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  Memorandum *for Record
  To J. Vorona Date : 12 March 1985
  SG1J From :
  Subject Disposition of the Former INSCOM Unit
  1. It is the intent of this memo to establish that the INSCOM unit be assigned to DIA/DT and
  that it not be considered as being fully operational for at least two years. Much of what is said
  in this memo has been said previously; however, the attempt here is to focus on the proper place
  and activity recommended for the INSCOM unit.
  2. First, a brief history of the INSCOM unit. That group was formed in mid-year 1979. Its
  function was immediately to do operational remote viewing to acquire intelligence data. The unit
  was formed by selecting Army personnel and sending a group of them to SRI where they received
  a few weeks of orientation on remote viewing. When they returned to INSCOM they
  immediately began doing operational remote viewing. Since then, INSCOM has continued to
  send people to SRI to be trained. In all, some 12 people have received some degree of training.
  However, there are only 4 of these individuals currently available and they have only completed
  about 50% of the necessary training. In April 1980, it was proposed to the Army, Navy, Air
  Force and DIA that a joint service approach be taken to the remote viewing area. This concept
  was approved and the DIA and Army launched a three-year program in FY 1981. From its
  inception, the dichotomy of the Army and DIA programs was apparent. The INSCOM was an
  operational unit, and the DIA believed that much more research needed to be done before such
  a unit could be formed.
  3. Before an operational unit can be formed you must solve the following problems:
  A. Screening and Selection: It is currently believed that everyone has the ability to do
  remote viewing to some degree, however slight, and that some are better than others. The
  purpose of this task is to identify those having the greatest ability. This problem was addressed
  in FY 1984 and shows great potential for both improving the quality of remote viewing data and
  shortening the training period. But, it is now still under investigation. It is hoped that, in FY
  1985, large populations can be screened and individuals can be identified for training. The
  INSCOM unit has thus far selected their viewers on the basis only of interviews and intuition.
  =iqu &; rn
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           B. Training: This is naturally the next step. Since FY 1981, three training programs
      have been developed. All of them show some potential, but none have produced the kind of
      results we had hoped. Part of the training problem may be solved by the selection process. At
      this point, however, a completely satisfactory training program has not been developed.
      C. Targeting: After a viewer is selected and trained the next task is to get him to the
      target. Until now, coordinates have been the most studied and trained procedure. There are
      other ways, however, and these need to be thoroughly researched and viewers need to be trained
      in their use. Other methods would include using the command "target," abstract targets, and
      using photographs. The current group of INSCOM viewers have only been trained on
      coordinates. Also, an operational remote viewer must be able to do search remote viewing.
      This differs from other forms of remote viewing in that the viewer looks for a target rather than
      describing what is at the target location. The methodology for search problems is still being
      researched.
      Another aspect of the targeting problem is target selection. It has never been claimed
      that remote viewing can be applied successfully to any and all operational targets. Much research
      needs to be done to tell us where remote viewing is most likely to provide usable data to a
      consumer, and where it cannot be successfully applied.
           D. Data Evaluation: Over the past several years a variety of methods have been used to
      evaluate remote viewing data. None of the methods were completely satisfactory and there was
      no universal method. Such an evaluation method has now been developed and will be tested
      over the coming year.
      E. Data Storage and Retrieval: Finally a system to store and retrieve information is
      needed. This will establish who is to be used, how he will be targeted against which targets and
      a variety of other useful data that will help acquire the best possible remote viewing data. Such a
      capability now exists and will be tested during the coming year.
      4. As all of the above items are not yet completed, it is still not possible to have an operational
      unit. We are at least two years away from having that. Let's look at INSCOM's current set of
      44operaional remote viewers." First, they were selected by interview and intuition. They have
      been trained only in coordinate remote viewing in a completely unevaluated training program.
      They have no training to do search problems. No system to evaluate their data exists and they
      have no automated system to store, retrieve and manipulate remote viewing data,
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 5. The following is my estimate of the INSCOM unit's capability to do operational remote
 viewing.
  (a) it is not now an operational-capable unit and will not be for at least 3 to 5
 years.
 (b) They currently do not have the ability to do quality remote viewing.
 (c) They have never been able to produce consistent high quality data.
 (d) They do not have data that can be used to demonstrate any statistical
 verification of their work over the past five years.
 (e) They rely on customers to evaluate their success or failure rather than having
 an in-house capability to carry out data evaluation.
 Their basic problem is that they have no one in the unit who adequately knows the technology.
 They even boast "we are an operational unit, we don't care about all that science shitl" This
 leads to all sorts of problems. In essence this is why Gen. Odum wanted the group moved.
 They are not able to judge the value of a training program. They have simplistic ideas on how to
 evaluate data. They do not understand the nuances of altering target formats. Their
 methodologies are governed by superstition rather than sound logic and science. They make
 numerous mistakes in their briefings. They are not equipped to deal with planning, executing
 and incorporating the basic scientific research into their program.
 6. If this unit is assigned to VO rather than DT, their problems won't be solved; they will be
 magnified. Gen. Odum's recognition of the inherent problems in the unit is certainly what
 inspired him to seek moving the group to a place where the proper control could be applied.
 But, unless DT has full control to the point where nothing goes into or out of the unit unless it
 passes through DT, this cannot be accomplished. VO does not have the experience or technical
 knowledge to provide the needed control.
 SGFOIA3
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