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
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# *Presidential Transition 2001: NSA Briefs a New Administration*



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## **(U) Presidential Transition 2001: NSA Briefs a New Administration**

David A. Hatch

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### **(U) INTRODUCTION**

(U) The American electoral process retains many vestiges reflecting its eighteenth century origins. In the age of supersonic transport and e-mail, U.S. citizens select their national leadership on a timetable derived from the speed of carriages and town criers.

(U) The most contentious vestige in the process is the electoral college, a scheme which allots votes to each state on the basis of population; the actual determinant of a presidential election is not the nation's popular vote, but the votes of the electoral college.

(U) In addition to a lengthy period of pre-election campaigning, the process is marked by a two and one-half month gap between election day and the inauguration of a new president. Presidential elections take place on the first Tuesday (after the first Monday) of November, and inauguration day is January 20 (or January 21 if the 20th falls on a Sunday).\*

(U) This gap, although it allows a "lame duck" administration to continue in office, has positive aspects to it. For one thing, it gives a new president more time to select his cabinet secretaries and other senior officials. The gap also enables the Senate to hold hearings on these senior nominations, and thus speed the confirmation process.

(U) During this gap the new president will have regular access to heretofore secret intelli-

gence. She or he may also require briefings on the capabilities of the various intelligence organizations. It was (and is) important that a new president learn what the intelligence community will be able to do for her or him – and what it will not.

(U) Two senior CIA officials who were involved with more than one presidential transition commented drolly, "Our experience with a number of administrations was that they started with the expectation that intelligence could solve every problem, or that it could not do anything right, and then moved to the opposite view. Then they settled down and vacillated from one extreme to the other."<sup>1</sup>

(U) The officials of a new administration get "bombarded" with information – a lot of it and quickly presented. Moreover, once they take office, the press of current problems often precludes general or background briefings. From a federal agency's standpoint, it is therefore desirable to reach these new officers early, before a barrage of other briefings dilutes the effect of the message or prevents any meeting with them at all.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In the past, in the transition periods following elections, the Central Intelligence Agency has been the manager for general orientations about the foreign intelligence community and for specific, classified briefings on topics of concern to the incoming administration.

(U) In 2000 the National Security Agency, for the first time, decided to engage more actively in

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\* (U) Even at two and one-half months, this is somewhat shortened from the original eighteenth century schedule; until the 1930s, inauguration day was in March.

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the presidential transition briefing process. The issues for NSA were not small. For those in the new administration for whom this would be the first exposure to cryptology, a briefing would be an important factor in determining how they would interact with NSA.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Even those with prior exposure to the intelligence community and NSA needed to know the recent ongoing changes occurring in the cryptologic community.

(U) This is the story of the election of 2000, NSA's period of change, and its participation in the transition activities for the new Bush administration.

### **(U) BRIEFING A NEW ADMINISTRATION**

(U) Traditionally, there have been two aspects of executive-level briefings. First, since the election of 1952, when President Harry Truman directed that it be done, the CIA has given intelligence briefings to candidates from both major parties during the election campaign.

(U) In this process, the CIA sought from the beginning to ensure that both candidates received equal treatment in the numbers of briefings and types of material provided. However, during the campaign of 1952, Dwight Eisenhower's briefings included information from communications intelligence; Adlai Stevenson's briefings did not. As the author of a CIA history discreetly noted, "Stevenson lacked experience with this sensitive material."<sup>2</sup>

(U) Second, once election results have been tabulated, the CIA has delivered intelligence briefings to the president- and vice president-elect and other senior officials through the President's Daily Brief (PDB), which contains the latest all-source information —

Tailored briefings have reflected the personal interest of



*President Dwight D. Eisenhower*

the new president and his prior experience of the intelligence community.<sup>3</sup>

(U) For example, after the election of 1960, CIA officials scheduled a general briefing on sources and clearances for John Kennedy, since neither his wartime service nor congressional career had included interaction with the intelligence community.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, President-elect George H. W. Bush in 1988 required no general briefings, since he had served as Director of Central Intelligence.

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(U) Frequently, the new president-elect has not been resident in the District of Columbia, and briefings had to be arranged in areas where secure spaces were not normally available. For example, both Eisenhower in 1952 and Nixon in 1968 received briefings in New York City.<sup>5</sup>

(U) In 1992 the CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence traveled to Little Rock to brief President-elect Clinton on intelligence matters and set up headquarters in an inexpensive motel chosen specifically to avoid the visibility a first-class establishment might have. Clinton, though previously unfamiliar with the structure and programs of the intelligence community, did not ask for any general explanatory briefings on these topics, and the CIA briefers did not volunteer them. A senior CIA official brought him the PDB and explained technical or organizational matters as they arose in the material.<sup>6</sup>

(U) Generally, the CIA also briefed on behalf of the other members of the American intelligence community. During the Clinton transition, for example, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research routinely sent its daily summary for the new president. The National Security Agency sent information to Little Rock tailored for the new president about once a week. Other agencies sent materials less often.<sup>7</sup>

~~(S//SI)~~ NSA did not participate in an active way in any presidential transition prior to the election of William Clinton in 1992. In December 1992, however, NSA's Operations Directorate tasked its subordinate organizations with providing SIGINT product relating to foreign reactions to the change of administration and examples of SIGINT product on current issues. The appropriate SIGINT National Intelligence Officer\* (SINIO) reviewed the product before release.

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~~(C)~~ As far as can be reconstructed now, this SIGINT product was not reviewed by the director, NSA, before release, nor was there specific guidance from "downtown." As far as can be determined now, NSA did not attempt to reach new officials below the president-elect.<sup>8</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) In any case, the effort in 2001 was to be much larger, better organized, and more aggressive in telling NSA's story than in 1992.

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\*~~(S//SI)~~ SIGINT National Intelligence Officers, modeled on a similar group at CIA, support the National Intelligence Council, a senior advisory group to the Director of Central Intelligence. SINIOs are organized by geographic or issue areas, and work with the senior officials in NSA and CIA to help the agencies meet the needs of customers and to improve the production process.

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~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//X1~~**(U) THE ELECTION OF 2000**

(U) In one sense, the presidential campaign of 2000 kicked off the day after the election of William Clinton in 1996, since he was constitutionally prohibited from seeking another consecutive term. In practical terms, however, the campaign began in mid-1999, as political parties held primary elections state by state. By mid-year 2000, each party had decided on its candidate and the traditional nominating conventions in the summer seemed anticlimactic.

(U) In August the Republican Party convention in Philadelphia nominated George W. Bush, governor of Texas, for president. Bush, once a corporate executive and son of a former president, selected as his running mate Richard B. Cheney. "Dick" Cheney was then an executive in the oil industry, was a former congressman, and had been secretary of defense under the elder George Bush.<sup>9</sup>

(U) The Democratic Party, in Chicago in August, nominated Vice President Albert Gore for President. Gore's choice for vice presidential nominee was Joseph Lieberman, senator from Connecticut.

(U) Although some pundits foresaw that the general election of 2000 would be close, none of the professional prophets predicted just how close it actually would turn out to be.

(U) As election day, November 7, ended, both candidates seemed near to winning a majority in the electoral college, but, by day's end, neither had quite achieved the majority necessary to win. As the last polls closed, the outcome was still unsettled – the electoral votes of Florida would determine the winner, but the returns from

some Florida precincts were incomplete and contested in some districts.

(U) Candidates and country lived in suspense together for the next month, as some counties in Florida undertook a slow recount, slow because counting had to be done by hand, with representatives of both sides attesting to the validity of the process at each step. The uncertainty was compounded by challenges to the layout of the Florida ballot, complaints about access to polling places by some voters, and questions about absentee ballots from overseas.

(U) With a lack of precedent to guide the process, both contenders launched legal challenges in court. Florida's Supreme Court, in a close decision, ordered a recount of all non-machine ballots in the state.

(U) On December 12, just before the deadline for states to select delegates to the electoral college, the Florida House of Representatives, controlled by the Republicans, voted to appoint Florida's electors pledged to George Bush. That same day, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned

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the Florida court order for the recount, ending any hope of changing the decision.

(U) Only a day later, no options left, Vice President Gore conceded the election with a finality. The forty-third president of the United States was to be George W. Bush.

### **(U) NSA IN A TIME OF CHANGE**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The National Security Agency was heir to the brilliant cryptologic efforts of World War II and the half century after it. Founded in 1952, NSA had supported civilian and military decision-makers throughout the Cold War – it is not too much to say that NSA and the Service Cryptologic Elements made significant but behind-the-scenes contributions to virtually every major crisis in the five decades after NSA's founding.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Since about 1990, however, the National Security Agency had undergone a period of intense, sometimes wrenching change. The incoming administration would be affected by these changes, and would have to become part of the solution to the problems.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Some of NSA's problems could be attributed to the end of the Cold War, with the subsequent realignment of international relations. Others were caused by the rapid technological advances that characterized the Internet Age. Still other problems were caused by a top-heavy bureaucracy that had not reacted well to the decade of change.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Two directors had been sent to NSA as agents of change. In 1996 Lieutenant General Kenneth Minihan, USAF, had been director of the Defense Intelligence Agency for only a short period when senior DoD officials selected him for NSA. They told him "NSA doesn't get it." Minihan was sent to Fort Meade to deliver this message and take corrective action.



**Lieutenant General Kenneth Minihan**

(S//~~SI~~) During his tenure, Minihan commissioned studies about policy and structure, and produced new doctrines for the end of the Cold War. Minihan repaired relations with other agencies in the intelligence community as well as Second Party partners, and began some institutional restructuring.

(U//~~FOUO~~) But the changes in this period were not deep enough, and questions about NSA organization and performance continued to mount in the DoD and Congress.<sup>10</sup>

(U) Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, USAF, who arrived in March 1999 as DIRNSA, had served as commander of the Air Intelligence Agency and director of the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center. His assignment just prior to becoming DIRNSA had been as deputy chief of staff for the United Nations Command and U.S. Forces in Korea.<sup>11</sup>

(U) General Hayden in public appearances liked to joke that the first time he stepped into NSA he was director.

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**Lieutenant General Michael Hayden**

(U) Immediately, however, he commissioned two studies, by inside and outside experts, to address the most serious shortcomings at NSA. Based on these two reports, General Hayden began far-ranging changes to NSA's structure and personnel on November 16, 1999. The first period in this process was entitled "the hundred days of change," although institutional reordering continued for months afterward in many areas.

(U//~~FOUO~~) These shifts, as General Hayden emphasized in numerous meetings with constituency groups and the workforce, were not caused by failure; on the contrary, NSA was still achieving many successes. He considered it an agency at the "top of its game." Reorganizations and reforms were necessary to ensure future success in a rapidly evolving world.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In steps, the director restructured NSA to emphasize the Agency's core missions of signals intelligence and information assurance. He also created new positions, such as chief financial officer and a chief acquisition officer, hiring several key leaders from outside. In another break with tradition, in June 2000

General Hayden called William Black, a former senior, out of retirement to be the new deputy director.

(U//~~FOUO~~) During the Cold War, NSA operations had had a large measure of stability, particularly in monitoring the Soviet Bloc, which used families of equipment, operated on more-or-less standard procedures, and changed incrementally. The Agency almost always was conversant with new technology and frequently was on the proverbial "cutting edge."

(TS//SI) With the fall of communism, however, target stability no longer obtained. The 1990s were marked by a revolution in electronics, accompanied by wide proliferation of commercial crypto-equipment. Each step in the SIGINT process became more difficult, from collection to reporting. Within a few years, NSA found itself falling behind in acquisition of new technology and its ability to exploit some important targets.<sup>12</sup>

(U) An advisory group to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence called NSA "arguably one of the important agencies" in the government. But, it warned, "over a large part of its domain, it is literally going deaf."<sup>13</sup>

(S//SI) New targets and new technology also required radical changes to the NSA workforce. The changes in SIGINT processing were made more difficult by shortfalls in the numbers of key skill groups, such as linguists and computer scientists. In addition to shortfalls in key disciplines due to a decade of decrements in personnel, the Agency's mix of talents needed redirection. To compound its problems, NSA found itself in a highly competitive job market, hard put to compete for new hires, particularly in information technology skills.<sup>14</sup>

(S) Beyond the changes in communications intelligence, there was a growing realization of the importance of electronic intelligence (ELINT) as a source of order of battle and warning infor-

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mation for the military. ELINT also was undergoing change and would require considerable investment.<sup>15</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) To deal with changes in SIGINT, NSA had proposed Project TRAILBLAZER, a testbed for analytic techniques. Analysts would try out new techniques and new technology on a selected target; those that proved themselves would be adapted more generally throughout the Signals Intelligence Directorate.<sup>16</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Another major initiative, Project GROUNDBREAKER, was a multibillion dollar program to contract out for most of its nonmission IT support. This would allow the Agency to remix its support personnel in much shorter periods than normal federal hiring would allow, and keep its IT support force conversant with the most modern technology.

~~(S)~~ No less rapid a revolution was occurring in the "protect" side of the cryptologic mission. New technology, and new means of communication, compounded by a new awareness of vulnerabilities, required sizable investments in people and technology to secure communications and computers.<sup>17</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) The issues involved in change at NSA became focused in January 2000, when NSA experienced a computer network outage for three and one-half days. Although nothing of information value was lost, as field stations and U.S. allies maintained continuity, the outage greatly reduced the amount and speed of SIGINT. To compound the problem, media reports of the outage further tarnished NSA's image as an organization behind the technology curve.<sup>18</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Solutions to these problems would be expensive, but would require more than money. NSA would have to redesign its hiring, personnel, and operations processes, almost certainly in radical ways.

(U) Since NSA had raised its public profile, and since the media and academics began writing more about the Agency, public perceptions changed greatly. The initial declassifications about cryptologic successes in World War II, begun in the 1970s, had created a favorable image of the institution and the functions it performed.

(U) The favorable impressions, however, were tempered by pockets of criticism. Many academics and civic groups remained suspicious of NSA's secret powers. A statistically significant sector of the American public believed NSA was violating its rights to privacy by monitoring telephone calls or e-mail. Negative images appeared in the entertainment media as well. Films such as *Mercury Rising* and *Enemy of the State* portrayed NSA as a rogue institution that freely violated the rights of Americans, even engaged in occasional assassinations.

(U) General Hayden in print and broadcast interviews reiterated that NSA respected the constitutional rights of American citizens and operated in accordance with the law. However, he recognized clearly the problems in the public perception of NSA; as he told a television host, "We live inside a political culture that distrusts two things most of all, power and secrecy. And you are sitting in the headquarters, David, of a very powerful and traditionally very secret organization."<sup>19</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Since these were the issues the incoming administration would have to deal with, these were the issues that had to be communicated to the new officeholders.

## **(U) BUILDING A TEAM**

(U//~~FOUO~~) In 2000, prior to the presidential election, General Hayden decided it would be necessary to brief the new administration, whichever it would be, about NSA and its missions. The nature of American cryptology was changing, as was NSA's organization, and the new president would be confronted with organi-

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zational and substantive challenges in regard to NSA.

(U//~~FOUO~~) From 1986 to 1989, General Hayden had been assigned as a politico-military affairs officer in the Strategy Division, U.S. Air Force Headquarters. More to the point, in that capacity he had been the executive officer of the Air Force's presidential transition team in 1988. Having seen the necessity of promoting strategic thought in a new administration then, he realized its importance for NSA in 2000. Looking at NSA's budget and personnel lines over most of the previous decade, it was easy to see, in his words, "those weren't good news stories."<sup>20</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) This decision to take an active role in the transition also reflected the rapid evolution that had occurred over the previous decade in NSA's policy toward external relations. For much of its existence, NSA was little more than a box on a wiring diagram to all but its few defense and intelligence community contacts.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In addition to increased interaction with departments of the Executive Branch, NSA necessarily had widened its contacts with Congress. After an initial period of uneasiness, NSA had worked in a positive way with the oversight committees since their establishment in the 1970s. From the 1990s, NSA began also to work actively with the Maryland congressional delegation on local issues.

(U//~~FOUO~~) General Hayden had continued and, in fact, extended NSA's policy of interaction with other agencies in the Executive Branch, with Congress, with media, and the general public. The decision to brief incoming officials of the new administration was an extension of this greater engagement, but took it in a new direction for NSA.

(U) Good intentions and a break with the past would not be enough, however. NSA would be

competing with virtually all other government agencies for time on crowded calendars.

(U) At the first of an aperiodic series of meetings for NSA's highest officials, October 14, under the generic heading "Seniors' Day," General Hayden announced he was appointing Dr. Terry L. Thompson, formerly deputy director for support services, to lead an effort to make NSA's SIGINT and IA mission known to the President-elect's national security team. The appointment was to be effective 1 November.<sup>21</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) The director was not detailed in his instructions to Dr. Thompson. He remembered his experience on the Air Force transition team in 1988; the effort looked like a success, the team "killed most of the forest land in the eastern United States" turning out transition papers, but often did not reach the principals, only departmental transition teams. In 2000, the director wanted someone to talk to the important members of the new administration, in effect



*Terry L. Thompson*

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be his "alter ego," answer their questions, and take advantage of opportunities to tell NSA's story.

(U//~~FOUO~~) As time went on, Thompson sent progress reports to the director regularly. The director read them and returned them with encouraging notes, but provided little specific guidance to the Transition Team. The director's management style, he would say, was to give people a task and then "get out of the way."<sup>22</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Thompson made contact with a wide range of NSA employees to try to find out what had been done in the past in times of presidential change. Reflecting the previous haphazard effort, no documentation was to be found, but a few people who had participated in the 1992 transition could be located, and they shared their memories of what little had been done.<sup>23</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Thompson contacted the DDI and DDO organizations about personnel to serve on his team. The Deputy Directorate for Information Systems Security responded quickly with a highly qualified individual. The Deputy Directorate for Operations, however, sent the question out for staffing, which took two weeks. The DDO personnel eventually nominated were not particularly interested in the process, however, so Thompson, who once had been DDO chief of staff, contacted individuals he knew who had strong SIGINT backgrounds and might be available.

(U) The personnel selected were chosen with some care to ensure the team reflected the different NSA missions. All were enthusiastic about the team; some described the offer as a "once in a lifetime opportunity" or a "highly unusual opportunity."

(U//~~FOUO~~) As it evolved, the team was composed of "core" members who worked on its issues full time, and "extended" members, those with subject or area expertise, who remained in

other organizations but would work on transition tasks when their expertise was needed.

(U) Reflecting a wider view of its mission, the new team chose the name "Transition 2001," rather than just "Presidential Transition." This subtle shift in name emphasized its commitment to brief new officials in both the executive and legislative branches, rather than just in one.<sup>24</sup> [For brevity, this paper will refer to the Transition 2001 team as T-2001.]

(U) The team represented a good cross-section of NSA experience. Most cryptologic disciplines were represented, and many of the team members had had fellowships to work in congressional offices, giving them a rather broad perspective of government operations. They recognized that it was important to make the new administration aware of NSA's value quickly, while it was still possible to avoid the "noise" created by pressing events.<sup>25</sup>

(~~C//SI~~) Terry Thompson, chief of the transition effort, held a doctorate in Russian history from Georgetown University. His first involvement with cryptology was as a Marine Corps officer in a radio battalion. He came to NSA as a Russian linguist in 1976. From 1990 to 1992, Thompson was NSA representative to the National Reconnaissance Office. Subsequently, he served as chief of staff for the Operations Directorate. From 1997, he was assistant director for support services until the directorate was abolished in 2000.<sup>26</sup>

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [ ] executive assistant (EA), had started in the Office of Security, then had become a staff specialist in the front office of the Directorate of Support Services. In 1999 she became executive assistant to Terry Thompson. When Thompson formed the transition team, she followed him and joined it as his EA, but, in effect, was EA to the entire team.<sup>27</sup>

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [ ] came to the team to do writing and graphics work, but retired in early January. [ ] replaced her on the team. [ ] had been an editor of the *Communicator*, a classified newsletter for NSA's workforce, and a former Director's "Skunk."\* She had been looking for a new position, and this "sounded like fun."<sup>28</sup>

(C) [ ] had been a Russian linguist in operations, but also had experience in the Legislative Affairs Office, and as a desk officer in the Office of Foreign Relations. He had recently been Chief of Operations at [ ]

(U//~~FOUO~~) [ ] had been a linguist, subsequently had worked in the Office of Policy, and had experience in SIGINT reporting, computer security, collection, and management.<sup>30</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) [ ] the Information Assurance Directorate representative to the team, described himself as a "dyed-in-the-wool, pocket-protector-wearing engineer." During two decades with IAD, he had designed cryptographic chips, engineered secure systems, managed a computer network, and, in his own words, "obsessively supported customers (often against their wishes)." He had also spent a year on a fellowship as a staffer in the Senate.<sup>31</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) [ ] had considerable experience in NSA's collection programs as well as in resource management. As a member of NSA's budget office, he had provided data to DoD during two previous changes of administration.<sup>32</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) [ ] had been a Special Agent in the Office of Security, and had worked investigations, polygraph, and industrial security. Prior to joining the transition team, he had served a one-year fellowship as a congressional fellow. Afterward, while serving in the Legislative Affairs Office at NSA, [ ] had prepared an analysis of expected changes to the intelligence oversight committees after the November elections. He briefed his findings to the Transition Team and was asked to join them as an "extended member."<sup>33</sup>

(S//SI) [ ] had long experience in cryptanalysis, including more than twelve years against the [ ] problem, and teaching advanced analysis. She was working as both manager and technical director in the Cryptologic Evaluation Center when she was asked to serve as an "extended member" and POC for cryptanalytic issues.<sup>34</sup>

(S) [ ] was assigned to the team in January as an "extended member." He was SIGINT Directorate account manager for the White House, the State Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. He had an engineering background, with work in signals research, target development, and other collection-related activities for sixteen years.<sup>35</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Team members perceived that some existing NSA organizations, particularly those established to deal with outside entities, might have felt "threatened" by the team's existence. Terry Thompson worked hard to explain to the chiefs of these offices that his team was not a threat to their turf. The team also co-

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\* (U) Shortly after his arrival as DIRNSA, General Minihan established the "Skunk Works," a small team of writers for his speeches and articles. The unusual name derives first from the 1940s comic strip "Lil Abner," where the chief industry in a mythical backwoods region was rendering polecats to their essence. Naturally, most people shunned this area. In the 1950s and 1960s, Lockheed Aircraft adopted this name for the exclusion area where it designed special-purpose airplanes. The name suggested a workplace of solitude for special assignments.



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opted some of these offices by inviting them to send "extended" members.

### **(U) T-2001 OPERATIONS**

(U) The T-2001 team might be described as a "hive" organization, where all members pitched in on any and all types of tasks. Team members also felt empowered to make decisions if Terry Thompson was out of the office, and, as it happened, he spent considerable time on the road.<sup>36</sup>

(U) The entire team, i.e., all core members and as many extended members as possible, would meet daily, usually both morning and afternoon, to ensure all were apprised of current actions and requirements. The meetings generally stayed short and focused on issues that had to be dealt with over the following day or two, but, on occasion, would prove good opportunities to discuss long-term initiatives. For example, early on, the team decided it needed to reach the Legislative Branch as well as the Executive.<sup>37</sup>

briefing or other information packet. While need for knowledge about the basics of NSA organization and process would be the same no matter which party took office, the issues and priorities would differ by party.

(U) One special consideration: if Bush were elected, it was possible that many officeholders would have served in the Reagan or (elder) Bush administration. This carried its own peril – it was important that they did not treat the Agency in 2001 on the basis of how it had looked and operated in the 1980s.

(U) Since many members did not join the T-2001 team until the first of November, this left little time to prepare for the aftermath of an election scheduled for the seventh. As it turned out, ironically, the long delay in settling the election that frustrated many Americans proved beneficial to the transition team.

(U) Also, given the likely short time of access to most senior officials, it became necessary to narrow the focus of the subject matter, to concentrate on the most important themes, those that could be communicated quickly. The difficult job of reducing NSA's message to perhaps half a dozen themes was made more difficult by the far-reaching institutional changes under way in almost all areas inside the NSA organization.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Consultations with the Directorates of Signals Intelligence and Information Assurance helped winnow the alternate themes down to a manageable few. Team members kept in mind the Overguidance\* package recently submitted to the Intelligence Community Management Staff when they compiled lists of NSA's needs.

*The Transition 2001 Team*

(U) The initial work of the team was basic, deciding what had to be told about cryptology and NSA, researching the specifics, and composing a

\* (U) Overguidance is a request for funds above the currently approved programs.

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
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~~(S//SI)~~ After deliberation, the five major themes selected by the team and approved by the director were

- 1) SIGINT transformation
  - a. Proliferation of Global Encryption
  - b. Trailblazer
- 2) Defense in Depth for National Security Communications
- 3) Cryptographic modernization
- 4) Computer network operations
- 5) NSA workforce<sup>38</sup>

~~(S//SI)~~ By the end of the transition period, the five had become six, with the addition of "ELINT." Other, subsidiary themes included the "brain drain," which threatened to limit future successes by NSA, the immediate need to increase investment in cryptanalysis, and the requirement that IAD improve awareness in the wider national security community.<sup>39</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) In addition to focusing on these selected themes, team members had to be prepared to deal with other issues that might be raised by the officials they briefed. One example



(U//~~FOUO~~) One team member with a background in finance drew up summary papers on NSA's budget. He found the fragmented Agency budget process hampered the acquisition of consistent budget information, and a great deal of

time was spent vetting numbers found in different databases.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Days were spent in compiling briefing books, issue papers, and orientation packets. Team members conducted research via published materials, including intelligence product, web pages on the external and internal networks, and by interviewing area experts. Team members often found official channels too slow for information gathering; all too frequently, the fastest, most practical way to get needed information was to tap the members' own personal network of colleagues and contacts. Including representatives from the various NSA components in the team's daily meetings helped speed communications both ways.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In order to gain a better understanding of NSA operations and accomplishments, transition team members arranged a number of field trips. Among the destinations were the White House Situation Room, the Pentagon, the Laboratory for the Physical Sciences in College Park, the Laboratory for Telecommunications Sciences in Adelphi, Maryland, and the Security Management Infrastructure Operations Division\* in Finksburg, Maryland.<sup>41</sup>

(U) Team members learned the classic lesson that the business of writing is rewriting. Information had to be put in a format tailored for the person being briefed. This meant not only eliminating jargon specific to SIGINT or IA, but also determining the point of view or specific interests of the new official – all the while relating material to the half dozen or so NSA transition themes.<sup>42</sup>

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\* (U//~~FOUO~~) The Security Management Infrastructure Operations Division at Finksburg, Maryland, produced keying material for secure voice systems and data networks. The facility had been established in 1988, initially to provide keying material for STU-III telephones; its vision expanded over the next decade

"IAD's Central Facility/Finksburg – not just STU-III's Anymore!" *Communicator*, Vol. 9, #17, 10 July

2001, 1.)

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~~(TS//SI)~~ Eventually, fact sheets were developed for institutional issues: analysis, ELINT, global encryption, language, and recruiting; for collection sites: Denver, the three RSOs,

[redacted]; for information-gathering capabilities: China, [redacted]

[redacted] and Russia. Also the team tailored a fact sheet for each of the eight Maryland congressional districts.<sup>43</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) None of the fact sheets asked directly for support, but gave a balanced treatment of the successes and challenges confronting NSA.

(U) While most of the writing was for their own use, the team also prepared "talking points" and background papers for NSA seniors. It was expected that members of the new administration would meet NSA officials in many venues other than formal briefings. Therefore, to promote consistency in the message, senior NSA officials were given a 3x5 reference card, the size of the typed daily schedule card most already carried, listing the six NSA transition themes. These formed, Terry Thompson told them, the "outline of a good elevator speech."<sup>44</sup>

(U) In addition to official materials with data, the team assembled "leave-behind" packages containing some *tchotchkes* (a Yiddish word literally meaning "trinket" or "geegaw"). *Tchotchkes* included a sampling of NSA-logo items\* that had proliferated since NSA went public – golf balls, mouse pads, pens, and the like, all bearing the Agency seal. NSA as a concept would be kept before the new officials.<sup>45</sup>

## (U) INTER-AGENCY LIAISON

(U//~~FOUO~~) The T-2001 team's perception was that the Intelligence Community Management Staff was not as proactive as they had hoped in coordinating actions among the various agencies. The team instead preferred to work with the Central Intelligence Agency on transition issues. P.L. 86-36 EO 1.4 (c)


(U//~~FOUO~~) Early in the process a person in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command and Control, Communications and Intelligence, to which NSA reported in the Pentagon, began to coordinate the efforts of intelligence agencies in the Defense Department. However, in mid-December, she resigned from the department, leaving NSA and the other agencies on their own from then on.<sup>46</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Director of Central Intelligence took the initiative and began briefings for the president-elect as soon as results were confirmed. T-2001 hosted the transition staffer at Fort Meade, and found he had numerous questions about the Agency. Team members spent three hours with him in a roundtable discussion, and, in the words of one participant, "knocked his socks off" on the kinds of intelligence NSA could deliver. The CIA speechwriter asked probing questions, so Terry Thompson, familiar with the SIGINT Directorate, made "cold calls" to invite analysts on short or no notice to brief the visitor on projects. One T-2001 member called it "the moral equivalent of web surfing, only it was all verbal."<sup>47</sup>


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\* (U//~~FOUO~~) Through the early 1990s, NSA's leadership objected to the sale of clothing or other items decorated with the organizational logo, a prohibition based largely on counterintelligence concerns. Once the gift shop in the National Cryptologic Museum opened for business in 1997, however, a very wide variety of these items were sold not only to NSA employees but also to the general public. In fact, it became something of an in-joke that the only people to be seen in public wearing NSA tee-shirts were nonemployees!

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(U//~~FOUO~~) The CIA in December contacted the Information Assurance Directorate to get secure telephones for a few members of the incoming administration.



(U//~~FOUO~~) The [ ] began working with CIA personnel at least two months prior to the election, preparing briefing books for the new president, whoever it would be. The books included summaries of collection activities, as well as explanations about other intelligence operations. This transition activity was conducted independently of the T-2001 team at NSA.

### **(U) THE VIPs**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The unexpected gap between election day and confirmation of the winner was both a benefit and a problem. The gap allowed T-2001 members additional time to prepare materials, but, by the same token, a shorter gap before the inauguration would leave them hard pressed to brief incoming figures before their assumption of office made it harder to get on their calendar and get sufficient blocks of time for longer briefings.

(S//SI) Among the [ ] regular activities was "flagging" SIGINT product that might be of special interest to senior government officials. In fact, the [ ] routinely reviewed about [ ] SIGINT products per day, from which it skimmed the cream. [ ] staff began flagging SIGINT product that would be of interest to the new president, particularly foreign reactions to the election.



(U//~~FOUO~~) It is interesting to note that the problem of identifying subjects for briefing continued even after the nominating process began. Those briefed by NSA generally would not divulge the names of others to be nominated in their issue area. This was a point of great frustration to T-2001 team members, who needed this news for scheduling purposes. They speculated that this reticence was based on the bad



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experiences of previous administrations: some nominees had run into trouble in the media over their personal lives, and the new administration did not want names leaked until individuals had been vetted.<sup>50</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Shortly after inauguration day, on January 25, the Senior Implementation Meeting, attended by the Agency's top leadership, heard a detailed report on the T-2001 effort thus far. The openness of the new administration to issues related to intelligence was discussed. Deputy Director William Black noted that the new secretary of defense would be more active in intelligence matters than his predecessor, which presented opportunities for NSA, if seized properly. Black reported that when asked what kept him awake at night, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had replied, "the need to recapitalize intelligence."<sup>51</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) The principal briefer for the new president would be a CIA senior officer, [redacted] DCI George Tenet designated him as his representative to Bush Transition Headquarters in Austin. [redacted]

(U) A number of channels were used to schedule briefings. At the highest level, General Hayden sent letters to key members of the Bush national security team – national security advisor and deputy, national security advisor to the vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense – offering them briefings and other assistance.

(U//~~FOUO~~) As a result of these letters, General Hayden briefed the secretary of state, the

secretary of defense, and Zalmay Khalilzad, leader of the Defense Department transition team. It took several tries to schedule Secretary Powell, due to calendar conflicts. The national security advisor came out to NSA some months after the Bush administration took office.<sup>53</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Interestingly, although NSA was in the DoD chain of command, when General Hayden began with "Good morning, Mr. Secretary," these were the first words he had exchanged with a secretary of defense in his tenure as DIRNSA.

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(U) The most common method of scheduling was the old-fashioned way, working telephone with target offices. [redacted] an "extended" team member, who had customer "accounts" in the Executive Branch as his regular assignment, coordinated Transition Team briefing plans with NSA representatives at the various agencies to identify personnel and schedule sessions.

(U) The highest level officers were to be briefed in their own offices in Washington; high-ranking appointees who came to Fort Meade were briefed in the Technology Demonstration Center\* and a few select places in the NSA complex. Terry Thompson arranged meetings with the secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, and Transportation, and the Trade Representative through the intelligence officers in the other departments.<sup>54</sup>

~~(S//SI)~~ For example, Thompson, accompanied by NSA's general counsel, briefed Attorney General John Ashcroft and three members of his staff at the Justice Department on February 23. The NSA briefers were the first in the intelligence

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*\*(U//~~FOUO~~) The NSA/CSS Technology Demonstration Center was established in 1997, under General Minihan, as a site to give visitors high-tech briefings on a variety of subjects, and do it in one location near his office. In addition to platforms for physical demonstrations, the Center had a three-screen "theater" for small groups, with high-definition video capabilities.*

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community to meet with the new attorney general. After the general briefing, the attorney general asked some questions about the relationship between law enforcement and the intelligence community, which NSA's GC answered. Ashcroft also requested a STU-III telephone for his official car.<sup>55</sup>

(U) Many senior and mid-level administration officials traveled to NSA for their orientations.

~~(S//SI)~~ On December 14, Ambassador Gail S. Schoettler visited NSA for briefings. The ambassador had been lieutenant governor of Colorado and U.S. representative to the World Radio Conference. She was now the transition focal point for DoD's Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence Program. After inspecting the Denver Consolidated Mission Ground Station, she came to NSA for a better insight into the Agency's transformation plans. Ambassador Schoettler received a variety of briefings on corporate change, modernization, and specific SIGINT targets in the Mideast.<sup>56</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) This, the first briefing at Fort Meade of a member of the DoD transition team, did not go well. The visitor herself admitted she had not understood much of what was told her and was unclear why certain topics had been selected for briefing. Based on this negative feedback, T-2001 members worked hard to revise the next presentations, particularly removing professional jargon unfamiliar to non-NSA employees, and ensuring briefers knew clearly in advance the points to be made.<sup>57</sup>

~~(C)~~ Among the earliest and most influential visitors was Rich Haver, the incoming administration's Transition Coordinator for Intelligence. In 2001 he was in private industry, but had begun his career in naval intelligence in 1973, subsequently served as assistant to Dick Cheney (when secretary of defense), and been chief of staff of the

National Intelligence Council at the Department of Defense.<sup>58</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) The [ ] team ensured that Haver saw the same material as the president-elect. Since Haver's office for the transition period was just across the hall, product selected for him could be hand-delivered to Haver's office.<sup>59</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Haver assumed his position as the president-elect's liaison to the intelligence community on Friday, December 15. He requested a visit to NSA, and came to Fort Meade the following Tuesday, the 19th. The haste suggested that NSA's issues were of some importance to him.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The agenda for Haver's visit was developed by General Hayden and William Black. They felt it necessary to get him to understand the major changes that were affecting NSA's ability to perform its job, and how NSA was responding to these challenges. The process was abetted because Bill Black was a personal friend of Haver.

~~(TS//SI)~~ The presentations to Haver, described by Terry Thompson as "knock your socks off briefings," dealt with SIGINT support to counterterrorism and the Middle East; he also got several technology demonstrations. Haver had lunchtime discussions with the director, deputy director, and other senior leadership. He was given briefings on NSA's foreign relations, industrial relations, ELINT, the planned outsourcing program, the budget and personnel problems.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At the conclusion of his visit, Haver told NSA seniors that he recommended support for NSA's recapitalization to the vice president-elect.<sup>60</sup>

~~(S//SI)~~ Among other visitors was Dr. Christopher Lamb, acting assistant secretary of defense for requirements, plans, and counter-

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proliferation policy. Dr. Lamb was the DoD representative for Presidential Review Directive 56 on Information Operations. He had never before visited NSA, so required overview briefings as well as presentations on NSA equities in Information Operations.<sup>61</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) The team responded vigorously to questions received from new officials in this interim period. For example, a nominee as deputy national security advisor asked a question about NSA's overhead collection capabilities. The Transition Team provided a direct answer, and also seized the opportunity to provide him with information on collection in general.<sup>62</sup>

~~(S//SI)~~ Norman Mineta, outgoing secretary of commerce, who had been appointed secretary of transportation in the new administration, visited Fort Meade. Mineta was shown the kinds of SIGINT support given to the department, especially COMINT and ELINT reporting used to support interdiction of illegal narcotics. The Coast Guard had opened a liaison office at NSA in 1998\* and represented the DoT on cryptologic issues as well as itself.<sup>63</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) As time became available, T-2001 also reached out to the Legislative Branch. Although their original strategy was to have the director meet as many members of the 107th Congress as possible, they had to settle for a more modest plan. General Hayden sent letters to every senator and representative from states where the Agency maintained a field site, inviting them to visit NSA and the field site, and offering a briefing on Capitol Hill. In addition, transition team members met with Congressman Ben Cardin (D, Maryland) to arrange a briefing exclusively for the Maryland delegation.<sup>64</sup>

(U) The Team scheduled two congressional briefings for January 22, one in the morning for members or staff whose states hosted NSA facilities, and for the Maryland delegation in the afternoon. Both sessions were held on an unclassified basis on Capitol Hill. For the Maryland delegation, team members emphasized the NSA workforce numbers, as well as spending and community activities by congressional district.<sup>65</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Probably due to heavy time pressures on senators and representatives during this period, no members of Congress attended NSA's two briefings on Capitol Hill (although staff members were present). The NSA transition team, to ensure members had access to the material briefed, did deliver information packets to their offices.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Some thought was given to expanding the range of congressional briefings, for example, seeking out the chairmen of committees other than those oriented to intelligence and the armed services. However, there was not enough time to attempt this.

### (U) END GAME

(S//SI//REL) NSA product reflecting international reactions to the new administration was given to President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and senior national security officials. After reading some especially timely material, President-elect Bush was heard to remark, "Great stuff! Keep it coming!" The [redacted] [redacted] noted that Bush was "very impressed" and wanted to see more of it.<sup>66</sup>

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ In fact, NSA, [redacted] [redacted] provided more than 200 serialized product reports to the president-elect, between the elec-

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*\*(U//~~FOUO~~) In 2002 the cryptologic organization in the Coast Guard became one of the Service Cryptologic Elements.*

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tion decision and the inauguration, covering more than forty countries and international organizations. These reports included valuable information about strategies countries intended to use in dealing with the incoming administration.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The president and vice president sent positive feedback on these products as well as guidance on further information required. The CIA team that prepared the *Presidential Daily Brief* used their specific guidance to revise its materials.<sup>68</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) As Terry Thompson later told NSA's senior leadership, "...nothing my team could have done would have the impact of NSA just doing its job."<sup>69</sup>

(U) The T-2001 effort continued through February. By March, decisions were made to cut off the program, based in part on recommendations from Terry Thompson.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Briefings for several subcabinet officials were turned over to NSA's Corporate Relations Staff.<sup>70</sup> Terry Thompson was transferred to the Pentagon in March as chief of NCR Defense. The director saw this transfer as a good way to capitalize on the contacts Thompson had made during the transition period.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Several team members felt the T-2001 had been terminated early, perhaps as

much as a month too soon. Some potentially useful outreach efforts then in progress had to be terminated. One member described this sudden transfer as "taking the wind out of our sails."

(U//~~FOUO~~) In retrospect, the director admitted that NSA's transition effort possibly had been terminated a little early, but he was responding to Thompson's reports that T-2001 had accomplished its major goals. The director felt that the "heavy lifting" had been done and it was time to let things "evolve."<sup>71</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) Ironically, at the time T-2001 turned out the lights, Vice President Cheney visited NSA, only the second vice president to do so.\* No transition team members were involved in his visit or the preparation for it, nor was there any reason to involve the team in the visit. Their work had been successfully completed, and the vice president had moved beyond transition issues.

(S//~~SI~~) On his first visit to any intelligence agency, Cheney toured the National Security Operations Center and the National SIGINT Collection Center. He was shown new technology, and met with a group of cryptanalysts who went by the collective nickname of "The Barbershop."<sup>72</sup> During lunch with the director, Cheney emphasized collaboration throughout the intelligence community. In an address televised to the workforce, the vice president mentioned that NSA's work was appreciated and that NSA had his and the president's support.

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\* (U) Hubert Humphrey visited NSA on September 26, 1967. After some briefings, he gave a barnburner of a speech, as only this skilled orator could do. The speech was marred only by his frequent references to something he called "SIG-NIT."

\*\* (U//~~FOUO~~) The nickname "The Barbershop" dates from 1985, when a group of mathematicians on a special project had to meet temporarily in spaces originally allocated for a new haircutting facility in the OPS3 building. The nickname stands, and covers a highly proficient group of cryptologists.



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(U//~~FOUO~~) Cheney, who had been familiar with cryptology in his previous government service, was impressed with what he heard and saw. At the end of the sessions, he turned to DCI Tenet and said with a little understatement, "Some things have changed!"<sup>72</sup>

~~(S//SI//REL)~~ Over a year later, on June 4, 2002, President Bush himself visited NSA, the third to do so.\* The president visited the National Security Operations Center, inspected gear used [redacted] and nuclear code material, and got a briefing from the Office of Counterterrorism.



**President George W. Bush at NSA, June 2002**

(U//~~FOUO~~) After a brief stop at the Memorial Wall, where over 150 fallen cryptologists are commemorated, he gave a well-received talk to the workforce gathered in one of the parking lots.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Unable to take even writing materials into the parking lot where the Chief Executive would address them, some employees got President Bush to autograph their NSA badges with a marking pen. In response to the employees' requests, the Security Office made a one-time exception, issuing new badges to those fortunate few, and allowing them to convert their signed badges into keepsakes.<sup>73</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) By any measure, however, the two executive-level visits made clear that the Bush administration appreciated cryptology and came to tell NSA of its value to them.

(U) Each of the transition team members looked back on the effort with pride. One remembered that it was a "terrific, energetic team with a common goal," and that everyone "put forth one hundred ten percent effort every day."<sup>74</sup>

(U//~~FOUO~~) In retrospect, General Hayden admitted, as with any project, some things could have been done better. However, overall, the effort had been a great success. "We have become known to the incoming administration, and vice versa, set up some good relationships with people in the correct positions. It worked well."<sup>75</sup>

## **(U) CONCLUSIONS**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The decision to engage in an active effort to reach key figures in the new administration originated with the director, NSA, as did the decision to terminate the effort about two months after inauguration of the new president. General Hayden's decision for engagement had been based on the knowledge that both NSA's potential and NSA's problems in transition had to be communicated to the new group of policy and decision makers.

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\**(U) Ronald Reagan and George Herbert Walker Bush preceded him to Fort Meade.*

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Both creation of the effort and its termination were good decisions. The decision to create the effort seems to this writer to have been a little late: the NSA Transition Team in normal circumstances might have needed more time to prepare for the transition; it was, fortunately, the beneficiary of the unusual length of time required to settle the 2000 elections. Although the team felt that the timing of the termination of their efforts was too abrupt, their work had been essentially completed, and any remaining odds and ends of business could be turned over to standing liaison offices.

(U//~~FOUO~~) It is more difficult to sustain the criticism by some team members that the termination order came too early. The team had already arranged most major briefings, and the team leader himself advocated closure. NSA had a standing organization ready to take on the few tasks remaining from the transition period.

(U//~~FOUO~~) General Hayden's concept for the transition effort was to have a team that would not just generate position papers, but would be flexible enough to deliver NSA's essential points to the key players of the new administration in any way possible. He got what he wanted.

(U//~~FOUO~~) T-2001 quickly developed a succinct list of major points to be presented to the incoming administration. It compiled a list of officials to whom the presentations had to be made, and pursued appointments with them aggressively. Virtually all the desired briefings occurred; in some cases, NSA was the first to brief that particular official.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Two reasons for the success in setting goals and achieving them quickly were the talents of the team members and their enthusiasm for the project. After some initial problems in selecting team members, Dr. Thompson used his unofficial contacts to assemble a group of people representing a wide range of cryptologic disciplines. Those who responded to his invitation to

join the team did so with the feeling that it would give them a positive experience.

(U//~~FOUO~~) T-2001's efforts were understood and approved at NSA's senior levels, although the director and deputy director only occasionally offered guidance. This was in accordance with the director's management style, in which he assigned a task, then let the principal carry it out with a minimum of interference.

(U//~~FOUO~~) With NSA undergoing its own transition, which often involved reorganizations and transfer of personnel, at times the response by some NSA components to T-2001's needs was spotty. It was important to team success, therefore, that the individual team members each had an individual network of contacts that could be tapped for information or other kinds of support.

(U//~~FOUO~~) It should be noted that the effort proceeded to a successful conclusion without much guidance or support from NSA's parent organization, the Department of Defense, or the Intelligence Community Staff.

(U//~~FOUO~~) On the other hand, the cooperation between NSA and the Central Intelligence Agency was mutually enhancing. In the 2000-01 effort, the CIA, which had responsibility for briefing the new president, clearly appreciated the value of NSA product to him, and abetted NSA's efforts.

(U//~~FOUO~~) From early days, T-2001 team members embraced a broader vision of their mandate than perhaps was originally intended. First, they decided not only to seek to reach the principal officeholders of the new administration, but also to "influence the influencers," i.e., those who would hold key subordinate positions. In addition, the team recognized the importance of

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taking NSA's message to Congress, not just members of the Executive Branch.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In accordance with the director's wishes, T-2001 developed a flexible response. Although it generated plenty of paper, T-2001 produced flexible briefings tailored to the expected concerns of the individual being briefed. Both the paper and verbal briefings were focused on the core issues and carefully balanced with both good and bad news about NSA.

(U//~~FOUO~~) General Hayden, Dr. Thompson, and the principal members of the T-2001 team were comfortable delivering briefings in both formal and informal settings. Their presence gave NSA's message the best possible delivery, and allowed them to respond immediately to the concerns of new officials.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The mix of talent, flexibility, and dedication served NSA well in its first attempt at direct involvement in the presidential transition process. The proof of the success of this effort lies in the positive response by officials at all levels in the incoming Bush administration.

### **(U) Notes**

(U) The T-2001 transition team found itself generally without written documentation of any previous presidential transition efforts on which it could build. Unfortunately, the records of the T-2001 Transition Team are fairly scanty. There is little official correspondence and surprisingly little e-mail for an entity in an institution dedicated to cyber-communication. Much of the team's story had to be reconstructed through questionnaires and interviews with the team members.

(U) The classification marking for each footnote reflects only the content of the note itself; for the most part, this reference content is unclassified. However, many, if not a majority, of the documents do contain classified information.

1 (U) Richard J. Kerr and Peter Dixon Davis, "Ronald Reagan and the President's Daily Brief," *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter 1998-1998, unclassified edition, 51-6; the quote appears on p. 51.

2 (U) John L. Helgerson, *Getting to Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952-1992* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, n.d.), 41.

3 (U) Helgerson, 1-4.

4 (U) Helgerson, 60-61.

5 (U) Helgerson, 34-37, 83-85.

6 (U) Charles A. Peters, "Serving Our Senior Consumers," *Studies in Intelligence*, Fall 1995, 17-23. Helgerson, 14-15.

7 (U) Helgerson, 10, 160.

8 (U) [redacted] two e-mails to author, 23 July 2001. [redacted] e-mail to the author, 23 July 2001. [redacted] e-mail to [redacted] [redacted] 20 July 2001 [redacted] e-mail to the author, 23 July 2001. [redacted] e-mail to the author, 24 July 2001.

9 (U) [http://www.hq.nsg.usn/nsa/tx/REFERENCE/george\\_w\\_bush.htm](http://www.hq.nsg.usn/nsa/tx/REFERENCE/george_w_bush.htm). [http://www.hq.nsg.usn/nsa/tx/REFERENCE/richard\\_cheney.htm](http://www.hq.nsg.usn/nsa/tx/REFERENCE/richard_cheney.htm).

10 (U) Interview, Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, by David Hatch and [redacted] 8 March 1999, OH-1999-21.

11 (U) Biography, "Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, United States Air Force," DIRNSA/CHCSS's Home Page.

12 (U) Transition 2001 Factsheet, "Access and Collection," n.d. Transition 2001 Factsheet, "Proliferation of Global Encryption," n.d.

13 (U) Quoted in Transition 2001 Factsheet, "NSA/CSS Resources," n.d.

14 (U) Transition 2001 Factsheet, "The NSA/CSS Language Analytic Workforce," n.d. Transition 2001 Factsheet, "NSA/CSS' Hiring and Recruitment Program," n.d.

15 (U) Transition 2001 Factsheet, "ELINT," n.d. Transition 2001 Factsheet, "NSA/CSS Key Issues for Transition," n.d.

16 (U) Transition 2001 Factsheet, "Trailblazer," n.d.

17 (U) Transition 2001 Factsheet, NSA/CSS Key Issues for Transition," n.d.

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18 (U) NSA Input to ASD/C3I Transition Book, "Bite Me Issues," n.d.

19 (U) *60 Minutes II*: "Interview with David Martin, CBS News, Inside the NSA," taped 2 December 2000, air date 13 February 2001.

20 (U//~~FOUO~~) "BIOGRAPHY: Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, United States Air Force," <http://www.dir.nsa/docs/bios/hayden.html>. Interview, Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, by David Hatch and Jimmie Collins, 26 October 2001, OH 2001-34.

21 (U) Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, briefing, "NSA/CSS Seniors' Day," 14 October 2000. "Presidential Transition," DIRgram 141, 6 November 2000. Personnel Assignment Orders, Number 45-00, 30 November 2000, Revised Version.

22 (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with Dr. Terry Thompson, 3 April 2001, OH-2001-16. (U//~~FOUO~~) OH General Hayden, OH 2001-34.

23 (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with Dr. Terry Thompson, interviewed by David A. Hatch, 3 April 2001, OH-2001-16.

24 (U) "Presidential Transition," DIRgram-141, 6 November 2000.

25 (U) [ ] e-mail to the author, 8 June 2001. [ ] e-mail to the author, 30 June 2001.

26 (U) NSA web, official biography, Terry L. Thompson.

27 (U) [ ] e-mail to the author, 8 June 2001.

28 (U) [ ] e-mail to the author, 19 July 2001. Ibid. 2 August 2002.

29 (U) [ ] e-mail to the author, 5 June 2001.

30 (U) [ ] e-mail to the author, 5 June 2001.

31 (U) [ ] e-mail to the author, 11 June 2001.

32 (U) [ ] e-mail to the author, 30 June 2001.

33 (U) [ ] e-mail to the author, 30 June 2001.

34 (U) [ ] e-mail to the author, 5 July, 2001.

35 (U) [ ] e-mail to the author, 18 July 2001.

36 (U) The details of the transition team's activities have been compiled by and large through e-mails from the team members to this author. Since many of them furnished many of the same details, I have decided against attributing specific paragraphs to individuals. All materials, including these e-mails are to be found in the Series File maintained by the Center for Cryptologic History.

37 (U) Interview, Dr. Terry Thompson, interviewed by David Hatch, OH-2001-16, 3 April 2001.

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39 (U) Transition 2001 Page, "Themes," <http://leadership.dscsc.s.nsa/transition2001/index.html>.

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50 (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview with Dr. Terry Thompson, 3 April 2001, OH-2001-16.

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54 (U) Interview, Dr. Terry Thompson, OH-2001-16, 3 April 2001.

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