committed to its [NSA's] care were so great, and the consequences of error so devastating, that authority to deviate from a proposed uniform loyalty program for Federal employees should be granted to this agency." *

* Report by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 13 Aug 62, p. 20.

Finally the bill would amend both the Performance Rating Act of 1950 and Public Law 86-36 of 29 May 1959 to exempt NSA from restrictive Civil Service procedures. The changes would give NSA exemptions similar to those granted by Congress to other sensitive agencies. The former, for example, required the Civil Service Commission to inspect the administration of performance ratings and permitted employees to appeal performance ratings to the Commission. *

* Public Law 86-36, 86th Congress, H.R. 4599, 29 May 59; H.R. Report No. 2120, 2 Aug 62, sub: Amending the Internal Security Act of 1950.

The legislation proposed by Representative Walter had the approval of the Department of Defense, and no objections to it were raised by the Department of Justice and the U. S. Civil Service Commission. The House Un-American Activities Committee reported the bill favorably on 2 August 1962, and it was subsequently passed by the House of Representatives. The Senate, however, did not act on the measure before Congress adjourned. Sponsors of the bill intended to reintroduce the measure in the next Congress, and they were confident that it would then be enacted into law. *

* H.R. Report No. 2120, 2 Aug 62; CONFIDENTIAL information provided by Roy R. Banner, Legal Advisor, NSA.

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5. Impact on NSA's Security Program

The defection of Martin and Mitchell provided a powerful stimulus for overhauling and strengthening security in NSA. For the first time, representatives of the Secretary of Defense and the Congress subjected the Agency's security procedures and practices to critical scrutiny, and sought to determine how the protection afforded by it to sensitive materials could be improved. Changes made by NSA as a result of internal analysis and scrutiny from outside have been discussed in this narrative within the context of the various programs to which they applied. Beyond any doubt no other event has had, or is likely to have in the future, a greater impact on the Agency's security program.

The Director, NSA, assured the Secretary of Defense in November 1960 that the standards he would establish for both hiring and clearance would be specific and would be "experimentally severe toward determining and adopting the maximum degree of severity which maintainance of a workforce can tolerate." *

* UNCLASSIFIED Memo, Director, NSA, for the Secretary of Defense (Attn: Assistant to Sec Def, Special Ops), 14 Nov 60, (Serial N4333), sub: Current NSA Security Policies.

Revised procedures for screening applicants gave much more attention to determining suitability for employment, and required careful evaluation of all pertinent factors through coordinated actions by PERS and SEC. The mandatory, pre-employment, medical examination was henceforth expanded to include a psychological screening to ascertain a candidate's mental and emotional fitness for employment. Applicants who gave indications of emotional instability were then examined by the Agency's psychiatrists. Information derived by the Office of Security Services from its investigative sources, including all data obtained through polygraph interviews, was thereafter routinely made available to the Office of Personnel Services for its use in evaluating suitability for initial or continuing employment. The Service investigative agencies benefited by receiving the data derived from the polygraph interviews of applicants. *

* Report by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 13 Aug 62; SECRET Memo, M5 to ADMS, 16 Apr 62, sub: Assessment of M5 Responsibilities and

All pertinent factors were weighed in determining eligibility for access to cryptologic materials. At least two independent evaluations of a candidate's eligibility for a clearance were made in SEC, and two additional independent evaluations of his suitability for hiring were made in PERS. Doubtful cases were referred to the Director of Security and the Director of Personnel, and if they were unable to resolve a case, it was referred to the Director, NSA. Under the revised procedures, applicants could not be given even conditional appointments unless they had passed all screening except the full field investigation. The changing of a conditional to a permanent appointment, and the granting of a COMINT clearance, depended on a favorable report of a full background investigation. The revised procedures brought greater confidence in the reliability of newly hired and newly cleared employees, but since they were so time-consuming, they raised the problem of how to reconcile the Agency's security policies with its recruitment objectives. *

* Report by Committee on Un-American Activities, 13 Aug 62; SECRET Report of Review of NSA Security Procedures and Status, Part I, Section 2.

Concern over the reliability of the Agency's employees resulted in the review of all security files containing unresolved derogatory information, no matter how trivial. As noted previously, upon completion of the survey in August 1961 more than a thousand files had been processed, and 26 employees had been dismissed for sexual deviations. Meanwhile, the Military Departments were encouraged to render their periodic reinvestigations of NSA employees more meaningful. *

* SECRET Report of Review of NSA Security Procedures and Status, Part I, Section 2; Report by the Committee on Un-American Activities, 13 Aug 62.

The demands made on NSA's security staff as a direct result of the defection of Martin and Mitchell seriously overtaxed the resources of the Office of Security Services. The diversion of SEC employees from normal duties to special tasks from September 1960 until the Spring of 1961 temporarily

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weakened some forms of security protection afforded to the Agency. The higher standards set for personnel security, however, were accompanied by a substantial enlargement of the staff administering them, and the great interest in strengthening the security program brought a response to most of its requirements, though in the important area of internal security supervision SEC did not at once obtain all the reinforcements estimated to be necessary to insure the continuing reliability of all the Agency's employees.

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FOREWARD

This report summarizes the investigative effort conducted by the Office of Security Services, National Security Agency, and other assisting Federal Investigative agencies from 26 July to 1 February 1961. It contains the scope of the coverage, a summary of the information developed and a statement of the additional investigative effort required.

It should be noted that various portions of this report are of different classifications. The particular items have been classified to protect sources of information, the information received and the investigative techniques.

Approved for Release by NSA on 01-29-2007. FOIA
Case # 17515

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
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PERSONAL DATA

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

BIOGRAPHICAL, PHYSICAL DATA AND OTHER CHARACTERIZATION
OF
BERNARD F. MITCHELL

Date and Place of Birth: 11 March 1929, San Francisco, California
Family: Upper middle class; parents living; two brothers
Education: Humboldt State College - September 1948 - June 1949
California Institute of Technology - September 1949 - December 1950
Stanford University - January 1955 - June 1957
B.S.-Statistics
Military Service: U. S. Navy - 8 January 1951-24 November 1954
Color: White
Height: 5' 11"
Weight: 160 - 165 lbs.

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Scars : Small scar over left eyebrow near nose, lower right cheek near jawbone, also several small scars below lower lip.

Hair : Light Brown - beginning to recede. Wears hair in "crew cut" style.

Eyes : Blue. Should be wearing glasses since Subject's distance vision is poor without corrective glasses. Subject was fitted for contact lenses during 1958. Subject was fitted for regular glasses prior to this. Usually wears horn-rimmed frames on regular glasses.

Teeth : Excellent - no evidence of partial plates.

Speech : Talks with a nasal slur.

Gait : Walks in a slightly stooped manner.

Dress : Generally is attired casually in slacks and a knit pull-over sweater. Very careless of appearance.

Personality : Very retiring. At times anti-social.

Idiosyncrasies : Eats raw chicken because he likes the taste. Has intense dislike for lettuce. Described as "odd type", also "absent-minded".

Interests : Recreational chess, pianist, photography, pistol shooting, skin diving, weight-lifting, swimming, mountain climbing.

Picture : The picture submitted to FBI described as excellent likeness of Mitchell.

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~~SECRET~~BIOGRAPHICAL, PHYSICAL DATA AND OTHER CHARACTERIZATION
OF

WILLIAM H. MARTIN

**W H MARTIN**

Date and Place of Birth: 27 May 1931, Columbus, Georgia
Family: Upper middle class; parents living; two brothers
Education: Central Washington College, Ellensburg, Washington - October 1949 - December 1950; October 1955 - June 1956
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington - October 1948 - June 1949; July 1956 - 1957
B.S. - Mathematics
Color: White
Height: 5'11"
Weight: 175 lbs.

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<u>Eyes</u>	: Blue - vision good.
<u>Hair</u>	: Brown. Receding. Worn in a "crew cut" style as recently as March 1960.
<u>Scars</u>	: 1/4 inch scar in eyebrow area (which eyebrow is not known). 1 inch long scar on jaw near mouth. Birthmark in right and left groin area. Mole on back of left shoulder. Vaccination scar on upper left arm. May have skin fungus on body, especially in area of stomach.
<u>Dress</u>	: Meticulous dresser - usually in a solid colored dark black, brown, or blue, business suit costing approximately \$85.00.
<u>Speech</u>	: Subject attempts to be grammatically correct. Speaks slightly effeminately.
<u>Personality</u>	: Introvertive.
<u>Gait</u>	: Slightly stooped - with a slight "waddle".
<u>Picture</u>	: Subject's most recent picture submitted to FBI on 5 August 1960, described as an excellent likeness.
<u>Interests</u>	: Chess, pianist, collects Japanese sword handles.

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Professional Associates

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~~SECRET~~National Security Agency Personnel

A. Coverage

Forty-three persons in the organizational area to which Martin and Mitchell were assigned at NSA have been interviewed. One hundred forty-two additional NSA employees with whom Martin and Mitchell have had professional contact have been identified and interviewed to determine the extent of the knowledge gained by Martin and Mitchell concerning the operations of NSA. They have also been questioned extensively for information as to the character, habits, interests, associates and activities of Martin and Mitchell.

Sixty-five members of the NSA Academy of Skin Diving were interviewed concerning their knowledge of Mitchell and advised that they did not have close contact with him inasmuch as he seemed disinterested in the group and participated very little in its activities.

B. Information Developed

No one has been located among NSA personnel who acknowledges any awareness or suspicion of disaffection for the United States, sympathy for Russia or intention to defect on the part of Martin and Mitchell. Four persons were informed by Mitchell in late May 1960 that he was interested in or was undergoing psychiatric treatment. Martin and Mitchell were known to be close friends and somewhat anti-social but no one had any knowledge of a homosexual relationship between them. Martin and Mitchell are both said to have been outspokenly atheistic but Mitchell is also reported to have been shown a brief interest in the Unitarian Church. No one had specific

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~~SECRET~~National Security Agency Personnel (Cont'd)

knowledge of a trip to Cuba and Mexico by Martin and Mitchell in December 1959 or of their intentions to leave the country on their 1960 vacation. Two persons recall that Mitchell had mentioned previous travel to Mexico, but believed it to have been during a summer vacation in 1959.

Martin is said to have criticized American women and marital laws. Martin and Mitchell have both been described as socially awkward and Mitchell has been described as unsophisticated and naive about the practical world.

It is reported that Martin specifically requested assignment to the University of Illinois, but there is no evidence that his request was influenced by any one at NSA.

One professional contact, [] was a close social acquaintance of Mitchell. More information regarding [] appears elsewhere in this report.

Two professional associates advised that Mitchell and Martin "steered" other NSA employees to the Yenching Palace, Connecticut Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C., and that the two men appeared familiar with menus and acquainted with a waiter. NSA has received information that an owner of the Yenching [] whose father [] is now resident in the Peoples Republic of China. It is also reported that the manager of the Yenching Palace, [] has been a leader of recent integration disturbances in the Washington, D. C. area. Investigation, however, has revealed no association

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~~SECRET~~National Security Agency Personnel (Cont'd)

between Mitchell and Martin and the above-described individuals at the Yenching Palace.

C. Collateral Investigations

As the Martin and Mitchell investigation has progressed, it has been necessary to determine the degree and significance of association between the defectors and certain other NSA employees. Investigations have therefore been conducted concerning the following individuals:

[REDACTED]	- Professional and social associate.
[REDACTED]	- Supervisor
[REDACTED]	- Supervisor
[REDACTED]	- Supervisor
[REDACTED]	- Chess associate
[REDACTED]	- Supervisor
[REDACTED]	- Supervisor and chess associate.

These investigations were conducted with special regard to whether the individuals were influenced by Martin and Mitchell, whether they were themselves influential in the defection of the two men, or whether they had knowledge of Martin and Mitchell's trip to Cuba and Mexico in December 1959, Mitchell's psychiatric treatment, Martin's sexual aberrations (to be later described) or any other aspects of the personalities and activities of Martin and Mitchell, the disclosure of which might have contributed or led to prevention of the defection.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~National Security Agency Personnel (Cont'd)

These investigations have disclosed nothing as yet indicative of untoward or unusual association with the defectors or awareness of the plans of Martin and Mitchell to defect. With the exception of the investigations, which are continuing, the investigations have been completed.

D. Additional Investigation

Although investigation to date has revealed no evidence that any persons at NSA aided Martin and Mitchell in the collection of information about NSA for illicit purposes, or influenced Martin and Mitchell in their decision to defect, inquiries are being conducted on a continuing basis to explore this possibility.

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Social Contacts and Activities

Martin and Mitchell Families

Neighborhood Inquiries

Personal Associates

Chess Activities

Viktor Kaskin Bookstore

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~~SECRET~~Martin and Mitchell Families

A. Coverage

Since the disappearance of Martin and Mitchell, representatives from the Office of Security Services, NSA, have had numerous telephone contacts and have interviewed members of both families personally. Although initial contacts were for the purpose of obtaining information which might aid in locating Martin and Mitchell, later telephonic and personal contacts have been for the purpose of seeking information concerning Martin and Mitchell's associates, activities, interests, habits and other leads bearing upon influences leading to their defection or possible implication of the families.

B. Information Developed

Both families have been cooperative and have provided significant information leading to the location of associates of Martin and Mitchell. The Mitchell family advised that their son had mentioned psychiatric treatment; that all through his life he has been influenced by other individuals and has "tagged along". The Mitchell family agreed that an observable change in the interests and thinking of Bernon occurred during the three years following his employment at NSA. Mrs. Mitchell related that Bernon expressed concern over U.S. intelligence activities and foreign policies on several occasions. Mitchell's family mentioned that Mitchell was skillful in manipulating combination locks and had, after his release from the Navy, advertised that he would be willing to

~~SECRET~~Martin and Mitchell Families (cont'd)

open any safe in Eureka, California, which was inoperable as a result of its combination being lost or forgotten. The Mitchell family also recalled that Mitchell and Martin had taken a trip to Cuba and Mexico in December 1959.

Mrs. Martin advised that she is of the opinion that it was absolutely impossible her son, William, could have voluntarily defected to the Soviet Union and insisted that the "Parting Statement" must be a forgery. The Martins made available details of William's background, however, and confessed that they knew very little of his activities for the past eleven years. Both the Martin and Mitchell families have made telegrams and letters received from their sons in Moscow available for examination. Recent information from these letters reflect that William Martin has married a Russian girl and is probably living somewhere other than Moscow.

C. Additional Investigation

An inquiry into the backgrounds of the members of the immediate families of Martin and Mitchell is being conducted by military investigative agencies. It is estimated that these investigations will be completed approximately 15 February to 1 March 1961.

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~~SECRET~~Neighborhood

A. Coverage

Extensive investigation has been conducted in and around the Laurel, Maryland and Washington, D.C. areas and among persons who have lived in close proximity to Martin and Mitchell. Twenty-eight such persons have been interviewed concerning their knowledge of the activities, interests and associates of Martin and Mitchell. These have included merchants, neighbors, taxi drivers, motel operators and residents and the proprietors of photographic shops.

B. Information Developed

Martin and Mitchell are generally recalled as odd young men who kept to themselves except for a few friends. Martin would never permit cleaning women into their quarters unless one of them was present. The blinds were always kept tightly drawn, even during the day. Neighbors suspected that Martin and Mitchell were homosexuals but had no positive knowledge of this and never reported their suspicions to any authority. In late May or early June 1960, Mitchell commented to his landlady that he was going to a psychiatrist to "find out what was wrong" with him. He also told her of a trip to Cuba in December 1959. No one was aware of any indications of disaffection for the United States or sympathy for the Soviet Union on the part of Martin and Mitchell. The neighbors observed their departure on 25 June 1960 but noted nothing singular in their behavior. The taxi driver who transported them to the airport recalled the trip because they talked about chess all the way.

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~~SECRET~~Neighborhood (cont'd)

In addition, neighborhood inquiries reflect that Mitchell was active in swimming at the Laurel swimming pool in Laurel, Maryland. The Manager, Life Guard and other contacts report that Mitchell appeared disinterested in women and most frequently associated at the pool with Lothar Greene, Professor Charles Pulvari and Attila Stanko.

Mitchell reportedly was quite vocal in denouncing religion and expressing his atheistic opinions. He is also stated to have been critical of United States intelligence policies and practices, national customs, and economic system. One contact reports that Mitchell expressed personal interest in the Castro Movement in Cuba.

C. Additional Investigation

All investigation by NSA in the neighborhoods in which Martin and Mitchell formerly resided have been completed. Military investigative units are completing interviews of former neighbors no longer resident in the greater Washington-Baltimore area.

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~~SECRET~~Personal Associates - Contacts

A. Coverage

Approximately four-hundred fifty persons, identified by various sources as personal associates and contacts of Martin and Mitchell, have been interviewed and questioned concerning their knowledge of the activities, interests, political and ideological orientation, habits, associates and character of Martin and Mitchell. Inquiry has been or is being conducted into the character, records and general backgrounds of all persons personally associated with Martin and/or Mitchell. Additional investigation of Martin's associates at the University of Illinois is reported elsewhere in this summary.

B. Information Developed

Associates of Mitchell deny any knowledge of his disaffection for the United States; however, Martin has reportedly expressed sympathy for the Soviet Union. Personal associates also deny any knowledge of homosexuality on the part of Martin and Mitchell and state that both men engaged in social and sexual activity with women. One female associate of Mitchell acknowledges frequent and normal sexual activity with him during the entire period of their acquaintance. Martin and Mitchell are both reported to have sought social contact with women on many occasions. One female acquaintance of Martin states that in conversation he showed an interest in masochism. It has been reported to NSA an interview with another female who reportedly heard Martin admit masochistic practices. One former co-worker of Martin, currently employed at the Institute

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
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Personal Associates - Contacts (cont'd)

for Defense Analysis, advised that Martin visited Baltimore night clubs and was acquainted with a female entertainer at one of these clubs. An Ellensburg, Washington, acquaintance of Martin, who was interviewed, alleged that Martin had perverted sexual relations with Japanese females and with women in the State of Washington, and that in 1955 and 1958, Martin had told him of plans to defect to the USSR.

Mitchell has had as his close friends at least two men of Hungarian birth, and one individual who has admitted past membership in the Communist Party.

The following information has been developed concerning associates of Martin and Mitchell:



(2) Sheila Bowater, aka 'Lady Zorro,' has been an entertainer at the Oasis Club, Baltimore, Maryland. She advised that she had approximately thirty or forty dates with Martin in the Baltimore-

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Personal Associates - Contacts (cont'd)

Washington area, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] She also stated that she saw Martin in London, England, in July 1960, when she was performing at a night club in Blackpool. Her presence in England in July 1960 has been verified. Interviews with other female entertainers in Baltimore tend to corroborate Bowater's testimony concerning her activities with Martin in Baltimore, Washington, and Laurel, Maryland.

(3) James Milton Lyons, Ellensburg, Washington, an associate of Martin from 1955 to 1957 who saw him on subsequent occasions when Martin was in Ellensburg stated that Martin claimed to have engaged in perverted heterosexual sex practices of a sadistic-masochistic nature while in Japan and that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in Washington State, where Martin performed abnormal sexual activity. Although he opined that Martin was not homosexual, Lyons reported that Martin told him that he had experimented with homosexuality in Japan. Lyons' deposition includes statements to the effect that as early as 1955 Martin intended to go to Russia and claimed to have discussed this intention with Mitchell while they were both in the Navy. From 1955 to 1957, Lyons reported, Martin's intention to defect was founded on Martin's impressions that the USSR rewarded scientists more generously than did the United States and that the United States had become degenerate. Martin also believed that Soviet

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~~SECRET~~Personal Associates - Contacts (Cont'd)

women would be more receptive to him than American females and that American businessmen, such as his father, often practiced deceit and deception. Lyons also stated that Martin wished to defect because he hated his parents, particularly his mother, whom Martin described as neurotic and sadistic.

According to Lyons, Martin took employment with NSA not only because he could thereby obtain an advanced degree in mathematics, but because the advanced degree, coupled with knowledge gained of NSA activities, would enhance his bargaining position with the Soviets and induce them to accept him as a defector. Lyons reported that in 1953 Martin discussed his concern regarding the means and arrangements for making contact with the Soviets and actually defecting. Lyons further advised that Martin desired to become proficient in the Russian language prior to his defection. According to Lyons, Martin never mentioned conducting espionage in the United States, but talked solely about defecting to the USSR. Lyons stated that Martin frequently expressed his elation regarding obtaining a security clearance with the Navy, and confided that he had listed on his Statement of Personal History individuals who, though prominent members of their communities, knew little of his personal or private life. Lyons also stated that Martin was apprehensive of the NSA polygraph examination because of his sexual proclivities and advised Lyons that if the necessity arose, he would admit to a small part of his sexual activities and thus

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~~SECRET~~Personal Associates - Contacts (cont'd)

mislead the examiner. Lyons continued that Martin believed few individuals are completely "clean" as far as their backgrounds are concerned and was of the opinion that if he admitted a portion of his escapades his total background would be overlooked by those granting security clearance. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(4) Anstol I. Zverev, a former engineer in the Soviet Army who was taken prisoner by the Germans in 1942 and who, after living in Germany and Western Europe, emigrated to the United States in 1952, is currently employed in a technical capacity at the Westinghouse Corporation. He has in the past approached the NSA Chess Club in search of chess opponents and has engaged in chess games with at least one member of that club. This member advised that Zverev contacted Martin, formerly an NSA Chess Club official, in order to arrange a chess game. Zverev has since denied ever having met Martin, ever having played chess with Martin, and ever having known Martin personally. Zverev additionally has advised that he has had no contact of any kind with Soviet officials since his capture by the German army during World War II.

(5) Professor Charles Pulvari, a Hungarian refugee, teaches at Catholic University. He is separated from his wife and lives with Attila Stanko, aka Czjkancko, a young Hungarian refugee. He claims

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~~SECRET~~Personal Associates - Contacts (cont'd)

to be Mitchell's "most intimate confidant" and has engaged in extensive social and athletic activity with him. Pulvari informed his secretary at Catholic University that he was to have accompanied Martin and Mitchell to Mexico in June 1960 but had been unable to do so because of his inability to arrange for leave from the university. There has been no indication that Pulvari was aware that the USSR was the ultimate destination of Martin and Mitchell or that Pulvari has sympathy for Communism or the USSR.

(6) [] NSA associate and social acquaintance of Mitchell, also claims to be Mitchell's closest friend. He shares many of the atheistic views of Martin and Mitchell and espouses a Utopian political philosophy which approaches Marxism. He may have had prior knowledge of the planned Martin and Mitchell defection, although he denies it.

(7) [] former military assignee to NSA, shared living quarters with Martin at the University. Martin is reported to have discussed defection with him, although [] denies prior knowledge of Martin and Mitchell's plans. He is the close friend of a suspected underground Communist and is acquainted with others believed to be sympathetic to the Communist cause. [] security clearance at IDA has been suspended.

(8) Morton and Jean Rubio Jackson, friends of Martin at the University of Illinois, are both known to have been [] (b) (6)

[] in the past and are suspected of continuing activities.

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~~SECRET~~Personal Associates - Contacts (cont'd)

(9) Robert F. McNaughton, Jr., currently employed at the Moore School of Electrical Engineering, the University of Pennsylvania, was an instructor of Mitchell at Stanford University and a co-author, with Mitchell, of an article published in a technical journal. In addition to the contact with Mitchell at Stanford, he had social association with Mitchell and Martin in Washington, D.C. He has admitted that he [redacted] in March 1947 (b) (6) while attending Columbia University and studied at the Jefferson School of Social Sciences during the spring of 1947. He additionally states that he [redacted] in June 1948, that he (b) (6) never had ideals synonymous with those of [redacted] and that he realized that he was in error [redacted] It has been reported that McNaughton listed several individuals on his Statement of Personal History who held membership in various front organizations and has also listed affiliation with the American Veterans Committee, the Young Peoples' Political Action Committee, and the Young Peoples Progressive Citizens of America. McNaughton

[redacted] (b) (6)

1952. McNaughton reportedly believed Mitchell was unstable and that although Mitchell and Martin were at first enthusiastic about their NSA employment, they became disenchanted with NSA and expressed their concern regarding a missing aircraft which they suspected had been 'spying for the United States.'

(10) [redacted] a communications technician in the U. S. Navy, was associated with Martin and Mitchell in Japan and at NSA.

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~~SECRET~~Personal Associates - Contacts (cont'd)

[] reportedly listed on his Statement of Personal History an individual alleged to be a member of the Communist Party.

C. Additional Investigation

Pertinent inquiries are being conducted relative to the development of contacts and associates who may have been instrumental in or knowledgeable of the subversion of Martin and Mitchell and who may have exercised or may be in a position to exercise similar influences upon other NSA employees. Investigation of Pulvari, McNaughton, Stanko and [] is continuing. The access of [] to classified matter has been suspended pending completion of his current investigation.

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~~SECRET~~Chess

A. Coverage

Both Martin and Mitchell are known to be active chess enthusiasts. They both have belonged to the Washington Divan of the American Chess Association and the NSA Chess Club. Both have been President of the latter. Thirteen members of the Washington Chess Divan and twenty-one members of the NSA Chess Club have been interviewed to determine whether Martin or Mitchell have established any foreign associations through chess; who their more regular chess opponents have been; what is known of them by persons who have met them through chess; and whether either Martin or Mitchell have given to a chess opponent any indication of disaffection for the United States, sympathy for the Soviet Union or intention to defect.

B. Information Developed

At the Washington Chess Divan, Martin and Mitchell are remembered as an unusual couple. Martin described himself to one member as being 'quite lonely.' Mitchell is described as insecure and as the more sensitive of the two. No one recalls that Martin or Mitchell ever played chess with a foreign national, although foreigners are known to visit the Divan on occasion. One Washington Chess Divan member recalled that a member of the Soviet Embassy Staff or a Soviet newsmen had attempted to join the Divan; however, his membership attempt was vetoed. No one was located who knew anything of the personal lives, habits, political orientation or convictions of Martin or Mitchell. NSA Chess Club members described Mitchell

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~~SECRET~~Chess (cont'd)

as anti-social and as a nonconformist. Mitchell is also said to have commented on news articles concerning an American aircraft shot down by Russian pilots. None recall any expressions of ideological opinion or political leaning. One member states that Mitchell was associating with an unidentified married woman. Martin is quoted as having criticized American women as being 'spoiled and grasping.'

It was learned that one Anatol Zverev (previously explained under Personal Associates), a person of Russian extraction, had contacted the NSA Chess Club in search of a chess opponent. Martin is said to have contacted Zverev in response to the invitation, but Zverev reportedly declined the match because of Martin's 'sensitive position.' Zverev did, however, accept matches with another member of the NSA Chess Club with whom he continues to associate.

C. Additional Investigation

Investigation is continuing among members of the Washington Chess Divan. As the investigation develops attention is being given to determining any association between Soviet or other foreign nationals and Martin and Mitchell through the media of chess.

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~~SECRET~~Viktor Kamkin Bookstore

A. Coverage

Based upon the speculation of a chess associate of Martin that Martin may have bought Russian literature concerning chess at the Viktor Kamkin Bookstore, investigation has been conducted to determine whether either Martin or Mitchell were known to Mr. or Mrs. Kamkin. The possible significance of this information stems from the fact that the Kamkin Bookstore is the largest purveyor of Russian language literature in the Metropolitan Washington-Baltimore area. It is also known to be frequented by foreign nationals and persons interested in Russian culture and the Soviet Union. The Kamkins have been offered a franchise as the official outlet of Russian cultural material for the Soviet Union and have recently returned from a lengthy visit to Russia.

B. Information Developed

Mrs. Viktor Kamkin identified Martin from a photograph as a patron of the Kamkin store. She was unable to identify Mitchell. Mr. and Mrs. Kamkin stated that they never observed Martin or Mitchell in their store in the company of anyone known to them as an official or employee of the Soviet Embassy.

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University of Illinois

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~~SECRET~~University of Illinois

A. Coverage

Extensive investigation has been done in the vicinity of Champaign-Urbana and the University of Illinois to determine the activities, associates, interests and influences to which Martin was exposed while attending the University from September 1959 until June 1960. All available sources were reviewed, in detail, for pertinent information concerning Martin, his associates and activities. Sixty-two persons, representing the faculty, student body, neighbors, associates and other contacts were interviewed and questioned to determine whether they had knowledge indicating that Martin might have been influenced or aided in planning his defection during his tour at the University and to determine whether persons with whom Martin had contact in the Champaign-Urbana area might have been instrumental in or have contributed to the subversion of Martin and/or Mitchell. Twelve additional NSA employees were contacted who have received Agency fellowships to study at the University of Illinois.

B. Information Developed

It was learned that while at the University of Illinois, Martin maintained a close association with a person known to be a member of the Communist Party Underground, with others suspected of Communist sympathies and with persons known to be extreme "liberals" in their political and philosophical orientation. He is said to have been outspoken in his criticism of the United States actions

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~~SECRET~~University of Illinois (Cont'd)

and policies in connection with intelligence matters and with government treatment of scientists. He has been described as a nervous and sarcastic person, arrogant and given to bragging about his "inside knowledge" of United States intelligence activities. Associates of Martin were among the signers of a petition protesting the dismissal of a professor from the University because of objectionable views published on the subject of sex. Martin was heard to complain about the restrictions on foreign travel imposed by the National Security Agency upon its employees and to have mentioned the possibility of defection. He told a friend that he had been to see a United States Congressman and had related to him some "sensitive information" about the United States "meddling" in the affairs of a foreign country but had been told to "go home" and to "keep quiet" about the information. (Subsequent interview with Congressman Hays verified the above information.) Martin is said to have complained about his inability to find an intellectually suitable mate and to have expressed admiration for Russian society. He is reported to have confronted a visitor with a loaded gas gun once when answering his door.

An associate of Martin stated that Martin was experienced in the photography of microscopic objects. He also is reported to have had a large collection of Japanese art objects and curios, much

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~~SECRET~~University of Illinois (Cont'd)

of which he gave away or sold during his term at the University.

He is said to have been [REDACTED] (b) (6)

[REDACTED] in Champaign-Urbana and Chicago. His telephone records reflect late-hour calls to a public telephone booth in the basement of a Chicago music hall which is in the same block as the Modern Bookstore, the outlet for all Communist Party literature in the Chicago area, and which is located three blocks from the headquarters of the Communist Party in Chicago. There is practically no evidence of correspondence or communication between Martin and Mitchell while Martin was at Illinois.

Inquiries concerning past recipients of NSA fellowships at the University of Illinois revealed nothing pertinent insofar as a conscious attempt to channel Agency employees to that University is concerned.

C. Additional Investigation

Another government agency is conducting an investigation relative to the activities of the Communist Party at the University of Illinois with specific regard to the associates and activities of Martin.

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Navy Duty

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~~SECRET~~Navy Duty

A. Coverage

All service records and investigative material in the Department of the Navy have been reviewed in detail. Sixty-four persons who served as superiors or co-workers of Martin and Mitchell in Japan have been located and interviewed to determine what is known of the activities, associations, interests and influences which existed during their military service which might relate to the ultimate development of their decision to defect.

B. Information Developed

Former Navy associates interviewed thus far have indicated that Martin and Mitchell were close friends in Japan and that they shared interests in photography, chess and manipulating dial-type combination locks. The former associates advised that both men were atheists. Mitchell was a recluse and a nonconformist as far as Naval regulations and procedures were concerned, while Martin, although a haughty pseudo-intellectual, found it easier to make friends and was more highly regarded than Mitchell. Martin appeared to be Mitchell's only friend.

Reportedly, Martin expressed his preference for 'pure Communism' as a form of government but believed that such a system is not practiced in any country, including the Soviet Union. According to interviewees, Martin allegedly favored dictatorship, state-ownership of all property and was not in favor of free elections. Martin reportedly remarked that he was against Capitalism and thought that it was doomed. An after-the-fact opinion expressed by one reference indicated Martin was completely leftist.

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Several references related that Martin always had considerable amount of money and often retained his pay checks for an undetermined period of time.

One individual mentioned that Martin had arranged with a Japanese hotel owner in Yokohama for private entertainment. According to this person, the entertainment was attended by Martin and two other Navy enlisted men and involved two Japanese females engaging in acts of sexual perversion. Although some of the persons interviewed suspected Martin and Mitchell of being homosexuals and of associating with homosexuals, none of the interviewees furnished more concrete information in this regard. None of the individuals thus far interviewed have been able to furnish any information concerning disaffection on the part of Martin and Mitchell during their tours of duty in the Navy.

It is to be noted that Martin ended his Naval service in Japan and was released from the Navy in that country. Subsequent to his release Martin was offered a job in Tokyo by one George Paris, an individual described as an associate of known Soviet agents in the Far East. No information received to date indicates that Martin was in contact with such individuals.

C. Additional Investigation

Efforts are continuing to locate and interview persons who served in the Navy with Martin and Mitchell. Attempts are being made to determine the full extent and significance of Martin's association with George Paris.

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~~SECRET~~Medical Information

A. Coverage

Efforts have been made to locate and interview all physicians, psychiatrists, dentists or other practitioners with whom Martin or Mitchell have had contact. This has been done in order to develop information reflecting upon the emotional stability of Martin and Mitchell. Mitchell's dentist, optometrist, physician, pharmacist and psychiatrist have been questioned. The records of the NSA Medical Center have been reviewed. Martin's medical records at the University of Washington have been reviewed, as have those of the University of Illinois.

B. Information Developed

Records of the NSA Medical Center revealed that both Martin and Mitchell have been treated for minor physical complaints. Martin has received immunization shots in connection with his assignment to the University of Illinois. NSA Medical Center files contain no records of psychological examination or observation.

Mitchell's dentist has said that Mitchell has a phobia for chewing vitamin pills. The dentist has not observed any other singular or distinctive characteristics.

Mitchell's optometrist described Mitchell as 'absent minded.' He stated that Mitchell claimed to be married.

Mitchell's personal physician has treated Mitchell for physical complaints. In April or May 1960 he referred Mitchell to a psychiatrist at Mitchell's request. Mitchell had advised him that

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~~SECRET~~Medical Information (Cont'd)

he had a personal theory concerning male impotence and wished to discuss it with a psychiatrist.

Mitchell's psychiatrist (Dr. Clarence Schilt, Silver Spring, Maryland) first saw Mitchell on 25 May 1960. He subsequently saw him on 30 May 1960 and 3 June 1960. During the first visit, Mitchell discussed his personal theories on homosexuality but refused to acknowledge a personal problem. During the second visit, Mitchell showed concern over what records were made of the interviews, whether a recording device was being used, whether hypnosis or truth serums were used and whether the consultations would be kept in strict confidence. Again he failed to acknowledge a personal problem. On the final visit, Mitchell is said to have been distraught to the point of panic. The psychiatrist stated that Mitchell on this occasion appeared to be suffering because of a conflict of authority of some kind. Mitchell never reached the point of discussing his actual problem but the psychiatrist was of the opinion that Mitchell was "in a jam with authorities."

Although Mitchell never confessed any homosexual activity, the psychiatrist is of the opinion that Mitchell has had a homosexual problem all his adult life.

Records at the University of Illinois dispensary reveal that Martin was treated in the winter of 1959-60 for a recurrent respiratory ailment. Files contain no mention of psychological counselling requested by or given to Martin.

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~~SECRET~~Medical Information (Cont'd)

The complete file regarding Martin's consultations at the University of Washington Counselling Center in December 1948 has now been reviewed. This file reflects that near the close of his first semester at the University, Martin approached the Counselling Center to obtain assistance relative to two personal problems, viz., his poor academic performance and his awareness of certain personality aberrations which he believed were not conducive to good social adjustment. Prior to his interview by members of the staff of the Counselling Center, Martin executed an autobiography and was given a battery of psychological tests. These tests disclosed that Martin was a brilliant but emotionally immature individual who did not respect his father, who pitied his younger brother and who expressed his antipathy toward his mother by describing her as neurotic, ambivalent and sadistic. Martin's condition was diagnosed as a beginning character neurosis with schizoid tendencies. It was also believed that Martin was sadistic.

(b) (6)

but no information has been developed which would indicate that Martin consulted these individuals because of their political beliefs.

C. Additional Investigation

Additional medical data regarding Martin and Mitchell is being sought.

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Financial Information

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~~SECRET~~Financial Information

A. Coverage

Investigation has located four banks in Laurel, Maryland, Washington, D.C. and Champaign, Illinois where Martin and/or Mitchell have had accounts. Complete records of bank transactions have been obtained and reviewed for information reflecting unusual activity of possible significance.

B. Information Developed

Records of purchases of travelers checks have led to the obtaining of the cancelled checks reflecting upon the financial resources of Martin and Mitchell during their trip out of the United States. Other cancelled checks have revealed no significant contacts or unusual expenditures. Mitchell has been determined to have received an appreciable financial gift in early 1960. No unexplained deposits have been noted. A strange lack of substantial financial resources has been noted on the part of Martin. It should be noted, however, that the prostitutes with whom Martin had contact in Baltimore advised that Martin paid them large amounts of money which were usually in the form of cash.

The bank inquiries led to the location of Mitchell's safe deposit box. A complete audit of the bank accounts of Mitchell and Martin disclosed that they operated on a cash basis with the exception of payments of rent, utilities and other incidental expenses.

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Parting Statement

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~~SECRET~~The Parting Statement

On 2 August 1960, a Court Order was obtained by the Maryland State Police, at the request of the National Security Agency, and a safe deposit box belonging to Mitchell at the State Bank of Laurel was opened. A "parting statement" from Martin and Mitchell to "The American People" was found in the box.

On 3 August 1960, the State Court released the statement to the custody of the United States Attorney for Baltimore, Maryland, who in turn released it into the custody of the Department of Defense.

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Personal Effects

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~~SECRET~~Personal Effects

A. Coverage

During the course of investigation, the personal effects of Martin, at Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, and of Mitchell, at Laurel, Maryland, have been examined in detail and, in certain instances, have been subjected to laboratory examination.

B. Information Developed

Evidence of the hobbies, interests and reading habits of Martin and Mitchell has been developed from the above examination, but no significant evidence relating to espionage, subversion or planned defection has been revealed. An unusual absence of retained correspondence was noted. There was evidence of the destruction of paper. A study of latent fingerprints has been unproductive. Martin and Mitchell's effects reveal their interest and activity in photography, music, Russian language, French and travel. Mitchell also possesses much athletic and sporting equipment, firearms and a large liquor supply. A pencil-gun which discharges gas when fired was found in Mitchell's home, but it is believed to have been left behind by Martin, since a former neighbor at Champaign-Urbana, Illinois had observed Martin with such a pencil-gun in his hand when answering the door on one occasion. The typewriter which Martin and Mitchell used to type their "Parting Statement" has been located and identified as one which Mitchell rented from an office supplies establishment in Laurel, Maryland.

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Supporting Investigative Measures

Travel Media

Educational Institutions

Communications

Credit Records

Library Records

Utilities

Insurance Records

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~~SECRET~~Supporting Investigative Measures

A. Coverage

The following supplementary checks have been made for information leading to the identification of associates, activities or information which might reflect upon the influences leading to the defection of Martin and Mitchell, the nature of their activities prior to defection and the actual preparation for and execution of their defection. These indices have also been carefully studied for indications of influences and activities which might still involve NSA employees or might lead to the identification of present security weaknesses or risks which may remain in the National Security Agency.

(1) Travel Media:

During the course of investigation, detailed information has been obtained concerning the mode of travel of Martin and Mitchell out of the United States. Complete manifests, ticketing information and schedules have been obtained and reviewed. Sixty-seven persons, including passengers, stewardesses, and ticket agents have been interviewed. The passenger manifests of the trip Martin and Mitchell booked to Cuba and Mexico in December 1959 have also been obtained.

(2) Educational Institutions:

The records of the George Washington University and the University of Illinois have been searched for information concerning the courses taken by Martin and Mitchell, their professors and classmates.

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~~SECRET~~Supporting Investigative Measures (Cont'd)

(3) Communications:

Records of the telephone companies in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois and Laurel, Maryland have been obtained and records of incoming and outgoing calls reviewed for the past year. Telegraph companies in the same areas have been checked for incoming or outgoing messages during the same period. Post Office records have been checked for information concerning incoming or outgoing registered or insured mail or packages.

(4) Credit Records:

Records of credit agencies in the areas where Martin and Mitchell have lived and of organizations issuing credit cards have been checked as further sources of information concerning the financial resources and habits of Martin and Mitchell.

(5) Library Records:

Records of library facilities available to Martin and Mitchell have been checked to determine their reading habits and library activities beyond those indicated by literature found among their personal effects.

(6) Utilities:

Records of gas, electric and water companies have been checked for indications of unusual use of any of these utilities which might indicate possible interests or activities of which we are presently unaware.

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~~SECRET~~Supporting Investigative Measures (Cont'd)

(7) Insurance Records:

Insurance records have been reviewed to determine whether cancellation of policies could have revealed plans to leave the country and to determine whether unusual beneficiaries are indicated.

B. Information Developed

(1) Travel media checks have revealed how and when Martin and Mitchell left the United States and travelled from Mexico to Cuba. No significant information has yet been learned from crews or fellow passengers. Information has been received, however, to the effect that one of the passengers on the June 1960 flight from New Orleans to Mexico City, may have been Edmond Verniers, reportedly a Soviet agent and Belgian citizen currently residing in Pensacola, Florida.

(2) No significant information has as yet been learned from professors or classmates.

(3) Communications records have provided leads, but no significant results have yet been obtained.

(4) Credit records reveal no unusual financial activity.

(5) Library records have proved uninformative concerning Martin and Mitchell.

(6) No unusual characteristics have been noted in Martin and Mitchell's use of utilities.

(7) Insurance records reflect that Martin and Mitchell's health and automobile policies were renewed shortly prior to departure.

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~~SECRET~~Supporting Investigative Measures (Cont'd)

C. Additional Investigation

Contact of travellers who were on trips with Martin and Mitchell continues, and efforts to determine whether Verniers contacted Martin and Mitchell on the flight are continuing. Attempts to identify and locate all persons in communication with Martin and/or Mitchell are continuing, as are efforts to contact academic associates.

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Investigative Activity
Coordinated With Other Agencies

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~~SECRET~~Investigative Activity Coordinated with Other Agencies

A. Coverage

Investigation has been coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency since 29 July 1960, on which date National Security Agency investigators determined that Martin and Mitchell had left the United States. Commencing on that date, those Agencies actively participated in efforts to locate and intercept Martin and Mitchell in (b)(1) Cuba and are responsible for determining the available information concerning Martin and Mitchell's movements after leaving the United States. The National Security Agency has kept both CIA and the FBI fully apprised of all developments in the NSA and service investigations on a current basis and they have kept NSA advised of all developments pertaining to their operations in connection with Martin and Mitchell.

In addition to coverage abroad, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has given assistance to NSA by conducting laboratory examination of papers, materials and fingerprints connected with the investigation and by furnishing the results of these tests to NSA. They have also interviewed persons who may have or have seen Martin and Mitchell in Mexico or Cuba and have reported these interviews to NSA. They have forwarded information concerning any reported sightings of Martin and Mitchell from all parts of the United States. FBI has conducted many searches of their own indices at the request of NSA

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~~SECRET~~Investigative Activity Coordinated with Other Agencies (Cont'd)

and have provided all available information resulting from these searches.

The Security Office of the Department of State has been kept advised of all information developed during investigation which could affect their interests. Based upon this information, they have commenced investigations of their own, of which they are keeping NSA informed. The Passport Division, Department of State, has also cooperated extensively.

The assistance of Police Departments in the Metropolitan Washington-Baltimore area, the Maryland State Police and the Laurel, Maryland Police has been enlisted by NSA in connection with certain phases of this investigation. Complete cooperation has been received.

The United States Post Office Department has, at the request of NSA, instituted and maintained a watch on the mail received by several persons involved in the Martin and Mitchell investigation and has searched its records and registries for helpful information and leads.

The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Army, is assisting in the location and interview of former neighbors of Martin and Mitchell no longer resident in the Washington-Baltimore area, and Mitchell and Martin's fellow passengers on the airline flights from Washington to Latin America.

The Office of Special Investigations, United States Air Force, is

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~~SECRET~~Investigative Activity Coordinated with Other Agencies (Cont'd)

assisting in conducting investigations on Mitchell's family and on Mitchell's background from age thirteen to 1957, excluding his Navy duty.

The Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy, is conducting investigations regarding Martin's family and regarding Martin's background from age thirteen to 1957, and concerning Martin and Mitchell's tours of duty in the Navy.

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