Administrative Programs Division

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This letter is in final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, U. S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Case Number 99-13. You requested a copy of the document "Final Draft, Executive Summary, Volume 3 - Psychological Operations - 75, Special Warfare - 75, Basic Derivative Study (BDS)."

The document has been declassified and is being released to you in its entirety.

We apologize for the delay in processing your request and hope it has not inconvenienced you. Thank you for your interest in the Freedom of Information Act Program.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Kinder
Colonel, U.S. Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management

Enclosure
Final Draft, Executive Summary. Volume 3 - Psychological Operations-75, Special Warfare-75, Basic Derivative Study (BDS). (U)

15 NOV 1968

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FINAL DRAFT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

VOLUME III - PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS - 75
SPECIAL WARFARE - 75
BASIC DERIVATIVE STUDY (BDS) (U)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: OADR

15 NOVEMBER 1968

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The conclusions and recommendations are based upon information gathered and analysis performed primarily by the Institute of Strategic and Stability Operations.
FINAL DRAFT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
VOLUME III - PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS-75
SPECIAL WARFARE-75
BASIC DERIVATIVE STUDY (BDS) (U)

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Section I. INTRODUCTION (U)

1. (C) PROBLEM

To develop United States Army Psychological Operations doctrine, concepts, organization, and materiel to support US Army missions and responsibilities during the period 1970-1975.*

2. (S-NOFOR) GENERAL

The basic mission of the PSYOP organization is to plan and conduct PSYOP in support of operations for which the US Army has responsibility; and to provide command and control, administrative and logistical support, and operational supervision over organic and attached units.

*The problem of the amalgamation of PSYOP and CA in the G5/65 section is not addressed in detail in the Basic Derivative Study of PSYOP-75 because of the lack of timely DA approval of this concept.
Section II. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS (U)

3. FINDINGS

a. The use of automatic data processing equipment will provide a more efficient and rapid means of storing and retrieving PSYOP intelligence.

b. Mobility of PSYOP will improve with the development of improved power sources and the miniaturization of PSYOP equipment.

c. Studies indicate the feasibility and desirability of continuing efforts to investigate mental conditioning and ideological reform of the individual.

d. Television combines in one form many of the advantages of other PSYOP media.

e. The addition of a short wave radio transmitter to the current mobile radio team will provide a capability to reach all audiences within the theater and field army.

f. Because of the anticipated increase in low-intensity conflict, a PSYOP staff function for the battalion should be considered.

g. US Army PSYOP organization is capable of playing an increasingly active role in supporting operations to prevent and control civil disturbances.

h. US Army PSYOP resources are also capable of assisting in civil defense planning.

i. Favorable audience reaction to PSYOP messages through subliminal suggestion is possible.
4. (S-NOFOR) CONCLUSIONS

a. The PSYOP organization will continue to rely on the Military Intelligence (MI) organization to obtain the majority of information for PSYOP.

b. Revolutionary methods of influencing behavior is of critical importance to the PSYOP effort.

c. The use of television in PSYOP should be developed further.

d. The addition of a short wave radio transmitter to the current mobile radio team will increase the effectiveness of PSYOP programs.

e. A PSYOP staff function for the battalion is necessary during low-intensity conflict.

f. US Army PSYOP expertise and resources should be employed in preventing and combating civil disturbance.

g. US Army PSYOP resources should be employed in support of civil defense planning.

h. Subliminal suggestion in PSYOP is both practical and feasible from a technical standpoint.

5. (S-NOFOR) The doctrine and concepts developed in this study should be approved and implemented.

6. (S-NOFOR) The personnel and materiel requirements in this study should be approved and implemented.
Section IV. DISCUSSION (U)

13. S-NOFORN) DOCTRINE

a. The US Army PSYOP organization is structured to accommodate high-intensity conflict, mid-intensity conflict, low-intensity conflict, type I, and low-intensity conflict, type II.

b. Whatever the operation, retention of the cellular concept of organization for PSYOP units provides the necessary flexibility to meet the threat of any conflict intensity within which US forces may be committed.
c. The PSYOP organization is a combat support element in the US Army force structure. The organization is cellular and can be tailored to support the mission of the command to which assigned or attached. The unit G5/S5 officer has staff responsibility for PSYOP within the command. Command relationship is from commander of supported unit to commander of supporting PSYOP unit. In order to insure an integrated and coordinated PSYOP effort, organic PSYOP staff elements are assigned at various command levels. During low-intensity conflict it will be necessary to assign an S5 to selected battalions while in higher intensities of conflict a staff element will be required down to interior brigade level. The G5/S5 officer exercises staff supervision over assigned and attached teams through the assigned PSYOP staff officer. (See G5/S5 concept at division level.)

d. Specifically, the Army's PSYOP mission is:

(1) To organize and train US Army PSYOP units to plan, conduct, and support overt and covert PSYOP in support of unified and specified commands, US country teams, and other US agencies.

(2) To deploy and maintain trained PSYOP units or elements capable of rapid deployment on a world-wide basis to support cold, limited, and general war operations.

(3) To support operations, as directed, against covert and indirect aggression, subversion, and insurgency.
(4) To assist in development of PSYOP units and capabilities in ground forces of our Allies.

(5) To assist US civil authorities, within available resources, in civil defense, disaster, and disturbance activities by providing advice and assistance through media, equipment, and personnel.

14. EMPLOYMENT

a. The increasing trend toward political restraints and considerations imposed on combat forces committed to all intensities of conflict requires an increasing awareness on the part of all commanders of the psychological impact of their operations. This is best accomplished by having a PSYOP staff officer participate in the planning phase of all operations. The assignment of organic PSYOP staff elements to all levels of command down to brigade is proposed.

b. Although current PSYOP concept is geared primarily to support tactical operations, the possibility of general war requires that US Army PSYOP organizations retain the capability and equipment to conduct strategic operations.

c. PSYOP capabilities will be increased by providing a short wave radio at field army and theater army levels, and by the use of television for propaganda dissemination. The use of TV is considered to be the second most effective PSYOP method – the most effective being face-to-face communications.
d. PSYOP capabilities can aid friendly and allied armed forces by providing advice and assistance in building their own PSYOP capability.

e. US Army PSYOP resources can be used to assist state and federal authorities in preserving law and order.

15. (S-NF0050-R) COMMAND AND CONTROL

a. A competent PSYOP staff element at each command level can exploit fully the use of psychological operations. The commander would be able to consult with the staff concerning psychological/political aspects of army operations. The commander would be provided measures of the psychological climate in the areas of operations to include dominant issues among the people, attitude toward US forces, the morale of the indigenous government, and other similar matters.

b. At the theater level, US Army PSYOP forces are under operational command of the commander of the unified command. With approval of this commander, PSYOP units may be placed under the operational control of other US military service elements and civilian organizations. Command less operational control of US Army PSYOP units is retained by theater army. Theater army headquarters is responsible that assigned PSYOP forces meet the requirements for support of the forces unified command.

c. When operational control of US forces is passed to Allied commanders, the commander of the unified command arranges for retention of US PSYOP forces under direct US command. In combined operations, PSYOP remains a national responsibility.
d. A joint theater PSYOP agency (or command) may be established by the commander of the unified command to control and direct the total US PSYOP effort in the theater in accordance with the provisions of appropriate interdepartmental agreements.

e. In the event the commander of the unified command elects not to establish a joint theater PSYOP agency (or command), selected PSYOP elements of the assigned PSYOP group are retained at theater level for conducting strategic PSYOP; other elements are assigned or attached to field army; and designated elements are retained by theater army.

f. In the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, a PSYOP element is included within the joint operations and plans section. This element supports evasion and escape, subversion, guerrilla warfare, and special operations. It concerns itself with exploiting the military, political, psychological, and economic vulnerabilities of the enemy. These operations may be covert (sponsor concealed), clandestine (operation concealed), or overt (no attempt to conceal).

g. PSYOP, properly applied, can create unity, maintain morale, and add to the determination of resistance forces; it can develop sympathy for the resistance and acceptance of their methods and objectives among uncommitted segments of the population; and, it can weaken the resolve of the enemy by inducing fear and doubts as to the correctness or eventual success of the enemy cause.
b. Specialists in methods of changing population attitudes through information, education, and communication.

c. Specialists to study continuously the emotions, attitudes, behavior, and accomplishments of a country.

4. In high-intensity conflict, not all PSYOP teams are completely mobile (as shown on TO 33-500G). Designated teams are airborne qualified and their equipment is capable of parachute delivery. To attain the high degree of mobility required for general war, the PSYOP organization requires transportation augmentation.

5. PSYOP can be classified in four general categories: Interpersonal (face-to-face) communication, printed communication, audio-visual communication, and audio communication.

6. Commanders evaluate the potential psychological impact of operations in the development of all plans. The commander also considers what effect operations will have on the overall PSYOP campaign and how PSYOP units can assist in the accomplishment of the mission.

   (h) Mid-intensity conflict. Mode of operation and problem areas outlined in high-intensity conflict are applicable to mid-intensity conflict except those related to the use of nuclear weapons.
(1) Intelligence. Few substantial differences exist in the conduct of PSYOP in the various intensities of conflict. Operational concepts generally remain valid in all phases. The following paragraphs examine the different areas of intelligence, mobility, firepower, command, control, communications, and service support.

(a) High-intensity conflict.

1. Because of the nature of PSYOP and its mission of influencing human behavior, intelligence on population acquires importance in addition to the three traditional considerations of enemy, weather, and terrain. Information used in the development of PSYOP intelligence is divided into two categories: current data, and area and background studies.

2. Intelligence support of PSYOP requires special capabilities in language, cultural information, and a familiarity with the principles of behavioral science similar to those required for strategic intelligence support.

3. Psychological operations units will require an increased capability for research and analysis, intelligence processing, development of propaganda content, and the conduct of face-to-face PSYOP. US Army specialists will be needed to perform the various related functions of a broadening PSYOP concept.

a. Analysts and planners for political and economic programs at national as well as community level.
(c) Low-intensity, types I and II.

1. PSYOP in low-intensity conflict is of particular significance in gaining support of the indigenous populace and thereby separating the insurgent from his support base within the population. PSYOP, because of its ability to support all aspects of tactical and non-tactical operations, plays a vital role in stability operations and other aspects of internal defense and internal development operations. Use of indigenous information sources is more common because of their accessibility.

2. With the presence of fixed base camps, there is less requirement for mobility of heavy propaganda production facilities. Nevertheless, the high degree of mobility of tactical units engaged in counterguerrilla operations requires a corresponding mobility capability for accompanying PSYOP teams.

3. Because of the nature and environment of low-intensity conflict, interpersonal communication assumes increased significance. PSYOP is everyone's job, not limited to the PSYOP unit. Through daily contact with the indigenous population, an increased responsibility for influencing behavior is placed on the individual.

4. In low-intensity conflict, the principle of centralized direction and decentralized execution applies to the conduct of PSYOP.

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(d) Military aid to US civil authorities.

1. The most immediate requirement for military assistance to civil authorities in civil-military planning, training, and operational readiness is to assist in controlling civil disturbances and re-establishing civil control. The US Army has both active and reserve units capable of assisting in preventing and suppressing civil disturbances. US Army PSYOP units can support operations to prevent and control civil disorders. There is no policy which precludes the use of US Army PSYOP assets in civil disturbance matters although their participation is of a politically sensitive nature.

2. PSYOP personnel can play a significant role in training US Army forces to cope with civil disturbances, and can support operations of this nature. In the preventative stage, the US Army PSYOP organization is capable of participating in developing pre-packs of printed and audio material to support contingency plans.

(2) Concept of operations. The concept of operations included in SW-75 includes five force models which are summarized in the following discussion:

(a) Force model 1.

1. This force model is based on Vol III, Annex F of Combined Arms and Support (CAAS-75) which is developed for a mid- and high-intensity war in Europe during 1974 and 1975. The basic mission of the strategic PSYOP battalion is to plan and conduct strategic PSYOP in support of theater operations and to
provide propaganda production, short wave radio, and printing support. The tactical PSYOP battalion's mission is to plan and conduct tactical PSYOP in support of field army operations and provide propaganda production support for subordinate PSYOP elements.

2. Field army operations in Western Europe will be conducted with other US Armed Forces. The field army conducts combat operations under the operational control of a combined force headquarters provided for in NATO international treaty agreements. In combined operations, the US component commander retains operational command of US PSYOP resources.

3. The field army contains sufficient PSYOP resources to support tactical and non-tactical operations. PSYOP, an element of combat power, reinforces the firepower of the field army. PSYOP's greatest contribution is in lowering the morale of enemy forces in order to destroy their will to continue fighting.

4. Effective PSYOP depends on current intelligence reinforced by area and background data. Automation of PSYOP intelligence increases the responsiveness of propaganda production and assists in the correlation of background data to current themes and selected target groups.

5. PSYOP organization to support this force model is contained in Annex B, Appendix I.
1. This force model is based on Volume II, Annex G of Combined Arms and Support (CAAG-75) which is developed for a mid-intensity war in Korea during 1974 and 1975. Field army operations in Korea will be conducted as part of an international force under the auspices of the United Nations, or as a major element of a combined United States - Republic of Korea (US-ROK) force. The operational environment will be that of mid-intensity conflict although allied forces must be prepared for escalation to high-intensity in the event of communist Chinese or Soviet employment of nuclear weapons. The conduct of strategic and tactical PSYOP is similar to that of general war within a combined force structure. US Army PSYOP resources are retained under the command and control of the US component commander.

2. Strategic support of operations in Korea will include Voice of America world-wide radio broadcast. In the active theater of operations, strategic support will be provided by the 7th PSYOP Group located in Okinawa. Although the density of radio receivers is low, and television deployed for use in PSYOP is in the early stages of development, these capabilities are included. As the UN offensive proceeds into North Korea, it may be necessary to airdrop inexpensive, preset receivers to the population. The same operation may be possible with TV receivers during the latter stages of the 1970-75 time frame, in which case mobile TV capability may be added.
3. The US Army PSYOP organization to support this force model is contained in Annex B, Appendix II.

(C) Force model 3.

1. This force model is based on Volume II, Annex H of Combined Arms and Support (CAAS-75) which is developed for low-intensity conflict, type I in Thailand during 1974 and 1975, and the Special Warfare (SW-75), Low-Intensity Conflict, Type II Scenario which is an addendum to force model 3.

2. Stability operations conducted under the operational command of MACTHAI will be a phased operation. During low-intensity conflict, type II, prior to November 1975, PSYOP support is phased according to the escalating situation. (See Annex B, Appendix III for organization.)

3. Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), whose chairman is the Chief of USIS in Thailand, advises the US Ambassador, the Thai government, and the US military command on the psychological aspect of political and military activities. The overall policy for psychological activities by US government agencies and US military forces in Thailand is promulgated by JUSPAO.

4. The US Army PSYOP organization to support this force model subsequent to November 1975 is contained in Annex B, Appendix IIIA.

(d) Force model 4.

1. This force model is based on Volume III, Annex I of Combined Arms and Support (CAAS-75) which is developed for mid-intensity war in Iran during 1974 and 1975.

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2. Field force operations in Iran will be conducted within a combined force structure which includes joint US and Imperial Iranian Armed Forces. The operational environment will be primarily that of mid-intensity conflict, with dissident tribal elements conducting insurgent activities in friendly rear areas. Tactical PSYOP conducted in Iran are supported by strategic PSYOP conducted from outside the country. Proponency for the strategic effort is determined by the President.

3. Because of the narrow power base and authoritarian role of the Shah, extreme caution must be exercised in the development of propaganda themes. The bulk of the propaganda will be of a tactical nature, directed toward the enemy force. The propaganda directed inward will emphasize the traditional unifying forces -- the monarchy and cultural heritage -- and exploit the traditional antagonism against the Soviets and Arabs.

4. The US Army PSYOP organization to support this force model is contained in Annex B, Appendix IV.

(e) Force model 5

1. This force model is based on Volume III, Annex J of Combined Arms and Support (CAAS-75) which is developed for low-intensity conflict in Bolivia during 1974 and 1975. CAAS-75 develops an independent division size force for deployment in Bolivia.
2. Stability operations conducted in Bolivia under the operational command of CINCSOUTH will be a phased operation. One PSYOP company of the PSYOP battalion assigned to the Latin American Strategic Army (STAR) Brigade deploys by air with elements of the STAR Bde on order. Deployed elements are placed under the operational control of Chief, MAAG, Bolivia, upon arrival in-country for the support of internal defense and internal development operations.

3. Personnel in the PSYOP company assigned to Latin American STAR Bde will be area oriented and language trained prior to deployment for the Canal Zone. Background studies and intelligence are automated through ADPS located in the Canal Zone for rapid retrieval upon alert for deployment. Initially, the PSYOP company in Bolivia will not have ADP. Upon arrival of the task force, however, PSYOP data will be transferred to data banks located within the force.

4. The Bolivian force model faces an internal threat brought about by poor economic conditions and inept governmental programs, rather than by communist-inspired insurgency. Therefore, civic action programs will play a prominent role in this force model. The chances for success of these operations will be enhanced depending on the degree of support and extent of integration with the PSYOP effort.

5. The US Army PSYOP organization to support this force model is contained in Annex B, Appendix V.
16. *(S-NOFORO)* ORGANIZATION

a. For the time frame 1970-1975, the PSYOP organization will remain cellular in structure and units will be tailored to meet specific situations. These cells will provide support to theater army, field army, and other commands and agencies of the government within the theater, as required. Draft Plan TOE 33-500H has a total of 23 teams. Significant proposed changes to the present TOE 33-500G are listed in detail in Appendix I of Volume III Special Warfare-75. A summary of significant proposed changes is outlined in Annex C of Volume III Special Warfare-75.

b. The general mission is to plan and conduct psychological operations and to provide command and control, administrative, logistical support, and operational supervision over organic and attached units. Psychological operations organizations are assigned to a field army, theater army, or army component of a unified command, as required. Suitable elements may be attached to subordinate commands or task forces, as required.


17. *(S-NOFORO)* MATERIAL

a. Annex E of SW-75 provides brief descriptions of all USACDCISSO's current and planned programs to develop projects within the Army-75 program for psychological operations. Initiated projects are identified by USACDC by
action control numbers (ACN). New requirements identified during preparation of the basic derivative study are described without ACN reference.

b. An index to PSYOP projects is listed below. Further description can be referenced in Volume III of SW-75.

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**The desirability of the Deputy G5 has been determined since the preparation of the Basic Derivative Study for PSYOP 75 and is therefore included in the envisioned G5/85 concept at this level.**
Annex 3

Appendix I. Force Model 1
Appendix II. Force Model 2
Appendix III. Force Model 3A
Appendix IV. Force Model 3B
Appendix V. Force Model 4
Appendix VI. Force Model 5
LEGEND:
COMMAND ——— COMMAND (-) OPN CON
OPN CON ———

PSYOP SUPPORT
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
TYPE II

FORGE
MODEL 3 (UD)

NOTES:
1. SUPPORT RTA DIV ME REGION
2. STAR BDE SUPPORT SF AND CA NORTH REGION
3. ABN BDE SUPPORT
NOTES: 1. CINCSOUTHCOM Backup Support
2. TF Control on Order
3. STAR BDE Support
4. One Per Separate Brigade

FORCE MODEL 5 (U)
NEW ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS - PSYOP-75 (U)

1. (S-NOFORN) The staff supervision of PSYOP has been transferred from the G3 to the G5 with the G5 staff section reorganized to include an amalgamation of the CA and PSYOP staff functions.

2. (S-NOFORN) A TV team with a production, transmission, and instant replay capability has been created.

3. (S-NOFORN) A PSYOP interrogation team has been designated to employ the most modern, advanced techniques in exploiting the propaganda potential of selected prisoners and detainees.

4. (S-NOFORN) The light, medium, and heavy printing teams have been consolidated into a single PSYOP printing platoon. Operational functions remain the same.

5. (S-NOFORN) The TV intrusion element will also be a capability of the TV team. The capability will include intruding into enemy broadcasts.

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