

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of MILLIONS of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

Serial: MDR-103899
11 September 2018

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.
27305 W. Live Oak Rd.
Suite #1203
Castaic, Ca. 91384

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This responds to your request of 27 March 2018 to have DOCID 4092105, "DRAFT OF PUEBLO PAPERS" reviewed for declassification. The material has been reviewed under the Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requirements of Executive Order (E.O.) 13526 and is enclosed.

Some portions deleted from the document were found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with E.O. 13526. The information denied meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Section 1.4 subparagraphs (b) and (c) and remains classified TOP SECRET and SECRET as provided in Section 1.2 of E.O. 13526. The withheld information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Sections 3.3(b)(1) and 3.3(b)(3) of the Executive Order.

Section 3.5 (c) of E.O. 13526, allows for the protection afforded to information under the provisions of law. Therefore, the names of NSA/CSS employees and information that would reveal NSA/CSS functions and activities have been protected in accordance with Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605, formerly 50 U.S. Code 402 note).

Since your request for declassification has been denied you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures. Any person denied access to information may file an appeal to the NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority. The appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days after the date of the denial letter. The appeal shall be in writing addressed to the NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority (P133), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, STE 6881, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6881. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which the requester believes the release of information is required. The NSA/CSS MDR Appeal Authority will endeavor to respond to the appeal within 60 working days after receipt of the appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of several overlapping loops and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

JOSEPH DEMATTEI
Chief
Declassification Services

Encl:
a/s

CENTER FOR CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

21 Apr 92

Gene Hatch

Some notes & reactions to [redacted]

[redacted] memo. When he dropped the original off w/ me, he took pains to reiterate that he admired Bob's work & didn't want to seem hypercritical. I told him I knew Bob would apprec any & all useful feedback and not be offended. Some time when I'm out there, let me scan Bob's handwritten notes - I didn't take time to read them.

Gene H.

~~TOP SECRET~~

14 April 1992

TO: Dave Hatch, D93

From: [redacted]

Via: Dave Gaddy ✓ 16/4/92

Subject: Draft of Pueblo Papers

EO 3.3b(1)
EO 3.3b(3)
PL 86-36/50 USC
3605

1. (U) Pursuant to our conversations over the past several days, I want to send my comments to you in writing concerning Bob Newton's draft manuscript on the seizure of the Pueblo. In discussions with Dave Gaddy, he suggested that I also might wish to schedule another oral interview so we could "bounce a few of these ideas around". I am very eager and willing to do this, but would find the following comments useful as a starting point. I also would like to see a copy of the transcript from the oral interview I had with Bob Farley to refresh my memory. Mr. [redacted] has seen an earlier draft of this note and generally agrees with the contents; I have tried to incorporate his thoughts as well.

2. (U) Bob Newton's research paper is extremely well done and, as I have indicated, brought back some memories that were a little disturbing to me personally. I think that parts of the paper are a bit harsh on the Navy, but I will leave the tone of your work to those better qualified. My purpose in writing this note is to bring to light some facts that may be worth including in the manuscript. I think if some of this is included it may bring a bit more balanced picture to the events surrounding the Pueblo, so it doesn't appear to be such a one-sided story, i.e., "we did things right and the Navy did everything wrong." I think if we include some of the data that follows, it will be clear that we in the USSS also made some basic mistakes that should be told in fairness to this historical account.

3. ~~(S)~~ Approximately 3 months before the Pueblo mission was planned, NSA established an analytic and reporting effort against the North Korean Navy target. Up until that time NSA did not have an independent U.S. technical base or expertise on this target. Our experience (and the Navy's) was very limited [redacted]. I believe that Sam Hong (the Chief of B71) was prompted to establish this new section because he felt we needed a U.S. view on this target. Our motivation to have a better technical base was at about the same time the Navy was considering conducting their own reconnaissance in this area. Therefore, the Navy's desires to establish their own base on North Korea [redacted] was very much justified and supported by what we were doing at NSA at about the same time, even though these efforts were not formally coordinated in advance. You may wish to weave some of this into pages 7/8.

4. ~~(S)~~ Since most of the personnel assigned to the new NKN section were drawn from within B71, we had exposure to the North Korean attitude concerning U.S. reconnaissance and were involved with reporting a number of NKAF hostile reactions to air reconnaissance missions off the coast of Korea over the Sea of Japan. When the Banner was scheduled to deploy earlier in the year, several of us were prompted to write a message outlining our concerns. This message was sent to a fairly wide distribution in Navy channels. So we were actually on record about these type of missions long before the Pueblo was being considered for deployment. It may be useful to pull the SIGINT product

~~Classified
Excluded from automatic downgrading and
declassification~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

we had been issuing on NKAF hostilities for a year or so before the deployment of the Pueblo to give some better measure of the long history of North Korean sensitivity which caused us to write both messages concerning the Banner and the Pueblo. I think it may be wise to capture this prevailing attitude on pages 4/8/11/160. I also believe Bob gives too much credence to the theory that the North Korean actions were somehow linked or even coordinated with the PRC and Soviet harassments. Scattered throughout this paper (pages 22/58/161 are examples) we seem to make a fairly strong case for this and I think the evidence is very limited. I would be more inclined to show the long history of NK sensitivity as a pattern that was there even before we had the AGER program. It is possible that the North Koreans acted without outside influence from either the Chinese or Soviets. Certainly their attitude toward reconnaissance was much more aggressive.

✓
Common perception
of attitudes
toward
✓

5. (S) In December 1967, drawing on our experience on the NKAF target, we felt comfortable in drafting the "warning message". It was originally addressed as the previous message was concerning the deployment of the Banner. During the coordination of this message, it was thought to be prudent to merely address our concerns to the JRC/JCS. I am not sure that it would have made any difference in light of the way the Navy handled the earlier Banner deployment, but the frustration level was very high at the analytic level, since no one seemed to have "read our product." In fairness, this feeling was perhaps magnified by the long history of seeing NKAF hostile intent in SIGINT, reporting on this activity, and then watching the Pueblo incident unfold in front us. Perhaps the lesson best learned was that we (all of us who knew of this at NSA) did not "market" what we had at the right level. A skill which we now seem have in abundance just wasn't there at the time, viz., making sure our assessment of what we are producing finds the right level. It was for this reason the NSOC was built and still functions. I believe that another mistake we made was in not sanitizing the "warning message" [redacted]. This would have given at least the senior [redacted] officials a better sense of our concern and help them orchestrate the crisis in the aftermath of the incident itself. Some of this could be included in either the summary or the conclusion portion of the document or on page 31.

interesting point
NSOC?

6. (S) There was little, if any, U.S. collection of North Korean Navy communications during the incident itself.

[redacted]

The NKN tracking stations used a "cardinal point" system as a point of reference to report azimuth/range tracking and the early positions we had were based on a previously recovered cardinal point. We plotted these locations on a large map that was later given by George Robb to Ambassador Goldberg to use in his presentation to the UN. It wasn't until a week or so later that we learned that the cardinal reference points had changed [redacted]

|| *

[redacted] and the HF tracking

~~TOP SECRET~~

positions we presented to the UN were not entirely accurate. Thus, the true positions of the Pueblo (based on NKN tracking data) were not published until long after the fact, and then only after we had put the story together from raw material [redacted]

did this change the low "outside" in the "the limits" accepted by us? NO! BN

[redacted] Page 44 may be a place where this theme could be addressed. Page 45 mentions that we had "U.S." intercept, which I find hard to believe, given our posture at the time.

7. ~~(S)~~ Since we were [redacted]

these inconsistencies in recoveries and analysis, George Robb was prompted to establish a "Pueblo Task Force" consisting of analysts from all sections in B11. This little unit worked for about a month and was charged with the responsibility of reviewing all SIGINT material collected during the time that the Pueblo was off the coast of Korea (10-23 January 1968). The task force results were fully documented in a SIGINT review: "The Voyage and Capture of the USS Pueblo". Twenty copies were printed and ten were given to the archives for storage, along with a safe filled with all the technical data and traffic that supported our conclusions. Mr. Robb was not inclined to give this document wide distribution because the title included the word "capture", indicating some wrong doing on our part and he (wisely, I believe) thought it should have read "seizure". Nonetheless, the document and supporting files contain all relevant SIGINT information on the incident itself. I was surprised to learn that this material was not referenced in some way during the course of the Bob Newton research. A draft copy of the report is included in the attachments to this note. It is titled "Review of the Pueblo Incident". I am not sure if this is the final version that was printed.

lead to suspect "Milt Zastaw" esp. in squelching distro as ordered. No cause effect could be shown on damage inflicted!

8. ~~(S)~~ During the course of the Pueblo Task Force review, we implemented a very detailed accounting system and learned that several voice tapes of NKN communications collected [redacted] were missing from the transcripts we had on hand. This was about 3 weeks after the seizure of the Pueblo. When [redacted] finally forwarded these to us (we feared they had been erased), the transcripts revealed early voice discussions by the NKN radar station and controlling entities discussing what actions to take regarding the "enemy" vessel approximately one hour before the Pueblo had actually been approached by the patrol vessels. This transcript (containing obvious warning information) was finally published about a month after the incident itself. There had been no [redacted] reporting on this critical voice material previously or knowledge [redacted] of this information, even though we had repeatedly asked [redacted] if all relevant material had been forwarded. It has never been clear to me why these early [redacted] voice tapes had been overlooked [redacted] until we found them missing in the post mortem Pueblo Task Force review. It may be useful to mention that the lack of a U.S. analytic and reporting base on the North Korean Navy target contributed to these events, since clear warning information was available in SIGINT but not reported in the USSS because it was bogged down [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~
~~RESTRICTED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

9. ~~(S)~~ [redacted] and I have talked about the draft and had some success in remembering a bit more detail than if we tried to do it alone. As you may know from other sources, Bernie, [redacted] and George Robb constituted the NSA team that was sent to New York to assist Ambassador Goldberg in his presentation to the UN concerning the seizure of the Pueblo. We think it is probably worth expanding pages 84/85 to include a bit more detail on the support we provided during this period of the crisis. While fairly commonplace in today's world, real time NSA support to this level at the State Department was a new experience. The NSA team was personally involved in advising Ambassadors Goldberg and Pedersen, including editing some key portions of the Ambassador's speech. [redacted] contribution to this was critical, giving first hand interpretation of the tapes taken to the UN. [redacted] also played a very important role throughout the crisis, having been called out of semi-retirement to give expert transcription/translation support. Bernie and I agree that his linguistic contribution to NSA analytic and reporting response to the Pueblo seizure was critical and probably should be mentioned in the historical account. Attached you will find the notes that George Robb kept (which were passed to Bernie when George retired). These notes may be useful in sorting out what happened in New York and NSA's contribution. Also inclosed is a copy of the official UN record of the Security Council's deliberations on 26 January 1968, when Ambassador Goldberg made his presentation.

EO 3.3b(1)
EO 3.3b(3)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

10. ~~(S)~~ Perhaps as elaboration to page 122 on the draft, it should be mentioned that the Navy's change of attitude regarding NSA's role in the debrief of the crew may have been in part caused by the way Dick Finley personally handled the privacy to General Carter. Because Dick had trouble "communicating with his Director", he chose to take the first message to a secure facility in Los Angeles. I accompanied him on the trip to LA and learned that he had told the Navy he and I were going "up north to visit relatives" or "his niece". When they questioned Dick and (I) the next day about our trip and learned that we had sent the privacy via communications from Los Angeles, the Navy became much more cooperative across the board. Soon after the early "privacy message" incident, Dick Finley hosted a New Year's Eve party for the Navy at one of the major hotels in San Diego. This brilliant stroke of liaison work also helped in smoothing over the early tension between the Navy and NSA people.

11. ~~(S)~~ There may be a bit of supporting information for pages 136/137 concerning the Pike Committee investigation. When I appeared before the legal counsel to this committee (accompanied by Roy Banner) we learned that an Air Force enlisted man, who earlier had been assigned to our section at NSA, had apparently written to the Pike Committee. He intimated there was much more of this story that needed to be told. The Pike Committee counsel was upset that we had "mislead" them, but through some excellent persuasion by Roy Banner, was assured

NSA Action

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 3.3b(3)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

that this kind of work, viz., assessing the SIGINT which was produced on any given subject or target area, was routinely accomplished by desk analysts and first line supervisors throughout at NSA. It was a masterful piece of work by Roy Banner, which supports some of Bob Newton's earlier conclusions regarding Roy Banner's contribution in sorting out NSA's image downtown. I know I was very glad that he was with me during that session.

12. ~~(insert)~~ Here are a few minor problems in the draft that should be looked at a little closer:

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

a. On page 29: Why don't we include the verbatim text of the "warning message"?

b. On page 39: I don't believe either of the Marine Sergeants had any experience with Korean communications. They had rudimentary language training, with no analytic, i.e., target, experience.

my recollection too

c. On page 45: It looks like we had [redacted] on this, which I find hard to believe, given our posture at the time.

EO 3.3b(1)
EO 3.3b(3)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

d. On page 58: As indicated, I believe that this conclusion is grossly overstated. It needs to be balanced with the overall attitude of the North Koreans toward any foreign activity near their coast over a long period of time.

e. On page 66: While he might have been in the watch center with General Morrison, I don't think [redacted] was ever assigned to B11.

(office)

f. On page 67: The date of the message to JCS is incorrect; it should read 29 December 1967.

[redacted]

ham, copy small scale maps!

h. On page 85: The first photo mission flown over Wonson Harbor was not with a drone, but with an SR71. Black Shield was the cover term used for SR71 missions in this part of the world.

check

i. On page 94: I do not believe that the collection platform used for the enhanced ACRP missions was the C130. I think there were RC135s flown in from other parts of the world.

with checking

j. On page 106: I believe that the CIA assessment of North Korean COMSEC was based on a [redacted] report that we later asked to be canceled. Thus, it may be useful to move the last paragraph on this page to precede the CIA statement.

||

k. On page 114: Since the SI crew's personnel jackets were aboard the Pueblo, along with SI "diaries" that Navy analysts routinely kept about their experiences, it is possible that this information gave the Koreans details to influence their questioning.

** Have thoroughly checked this!*

l. On page 116: I think it would be advisable to use the word "interviewers" versus "interrogators" when referring to the U.S. debrief team that helped gather information for the damage assessment.

good point!

~~TOP SECRET~~

Use "debriefers" to describe U.S. team in all cases except one and this one instance was a slip. RN

m. On page 126: Concerning the GOPI traffic: While reviewing material that was aboard the Pueblo as part of the Breeches Bouy team at Nebraska Avenue in January/February 1969, I discovered that a copy of our message concerning the Banner deployment was aboard the Pueblo. Therefore, NSA's concerns regarding U.S. reconnaissance in this area was apparently known to at least the Pueblo SI crew. I brought this to the personal attention of the Chief of the Breeches Bouy Team (Dick Finley), who asked that a copy of this message be included in the final ~~final~~ damage assessment documentation that you should have in the archives. //

n. On page 133: As indicated, I believe this is one place we are being more than a little harsh on the Navy. It just isn't going to do us any good to talk about their "embarrassment" or "attitude" in this historical account. //

o. On page 157: The Banner made a pass in Sea of Japan some time earlier in 1966 or 1967, which prompted us to write the earlier warning message I have referred to in paragraph 13 item 1 above. //

Do not believe this B.N.

p. On page 158: It bears mentioning here that the voice reflections collected by [] contained warning information almost two hours before the Pueblo was actually approached. It is very probable that the Pueblo copied these same transmission but did not have the linguistic capability on board to translate the voice in support of decisions on the bridge. It is also very probable that if the Captain had this information earlier, he may have chosen other tactics. //

(primarily state of comm. security common warning cap)

13. (U) I hope the above helps the process. Please take all of this as constructive and not in any way diluting all the hard work that has gone into the documentation thus far. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to call. I will be leaving for PCS assignment overseas on 4 June 1992, so it will be a little tough getting to me first hand, but I can be reached on the grey line 995-7202 or on PLATFORM []. I would like to have a copy of the final version sent to me at SUSLO London. Finally, please accept my expression of sorrow for the loss of your co-worker Bob Farley; he was always gracious in carrying out this very important work in D9 and a source of personal encouragement to me. //

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Very Respectfully

[Redacted Signature]

Incl: a/s
cc: [Redacted] (less enclosures)

~~_____~~
~~_____~~