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AFIT/GMO/LAL/96J-1

***MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR  
IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER:  
AN ANALYSIS OF JOINT DOCTRINE  
FOR THE COMING ERA***

Graduate Research Paper

James R. Ayers, Major, USAF

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MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER:  
AN ANALYSIS OF JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THE COMING ERA

GRADUATE RESEARCH PAPER

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Logistics and Acquisition Management  
of the Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

In Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Arts in Air Mobility

James R. Ayers, B.A., M.A.

Major, USAF

May 1996

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James R. Ayers

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### **Abstract**

The United States has experienced numerous eras of distinct international systems which governed its relationship with other nations. The end of the Cold War symbolized a transition point between such systems. Historically, the nature of a new order as well as the transitional point between orders is fraught with uncertainty. Nonetheless, instruments of national power such as the military must respond to the changing system to remain effective. The post-Cold War era has been characterized by an increased use of the military for operations short of war to include humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, sanction enforcement, etc. Although these missions are not new to the Armed Forces, military doctrine has only begun to address the unique challenges involved in executing operations short of war. Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), lists six fundamental principles for MOOTW. This research applies the concepts embodied in the principles of MOOTW with three MOOTW models; the Range of Military Operations Model developed by the U.S. Army, the Crises and Lesser Conflicts Model developed by Rand researchers Carl H. Builder and Theodore W. Karasik, and the MOOTW Characteristics Model developed by RAND researchers Jennifer M. Taw and John E. Peters.

**MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**  
**IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER:**  
**AN ANALYSIS OF JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THE COMING ERA**

**I. Introduction**

**Overview**

The fall of the Soviet Empire marked the end of an era in American history. For 40 years, the Containment Doctrine had been the common thread running through the fabric of national security. Out of this doctrine, a simple model of world order was created where every nation could be conveniently labeled as either a First, Second, or Third World state. The First World consisted of the U.S. and its western allies. Second World nations included the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations. Undeveloped and underdeveloped nations were grouped into the Third World. Despite the constant threat of nuclear war, or perhaps because of it, world affairs could be analyzed through this simplistic prism. "The principal lines of force," as former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger stated, "could be etched with remarkable clarity" (Schlesinger, 1991:3).

Today, the world is at the brink of a New World Order, which is the term coined by the Bush administration to describe the future era. While the phrase correctly implies that the Cold War world order has been altered, it falsely leads one to believe the new era will be marked with peace, stability, or clear lines of force (Schlesinger, 1992:4).

Although the threat of nuclear confrontation has been reduced, the new world is likely to be more complex and unstable rather than less. In the Balkans and the Transcaucasus, bitter and long standing ethnic divisions that simmered for years under a tight Soviet lid have boiled over. Many Third World governments, some who were pawns in the superpower conflict, have been set adrift by their former benefactors and are struggling for survival. The Third World implosion has spawned a newfound freedom of action for transnational actors that include drug traffickers, insurgents, and terrorists (Coll, 1992:48).

The Pollyannish predictions of a New World Order complete with hopes for peace breaking out and peace dividends, belie troubling changes in fundamental world institutions. In much of the world, the nation-state is becoming irrelevant. From Latin America to Africa to Eastern Europe, governments struggle to coexist with emerging systems of resource allocation and human organization. From Colombian drug cartels to machete-swinging clans of Somali warlords, non-state organizations are usurping state sovereignty (Peters, 1995:9). The future of the nation-state itself may be at stake. According to Martin Van Creveld, professor of history at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, the most important institution of the modern era, the nation-state, is dying.

We are moving away from a system of separate, sovereign, states toward less distinct, more hierarchical, and in many ways more complex structures. Inside their borders, it seems that many states will soon no longer be able to protect the political, military, economic, social, and cultural life of their citizens. These developments may lead to upheavals as profound as those that took humanity out of the Middle Ages and into the Modern World. (Van Creveld, 1996:4)

While no one knows for sure if the New World Order will lead to the dissolution of sovereign, territorial, legally equal states, the transition is likely to be eventful, and in

many cases, violent. Yet, the transition marks a window of opportunity where U.S. influence may be able to shape the future world order. President Clinton, in his National Security Policy of Engagement and Enlargement, states:

American leadership in the world has never been more important. If we exert our leadership abroad, we can make America safer and more prosperous--by deterring aggression, by fostering the peaceful resolution of dangerous conflicts, by opening foreign markets, by helping democratic regimes and by tackling global problems. Without our active leadership and engagement abroad, threats will fester and our opportunities will narrow. (Clinton, 1994:5)

In the post-Cold War era, "American leadership and engagement abroad," has increasingly taken the form of military intervention. According to U.S. Army General Frederick M. Franks, more U.S. troops have been deployed in operations to support U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives since the end of the Cold War in 1989 than in the entire period from the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 until 1989. Most of these deployments were for actions short of war such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, crisis response, and sanction enforcement (Franks as cited by Applegate, 1994:1).

While the military has a long history of participation in operations short of war, the frequency and scope of such operations in the post-Cold War era are unprecedented. Some believe the rising tide of operations short of war, marks a change in military focus, away from warfighting skills and towards more non-combat skills. For example, Gregory D. Foster, the J. Carlton Ward Distinguished Professor and Director of Research at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, believes operations short of war should become the military's principal focus. He states, "The primary purpose of the military must change demonstrably and fundamentally--from warfighting to nation building,

peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance” (Foster, 1993:27). The soldiers in the field also admit there is a need for change. Major Ralph Peters, U.S. Army, states, “from fighting cholera in eastern Zaire to impounding nuclear materials in Kazakhstan to attempting to alter the collective behavior of Haiti, our military future is visible all around us” (Peters, 1995:12). A commission of former government officials has even proposed creating a separate military command that would support U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.

Not everyone has embraced these revolutionary ideas. One vocal critic of a standing peacekeeping and humanitarian force has been Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington. Huntington states, “The mission of the Armed Forces is combat. The military should not be organized or prepared or trained to perform such (noncombat) roles. A military force is fundamentally antihumanitarian: its purpose is to kill people” (Huntington, 1993a:43). While Huntington acknowledges that the military can and should be used for humanitarian and civilian activities, he firmly believes that such roles should not define the military. “All such roles should be spillover uses of the Armed Forces which can be performed because the services possess the organization, training and equipment that are only maintained to defend the nation” (Huntington, 1993a:43).

Despite the growth in MOOTW taskings, General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believes the military’s prime focus should be on fighting and winning the nation’s wars (Mahlburg, 1994:27). Nonetheless, the Joint Staff recognizes the need to increase its emphasis on MOOTW skills, “While we have historically focused



on warfighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations--other than war" (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:I).

Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, provides some insights on how the military views MOOTW in the post-Cold War era. In this document, the Joint Staff identifies six fundamental principles they believe apply to all MOOTW missions: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. But how do these principles address the differences between war and operations short of war? How applicable are these principles across the broad range of MOOTW? Are they as appropriate for disaster relief as they are for peacekeeping?

### **Problem Statement**

Joint Pub 3-07 is a critical building block for planning and executing MOOTW. It serves as a springboard for most MOOTW publications, tactics, techniques, and procedures. With the U.S. devoting more and more military resources to MOOTW missions, it is essential that these forces be employed according to valid principles of conduct. An evaluation of the JCS's six principles is needed to assess how well these principles apply to the wide range of MOOTW missions. This research assesses the validity of JCS doctrine by comparing the six principles of MOOTW found in Joint Pub 3-07 with three other models of MOOTW.

### **Need for Resolution**

Following the end of the Cold War, America's military was restructured from a force designed to confront the Soviet threat to one designed to fight two near-

simultaneous major regional conflicts (Kugler, 1994:4). Despite the changing threat and rising tide of MOOTW taskings, the military's primary focus is still to fight and win the nation's wars.

Since the Revolutionary War, the U.S. military has been organized, trained, and equipped for the prosecution of war, while operations and mobilizations short of war were consistently handled as issues on the margins of military priorities (Builder, 1995b:ix). To many military observers, the current doctrine for MOOTW, continues to marginalize operations short of war when just the opposite is needed.

Senior RAND analyst Carl Builder believes the military should to focus on doctrinal "frontiers" where revolutionary change takes place. "For the past several years, I have been beating the drum for a frontier that I call the constabulary role of air and space power--where our military forces are employed in police-like operations" (Builder, 1995a:9). Robert J. Bunker, National Securities Professor at California State University, San Bernadino, states "because current doctrine is so constrained to Clausewitzian (conventional) thought, many doctrinal questions such as 'Have the principles of war changed?' 'What is victory?' and 'What is the battlefield?' must be re-examined" (Bunker, 1995:40).

To merely ask such questions, shakes the comfortable, familiar foundations of military doctrine. The revolutionary change in world order necessitates a critical analysis of doctrine at all levels of conflict. Nowhere is this more important than in operations short of war. Clearly, the U.S. wants a military capable of doing more than fighting and

winning its wars. To be effective in MOOTW missions, the military must develop doctrine that is responsive to the post-Cold War era (Builder, 1995a:10).

### **Investigative Questions**

This paper will address the following research question: How does current MOOTW doctrine, as indicated by the six principles of MOOTW in Joint Pub 3-07, compare to other models of operations short of war? To answer the research question, this study will develop answers to the following investigative questions:

1. How is MOOTW defined?
2. How do the principles of MOOTW differ from the principles of war?
3. What is the current doctrine on the conduct of MOOTW?
4. What changes have taken place in the post-Cold War era that have caused the military to alter its views MOOTW?
5. How do the six principles of MOOTW apply to specific types of MOOTW missions?

### **Methodology**

The research for this paper was conducted as a qualitative, comparative study. The JCS model for MOOTW doctrine as described in the six MOOTW principles was used as the basis for comparison since all MOOTW doctrine flows from this document. The JCS model is compared and contrasted with three other models, one found in U.S. Army FM 100-5, and two others which were produced under separate RAND research projects. These models were selected because of the dissimilar way in which they describe the same relative concept. Hopefully, the result will be a broader perspective of MOOTW.

The decision to commit troops to an operation short of war is typically accompanied by a great deal of public debate over the merits of the mission and the degree of national interests at stake. This paper concentrates on the use of military force in operations short of war after National Command Authorities have decided to use the military instrument. This area of interest was chosen because of personal experience in both MOOTW and war and because of likely involvement as a military officer in such missions in the future.

### **Direction of the Paper**

Chapter 2 of this paper addresses the current and historical literature used to prepare this study. The chapter begins by examining the origins of the term Military Operations Other Than War and moves on to a discussion of how MOOTW has been influenced by the new world order. This chapter concludes by introducing the six principles of MOOTW and the three comparative models that will be used in chapter 3.

In chapter 3, each principle is analyzed in turn according to the three comparative models. This analysis includes MOOTW situations where the principle clearly applies as well as situations where application is more ambiguous. Chapter 4 contains a summation of the paper as well as a discussion of possible alternatives.

## **II. Literature Review**

### **Overview**

This chapter contains a review of the literature relating to the topic of the paper and can be separated into several areas. The chapter begins by tracing MOOTW's evolution from the original concept of *Low Intensity Conflict*. This is followed by a discussion of the key issues surrounding MOOTW in the post-Cold War era. These issues include national security strategy and national military strategy, the nature of the public debate shaping MOOTW policy, and the preparedness of the military to execute MOOTW taskings. The last section of this chapter introduces the six MOOTW principles developed by the JCS. This section concludes with a description of the three comparative models that will be used in chapter three analysis.

### **Origins of the Term MOOTW**

Background. One challenge in studying operations other than war is in defining the term itself. Unfortunately, there are as many opinions about what constitutes MOOTW as there are authors. To the layman, the definition would appear intuitively obvious--any military activity short of war. Unfortunately, this definition does not narrow the subject adequately for detailed study. For instance, does *war* in this context refer only to declared wars or should the Korean, Vietnam, and Persian Gulf conflicts be included as war and therefore be excluded from MOOTW studies? Is it proper to lump Hurricane Andrew relief operations in the same military category as the armed intervention in Panama in 1989? Most studies of operations short of war have some

means of categorizing the various missions. These studies can trace their roots to the *Low Intensity Conflict* (LIC) concepts of the late 1980s.

MOOTW and Low Intensity Conflict. Lieutenant Colonel John R. Hunt, USAF, in Emerging Doctrine for LIC states that *Low Intensity Conflict* (LIC) was the term first coined by the Reagan administration to describe operations other than war. The term itself, *Low Intensity Conflict*, is agonizingly broad. The Air Force defined LIC as “political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states” (AFP 3-20:1-1). LIC may be viewed as a continuum of conflict intensity (Figure 1). At its upper limits, LIC is very close to war and shares many of its characteristics. At its lower limits, it is distinguished from peace by introducing violence into the equation (Hunt, 1991:13).




Figure 1. Conflict Continuum (Adapted from review of Hunt, Emerging Doctrine)

Lieutenant Colonel Hunt believes *Low Intensity Conflict* was a value-laden concept implying equal threat levels to all belligerents. Hunt states that the exact opposite is more often the case. A low intensity conflict to the U.S. can be a matter of survival to another country. Because of this, the term *Low Intensity Conflict* was cast aside for a more neutral nomenclature, *Military Operations Other Than War* (MOOTW) (Hunt, 1991:24).

## **MOOTW In the Post-Cold War Era: Policy, Doctrine, and Strategy**

Background. The next part of this chapter looks at current policy, doctrine, and strategy. The literature shows that within the military establishment, the strategic focus is fixed firmly on combat roles and missions. Outside the military, some are calling for the creation of specific MOOTW units within the Armed Forces. These units would include a standing force and troops especially trained in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations.

Policy, Doctrine, and Strategy: Some Important Differences. Although some authors treat the terms *strategy*, *doctrine*, and *policy* synonymously, there are subtle but important conceptual differences that need to be pointed out. A *strategy* is a plan for using available resources to achieve specified objectives (Joint Forces Manual 1-2). As RAND Senior Social Scientist Richard Kugler states, “Military strategy is best viewed as a component of national security policy. It is a vehicle by which a nation employs military forces to pursue its economic and political goals” (Kugler, 1994:4). *Doctrine*, on the other hand, is a general agreement within a particular service branch over the “best way to do things” (Drew, 1996:51). The late General Curtis E. LeMay said doctrine was “the central belief for waging war in order to achieve victory, the building material for strategy” (Drew, 1995:51). Thus, *doctrine* may be viewed as a bridge between national security policy and military strategy. The relationship between the terms is illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Policy, Doctrine, and Strategy (adapted from Builder, Davis, and Kugler)

Current National Security Policy and Current National Military Strategy. In the U.S., policy formulation follows a consistent hierarchy (Figure 3). According to former USAF Assistant Chief Of Staff, Lieutenant General Glenn A. Kent, national security strategy embraces all instruments of national power, political, economic, and military, whereas national military strategy states those objectives to be achieved--at least in part--through military means (Kent, 1994:64).

Table 1. U.S. Strategic Planning Hierarchy (Adapted from Kent, 1994, p. 69)

| Planning Hierarchy         |                        |
|----------------------------|------------------------|
| Document                   | Author                 |
| National Security Strategy | President              |
| ▼                          |                        |
| National Military Strategy | Chairman, JCS          |
| ▼                          |                        |
| Campaign Strategy          | Theater Commander      |
| ▼                          |                        |
| Operational Plans          | Service Component Cmdr |

The Clinton Administration's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement provides the policy basis for planning the national military strategy. Clinton's policy emphasizes "worldwide engagement and the enlargement of the



community of free market democracies” (Clinton, 1994:5). In turn, the National Military Strategy, formulated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calls for “flexible and selective engagement involving a broad range of activities and capabilities to address and help shape the evolving international environment” (Shalikashvili, 1995:ii). There are three components to the National Military Strategy:

1. Peacetime engagement;
2. Deterrence and conflict prevention; and
3. Fighting and winning the Nation’s wars.

The first two items are most directly related to the non-combat, non-traditional missions that make up MOOTW. While the military is committed to executing such tasks, the primary focus of the military is clear. “Let there be no doubt about one fundamental fact: military forces exist--are organized, trained, and equipped--first, and foremost to fight and win America’s wars” (Shalikashvili, 1995:1).

Two MRCs and the Bottom-Up Review. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the military began a series of incremental force reductions. In March 1993, then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin decided to reassess all defense concepts, plans, and programs from the ground up. The Bottom-Up Review of 1993 redefined the nation’s defense requirements in light of the threats and opportunities spelled out in President Clinton’s National Security Policy. As former Secretary Aspin stated, “We must determine the characteristics of this era, develop a strategy, and restructure our armed forces and defense programs accordingly” (Aspin, 1993:ii). The Bottom-Up Review cited four categories of threats that the U.S. anticipates it will face in future:

1. Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;
2. Regional threats:
3. Threats to democracy and reform; and
4. Economic threats.

These threat assessments contain clues about the future role of military forces as an instrument of national policy. As Secretary Aspin stated, “Our armed forces are central to combating the first two dangers and can play a significant role in meeting the second two” (Aspin, 1993:12). The quote suggests a more peripheral role for the military in confronting the second two items which are most closely tied to non-traditional applications of force. In essence, the document asserts the primary mission of the armed forces is still to fight and win the nation’s wars. This point is reflected in the Bottom-Up Review’s central theme; “the U.S. must field a force capable of fighting and winning two near simultaneous major regional conflicts” (Aspin, 1993:3). All force structure flows from this assumption. The important contribution this document makes to MOOTW, however, is that while the combat role of the military will remain primary, operations other than war are expected to play a larger role for conventional forces than at any time since the Vietnam War.

### **The Public Debate**

As with any national policy there is a great deal of public debate over the use of military forces for MOOTW. The principal focus of the public debate is on the appropriateness of assigning such missions to the military and the deleterious effects such

missions have on warfighting skills (Builder, 1995b:5) As Bradley Graham, a defense reporter for the Washington Post, stated:

If the military becomes perceived as a force that can be enlisted increasingly to do international assistance work while it waits to fight the next war, Pentagon officials fear the strain may lead to diminished combat readiness, mistakes, morale problems and political trouble. (Graham, 1994:29)

Without the constant Soviet threat to occupy its attention, some see the military as a newly available resource for political intervention. As Wall Street Journal reporter Karen House states, "the military has the (available) men, material, discipline, and efficiency to do what failed governments are less capable of doing" (House, 1994:18). Others such as Eric Schmitt of The New York Times point out the "military's gigantic transport capacity and logistical expertise make it well suited to the (MOOTW) role" (Schmitt, 1994:3)

Some strategists argue that the increased use of military forces for MOOTW missions could have undesirable consequences. As General Shalikashvili remarked, "My fear is we're becoming mesmerized by operations other than war and we'll take our minds off what we're all about, to fight and win our nation's wars" (Shalikashvili, 1994:354). More than worrying about a perceived loss of focus, the military is beginning to notice readiness impacts from prolonged MOOTW commitments. As Ken Adleman of The Washington Times notes;

And after time pumping that water in Goma (Zaire), our troops may no longer be ready for combat in Korea. Combat readiness dissipates as humanitarian missions rise. Training for food and medical distribution differs from training for close air support and tank maneuvers. (Adleman, 1994)

A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report on the impact of peace operations on unit capability confirmed Aldeman's suspicions. "It can take up to six months for a ground combat unit to recover from a peace operation and become combat ready" (GAO, 1995:2).

## **MOOTW Preparedness**

Background. Most of the pertinent literature on military preparedness for MOOTW is found in the contemporary periodicals published by organizations such as the Air War College, Army War College, and the National Defense University. Despite the military's long legacy of participation in operations short of war, changes in the world structure have weakened the relevance of historical literature on this issue. For instance, ten years ago it would have been inconceivable to field a military whose principal task was to conduct operations short of war. This concept is openly debated today. Preparedness for MOOTW is fundamentally a force structure decision. In other words, should the military create units specifically trained for MOOTW missions? There are three general positions in the literature: those who prefer to remain focused on warfighting skills, those who see the need for a complete shift to operations short of war, and moderates who see the need for a balanced approach.

Preparedness: Force Structure Concerns. There is near universal consensus within the military that MOOTW missions should be subordinate to fighting and winning the nation's wars. For the most part, the military will continue to be organized, trained, and equipped based on conventional applications of force. Senior RAND Analyst Paul K. Davis believes that the future force structure should be adequate to defeat an opponent

in one MRC and deter or limit an opponent's gains in a second MRC. Davis acknowledges that such a force "may be ill suited for anything other than a replay of the Gulf War" (Davis, 1994:39).

Conversely, there are those who argue that the military should have units specifically trained to perform MOOTW roles. According to Samuel Huntington, some strategists have proposed the creation of separate commands for humanitarian assistance operations and for support of U.N. peacekeeping operations. Still another group, Huntington states, want to create an officer corps "whose expertise includes peacekeeping, humanitarian administration and civilian support operations" (Huntington, 1993a:39).

Gregory D. Foster believes the military must change from a destructive force to a constructive force. In Foster's view old approaches to national security will not work in the post-Cold War environment. He believes the military must shift its focus away from warfighting and towards nation building, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief (Foster, 1993:27).

There are others who argue the military must find middle ground between a force prepared for war and a force prepared for MOOTW. Carl Builder and Theodore Karasik argue that balancing conventional warfighting skills with MOOTW skills creates "two horns of a dilemma." In a future dominated by MRCs the military will have the right kinds of forces but probably not enough of them. Conversely, in a future dominated by MOOTW missions, the military will have plenty of forces but not necessarily the right

type. The MRC “horn” is based on force quantities, whereas the MOOTW “horn” is based on force qualities (Builder, 1995b:27).

According to Builder and Karasik, the two MRC strategy imbedded in the Bottom-Up Review struck a delicate balance between probability and risk. Although there is a low probability of U.S. forces engaging in an MRC, the consequences of not organizing, training, and equipping the armed forces for just such an occurrence would be disastrous. On the other hand, while there is a much greater probability that forces will be engaged in MOOTW, the consequences of not deliberately structuring a force around MOOTW contingencies are much more tolerable. “The conflicting elements create an ugly choice for the services: Would they prefer to find themselves in situations for which their forces were remotely, but fatally, inadequate; or frequently ill-suited to, or inefficient for, their tasking?” (Builder, 1995b:27).

The military’s answer to that questions is clear. General Shalikashvili rejects the notion that units should be trained exclusively for peacekeeping: “Neglecting training in warfighting for peacekeeping missions would be an awful mistake. The challenge for the military is to determine how to add training in peacekeeping without affecting training in warfighting” (Shalikashvili, as cited in Mahlburg, 1994:27). For the present, the prevailing position on military force structure belongs to General Shalikashvili.

### **Principles of War**

While the military remains focused on war fighting skills, it has begun to recognize doctrinal differences in MOOTW. The development of the six principles of MOOTW was major step forward. These principles, derived from the principles of war,

represent an evolutionary step in doctrine. Before discussing the MOOTW principles, it is important to highlight the principles of war.

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, lists nine principles which guide warfighting at all levels of combat. These principles form the bedrock of U.S. military doctrine to include MOOTW doctrine.

Objective. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined end state. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation (Joint Pub 3-0, 1995:107).

Offensive. Offensive actions are designed to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. It is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective (Joint Pub 3-0, 1995:108).

Mass. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the time and place to achieve decisive results. Concentrated application of force can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results with minimal loss of life (Joint Pub 3-0, 1995:108).

Economy of Force. This principle refers to the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, or delays in order to achieve mass elsewhere (Joint Pub 3-0, 1995:08).

Maneuver. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy at a disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus protects friendly forces (Joint Pub 3-0, 1995:108).

Unity of Command. Unity of command ensures unity of effort under one commander for every objective. All forces should operate under a single commander who has the requisite authority to direct all forces employed (Joint Pub 3-0, 1995:108).

Security. Security prevents the enemy from acquiring an unexpected advantage. While risk is inherent in all military operations, security measures will reduce a force's vulnerability to hostile acts, influence or surprise (Joint Pub 3-0, 1995:109).

Surprise. The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time, place, or manner for which it is unprepared. Surprise can shift the balance of combat power and thus enable a force to achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended (Joint Pub 3-0, 1995:109).

Simplicity. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear and concise orders to minimize misunderstanding and confusion. All other factors being equal, the simplest plan is preferable (Joint Pub 3-0, 1995:109).

### **The JCS Model: Six Common Principles of MOOTW**

Background. In the midst of the changing world order, the military has developed an initial doctrine for conducting operations short of war, Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War. There are three important concepts woven into current doctrine: the relationship between MOOTW and War, the politicized nature of MOOTW, and the principles of MOOTW. Each will be discussed in turn.

War and Military Operations Other Than War. Clausewitz saw war as "a continuation of political intercourse with a mixture of other means" (Von Clausewitz, 1968:101). The same logic applies to military activities short of war. In other words,



MOOTW complements the political, economic, and warmaking instruments of national power. The JCS emphasize this point throughout Joint Publication 3-07. According to the JCS, the path to understanding MOOTW as an instrument of national power begins with understanding how MOOTW differs from war.

MOOTW focuses on deterring war and promoting peace while war “encompasses large scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives” (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:vii). In war, the goal is to achieve national objectives as quickly and decisively as possible with limited loss of life. MOOTW objectives are often less clearly defined: deter potential aggressors, satisfy treaty obligations, enforce peace accords, or provide humanitarian assistance. Nonetheless, MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and non-combat operations (see Figure 4) (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:vii).

Political Nature of MOOTW. MOOTW is more sensitive to political considerations due to the overriding goal to “prevent, pre-empt, or limit hostilities” (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:I-1). RAND analysts Jennifer Taw and John Peters believe the broad political objectives of war, “seize territory” and “defeat the enemy,” have been replaced in MOOTW by complex objectives that “infuse military decisionmaking at the most picayune levels of detail” (Taw, 1995:xi). These political objectives are often manifest in MOOTW through more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) and through subordination of the military to other organizations such as the Department of State or the U.N. Additionally, some MOOTW taskings require DOD coordination with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs).

Principles of MOOTW. While military commanders must be cognizant of the political issues in a MOOTW operation, they must also recognize and apply some fundamental MOOTW principles. The Joint Staff developed six MOOTW principles that are listed in Figure 3. The first three are derived from the principles of war while the remainder are MOOTW specific.

| PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR |  |
|--|--|
| <b>OBJECTIVE</b>                                 | Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective         |
| <b>UNITY OF EFFORT</b>                           | Seek unity of effort in every operation  |
| <b>SECURITY</b>                                  | Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage           |
| <b>RESTRAINT</b>                                 | Apply appropriate military capability prudently  |
| <b>PERSEVERANCE</b>                              | Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims |
| <b>LEGITIMACY</b>                                | Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government             |

Figure 3. Principles of MOOTW (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:II-2)

Objective. Arguably the most universal principle of war is the notion of the Objective. Commanders must understand the end state that constitutes success. The exact end state can be difficult to define in MOOTW missions. This is partially due to ambiguous and dynamic political objectives upon which the military objectives are based. Even subtle changes in political objectives known as Mission Creep can be important enough to warrant a change in military objectives. If adjustments are not made, the

military objectives may no longer support the political objective thereby compromising legitimacy and force security (Joint Pub 3-07,1995:II-2).

Unity of Effort. Commanders must ensure all means are directed toward a common purpose. This is difficult to achieve in MOOTW given the variety of international agencies often involved, each with unique command arrangements and a separate viewpoint of the mission objectives. To overcome the coordination obstacles, commanders must establish liaisons among the key participants. Because even small unit levels come in contact with these organizations, it is important that everyone throughout the chain of command understand the formal and informal working relationships. (Joint Pub 3-07. 1995:II-3).

Security. In non-combat environments there is a tendency for forces to become complacent. This is especially true in scenarios where there is no clearly defined threat. Commanders must have their troops poised to defend themselves whenever necessary. The security umbrella may need to be extended to civilians or participating agencies. In such cases, the protection of non-government organizations (NGOs) may create a misperception among the population that the NGO is aligned with the U.S. To remain effective, many NGOs must remain neutral. Thus, the NGOs may be reluctant to accept U.S. military protection (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:II-5).

Restraint. The judicious use of force is essential to avoid antagonizing the parties involved. Excessive force "damages the legitimacy of the organizations while enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party" (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:II-5).

Commanders must ensure their personnel know, understand, and apply the established

rules of engagement (ROE). The ROE should be congruent with stated political objectives and must not needlessly endanger the lives of military personnel (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:II-5).

Perseverance. MOOTW missions may take years to achieve the desired results. Underlying causes of crises are often difficult to detect thus making it difficult to achieve a decisive resolution. Successful MOOTW missions often require the patient, persistent, and resolute pursuit of goals and objectives (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:II-5,6).

Legitimacy. Legitimacy, often a decisive element in MOOTW, is the perception that an action is grounded in legal or moral principles. The stronger the perception, the greater the support for the action. Legitimacy may depend on actions sanctioned by the U. N., restraint in the force employed, or the disciplined conduct of forces involved (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:II-5).

### **Three Comparative Models**

Background. The principles of MOOTW may be better understood when examined in the context of other MOOTW models. This section introduces three comparative models that will be used in the chapter three analysis of MOOTW principles.

Model #1: Range of Military Operations (RMO), U.S. Army. The continuum of military operations depicted in Figure 4 portrays three environmental states: war, conflict, and peace. MOOTW resides in both conflict and peacetime environmental states and as such may require the use of combat and non-combat skills. This apparent contradiction is a reality in MOOTW. For example, Operation Restore Hope, the relief effort in Somalia, began as a humanitarian mission and degenerated into a combat search for Somali

warlord Mohammed Farad Aidid. While the Somali operation fell under a MOOTW umbrella, it was frequently violent nonetheless (Peters, 1995:14).

| Range of Military Operations |                    |                     |                                   |   |
|------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| Environmental States         | Military Operation |                     | General US Goal                   | Representative Examples   |
| WAR                          | COMBAT             | War                 | Fight & Win                       | Large Scale Combat Operations<br>Attack                      Defend   |
| CONFLICT                     |                    | Military Operations | Deter War and<br>Resolve Conflict | Peacekeeping                      Antiterrorism<br>Counterinsurgency                      Show of Force<br>Raid                      Strike<br>Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) |
| PEACETIME                    |                    | Other Than War      | Promote Peace                     | Counterdrug                      Peace building<br>Nation Assistance                      Civil Support<br>Disaster Relief<br>Humanitarian Assistance                                   |

Figure 4. Range of Military Operations (US Army FM 100-5, 1993:2-1)

According to the RMO Model, the principal goals of MOOTW are to deter war and promote peace. MOOTW missions deter war by convincing an aggressor that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh any possible gains (FM 100-5, 1993:2-1). The aggressor is reluctant to act because of fear of failure, cost, or consequences. Peace promotion is closely aligned with deterrence, and the methods employed often overlap. MOOTW missions such as humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and disaster relief are employed to promote peace, thereby fostering a climate of stable cooperation among nations (FM 100-5, 1993:2-1). The key contribution of the RMO model is that it categorizes MOOTW missions according to their purpose rather than their intensity.

Model #2: Crises and Lesser Conflicts (CALCs), Builder and Karasik . As

Figure 4 illustrates, MOOTW taskings vary considerably. Some operations, such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) and Disaster Relief Operations, are relatively short term while others such as airborne surveillance of drug smuggling activity are more open-ended. These missions seem to involve non-traditional applications of military force but Samuel Huntington argues “there are almost no conceivable roles in this new phase of our history that the Armed Forces have not performed in the past” (Huntington, 1993a:39). Despite this fact, scholars still find it difficult to classify the wide range of MOOTW missions.

Operations short of war have been given a variety of names: nontraditional military missions, non-combat missions, low intensity conflict--none of these names completely fit the wide range of activities involved in MOOTW. For instance, MOOTW is not nontraditional, the military has been conducting such operations throughout its history. MOOTW is not non-combatant, many MOOTW operations require the use of force. *Operations short of war* is a category so broad that it includes everything from wetland management to sanction enforcement (Builder, 1995b:3).

Should sanction enforcement be viewed through the same prism as wetlands management? RAND Analysts Carl Builder and Theodore Karasik in Organizing, Training and Equipping the Air Force for Crises and Lesser Conflicts, developed a more descriptive model of the different MOOTW missions. Builder and Karasik separated MOOTW activities according to their location (domestic versus international), and their nature (routine versus nonroutine) (Figure 5). While all the quadrants in Figure 5 consist

of MOOTW missions, those items in the lower right hand corner are likely to be the biggest drain on military resources in the near future and as such deserve their own taxonomy, *Crises and Lesser Conflicts* (CALCs) (Builder, 1995b:4).

|            | Domestic   | International  |
|------------|--|--|
| Routine    | Flood control<br>Executive transport<br>Medical support<br>Managing wetlands | Drug interdiction<br>Military assistance<br>Intelligence support<br>Military Presence                              |
| Nonroutine | Disaster Assistance<br>Civil Order   | <b>Humanitarian aid<br/>Peace operations<br/>Crisis response<br/>Enforcing sanctions<br/>Military intervention</b> |

CRISES AND LESSER CONFLICTS (CALCs)

Figure 5. Span of Operations Short of War (Builder, 1995b:4)

Builder and Karasik argue that just as MRCs have become the dominant concept in DOD war plans, CALCs will become the dominant concept in DOD planning for operations short of war. The major issue for defense planners will be to determine the best use of military power across the CALC spectrum.

Model #3: Model: Common Characteristics of MOOTW, Taw and Peters.

RAND researchers Jennifer Taw and John Peters, in Operations Other Than War, Implications for the U.S. Army, categorize MOOTW in terms of its operational characteristics. Taw and Peters examined eight MOOTW missions conducted by the U.S. and the U.N. between 1954 and 1994 (Table 2).

Table 2. MOOTW Characteristics (Taw, 1995:8)

| Cases                | Political Constraints | Restrictive Rules of Engagement | Urban Operations | Nongovernmental Organizations | Humanitarian Components | Coalition | Special Operations Forces |
|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|
| U.S. Operations      |                       |                                 |                  |                               |                         |           |                           |
| Lebanon, 1982-1984   | X                     | X                               | X                | X                             | X                       | X         | X                         |
| Panama, 1989         | X                     | X                               | X                | X                             | X                       |           | X                         |
| Bangladesh, 1991     | X                     |                                 |                  | X                             | X                       | X         | X                         |
| Kurdistan, 1991      | X                     | X                               | X                | X                             | X                       | X         | X                         |
| Kuwait, 1991         | X                     |                                 | X                | X                             | X                       | X         | X                         |
| Somalia, 1992-1994   | X                     | X                               | X                | X                             | X                       | X         | X                         |
| U.N. Operations      |                       |                                 |                  |                               |                         |           |                           |
| Sinai, 1956-1973     | X                     | X                               | X                | X                             | X                       | X         |                           |
| Cyprus, 1954-present | X                     | X                               | X                |                               | X                       | X         |                           |



They found seven common characteristics in MOOTW missions: political constraints, restrictive rules of engagement, urban operations, participation of non-governmental organizations, humanitarian taskings, coalition operations, and the use of special operations forces. Taw and Peters' characteristics are consistent across a range of cases that were selected in part for their dissimilarities, suggesting that such characteristics should be anticipated in future MOOTW missions. (Taw, 1995:11)

### **Summary**

The literature highlights the difficult task of addressing the nature and varieties of conflict, a fundamental pretext to any MOOTW debate. Despite the difficulties in framing the argument, the growing relevance of MOOTW is clear in the literature. As an integral part of both the President's National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, MOOTW missions will continue to increase in importance. While the military is still principally focused on conventional applications of force, it has begun to recognize the future significance of operations short of war.

### III. Description of Problem Components

#### The MOOTW Pyramid

The principles of war, though primarily associated with large scale combat operations are applicable to most MOOTW situations. However, political considerations and the unique nature of many MOOTW taskings necessitate the addition of three principles that are specific to MOOTW scenarios (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:II-1). Figure 6 depicts the relationship between generic principles of war and principles unique to operations short of war. Each of the six MOOTW principles contained in this model will be compared with the three models listed on page 31.




Figure 6. MOOTW Pyramid of Principles (Adapted from Joint Pub 3-07)

## Principle 1. Objective

Arguably the most universal principle of military force is the notion of the *Objective*. Simply stated, commanders must understand the end state that constitutes success. In war, the objective is often clear--seize territory or defeat an enemy force. The RMO Model depicts MOOTW as occurring in conflict and peacetime environments. The exact end state can be difficult to define in environments such as these. As General John Shalikashvili asks, "What does decisive victory in Rwanda mean? I don't know" (Mahlburg, 1994:27).

Desired end states may be difficult to define because of the ambiguous and dynamic political constraints upon which the military objectives are based. All eight operations in Taw and Peters' Characteristics Model had political constraints. U.S. Navy Commander Roger C. Easton illustrates this point in Somalia: Key Operational Considerations and Implications,

Peace enforcement operations (a type of MOOTW) will probably commence while the international community is trying to sort out its policy and develop a strategy. It is not easy in the international forum to get disparate nations to agree on a course of action. When they do agree, the language will most likely be vague, in a form which each nation can interpret slightly differently, putting their spin on it, in order to serve individual national interests. (Easton, 1993:18)

Builder and Karasik recognize the political influences on MOOTW objectives. This is one of the reasons why CALCs deserve their own classification within the MOOTW family. As Builder states, "CALCs may often be conducted for very high stakes and under severe political and military constraints" (Builder, 1995b:8). While some successful non-CALC operations might be conducted under broad mission

statements, clear mission statements and defined end state criteria are absolute requirements for CALCs. This requires civilian and military leaders to define the limits to their commitments.

U.S. involvement in Somalia demonstrated the consequences of poorly defined objectives. What started as a humanitarian mission soon degenerated into urban guerrilla warfare that forces in the field were ill prepared to handle. By the time the last American troops left Somalia, the U.S. had suffered proportionately more casualties than did the entire force that fought Desert Storm (Peters. 1995:14).

The incremental, insidious growth in mission scope is known as Mission Creep. Mission Creep typically occurs in the absence of conscious decision making and the results are often disastrous for the commander's in the field. As General Joseph P. Hoar, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command during the Somali operation, states, "the formulation of a clear and precise mission statement which defines measurable and attainable objectives is paramount" (Hoar, 1993:63).

## **Principle 2. Unity of Effort**

This MOOTW principle is derived from the principle of war known as unity of command which emphasizes the need to coordinate efforts for every objective under one responsible commander. As the environmental state progresses from peace to conflict to war, unity of effort becomes progressively more achievable. In war, for example, joint and combined operations typically fall under a single U.S. military commander. Peacetime MOOTW tasks such as humanitarian assistance operations typically involve multiple players including NGOs. Few NGOs are willing to place themselves under

military authority during a contingency which makes it difficult to coordinate efforts (Dayon, 1995:2-31). On the other hand, unity of effort is seldom an issue for unilateral MOOTW actions such as raids, strikes, and shows of force.

A unified effort is a vital part of a successful MOOTW operation. Unfortunately, NGOs and outside organizations make it more difficult to achieve operational unity. In the Characteristics Model, NGOs are routine participants in MOOTW missions. According to Taw and Peters, these NGOs played crucial roles allowing U.S. forces to effectively and rapidly conclude military operations. NGO-military cooperation, on the other hand, was more problematic, especially in situations where military efforts threatened NGO autonomy or where NGOs feared that association with U.S. forces could endanger their own personnel (Taw, 1995:10).

U.S. operations in Somalia illustrate the difficulty in achieving unity of effort when dealing with multiple NGOs. As General Joseph P. Hoar stated,

Dealing with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the principal donors of relief aid, proved challenging. NGOs are staffed by spirited frontline relief workers, many of whom are true heroes of humanitarian assistance. To minimize fear expressed by NGOs over the involvement of the Armed Forces in humanitarian operations, Joint Task Force (JTF) leadership must ensure that NGOs understand the military mission. (Hoar, 1993:57)

General Hoar's comments reveal an important fact about humanitarian operations: the military's mission and the NGOs' missions are often different. Many NGOs, like all military institutions, are political organizations with various political agendas, separate chains of command, and disparate capabilities and limitations. To be successful, realistic

military and humanitarian roles and functions must be guided by achievable and agreed upon objectives, cooperation and coordination are essential (Pope, 1994:9).

To overcome the coordination obstacles, commanders must establish liaisons among the key participants. This liaison took on a formal hierarchy in Somalia. To begin with, the country was divided into nine humanitarian relief sectors (HRS). Next, a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) was established in each HRS to coordinate relief efforts within that sector. Finally, a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), co-located with military headquarters in Mogadishu, supervised the various CMOCs. This structure helped synchronize military and humanitarian efforts at both the operational and tactical levels (Pope, p. 26).

### **Principle 3. Security**

The last MOOTW principle derived directly from the principles of war is *Security*. In war, there is a clear need to protect friendly forces from enemy actions. Conversely, in MOOTW the principle of *Security* is often overlooked. There is an inherent tendency for forces to become complacent in non-combat operations. According to the RMO model, none of the peacetime MOOTW missions involves combat and thus would be vulnerable to security lapses. Unfortunately, some peacetime operations do involve combat as the humanitarian mission to Somalia demonstrated. Nonetheless, as the environmental state moves from war to peace the threat becomes less clear and the need for security receives less emphasis.

Seven out of the eight cases examined in the Characteristics Model included military operations on urban terrain (MOUT). MOUT pose unique security challenges

for military forces. As was the case in Somalia, most MOUT operations in the post-Cold War era are likely to be conducted under the umbrella of a MOOTW operation. Urban guerrillas seeking to thwart peace operations, counterinsurgencies, or even humanitarian operations have the same benefits and advantages that they enjoyed in rural areas: control over territory, the allegiance of a considerable part of the country's population, and a reasonably secure base for operations around the heart of the government and the commercial infrastructure (Taw, 1994:229).

Ironically, in some cases, U.S. forces participating in MOOTW operations may be too security conscious. One of the interesting issues the U.S. has faced in peace operations is that the traditional peacekeeping countries, such as The Netherlands, believe U.S. forces are poorly suited for this type of duty because the U.S. is unwilling to take enough risks. For example, when U.S. force were first sent to Macedonia to join U.N. forces, the local U.N. commander noted that he could not trust U.S. troops to allow themselves to be captured by hostile parties, which might be essential to mission success. Because of this, U.S. forces were not deployed to the field until they had been trained in the nuances of the peacekeeping mission (Alberts, 1995:31).

#### **Principle 4. Restraint**

According to the Joint Staff, *Restraint* requires "the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective" (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:II-4). The principle of *Restraint* is often manifested in the level of force permitted in a given operation. This level is outlined in the rules of engagement (ROE) for an operation. Restrictive rules of engagement are common to MOOTW missions as the

Characteristics Model demonstrates. For example, in traditional urban combat, soldiers might secure a room by using hand grenades and automatic weapons. To avoid civilian casualties during Operation Just Cause, soldiers in Panama City were ordered to knock on doors first, then announce their presence, thus making themselves vulnerable (Taw, p. 9).

The RMO model helps illustrate why restrictive rules of engagement are common to MOOTW. According to the RMO model, all military activity takes place in one of three environmental states. Operations that occur in environments below war (conflict and peacetime environments) are more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than wartime operations. In these environments, a single act by U.S. forces could have significant military and political consequences (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995:II-4). Restrictive ROE are designed to reduce the likelihood that a single mistake by troops in the field will jeopardize the entire mission.

While nothing in the ROE negates the military commander's right to act in defense of his unit, the level of restriction does vary according to the MOOTW mission.

In Panama, the rules were relatively more flexible than in either Lebanon or Somalia, where, at various stages of each operation, extremely restrictive, somewhat confusing, ultimately frustrating--and in Lebanon, dangerous--rules were imposed on soldiers conducting these operations. (Taw, 1994:9)

The ROE must be made absolutely clear to every soldier. Each soldier should understand how these restrictions affect their capabilities as well as their rights and responsibilities to defend themselves. Often, the ROE is tailored to allow on-scene commanders the flexibility to determine the threat and the appropriate response to the



threat, including the use of deadly force (Hoar, 1993:58). The ROE for Somalia illustrates this point (Figure 7).

**JTF FOR SOMALIA RELIEF OPERATION  
GROUND FORCES RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**

**NOTHING IN THESE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT  
LIMITS YOUR RIGHT TO TAKE APPROPRIATE  
ACTION TO DEFEND YOURSELF AND YOUR UNIT.**

- A. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE TO DEFEND  
YOURSELF AGAINST ATTACKS OR  
THREATS OF ATTACK
- B. HOSTILE FIRE MAY BE RETURNED EFFECTIVELY  
AND PROMPTLY TO STOP A HOSTILE ACT.
- C. WHEN U.S. FORCES ARE ATTACKED BY UNARMED  
HOSTILE ELEMENTS, MOBS, AND/OR RIOTERS, U.S.  
FORCES SHOULD USE THE MINIMUM FORCE  
NECESSARY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND  
PROPORTIONAL TO THE THREAT.
- D. YOU MAY NOT SEIZE THE PROPERTY OF OTHERS  
TO ACCOMPLISH YOUR MISSION.
- E. DETENTION OF CIVILIANS IS AUTHORIZED FOR  
SECURITY REASONS OR IN SELF-DEFENSE.

**REMEMBER**

- 1. THE UNITED STATES IS NOT AT WAR
- 2. TREAT ALL PERSONS WITH DIGNITY AND RESPECT
- 3. USE MINIMUM FORCE TO CARRY OUT MISSION
- 4. ALWAYS BE PREPARED TO ACT IN SELF DEFENSE

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Figure 7. ROE for Somali Relief Operations

## **Principle 5. Perseverance**

Joint Doctrine for MOOTW cautions “prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some MOOTW may require years to achieve the desired results” (Joint Pub 3-07, p. II-4). John Mackinlay, a senior research associate at the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, believes that in the “mid-level scenarios” between peace and war, “there are no quick-fix problems that have an easily identified beginning and end state” (Mackinlay, 1993:43). The social changes and transnational violence in the post-Cold War era are deep and divisive. It is unrealistic to expect collapsed states to become viable, stand-alone societies 12 months into a U.S. military operation. These countries will require healing processes that are measured in decades not months (Mackinlay, p. 43).

Mackinlay’s “mid-level scenarios” are roughly the equivalent of conflict environmental states discussed in the RMO model. However, many operations occurring in the peacetime environmental state require a long term view. Humanitarian assistance, nation building, and counterdrug enforcement are all MOOTW missions that defy short term solutions.

Taw and Peters, in their analysis of the Characteristics Model, state that some operations other than war constantly move back and forth along the continuum between peace and war. Short term solutions that include military intervention are inappropriate in these MOOTW situations. Taw and Peters cite the U.S. involvement in Lebanon and Somalia as examples.

In Lebanon, U.S. forces claimed to be conducting peacekeeping along side the British, French and Italian multinational force (MNF). To expedite the peace process, U.S. forces became engaged in something more akin to stability operations or foreign internal defense. Muslim militias, believing the U.S. had aligned with the Christian government, launched the infamous attack on the Marine Corps barracks outside Beirut. All MNF troops were withdrawn in the wake of the bombing. In the end, Lebanon was no closer to peace than it was before the troops had arrived.

In Somalia, U.S. forces were deployed to secure the flow of relief supplies to the needy until the U.N. could take over. Initially, the U.S. agreed only to restore sufficient order to Somalia so that food corridors would remain open and distribution would be assured. The U.N. had a broader political agenda than to merely feed the starving. They wanted a stable government put in place. When the U.N. took control of Somali operations, the remaining U.S. forces in Somalia became embroiled in a web of nation building and disarmament that resulted in numerous U.S. losses (Taw, 1995:15). As one American reporter in Somalia stated, "We walked into somebody else's civil war, a war we didn't understand, and we expected them all to be grateful" (Maren, 1994:13).

#### **Principle 6. Legitimacy**

Brigadier General Morris J. Boyd, U.S. Army, classifies *legitimacy* as "a condition growing from perceptions by the U.S. public, U.S. forces, indigenous parties and the international community of the legality, morality, and correctness of a set of actions" (Boyd, 1995:24). This definition presupposes that a legitimate indigenous government exists. Unfortunately, MOOTW often takes place in areas where there is no

legitimate host government as was the case in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. Martin Van Creveld attributes this phenomena to the decline of the nation-state and the rise of tribalism in the non-western world (Van Creveld, 1996:4).

The RMO model is based on a western paradigm where nation states employ military force across an environmental continuum from war to conflict to peace. In this continuum, peace is considered to be the normal condition or the natural order of relations among and within nations. It can be argued, however, that the conflict environmental state for MOOTW is actually war to non-Western belligerents and the natural order for many non-Western societies is war rather than peace (Bunker, 1995:37).

In the post-Cold War world, war is no longer the exclusive domain of the nation-state (Bunker, 1995:35). As Martin Van Creveld states, “the right to resort to violence, instead of being monopolized by an all-powerful state, is diffused in the hands of family heads, tribal chieftains, feudal noblemen, and the like” (Van Creveld, 1996:14). Furthermore, in parts of the non-Western world, peace is no longer the natural order of existence. In Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia, states of war based on tribal and religious dominance or conflict between subnational and local groups already existed before U.S. involvement.

It is highly likely that MOOTW operations in non-Western societies will be accompanied by constant and endemic states of war that undermine the authority and legitimacy of regional governments. The intent of the principle of *Legitimacy* according to General George A. Joulwan is to “assist the regional governments to become self-

sufficient, stable, and peaceful neighbors. This is only possible if the authority of the legitimate government is recognized and accepted by the people" (Joulwan, 1994:9).

Robert J. Bunker argues that a new politico-military model should be developed to replace the RMO model. The new model would break with the war, conflict, and peacetime continuum of military operations and would recognize that nation-states no longer possess a monopoly on warmaking(Bunker, 1995:39).

### **Summary**

MOOTW taskings pose a unique set of challenges to the U.S. military. These challenges become evident when the six principles of MOOTW are compared with different models of MOOTW. First, MOOTW objectives are likely to be less clear than wartime objectives. Ill-defined end states can lead to Mission Creep which could endanger the lives of U.S. forces and jeopardize mission success.

Second, U.S. forces committed in operations other than war will not always be designated as the lead agency in attaining U.S. policy objectives. Therefore, deployed commanders must emphasize common understanding and commitment of purpose among the agencies involved in order to achieve mission success.

Third, MOOTW missions are often conducted in the absence of a direct threat to U.S. forces. Despite this fact, the military must remain conscious of security issues.

Fourth, restrictive rules of engagement are the norm in MOOTW. The ROE must strike a balance between political and military considerations. Rules governing the use of force must be prudent and appropriate without needlessly endangering the lives of U.S. forces.

Fifth, some MOOTW missions cannot be measured in days, weeks, or months; they may take years to achieve the desired objectives and success may involve more than military efforts alone. Commanders need to balance the desire for quick, decisive action with sensitivity for strategic, long term mission goals (Boyd, 1995:24).

Last, MOOTW operations should bolster the legitimacy of host governments. This is possible only if the authority of the legitimate government is recognized and accepted by the citizenry. This poses a dilemma for U.S. forces operating in regions where there are no legitimate governments.

## **IV. Conclusion**

### **Overview**

The primary mission of the Armed Forces has always been to fight and win the nation's wars. In peacetime, the military's focus has been on preparedness for war. Operations short of war were treated as issues on the margins. With the end of the Cold War, the threats from war and operations short of war have changed dramatically. The imminent danger of superpower confrontation has been replaced by the prospect of two near simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). At the same time, operations short of war have increased, with rising demands to use the military to solve problems of ethnic conflict, humanitarian and disaster assistance, and civil unrest (Builder, 1995b:ix).

Yet, operations other than war are not new to the military. In the late 1800s, the Army helped combat malaria in Panama and cholera in Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua. Naval ships have explored the Amazon, surveyed South American coastlines, and laid transoceanic cables (Huntington, 1993a:38). The first military operation flown by a U.S. aircraft was a non-combat mission supporting Major General John J. Pershing's pursuit of the Mexican bandit Pancho Villa in 1916. Aviation pioneer, Benjamin Foulois, commanded the First Aero Squadron that gave Pershing airborne reconnaissance of Villa's movements (Fogleman, 1994). As General George A. Joulwan, U.S. Army, states, "When viewed through historical precedence, operations other than war are indicative of business as usual for the U.S. military, whereas combat operations are the exception" (Joulwan, 1994:5).

Despite this historical precedence, the military has only recently begun to address the doctrinal issues surrounding MOOTW. Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, contains the most up-to-date doctrine on operations short of war. The heart of this publication is the six principles of MOOTW. Derived from the time-tested principles of war, these six principles serve as guideposts for any MOOTW mission. The principles are more readily understood when viewed in the context of explanatory MOOTW models.

### **MOOTW Principles and the Three MOOTW Models**

Background. Simply stated, MOOTW is any military activity short of war. This broad definition, however, fails to answer a critical question: How does MOOTW differ from war? Doctrine, or the military's view of the best way of doing things, must capture the differences between war and operations short of war. The building blocks of all MOOTW doctrine are the six principles of MOOTW contained in Joint Pub 3-07. How well do these principles address the unique aspects of MOOTW? One way to answer this question is to compare the principles of MOOTW with various MOOTW models.

RMO Model. The first model used was the U.S. Army's Range of Military Operations (RMO). This model separates the occurrence of all military activities into one of three environmental states: war, conflict, and peace. While the RMO model effectively demonstrates that MOOTW involves combat as well as noncombat, it does not adequately define the conflict environmental state. Is conflict really a strategic environment distinct from war or peace? Was World War II not a conflict? As Lieutenant Colonel David A. Fastabend, U.S. Army, states, "Our doctrine has a problem



with conflict. Does it matter much? Unfortunately, it matters completely. National confusion about conflict is at the heart of today's discourse on the role of military force" (Fastabend, 1995:43). The environmental continuum in the RMO model helps illustrate several MOOTW principles such as *Objective*, *Restraint*, and *Perseverance*. The model, however, is not infallible. An analysis of the MOOTW principle of *Legitimacy* reveals some weakness in the RMO environmental continuum.

In conflict, as opposed to war, it is difficult to define the desired end state or military *Objective*. While wartime objectives are relatively clear (seize territory, defeat an armed force, etc.), MOOTW objectives tend to be more ambiguous (feed the hungry, keep the peace, disarm the populace, etc.).

Similarly, the degree of *Restraint* in an operation is related to an operation's placement on the RMO environmental continuum. Generally speaking, as the operation moves closer to war, the degree of *Restraint* on the use of weapons, tactics, and levels of violence decreases. In other words, the principle of *Restraint* permeates considerations over the ROE and choice of weapons for operations that occur in environments short of war (Boyd, 1995:25).

*Perseverance* is essential in MOOTW tasks. Missions that fall in environments below war may be of short duration or could require years to achieve the desired results. In peacekeeping, for example, every soldier must be aware that the goal is to establish peace not destroy an enemy. The unrestrained use of force could jeopardize mission success (Boyd, 1995:25). As General George A. Joulwan stated,

The criterion for success (in MOOTW) is change. The U.S. must focus on changing the historical precedent of regional instability and the resulting inability of nations to satisfy the basic needs of their people. Therefore, success requires perseverance. (Joulwan, 1994:9)

The RMO model is a useful tool for explaining the MOOTW principles of *Objective, Restraint and Perseverance*. The model is built on western concepts wherein peace is considered to be the normal condition between nations. Robert J. Bunker believes “this view is fundamentally flawed when applied outside Western civilization” (Bunker, 1995:35). Tribal and ethnic warfare have become the natural order of existence in parts of the non-Western world. What Army doctrine defines as a conflict environmental state is actually a chronic state of war in some non-Western nations. These persistent states of conflict erode the *Legitimacy* of non-Western governments at the same time U.S. MOOTW operations are attempting to support those governments. The MOOTW principle of *Legitimacy* is a perception that the actions are legal, moral and appropriate to the situation. *Legitimacy* can only be sustained if the host government is supported by its constituents. Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, are all examples of U.S. MOOTW missions where there were no legitimate host governments.

CALC Model. The second model used was Builder and Karasik’s Crises and Lesser Conflicts (CALCs). Builder and Karasik believe MOOTW missions are distinguished by their location (domestic versus international) and their nature (routine versus nonroutine). According to this model, the dominant form of MOOTW is the nonroutine, international missions which Builder and Karasik refer to as CALCs. They state “just as MRCs have become the dominant conception of war for defense planning

purposes, CALCs are becoming the dominant planning form for operations short of war” (Builder, 1995b:5).

CALCs exemplify missions where the principles of MOOTW are especially applicable. For example, CALCs include humanitarian relief efforts which commonly involve the participation of multiple NGOs. *Unity of Effort* is difficult to achieve in humanitarian operations because of the diverse array of participants. In humanitarian operations, it is not uncommon for the military to be subordinate to other U.S. or international agencies. Although not in command of the entire operation, the military must understand and support the team effort if the mission is to succeed.

Peace operations are another type of CALC that illustrate some of the principles of MOOTW. The measures of success in peacekeeping are stability and a transition to a long-term peace. The principle of *Perseverance* recognizes that it could take months or years to achieve these results. Peace operations also require *Restraint* in the use of force. Unrestrained force may prejudice efforts to settle disputes between the belligerents (Boyd, 1995:25).

Characteristics Model. The last comparative model was Taw and Morrison’s Characteristics Model. Taw and Morrison studied eight different MOOTW operations that occurred between 1954 and 1994. They found a number of similar characteristics in the eight operations that are closely aligned with the principles of MOOTW.

As the model illustrates, political rather than military considerations predominate MOOTW and the result is often ill-defined *Objectives*. As Taw states, “Only when equipped with a fairly unambiguous sense of the political objectives and the expected end

state can military planners craft the necessary military objectives and plans for the undertaking at hand” (Taw, 1995:19). Furthermore, Mission Creep is likely when military actions are guided by unclear political objectives or strategy. As a result, an operation may gradually mutate from something with militarily attainable objectives is not an impossible task.

Several of the characteristics identified in the model relate directly to a specific MOOTW principle. Six of the eight cases contained restrictive rules of engagement, a characteristic attributable to the MOOTW principle of *Restraint*. All eight cases had humanitarian components and seven involved NGOs. Success in humanitarian operations normally depends on the coordinated efforts of both the military and the NGOs, a fact directly related to the MOOTW principle, *Unity of Effort*.

Taw and Morrison also point out that MOOTW missions routinely take place on urban terrain. Operations on urban terrain pose unique risks for the military and these risks are directly related to the MOOTW principle of *Security*. As Taw states, “snipers, rioting, and looting, as well as clearing buildings, controlling refugees, and maintaining stability challenge conventional infantrymen’s skills and abilities, consume manpower, and require more security than are normally available” (Taw, 1995:45).

Summary. Operations other than war in the post-Cold War era pose unique challenges to the military. Many of these challenges are embodied in the six principles of MOOTW. Since the principles are the foundation for all MOOTW doctrine, it is important that commanders understand and apply the principles across the entire range of MOOTW environments. Because doctrine is fluid rather than static, these principles

must be continuously analyzed for their applicability. This research offered one method for reviewing current doctrine on MOOTW. General George A. Joulwan, U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Southern Command, brings many of the issues surrounding MOOTW into perspective,

Some have said "things are not as they used to be." They never are. It is a changed world from the one we knew only five years ago, and U.S. military organizations must change as well. In fact, one might say that the U.S. military is returning to normal after the anomalous Cold War era because, historically "normal" operations for U.S. Forces are operations other than war. While U.S. military forces must remain ready to fight and win if required, we must now secure and reinforce the peace that has followed the end of the Cold War. (Joulwan, 1994:10)

## Appendix

### Terms and Definitions

Arms Control. A concept that connotes: (a.) any plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement, governing any aspect of the following: the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems (including the command and control, logistics support arrangements, and any related intelligence-gathering mechanism); and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment of the Armed Forces retained by the parties (it encompasses disarmament); and (b.) on some occasions, those measures taken for the purpose of reducing instability in the military environment.

Antiterrorism. Defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts

Counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism

Counterdrug Operations. Support provided by the Department of Defense to law enforcement agencies to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs.

Counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.

Civil Support. Those activities and measures taken by the DOD Components to foster mutual assistance and support between the DOD and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies.

Ensuring Freedom of Navigation. Operations conducted to demonstrate U.S. or international rights to navigate air or sea routes.

Exclusion Zones. A zone established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specific activities in a specific geographic area. The purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of force.

Humanitarian Assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the

efforts of host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.

Nation Assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, and other DOD programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. Operations conducted to relocate threatened noncombatants from locations in a foreign country. These operations normally involve U.S. citizens whose lives are in danger, and may also include selected foreign nationals.

Peace Enforcement. Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

Peace Operations. Encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

Peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

Protection of Shipping. The use of proportionate force by U.S. warships, military aircraft, and other forces, when necessary for the protection of U.S. flag vessels and aircraft, U.S. citizens (whether embarked in U.S. or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence. This protection may be extended to foreign flag vessels, aircraft, and persons consistent with international law.

Raid. An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.

Recovery Operations. Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security.

Sanction Enforcement/Maritime Intercept Operations. Operations which employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area.

Show of Force. An operation, designed to demonstrate U.S. resolve, which involves increased visibility of U.S. deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation, that if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to U.S. interests or national objectives.

Strike. An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective.



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## Vita

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1. Did this research contribute to a current research project?      a. Yes      b. No
  
2. If you answered YES to Question #1, do you believe this research topic is significant enough that it would have been researched (or contracted) by your organization or another agency if AFIT had not researched it?      a. Yes      b. No
  
3. The benefits of AFIT research can often be expressed by the equivalent value that your agency received by virtue of AFIT's performing the research. **Please estimate** what this research would have cost in terms of manpower and dollars if it had been accomplished under contract or if it had been done in-house.

Man Years \_\_\_\_\_ \$ \_\_\_\_\_

4. Whether or not you were able to establish an equivalent value for this research (in Question 3), what is your estimate of its significance?  

|                          |                |                            |                          |
|--------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| a. Highly<br>Significant | b. Significant | c. Slightly<br>Significant | d. Of No<br>Significance |
|--------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|

5. Comments (Please feel free to use a separate sheet for more detailed answers and include it with this form):

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name and Grade

\_\_\_\_\_  
Organization

\_\_\_\_\_  
Position or Title

\_\_\_\_\_  
Address