Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788ROO1200030002-5 Illusion? value against Soviet employment of an aggres- sive foreign policy. Consequently, Lockwood calls these statements declaratory deterrence. As achack to verifythe real Sovietview of given U.S. doctrine, Soviet foYeIgn policy behavior Is compared to their analysis of the U.S. doctrine. By using a wide variety of sources including journals whose articles have prior approval of the C.P.S.U. and the formerly classified Soviet general staff publication, Mllitaiy Tbought, Lock- wood enables the reader to view U.S. strategic doctrine through Soviet eyes. Three themes emerge from the book. The first Is that Soviet strategic planners view U.S. doc- trinie within theframework of theirown strategic doctrine. This mirror Imaging was particularly evident In the Soviet reaction to McNamara's sesured destruction doctrine, Although this was an arms control strategy designed to provide a minimal nuclear capacity to Inflict unacceptable damage following a Soviet surprise attack, the Soviets believed it to be a nuclear warfighting doctrine because all of their doctrines were designed to win a nuclear war. The Soviets sim- ilarly misinterpreted Nixon's policy of realistic deterrence. Lockwood also notes that the Soviets tend to view purely academic discussions of strategic doctrine as having the Imprimatur of the government because all Soviet writings are approved by the government. Even though the Soviets ultimately recog- nized that the U.S waa Indeed moving toward a deterrence policy, the Kremlin was puzzled because according to Marxist-Leninist theory, Imperialist America is Inherently aggressive. The Soviets resolved this contradiction by con- cluding that the change in U.S doctrine from a nuclear warfighting strategy was In response to the rapid growth In Soviet strategic power. This was particularly evident In the Soviet reaction to realistic deterrence and the abandonment of McNamara's flexible response in favor of assured destruction. Lockwood clearly states that it the Soviets perceive us as abandoning a nuclear warfighting doctrine because of the buildup In Soviet arms, then the Incentive is for them to extract further concessions by building more arms than negotiating arms limitation. Finally, Lockwood concludes that the Soviets treat U.S. strategic doctrine seriously only if we have sufficient military capabilities to match our strategic pronouncements. The initial Soviet reaction to Schlesinger's limited nuclear option policy of increased targeting flexibility was one of concern inasmuch as the Soviets perceived us as moving from a deterrence to nuclear war- fighting strategy which included a possible pre- emptive strike. When, however, we neither deve- loped an antiballistic missile system nor Increas- ed our civil defense posture to meet the require- ments of a limited nuclear option strategy, the doctrine was quickly discredited. Accordingly, Lockwood recommends that the United States emphasize these two neglected areas In future strategic doctrine. This thought provoking and timely book Is a must for all those concerned with U.S. strategic rianning. One hopes that Lockwood will sim- Ilarly analyze the Soviet response to strategic developmunts during the Reagan administration. 1 at Lt. Jay L. Spiegel 331st MI Compshy, 97th USARCOM Fort Meade, Md. 44 Psychic Warfare, Threat or by Martin Ebon, McGraw-Hill, New York, 282 pages, $15.95. Psychic Warfare poses the strong possibility that some type of future warfare may include an Orwellian component. This does not mean that psychic warfare by Itself will supplant the more traditional modes of war and the book's context tends to support this slant. The book addresses the possible link between psychic phenomena, extrasensory perception, and mind control experiments with the future prospect of military application. There is strong ovidence in Ebon's book thatthe military, scien- tific and intelligence communities of both the United Statesandthe Soviet Union have and. are making ZOalOUS attempts to harness the power and potential of the mind to do things such as move objects, to perceive events that have not yet occurred, and to span time, distance and space across all ideological and political boun- daries. There have been attempts by U.S. and Soviet scientists, Plus scientists from nonaligned nations, to "pool" the results of past psychic experiments. Ebon's book states that the Soviets are playing down their interest In psychic appli- cations, but in reality are mounting a large effort to gain supremacy in this relatively new scien- tific field. The author's basic premise is that ail persons are endowed with extrasensory ability, but do not consciously apply It in theirdaily lives. There are, however, a relatively small number of per- sons that are keenly aware of their psychic gifts that, under controlled scientific conditions, appear to experience visual and sensory percep- tions "normal" people have not been able to experience, The author contends that "normal" persons have similar psychic experiences on occasion without being able to explain the "occurrence." Mind altering, psychotronlis; and extrasen- sory perception can be frightening when further explored. Ebon Illustrates this by explaining a case In which the CIA conducted,experiments using persons with keen psychic gifts to contact agents that had died while on operational mis- sions (CIA spy Oleg Penkovsy, for one). The agency's justification for the experiments was "to determine the circumstances of apprehen- sion, methods of interrogation, and the degree of inforfustion disclosed during Interroga- tion(s)." The military communities of both superpow- ers are aware of the possibilities in the areas of Intelligence and communications that psychic warfare could afford them, some which could enable them to "see" and "hear" Into enemy ter- ritory without actually having to send an opera- tional asset across national boundaries. The ultimate use of psychic power would be projection of mind power to a specific location, say 2 Dzerzinksy Square, the KGB headquarters In Moscow, and actually "picking up" informa- tion without the KGB knowing what is happen- Ing. Of course, the situation could be reversed. It all comes down to which nation wants It enough to commit the money and scientific resources required. If successful psychic war- faredoesoccurin the near future, it would mean that the nation using it first would have the potentialof keeping Itsecretfromtherestofthe world for an undeterminable period. Once the secret is out, however, there would be no telling what Impact It would have on our planet's power centers, and worse, how would further devel- opment and use be controlled. Some means would havistobefound tocurtall proliferation of this now "weapon." After reading this exciting book, I came away with the impression that Psychic Warfare Is an addition to the "Star Wars" package primarily because of the vast possibilities in collecting military information through mind power, As time goes on, new military uses should not be discounted if a nation is willing to invest a sub- stantial part of its military, industrial and scientific resources toward achieving it. Michael S. Evancavich U.S. Afty, Retired Pap C) UAO L5 Miltafy Intelligcnce Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788ROO1200030002-5 cro"Wovd solullan