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An Analysis Of The "New World Order"
And Its Implications For U.S. National Strategy

by

John T. Brennan

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Dr. Robert S. Jordan

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

April 1993

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ABSTRACT

TITLE: An Analysis Of The "New World Order" And Its Implications For US National Strategy

AUTHOR: John T. Brennan, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

The Cold War is over and the result is a transition from a bipolar world of US vs. USSR to a multipolar world or "New World Order" where the US remains the only military superpower.

However, this status is tentative for the United States. Like all the great superpowers in history, the US is about to let the weight of its military establishment, drag its economy into collapse.

This paper looks at the implications of President Bush's "new world order," and the opportunities it presents the US to preserve a peaceful international environment with an open international market system while at the same time retaining its superpower status. The paper establishes that the "new world order" is more than just rhetoric or simple statement of fact, it exists but is ill-defined. As a result, the paper proposes to define the term as *a democratic world where all nations join together in partnership and cooperation under the framework of the United Nations to establish peace, prosperity, and justice for all.*

This lofty definition has major implications for US national strategy. Politically, we must back out of the role of world policeman and become the "world's conscience," continuing to actively support the United Nations. Economically, we must get our domestic economy in order and invest in both the UN and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Militarily, we must look for a force structure which responsibly reduces it's size to that required for collective security, not unilateral action. We have a vision! What has been lacking is the long term strategy to achieve this vision. By following a program of active political and economic measures and responsible military reductions, we can ensure we retain our superpower status.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel John T. Brennan (M.B.A., Golden Gate University) was commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program after graduating from Purdue University in 1976. After a short time in the Inactive Reserves, he entered active duty in 1977, through the Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) Program at Laughlin AFB, Texas. After graduation from UPT, Lt Col Brennan entered F-15 training at Luke AFB, Arizona and was then permanently assigned to Bitburg AB, Germany from 1979 to 1983. Returning from overseas, he was stationed at Langley AFB, Virginia from 1983 until 1985. In 1985, Lt Col Brennan moved to the Pentagon and fulfilled a three year staff tour in the Secretary of the Air Force's Legislative Liaison Division. While at the Pentagon, Lt Col Brennan was selected to attend Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Graduating from ACSC in 1989, he returned to the cockpit flying F-15s at Kadena AB, Japan. Lt Col Brennan left Kadena AB in 1992, for the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, where he is currently stationed.

INTRODUCTION:

The "New World Order"! The term is now the new catch phrase of the 1990s. Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev first used the term in a speech in Moscow in April 1990. President George Bush popularized the term in a speech to the Congress on 11 September 1990, after Iraq invaded Kuwait.¹ Since then, President Bush and other administration officials have used the term numerous times.² What does this term mean to us today? Indeed, what does this term mean to us as a nation or to the world as a whole? Is there such a thing as a "new world order," or is it rhetoric and a sham? What is the US role in the "new world order"? It is obvious from reading the press that there is much confusion and much that is still unknown or misunderstood about the subject.³

Zbigniew Brzezinski appropriately describes the situation: "A good slogan is a good point of departure for a strategy, but it is not a substitute for a strategy. I think so far, we have a good slogan. But in so far as the New World Order is concerned, the president, to date, has not fleshed it out."⁴ This paper will attempt to "flesh out" the concept of a "new world order." It will address whether a "new world order" actually exists, what the term means to different people in different countries, and propose a definition of the term for use in US foreign policy. Aspects of the political, economic and military implications of this "new world order" on national security strategy formulation are presented, followed by a proposal for a US national security strategy for the twenty-first century. This paper counters the old adage "you can't have your cake and eat it too"! In this "new world order," I believe the US can do both. It is a matter of taking a responsible rather than an emotional approach to the situation. The essence of this approach is to define our goal for this "new world order" and to articulate a strategy to achieve this goal.

IS THERE OR IS THERE NOT A "NEW WORLD ORDER"?:

Before we go further in our discussion of the "new world order" we must first determine if such a thing exists. Some people claim it does not, calling the concept rhetoric, rationalization or just plain historically wrong. Joseph Nye opens his essay on the subject with, "Like Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points or Franklin Roosevelt's four freedoms, George Bush's grand rhetoric expressed the larger goals important for public support when a liberal democratic state goes to war."⁵ Marilyn Young, Professor of History, New York University, goes even further saying: "George Bush's new world order is not new, not orderly, and not even addressed to the world."⁶ Other authors have the same or similar attitudes; however, they appear to be a minority. As John Wilner explains, "The stunning breadth and pace of change has been overwhelming. Events that were unimaginable even five years ago have become commonplace. The unfortunate result is that many political observers and policymakers have been reduced to quibbling about what has *not* happened, while at times ignoring the ramifications of what already has."⁷

Although we may debate the issue of whether a "new world order" actually exists, it is a fact that major changes have occurred in the international environment. We have witnessed in the last three years the uniting of East and West Germany, the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of communism, and the breakup of the Soviet Union. These factors alone suggest that things are going to be radically different in international politics. Indeed, the dissolution of the bipolar world we knew after World War II and the creation of a multipolar world have made an opening for the establishment of a "new world order."⁸ What made this multipolar world and created this opening? Most authors agree it became possible because of the ending of the Cold War. What is ill-defined, though, is when the Cold War ended.

Arguments on when the Cold War ended range from May 1989, when Hungary opened its borders,⁹ to December 1991, the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).¹⁰ For this discussion, we will define the ending of the Cold War as November 1990. This is the point when President Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would back United Nations (UN) Resolution 678 and the use of force against Iraq.¹¹ There are indications of the Soviets coming around to a Western way of thinking prior to this time; however, there is no convincing earlier proof that they would not return to their old way of doing business. In the Gulf crisis, though the USSR agreed with the UN on the illegitimacy of Iraq's actions, they argued against the use of force to resolve the situation. If they had continued to resist the use of force against a Middle Eastern Cold War ally, it would have been difficult to argue the Cold War had ended. However, by agreeing to the use of force, the USSR showed there were some new fundamental issues of agreement between East and West. "For the first time since the 1956 Suez Crisis the two superpowers did not back different clients in a Middle East conflict; and for the first time since the 1967 Six Day War the Soviet Union did nothing to shield a prized client from the consequences of its military folly."¹²

Though we have argued that the end of the Cold War opened the door for a "new world order," does one truly exist? The majority of authors admit that: "The material for rebuilding is at hand, but whether the architecture will be the old and familiar or new and original remains to be seen."¹³ Paula Dobriansky sums up the views of many writers in her statement: "... the advent of new democracies, the strengthening of international organizations, and the growing respect accorded to international legal norms all combine to make the creation of a 'new world order' a realistic, albeit still challenging, undertaking."¹⁴ In addition to being realistic and challenging,

there is also consensus that the process is evolutionary in nature.¹⁵ Nye neatly describes the entire process by observing that: "In short the new world order has begun. It is messy, evolving and not susceptible to simple formulation or manipulation."¹⁶

Two prominent foreign policy specialists, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Roza Otunbayeva, provide further reinforcement for the existence of a "new world order." Brzezinski explains that: "A new order is emerging to some extent on its own because of changing global values and the increasing interconnectedness of nations and states."¹⁷ Otunbayeva emphasizes, "The movement to a new world order will not be easy and is also bound to meet with resistance but no obstacles, present or future, can stop it."¹⁸ This unstoppable movement, whether it develops on its own or with some help poses the question. . . .

WHAT IS THE "NEW WORLD ORDER"?:

The literature of the 1990s is full of different interpretations of the term "new world order." In James Schlesinger's opinion: "If the phrase means that the world order has been sharply altered from the strict divisions of the Cold War, then clearly it is correct. If it means that the world order will be novel, marked by a new stability, then it is unduly utopian."¹⁹ Nye points out:

The term 'world order' is used in two very different ways in the discussions of world politics. Realists, in the tradition of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, see international politics occurring among sovereign states balancing each others' power. World order is the product of a stable distribution of power among the major states. Liberals, in the tradition of Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter, look at relations among peoples as well as states. They see order arising from broad values like democracy and human rights, as well as from international law and institutions such as the United Nations.²⁰

One distinguishing attribute of the "new world order" is the change from a bipolar global environment during the Cold War to a multipolar world today. In today's international environment there is more to superpower status than simply military power. "In the international system of the 1990s, strong economic, political, and military capabilities are widely distributed,

creating many different poles of power. But understanding and predicting the relations of those poles with one another is very difficult."²¹ What is the implication of this for the US? "Political multipolarity, while perhaps difficult at first to accept, has become the *sin qua non* for a new period of creativity in American statecraft."²² Evidence of today's multipolar situation exists in examples, such as, the economic power of Japan and Germany, the demographic power of China and India, and the military power of the US.²³

This new era of multipolar relationships also has the possibility of more instability than we knew under the bipolar world of the Cold War. Schlesinger explains this concept by stating, "Although the world after the Cold War is likely to be a far less dangerous place because of reduced risks of a cataclysmic clash, it is likely to be more unstable rather than less."²⁴ Jacques Delors supports this view in his writing, "All around us, naked ambition, lust for power, national uprisings and underdevelopment are combining to create potentially dangerous situations, containing the seeds of destabilization and conflict, aggravated by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."²⁵ This multipolarity and instability are not a new phenomenon, "The world of 1816 through 1946 was multipolar, and it also saw numerous wars, including both world wars."²⁶

Again, today we see examples of violence and instability in the Gulf War and the current fighting in Yugoslavia.

This tendency for increased instability and violence is not and should not always be the case. As the "new world order" matures, the level of violence should decrease. This tendency is addressed in the writings of Michael Krepon, who states:

Nations will continue to use military force as long as they believe that their vital interests are threatened and that force can accomplish important objectives, at reasonable cost, when nonviolence means are likely to fail. The closer the world moves toward a new order, the less impelled individual states will feel to use military force, and the better the prospect will be for collective military action when force is required.²⁷

One aspect of this new order, which is a natural fallout from the demise of communism, is a greater hope for the spread of democracy. This move to a more democratic world will in itself reduce the tendency for violence in the new multipolar environment.²⁸ In this regard, Andrei Kozyrev notes, "The main thing is that the Western countries are pluralistic democracies. Their governments are under the control of legal public institutions, and this practically rules out the pursuance of an aggressive foreign policy. In the system of Western states . . . the problem of war has essentially been removed."²⁹

An interesting perspective of the "new world order" comes from other perceptions of the idea from around the world. Looking overseas, we see the same discussions and confusion on the subject that we have seen in the US. However, there are also two other areas of concern highlighted when we look at the international environment. The first is the need for cooperation and reduction in the use of force among all nations. The second is a fear that Third World countries will be slighted in the "new world order." Otunbayeva sees the "new world order" as, "In effect historic. It denotes a stage of transition from a postwar to a new world order under which uncompromising rivalry between the two sociopolitical systems must give way to partnership and cooperation, to a readiness to renounce force or the threat of force in settling problems . . ."³⁰ Looking at the Third World we find:

There are several important reasons for concern about a U.S.-third world relationship. First, the end of the Cold War has created major new vulnerabilities in the Third World that result from the withdrawal of great power competition and the diversion of resources to Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. . . . Second, one of the primary challenges now facing the international system is the widening disparity in quality of life between many of the developing and developed countries. For many people the success of the new world order is linked to progress in narrowing this gap.³¹

Finally, we see views similar to those expressed earlier, in the writings of scholars such as Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies, King's College, University of London, who writes:

Certainly if the 'new world order' is supposed to mean the triumph of liberalism and free markets, the rule of international law and an era of peace and prosperity, then the performance will be found wanting against the ideal. There are, however, two other interpretations that require more careful attention. The first is that the slogan reflects a presumption that international institutions and in particular, the United Nations, will be taking a more active and important role in global management. . . . on the second interpretation . . . the phrase 'new world order' is merely descriptive, requiring no more than acceptance that the current situation is unique and clearly different in critical respects from the one that obtained just a few years ago.³²

In this statement, Freedman captures the essence of the "new world order." The term is descriptive but also represents a vision for the future where the UN plays a leading role. In fact, most authors agree the UN is probably the best forum to accomplish the initiatives required for this "new world order."³³ No one better articulates this potential than President Bush who, in numerous speeches, enthusiastically supported this role for the UN. On 6 March 1991, in a speech to Congress, the President discussed, "A world where the United Nations, freed from Cold War stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders."³⁴ Prior to this, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, he commented, "We must show that the United Nations is the place to build international support and consensus for meeting the other challenges we face."³⁵ As we saw in the Gulf War, UN resolutions provided legitimacy for the use of sanctions and UN coalition forces provided the means to resolve the situation.

In addition to emphasizing the role of the UN, President Bush, in numerous speeches over the last two and a half years, has outlined his vision of the "new world order." The President in his speech to Congress on 11 September 1990, stated:

Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective--a new world order--can emerge; a new era--freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the

quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. . . . Today, that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we have known, a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibilities for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.³⁶

After the Gulf war, he amplified this idea saying:

You see, as the Cold War drew to an end we saw the possibilities of a new order in which nations worked together to promote peace and prosperity. I'm not talking here of a blue print that will govern the conduct of nations or some supernatural structure or institution. The world order does not mean surrendering our national sovereignty or forfeiting our interests. It really describes a responsibility imposed by our success. It refers to new ways of working with other nations to deter aggression and to achieve stability, to achieve prosperity and, above all, to achieve peace. It springs from hopes for a world based on a shared commitment among nations large and small, to a set of principles that undergird our relations. Peaceful settlements of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples.³⁷

With this as our basis, the question now turns to . . .

HOW SHOULD THE US DEFINE THE "NEW WORLD ORDER"?:

The term "new world order" obviously means many things to different people but what should it mean to us? First and foremost we will boldly state that the term is more than rhetoric. However, the idea that this term is merely a statement spawned by the end of the Cold War and the advent of a multipolar world, though true, is too simplistic. Enough change has occurred in the international environment to justify the use of the term.

As discussed, history shows that conflict is more likely in a multipolar environment than in a bipolar environment. As a result, the US as the sole remaining military superpower must be on the leading edge of the development and implementation of the "new world order" concept. What we need is a single substantive definition of the term "new world order"--an optimistic vision of a better way of conducting international affairs in the twenty-first century. Specifically, the "new world order" should be defined as--*a democratic world where all nations, join together in partnership and cooperation under the framework of the United Nations to establish peace,*

prosperity, and justice for all. This admittedly is a lofty definition and vision. But, as a nation, we need a long term goal and perspective. It took almost forty-five years to win the Cold War. Cultural impatience aside, the establishment of a "new world order" will take time. Without a long term view and "without a moral vision, national power has neither true purpose nor the ability to realize its full potential."³⁸ The specific value of such a vision and lofty definition will be addressed by looking at its implications for the three traditional elements of national power: politics, economics and the military.

WHAT ARE THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS?

From a political perspective, this definition means a world where; the United Nations is the sole determiner of legitimate and illegitimate causes; we nurture democracies; and coalitions solve world problems. Today, it means a world where there is a united effort to solve the crisis in Yugoslavia. Where we provide help to the emerging democracies of the former Soviet Union. Where we establish international committees to address the problems of AIDS, drugs, trade inequities, the environment, the development of the Third World, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and a multitude of other issues of international concern. In this light, the pursuit of a "new world order" as outlined above has profound effects on the national security strategy of the US.

In this "new world order," the US needs to continue strong support of the United Nations and, where appropriate, regional alliances. As discussed previously, the United Nations is required to provide the framework for "peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples."³⁹ The UN should provide the forum for the establishment of a worldwide consensus. This consensus should

establish acceptable norms and then condemn and punish those forces, states, nations, etc. which step outside the bounds of these established norms. As President Bush describes, "human dignity, the inalienable rights of man--these are not the possessions of the state; they're universal." ⁴⁰

Unlike the Carter administration, whose human rights policies were unilaterally imposed, the world needs to take these actions through the auspices of some global organization, i.e. the United Nations. The US must step away from the role of world policeman and shift that role to a multinational organization. As pointed out by the former Foreign Minister of the former Soviet Union:

The example of the action of the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf demonstrates the need for further improving the functioning of the U.N. Security Council. No single country, not even as powerful and rich as the United States can or has the right to play the role of global policeman. No one country, even the smallest and weakest, would agree with the idea of restraining the violators of order in the world if the restraining were done by a single power. ⁴¹

Instead of the role of world policeman, the US should take on the role suggested by former Secretary of State, James Baker, that of the world conscience.⁴² In the words of Alberto Coll, "the most appropriate political strategy for the United States will be to act as a 'grand facilitator' of the existing international order." ⁴³ In this regard, Coll also points out, "the distinguishing mark of a grand facilitator is its ability to relate its national interests to the interests of other states and the larger purposes of international society." ⁴⁴ If the US cannot relate its interests and sell its position in this way, then it should not be taking unilateral action to secure these objectives. To take unilateral action in such situations is no better than the communist adventurism experienced during the Cold War. What right does the United States have to impose its will on others? None! "Informed opinion holds that the US should only act in concert with the United Nations. Multilateralism and collective security are the order of the day. But, the same opinion also

maintains that, as the world's only superpower, the US must take the lead in initiating and conducting the action." ⁴⁵ The US needs to translate unilateral desires into actions taken in concert with other nations or the support of the United Nations. Ideally, these actions would be taken by regional alliances within the framework of the United Nations.

Regional alliances are important because ideally they allow regions to settle their own disputes and counter the feeling that "outsiders" are interfering in their business and affairs. Unfortunately, regional alliances have an abysmal record of accomplishment in this post-Cold War era. Examples, such as, Iraq-Kuwait, Central America, Liberia, Cambodia, Somalia and Yugoslavia all demonstrate the ineffectiveness of regional organizations in handling crisis.⁴⁶ Thus, it appears the best way for regional alliances to become involved is to incorporate them into a formal structure within the United Nations. The UN, which has extensive experience in peacekeeping operations, can spread that knowledge and experience through an internal framework and can make these regional alliances more capable of handling crises in their own areas. Again, US political leadership and support is required to spearhead and institutionalize a concept like this within the United Nations.

The counter to much of this discussion will be the "need for the US to maintain its vital interests." The response to this argument is that our primary vital interest is a stable international environment and an open and free global market system. The establishment of democracy around the globe, though noble in principle and a worthy goal, neglects cultures, traditions and history--or the fact that all countries may not be ready for democracy. More important than establishing democracies throughout the world is establishing stable governments and an open free international market system. The result may be that the pressures of a free market system will

provide more impetus for a change to democratic government than any other incentives. It is by no means definite that the course the countries of the former Soviet Union took in establishing democratic governments and free market systems at the same time is the right way to go. As we see in the news, the future of these governments and their reforms is tentative; not unlike our status as a superpower due to our economic problems.

WHAT ARE THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS?

From an economic perspective, this definition of the "new world order" means a world where; there are open economic markets for trade among all nations; there is a more equal standard of living among nations; and humanitarian aid is readily available for those people suffering from oppression or natural disasters. It means a world where we join together to provide relief for the Kurds in Iraq, the starving population in Somalia, and the earthquake victims in Egypt. It means a world where nations contribute to these goals according to their means and as their means improve so does their contribution to the international effort.

Among the many economic aspects of the vision of a "new world order" for the US, the first and foremost is the need to get our domestic economy in order. "Simply stated, the main challenge to our national security in the twenty-first century is economic competition from Japan, a united Germany, an integrated Europe, and even the newly industrialized countries of Asia--especially the so-called four tigers of East Asia: Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea." ⁴⁷ As Robert Kimmitt, describes, "though once neglected by the strategists of the early postwar era, economics has clearly become the growth sector of the national security business, and there is no sign of the boom subsiding." ⁴⁸ Although there are many other aspects of economics and national security strategy (such as trade policies, foreign aid, sanctions, etc.) our

domestic economy is currently the overriding concern. Without correcting this situation, our status as a superpower will be in jeopardy.

One of the most frustrating aspects of our society is that we seldom learn from history and thus avoid the mistakes of the past. A fairly basic study of history shows the rise and fall of all great "superpowers" or empires of the world evolved in a similar pattern. First, the country develops a strong domestic economy which then translates into political power. As the economy and political power grow there becomes a need for a substantial military force to protect, defend or as Clausewitz would explain, to extend their political power. Over time, the continued large diversion of resources into a military force shifts emphasis away from the economy, and the economy declines, as does the political and military power, to the point where the country is no longer a superpower. Unfortunately, this pattern describes the current US situation. This is not to say the military buildup of the 1980s was wrong. That buildup was required, and we had the economy to support it. Further, that buildup was a major contribution to the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a superpower. They simply did not have the economy to compete.⁴⁹ However, now that "war" is over and a multipolar world is a reality, the US domestic economy must become the number one priority in our national security strategy. Without a strong US economy to compete with rivals like Germany and Japan, the US could find itself going the way of the Soviet Union and other great superpowers in history. Given this requirement, the next step is to determine the best way to strengthen our domestic economy and regain the position of world creditor as opposed to the current debtor status we now maintain.

Efforts to correct the status of our domestic economy must be directed at such things as: reducing the deficit, reducing dependence on foreign imports, increasing competitiveness,

decreasing the national debt, increasing savings and investments, improving our educational system and infrastructure, and other fundamental growth related endeavors. To accomplish these goals, spending must decrease and revenues increase. Spending cuts should come from both responsible decreases in defense force structure and freezes in entitlement and discretionary programs. Revenues can be increased, not through tax increases, which since 1947 have always resulted in more spending, but through tax decreases which offer incentives for individuals and businesses to invest in high risk, high return projects.⁵⁰ The financial boom of the Reagan administration resulted from tax decreases.⁵¹ During this time had defense, discretionary and entitlement spending been balanced we would not have the national debt of today.

In a world context, the US must work toward open free market economies. As Kimmitt explains, "healthy, diverse market economies give individuals opportunity and promote economic growth. Societies that prosper economically offer fertile ground for stable democratic institutions, which, in turn, tend to foster governments less interested in military adventurism and more interested in public welfare."⁵² Further, the establishment of trade blocs can open the door to worldwide trade agreements and facilitate the establishment of regional alliances, as in the case of the European Community.⁵³

The final area of economic implications to be discussed herein, deals with foreign assistance to the United Nations and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). First, to accomplish the goals we have established for the "new world order" we must insure the financial viability of the United Nations. Currently the UN is owed over \$2 billion in back dues. Of this amount the US is in arrears over \$600 million.⁵⁴ Not only must the US and other countries pay their back dues, they must also shift some of their funds from the defense

drawdowns occurring throughout the free world into the UN. For the UN to function responsibly, it must have the financial wherewithal to do so. Secondly, the US and the rest of the international community must extend economic help to the countries of the CIS.⁵⁵ During this period of economic and political adjustment, it is in the United States best interest that these fledgling democracies succeed. If they do not, totalitarian regimes will reappear almost as quickly as they disappeared. This "new" Cold War could be more intense as the old ideology will be renewed by the fact that democracy and free market economies did not work. Countries would be forced to rebuild their defense establishments and any chance of saving the economy or establishing a "new world order" would be lost. It is far cheaper to invest in these fledgling democracies than to start another defense buildup. In this same light, it makes good sense for the world to finance the destruction of the nuclear arsenal possessed by these same countries. Many of these countries have expressed willingness to dispose of these weapons; however, they lack the financial resources to accomplish the task. Again, it would be a prudent investment to finance the destruction of these weapons and reduce the potential of nuclear conflict. Further, it may allow us to drawdown our strategic nuclear forces at a faster rate, thus freeing up money in the military budget which would have otherwise been spent on the nuclear force. This could create savings of up to \$50-70 billion which could be diverted to many areas of the domestic economy.⁵⁶

WHAT ARE THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS?

"Military power has always been based on economic strength," for this reason the military implications of the "new world order" are perhaps the hardest to define.⁵⁷ The end of the Cold War brought about the end of the monolithic Soviet threat and replaced it with numerous smaller, uncertain and ambiguous threats and an ailing US economy. However, the US, as the sole remaining military superpower, grossly outweighs any threat on the globe today.⁵⁸ As a result, it

is time to rethink our military strategy. "Until a new hegemonic threat appears, for example, the nation can well afford to worry less about its physical security. In this area, a kind of layered strategy can be envisioned, one that could be conducted with a much lower level of resources than the nation spent during the Cold War." ⁵⁹ This very issue is being seriously debated throughout the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Executive Branch and the Congress. What is not being debated is the linkage between our vision of the "new world order" and the means to achieve it. As described by Colin Gray, "the weakness common to critics and officials is that neither has secured a firm grip on the principles, or the method for deriving the principles, that should guide US defense planning in a period of very rapid change." ⁶⁰

Much of today's debate on "how much is enough?" could be circumvented by responsibly articulating our vision of the future and a strategy for achieving it. In this light, we must acknowledge some fundamental truths. First, we still have a Cold War military. To date, with the exception of basing or force positioning, we have not done anything substantial to reduce our forces. Second, countries like Iran, North Korea, and China, continue to buildup conventional forces. Third, history has shown that when we drawdown too fast, other countries take advantage of the situation and the result is another war. Finally, as a government and a military, we need to ensure we provide for the security of our citizens yet still pursue a realistic drawdown of our military forces while at the same time improving our domestic economy. The way to do this is a responsible reduction in forces and funding rather than an emotional reaction to these issues which we see occurring in both the military and the Congress. Somewhere between the two extremes we can meet and accomplish the task responsibly without parochial interests.

However, doing this requires a commitment to the establishment of a "new world order" and cooperative security agreements both within the United Nations and regional alliances.

According to John Steinbruner, "the current defense program seeks to continue a strategy of active military confrontation against no one in particular and therefore against everyone in general. The more appropriate alternative would shift to a principle of cooperative engagement, in which the United States seeks to regulate, by mutual consent, the size of force deployments, their operational practices, and their investment patterns."⁶¹ Embodied in this concept is the notion of collective security agreements. In General Galvin's words: "our future lies in collective security . . . If we think that the future is going to be one of instability and that a lot of crises worldwide are going to be long and difficult--and all signs indicate that that's the case-- then we don't want to be the only cop on the block. Because the block happens to be in a very bad neighborhood."⁶² To do this means, "we have to risk establishing an architecture of security that includes not only the United Nations and NATO, but regional organizations and bilateral agreements."⁶³ The way to maintain our superpower status lies in our ability to lead the world in the quest of our vision. This quest enables the establishment of collective security agreements, within the framework of the UN, which allows us to drawdown our forces yet maintain a structure which balances quality and quantity.

Despite the inevitable drawdown to force structure levels well below what we would normally consider prudent, "the new post-Cold War military configuration must continue to be built upon the dimensions that brought about the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, high technology and high-quality personnel instead of cannon fodder with low-tech weapons."⁶⁴ Investment must be made in forces and technology which yield the highest return and provide protection from the

worst of uncertain and ambiguous threats.⁶⁵ Examples of such technology and forces include: ballistic missile defense, stealth, and space assets.

WHAT SHOULD THE US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY BE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?

Politically, the primary reason for having a government structure is provision for the security of its citizens. As outlined by Terry Deibel:

Despite the revolutionary times in which we live, the broad categories of the national interest under which these strategic patterns fall are unlikely to change. The United States will continue to concern itself, first, with threats to its *physical security*. . . . Second, Americans will expect their government to see their nation's and their own *economic prosperity*, to promote the domestic welfare. . . . Third, Americans will probably continue to insist, as they have since revolutionary times, that their government attune its foreign policies to the values for which they believe their country stands.⁶⁶

It should be obvious from the above discussion that no one aspect of our national security strategy can be considered alone in trying to achieve these interests. Like the interdependence of the global economy, US national security pillars are equally interdependent and intertwined. The problem today is our national security strategy is geared for today and tomorrow. It is not geared for the next century. We lack an articulated strategy for how to reach our vision of the "new world order" and our place in it. In the words of Kermit Lanser, "it is a staple of all commentary on foreign policy these days that the collapse of the Soviet Union has left the US without a great organizing principle to substitute for the doctrine of containment that drove the American policy for some 50 years."⁶⁷ To this end, I propose the US gradually ease out of the world policeman role and take up the role of "world conscience." In this role, the US must step back from its traditional unilateral attitude and push for the establishment of a "new world order" and the continued support of the United Nations and regional alliances. If the US cannot achieve a consensus on actions it thinks needs to be taken it should not feel compelled to undertake them

unilaterally. Further, the US can no longer afford to act unilaterally. It must responsibly reduce its force structure to that required for collective security and coalition warfare.

Militarily it is time for the US to admit that we do not need the preponderance of forces we have today. "Although some degree of nuclear threat will continue in spite of accelerated arms reductions, and occasional terrorist attacks will remain a feature of the international landscape, catastrophic military dangers to American physical security seem hard to imagine for at least the next 15-25 years." ⁶⁸ Though we are seeing many changes and drawdowns throughout the military there are still more cuts that can be made if we shift to a philosophy of collective defense through regional and worldwide alliances. Under this concept, as visualized by U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "member states [will] have contingents of rapid-deployment forces in their national forces trained for U.N. work." ⁶⁹ As a result of this approach, the US could adopt a force structure which maintains the same employment capabilities it has today, however, not in the numbers we have today. Coalition warfighting will be the way of the future. Such an approach to reach a vision of this "new world order" can permit a drawdown of military spending such as:

Year:	Annual budget: (Constant 1993 Dollars)	Year:	Annual budget:
1994	\$263 billion	2003	\$215 billion
1995	\$255 billion	2004	\$210 billion
1996	\$250 billion	2005	\$205 billion
1997	\$245 billion	2006	\$200 billion
1998	\$240 billion	2007	\$195 billion
1999	\$235 billion	2008	\$190 billion
2000	\$230 billion	2009	\$185 billion
2001	\$225 billion	2010	\$180 billion
2002	\$220 billion	2111	\$180 billion

At anytime during this gradual drawdown we can reverse the trend and buildup if required to counter some unforeseen threat. The important point is that we articulate a vision and propose a

strategy to achieve that vision. The difference between this period of drawdown and past drawdowns is that as US forces decrease, the forces of the United Nations increase. This eliminates the apparent power vacuum of the past, where other countries took advantage of the situation and we found ourselves in yet another war. If a country pursues this course, the US will not be required to implement a massive buildup of forces as in the past because a UN force would be present to deal with the situation. During the interim, as the sole remaining superpower, the US can exert its influence toward establishing a "new world order." This status will inhibit any would be aggressors from building up and becoming a regional threat to their neighbors. The world community, through the United Nations, can then band together to deter aggression and oppression. State sovereignty is the rule as long as the state lives within the accepted norms of the rest of the world. If a state begins actions such as ethnic cleansing or other gross violations of human rights, then the world community condemns them and takes action to protect the citizens of the offending nation. In this situation, the government has failed to provide for the security of its citizens and outside actions are required to help those who are oppressed.

None of these actions are easy, but neither are they impossible. These courses do not require large sums of unilateral money or resources (relatively speaking), but do require considerable dedication. It takes a leader to step up to the challenge and start moving this vision into reality. The US is the only nation capable of taking this step. Our national security strategy must be designed to lead the way to the "new world order" but not bear the burden of the role of world policeman. In the words of Deibel, "if Americans can disenthral themselves from Cold War thinking, understand the character of the revolutionary changes they face, and create purposeful

strategies to deal with them, we may be poised on the edge of the most hopeful season in international affairs since the Congress of Vienna initiated a century of hegemonic peace." ⁷⁰

CONCLUSION:

The "new world order" President Bush made famous in his speech on 11 September 1990 became possible because of the ending of the Cold War in November 1990. The "new world order" is not rhetoric, and its development is evolutionary. In the process, there will be instability and the possibility of violence as we saw in the Gulf War. However, history shows that democratic societies do not normally wage war against each other, so as this "new world order" evolves, we look for *a democratic world where all nations join together in partnership and cooperation under the framework of the United Nations to establish peace, prosperity, and justice for all*. The establishment of a world like this is not without challenges. For us the challenge becomes what is the proper US national security strategy to deal with this "new world order." Politically, we must back out of the role of world policeman and become the "world's conscience," continuing to actively support the United Nations and its sponsorship of regional alliances. Economically, we must rebuild our domestic economy or face the fate of previous great superpowers--decline. Further, we must invest in both the financial viability of the UN and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Not to make these investments could destroy our vision and mean a return to the old way of doing business. Militarily, we must look for a force structure responsibly reduced to that required for collective security, not unilateral action. We have a vision! What has been lacking is the long term strategy to achieve this vision. By following a program of active political and economic measures and responsible military reductions, we can ensure retention of our superpower status. To do otherwise, will earmark us in history as only another fallen empire.

NOTES

1. Adam Roberts, "A new age in international relations?," International Affairs, Volume 67, Number 3 (July 1991): 519. Adam Roberts is Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford University.
2. Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D., "Bush's New World Order: What's Wrong with This Picture?," The Heritage Lectures, Number 333: 1. Kim Holmes is Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
3. James C. Hsiung, "The Post-Cold War World Order and the Gulf Crisis," Asian Affairs, An American Review, Volume 18, Number 1 (Spring 1991): 31. James Hsiung is a professor of politics at New York University and president of the Contemporary U.S.-Asia Research Institute.
4. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "New World Order? Interview: Zbigniew Brzezinski," SAIS Review, A Journal of International Affairs, Volume 11, Number 2 (Summer/Fall 1991): 6. Mr. Brzezinski was the National Security Adviser to President Carter. Currently he is a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a professor of American Foreign Policy at SAIS.
5. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What New World Order?," Foreign Affairs, Volume 71, Number 1 (1992): 83. Joseph S. Nye is Director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs.
6. Marilyn B. Young, "Ruthless Intervention," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 47, Number 5 (June 1991): 32. Marilyn Young is a professor of history at New York University.
7. John Wilner, "What's New About the New World Order?," The Fletcher Forum Of World Affairs, Volume 15, Number 2 (Summer 1991): i. John Wilner is the Special Features Editor for The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs.
8. Barry Buzan, "New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century," International Affairs, Volume 67, Number 3 (July 1991): 431-452. Barry Buzan is Professor of International Studies at Warwick University.
9. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "After Communism, What?," Problems of Communism, Volume 41 (January/April 1992): 7. Jean Kirkpatrick was the US Ambassador to the United Nations and a member of the US Cabinet and National Security Council. Ms. Kirkpatrick is presently a Leavey Professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
10. Douglas Stanglin, "Sorting Out the Pieces a Year After the Moscow Coup," U.S. News & World Report, Volume 113, Number 8 (August 24, 1992): 43.

11. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "New World Order or Hollow Victory?," Foreign Affairs, Volume 70, Number 4 (Fall 1991): 56. Alvin Z. Rubinstein is Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute of Philadelphia.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 59.
14. Paula Dobriansky, "Introductory Remarks," Problems of Communism, Volume 41 (January/April 1992): 5-6. Paula Dobriansky is Associate Director for Policy and Programs at the US Information Agency. She formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and Director of European and Soviet Affairs at the NSC.
15. Dou Hui, "Order Through Peaceful Coexistence," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 47, Number 5 (June 1991): 25. Dou Hui is a professor of Chinese external relations at Shanghai International Studies University.
16. Nye, 96.
17. Brzezinski, 1.
18. Roza Otunbayeva, "On the Threshold of a New World Order," International Affairs, Number 4 (1991): 142. Roza Otunbayeva was a Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and a Collegium member of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She was also President of the USSR Commission for UNESCO.
19. James Schlesinger, "New Instabilities, New Priorities," Foreign Policy, Number 85 (Winter 1991-1992): 4. James Schlesinger was Secretary of Energy (1977-79), Secretary of Defense (1973-75), and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (1973). He is currently a counselor for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, chairman of the Mitre Corp., and senior adviser at Lehman Brothers.
20. Nye, 84.
21. Roberto Garcia Moritan, "The Developing World and the New World Order," The Washington Quarterly, Volume 15, Number 4 (Autumn 1992): 150. Roberto Garcia Moritan is Argentina's ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
22. Greg Russell, "America's National Purpose Beyond the Cold War: New Lessons From the Old Realism," The Virginia Quarterly Review, Volume 68, Number 3 (Summer 1992): 417. Mr. Russell is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma.
23. Stefano Silvestri, "The New World Order: Too Good to be True?" The International Spectator Volume 26, Number 4 (Fall 1991): 23. Stefano Silvestri is vice-president of the Instituto Affari Internazionali and a member of the European Strategy Group.

24. Schlesinger, 4.
25. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment," Foreign Affairs, Volume 70, Number 4 (Fall 1991): 6. Mr. Delors is President of the EC Commission and is quoted by Mr. Brzezinski.
26. Hsiung, 33.
27. Michael Krepon, "An Odor of the Old, " The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 47, Number 5 (June 1991): 37. Mr. Krepon is president of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. .
28. Nye, 89.
29. Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment," p5. Andrei Kozyrev is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Republic and is quoted by Mr. Brzezinski in his article.
30. Otunbayeva, 142.
31. Milton D. Morris, "African Americans and the New World Order," The Washington Quarterly, Volume 15, Number 4 (Autumn 1992): 11. Milton D. Morris is vice president of research at the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies in Washington, DC.
32. Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World," Foreign Affairs, Volume 71, Number 1 (1992): 21-22. Lawrence Freedman is Professor of War Studies, King's College, London.
33. Silvestri, 34.
34. James Mayall, "Non-intervention, self-determination and the 'new world order'," International Affairs, Volume 67, Number 3 (July 1991): 427. James Mayall is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics.
35. Burton Yale Pines, "The New World Order: Sense or Nonsense?," The Heritage Lectures, Number 333: 9. Burton Yale Pines is Senior Vice President and Director of Research at The Heritage Foundation.
36. President George Bush, "Toward a New World Order," US Department of State Dispatch, Volume 1, Number 3 (17 September 1992): 91.
37. Ibid., "The Possibility of a New World Order," Vital Speeches of the Day, Volume 57, Number 15 (May 15, 1991): 451.
38. Russell, 419.

39. Bush, "The Possibility of a New World Order," Vital Speeches of the Day, Volume 57, Number 15 (May 15, 1991): 451.
40. Ibid., "The United Nations: Power To Act For Peace And Freedom," US Department of State Dispatch, Volume 3, Number 5 (3 February 1992): 76.
41. Benjamin Rivlin, "Regional Arrangements and the UN System for Collective Security and Conflict Resolution: A New Road Ahead?," Extracted from: Werner J. Feld and Robert S. Jordan, *International Organization: A Comparative Approach*, (Westport, CN: Greenwood/Praeger, 1993): 96.
42. Andrew C. Goldberg, "Selective Engagement: US National Security Policy in the 1990s," The Washington Quarterly, Volume 15, Number 3 (Summer 1992): 16. Andrew Goldberg is senior associate, CSIS, and vice-president, Burson-Marsteller.
43. Alberto R. Coll, "America as the Grand Facilitator," Foreign Policy, Number 87 (Summer 1992): 54. Alberto Coll is a deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, an assistant professor at Georgetown University and professor of strategy and international law at the US Naval War College.
44. Ibid., 57.
45. Kermit Lansner, "Hawks and Doves in the New World Order," Financial World, Volume 162, Number 4 (16 February 1993): 87. Kermit Lansner write a column entitled "Speaking Out" in Financial World.
46. Rivlin, 101-102.
47. Stephen H. Solarz, "Of Victory and Deficits," The National Interest, Number 21 (Fall 1990): 44. Stephen Solarz is a Democratic congressman from New York.
48. Robert M. Kimmitt, "Economics and National Security," US Department of State Dispatch, Volume 3, Number 22 (3 June 1992): 398. Robert Kimmit was Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the US State Department.
49. Colin Gray, "Strategic Sense, Strategic Nonsense," The National Interest, Number 29 (Fall 1992): 19. Colin Gray is the chairman of the National Institute for Public Policy.
50. Daniel J. Mitchell, "The Impact of Higher Taxes: More Spending, Economic Stagnation, Fewer Jobs, and Higher Deficits," The Heritage Foundation Background, Number 925 (10 February 1993): 1. Daniel Mitchell is a John M. Olin Fellow.
51. Ibid., 2.
52. Kimmitt, 399.

53. Terry L. Deibel, "Strategies Before Containment: Patterns for the Future," International Security, Volume 16, Number 4 (Spring 1992): 102. Terry Deibel is Professor of National Strategy at the National War College.
54. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Groping for a new world order," U.S. News and World Report, Volume 113, Number 12 (28 September 1992): 52. Boutros Boutros-Ghali is the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
55. John D. Steinbruner, "Business As Usual?," The Brookings Review, Volume 10, Number 3 (Summer 1992): 14-15. John Steinbruner is director of Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program and author of the book *Decisions for Defense* with William W. Kaufmann.
56. John Lehman, "US Defense Policy Options: The 1990s and Beyond," The ANNALS of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 517 (September 1991): 196. John Lehman was a member of the National Security Council staff from 1969 until 1974 and Secretary of the Navy from 1981 until 1987. Currently, he is an investment banker in New York.
57. Gray, 11.
58. Steinbruner, 13-14.
59. Deibel, 105-106.
60. Gray, 14.
61. Steinbruner, 15.
62. James Kitfield, "Fixing What's Not Broken," Government Executive, Volume 24, Number 11 (November 1992): 40.
63. Ibid., 40.
64. Lehman, 200.
65. Gray, 18.
66. Deibel, 82-83.
67. Lansner, 87.
68. Deibel, 85.
69. Boutros-Ghali, 52.
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