Approved For Release 20A91,Q8/15: CIA-RDPW-"792M0b?i"020005.3 109 108 Proposed information -processing influences. The alternative side to this debate suggests that errors are caused by generally adaptive inform ation- processing styles and short-cuts. This re- search has spread from the attributional field into that of human judgment and decision making in the ~orie general sense. Research- ers have pointed out many weaknesse in human cognition, but this paper describes only th ree w h ha* been highlighted by D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (Ptcliolokical Review, 1973, 237-251). This is because these three informa on-processing factors m~y rep- resent the more general processes t at underlie many more specific cognitive errors. :~~K~n and Tversky s cert - og =ve short-cuts to ul" quickly d effectively. Generall are effeNe, but th eir use may these heuris s is termed judgments -X- the relative freouency influ, of events may b influ nee byt .v_ a3 objects or events, availability ~b in perception, mem or imaonation. y t, \e termed judgment by resentAtiveness by vidual's judgment of t 0 bility t~v,_-± ee pends very much on that are similar to each o to rr-rs strategy which can lead to rrors adjustment. Here, individ a are id Xa P. _t~ ing with an initial value o po 'tion ine-m justed to account for new incom av be which erroneous beliefs confirming information. Iggfst that people habitually use their decisions and judgments these strategies, or heuristics, The first of so lead to errors. by availa~~, where people's of objects or the likelihood he relative availability of these erring to the accessibility of items The second heuristic is or similarity, where an indi tiTat two events are related de which these events have features to The final information-processing Th, is judgment by anchoring and _i said to make judgments by start which is then insufficiently ad on g information- -this is one way in g ntained even in the face of dis- Conclusions ,nitive social psycho- This paper desefbes three areas of )j~g logical research that lear on the question _ errors in everyday human jud en an ference and consequen , on the examination at d .s . e..clui 'no of erroi about the occurle . e~y ~psi spontaneous t fo r lorm a" m settings. The ech described doe7 m0 a' nany coher- new to ent theory of h= _f_rror and indeed ay not new to parapsy- , \b e . thre chologists Howeve~, this paper is intended to se e three func- tions: (I~ to int.1 ate some findings of relevance t parapsycholog, .c. t PZ a] text w and pre=them 1,Pu way that shows their context w hin psycho- _h on 0 info or remind to info logical i rc man judgmental error; (2) to info I.Ise_".,i parapsycho!ogists f the various ways in which false-posi ive or gative cone usions about the occurrence of psi may be false-ne reached, which mky help in eventually identifying mistaken conclu- sions about the operation of psi and consequently enhancing the quality of data on the occurrence of psi; and (3) to stress that while there is some emphasis in parapsychology on mistaken conclusions that psi has occurred, psychological research on human error logically cuts both ways, and can aid in the identification of false-positive and false-negative conclusions about the occurrence of psi. ANOMALOUS HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION (AHCI): TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ANOMALY (OR, HOW TO MAKE FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE COMPUTERS) K. Morgan (Dept. of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, 7 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9JZ, Scotland) This paper is an attempt to clarify in what manner a genuine anomaly can be distinguished from an incident explicable by known physical means. It also tries to exemplify the various methods that could be used to simulate an anomalous human-computer interaction (AHCI). This paper does not dwell in any more than a superficial manner upon the psychology involved in manipulating observers which would allow the described physical strategies to be carried out. That would demand a paper in its own right. Part of the research being carried out at the Koestler Chair and other institutions is the investigation of anomalous human- computer interaction. As with any area of parapsychological re- search there always exists the danger of the researcher mistaking a normally explicable phenomenon as an anomaly. This paper was written to help people who are confronted by an unusual happening on a computer to evaluate the situation and to be aware of the pos- sibility of there being normal methods of simulating almost any anomaly. The various categories into which both simulated and genuine anomalies could fall can be separated into the following: (1) Human. The majority of so-called anomalies might be found to be caused by the users' ignorance of their own computer system or aspects of it. This, coupled with the human trait of forcing unconnected events into meaningful patterns, might explain many anomalies. (2) Software Anomaly. The methods of achieving the simula- tion of a software (nonhardware- based) anomaly can be broken down into the following categories. (a) Replacement of the target program. The target program or process is exchanged for an amended version that contains the extra "feature" that will become the "anomaly." Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP96-00792ROO0701020005.3 110 Approved For Release 2000tGOP15: CIA-RDP9640702R6Q07(Yl&2G005-3 (b) Adjusting or twiending the target program or process. Methods of Avoiding Computer-Based Fraudulent Anomalies In this scenario the target process is amended at the same time or very shortly before the "anomaly." This would of course demand Examples of new technology that might help alleviate the above- the knowledge of the specification of the software being used at the mentioned problems are target site. (c) Breaches in computer /organizational security both prior to and simultaneously with anomaly. These are often a necessary prerequisite of any of the above software anomalies. The breach in security could even be from a remote site, via a computer communica- tion link that has access to the target system. The use of inter- preted languages or online debugging (disassembling) tools makes this reasonably easy. (3) Hardware Anomaly. This section covers any physical ef- fect that occurs to an item of computer machinery (but not to the logic controlling it). These "effects" could often take the form of either repairing or destroying an item of equipment. These items could be anything from a personal electronic belonging (e.g., an electronic watch) to a computer's storage device. (a) Replacement. In this scenario an exact duplicate of the target is prepared and exchanged for the target item when the op- portunity arises. The duplicate has some extra "feature" which will be used by the false anomalist to simulate the required anomaly. (b) Adjustment /destruction- -Nive." To adjust or amend an item of equipment is not as difficult as it might appear. Much com- puting equipment is sensitive to one or many of the following en- vironmental influences: weak magnetic fields, physical force (e.g., bending), exposure for long periods to strong sunlight, contact with sharp objects, extreme humidity, temperatures outside the tolerated range, contact with static electricity, and any substances or object making contact with a recording or electrically conductive surface. (c) Breaches in computer/ore7anizational securitv before or simultaneously with anomaly. In contrast to the previous scenarios, simulating hardware anomalies requires the physical presence of the false anomalist or environmental influence in order to achieve the anomaly. (4) External to Computer System. Such things as electrical mains fluctuations are a possible example of natural "disasters," and if the fluctuation coincided with some other meaningful event the users might decide that an anomaly had occurred which had a correlation with that meaningful event, thus starting local lore about this false correlation. (1) WORMS (write once read many times) optical disks. These (at present) are noneditable and are immune to "grubby thumbs," magnetic fields, and static. They are therefore much better potential psi-corruption targets than the currently favorite floppy disk, especially if the target data on the disk are well en- crypted and the disk uniquely identilled. (2) Optical fiber cables. This makes data transmission line monitoring or adjustment much more complex. (3) Automated technical advisers for computer-based securitv. These can rapidly and thoroughly analyze a large and highly com- plex system specification for security weaknesses. They are only as good as the level of detail or accuracy in the specification and the expertise of their user. (4) Gypsy verification environments & (5) Program analysis tools. Both of these methods could be useful in the analysis of a piece of code that has been in an "anomaly." Again, they are sub- ject to the same weaknesses discussed under the previous heading. (6) Cryptographic methods. These can be highly effective in preventing access to information, provided a sufficiently good encryption method is selected. (7) Shielding. Simple shielding of vdu screen emission can eliminate the chance of a computer screen being reconstituted out- side the system confines. Conclusion This paper has tried to portray the various scenarios that could be misinterpreted as an "anomalous" human-computer inter- action (AHCI). It also tried to show that there are conceptual pat- terns that allow AHCl anomalies to be categorized, along with their possible fraudulent explanations. It is hoped that armed with such a method of categorization experimenters may be able better to re- cord and evaluate the intriguing field of AHCI. In such evaluations it mav be more cost effective to create a means of detecting a frauei- ulent anomaly rather than to proof a system against every possible threat. A highly motivated false anomalist with large financial and time resources might be able to create fraudulent anomalies, regard- less of the tightest precautions. Experimenters might therefore find it helpful to adopt an experimental condition where no one Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP96-00792ROO0701020005-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP96-00792ROO0701020005-3 112 Papers star "makes or breaks" the results. By using large "anonymous" source groups the incentive for any one individual to create false anomalies might be greatly reduced. STATISTICAL ISSUES AND METHODS* WHEN WILL WE BEGIN TO REDUCE ALPHA AND BETA ERRORS IN STATISTICAL PSI EXPERIMENTS? Ulrich Timm (Institut ffir Grenzgebiete der Psychologie und Psychohygiene, Eichhalde 12, 7800 Freiburg i.Br. , West Germany) In many psi experi ents some stat~gtical selection errors are made, after whose corr the initial/statistical significance dis .c appears. These are Type I errors, m re simply called alpha errors. That does not necessarily ean, how er, that in these experiments real psi effects do not exis , since tFeusual methods, if utilized correctly, are often so ine ctive-- ith regard to the rareness, instability, and inconsistenc of ps' effects--that they can only seldom lead to statistical sli can e. This inefficiency of statisti- sl cal methods creates Ty e I r r , or beta errors. Therefore, P,e II P, our objective should not 1y he reduction of alpha errors and the related decrease of spurio s *gnificances but also the reduction of beta errors and the related i c ase of real significance. First I give an overview of tho e alpha errors that I call statistical selection errors. T ese sh simply stated, the follow- rs' ing three qualities (Timm, Z , 1983, 9 229) (1) From a set of st istical re ult a single result is se- 'a 'ficance test. lected and ev, ed by some s' (2) The selection * not performed r domly but according to a criterion hat is related to th level of the single result in that it directly or indirectly favors positive results. (3) Despite this success -dependent selection, the significance test i ~d out and interpreted in the usual manner without any correction. *Chaired by Martin U. Johnson. Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP96-00792ROO0701020005-3