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## **Timeline, Email Traffic, and Comments Regarding ALDF Personnel Involvement with STS 107 Columbia Flight**

Bob Daugherty

### **January 27, 2003    Monday**

Received a telephone call from Carlisle Campbell at JSC...works for the engineering directorate in Mechanical Systems...involved with doors, hatches, landing gear, etc for the Orbiter. Have worked with Carlisle for almost 20 years on landing and tire-related issues. He asked if I had heard about the issue with foam debris impacting the orbiter during ascent and I replied I had not. He filled me in on the issue, and mentioned that "people" were talking about not knowing exactly where the impact location was on the bottom of the orbiter but that some people mentioned that the gear door might be a vulnerable place to get damaged because of the nature of the thermal seal there. He mentioned that there had been lots of analysis, that the analysis said they didn't think there was a safety of flight issue, but that the gear door was in the "predicted target zone" of the impact. He emailed me two powerpoint documents that discussed the analysis and showed the predicted impact area. He mentioned the fact that "people" were throwing around possible worst-case scenarios regarding landing with two flat tires. This was the main reason for talking to us since we have previously provided JSC and the simulation folks, years ago, with models for just such a landing (not for the reason of them failing due to thermal damage...but just for covering all the bases and not caring why they might be flat). It just so happened that this very week, the astronaut training session at the Ames VMS was occurring where we already were looking at the effects of landing with one tire flat (again, the reason for such was not important), and whether or not the second tire on the strut would fail due to overload. We have done a lot of work on a load-persistence model we developed here at Langley and that was being evaluated. The astronauts were also looking for ground handling techniques that could help prevent the second tire from failing if they had a single tire flat at touchdown. So Carlisle and I knew the simulation community was in a position to very easily and quickly simulate a landing with two flat tires. We discussed the fact that "orbiter management" had not approved such simulations...I can't say whether its because they hadn't yet been approached or they just didn't think it was appropriate since the analysis of the thermal damage did not suggest a safety of flight concern. We then got Howard Law, JSC, Guidance and Control simulation engineer on the phone who was at Ames helping to run the load-persistence testing and asked him about whether they could easily do the simulation we thought would be good to do (the two flat tires) since it is just good engineering practice to simulate anything you can to gather contingency information. We discussed what their simulations had shown during the load persistence runs where the second tire had failed and now you were sliding on two flat tires. We determined that at low speed they were not using our models for drag correctly so I went and got together some old model information for sliding on a dragging strut and faxed him a flow chart for that model out at Ames. We also discussed the fact that some people at JSC were of the opinion that acquiring more information and visualizing the damage area was a good thing to pursue and talked about the options regarding ground based telescopes, EVA's, etc. This discussion was simply two engineers talking...nothing special since neither of us have any expertise in this area. He mentioned that at that point there were no plans to

visualize the damage since the orbiter had no arm, an EVA is very difficult due to the location underneath and lack of hand-holds, and that some thought that ground based telescopes might not have the resolution needed for a good view. We agreed that we thought it made good engineering sense to visualize the damage but were of the opinion that since folks higher up than us were pressing that issue we would not stick our nose in their business...we were just two engineers talking amongst ourselves.

### **January 27, 2003    Monday**

Received several emails from Campbell showing the powerpoint presentations on the tile damage, and a video of the impact of the debris taken from behind the left wing (impact itself hidden from view):

Email subject lines:

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:04:04 : STS-107 Post-Launch Film Review - Day 1

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:06:03 FW: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:14:10 FW: STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Meeting

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:16:52 FW: STS-107 Wing Debris Impact on Ascent: Final analysis case completed

I then watched the video and replied with the following email:

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 4:35 Video you sent

Carlisle then replied with the following email:

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:59:53 FW: Video you sent

Faxed the dragging strut model to Howard Law on the same day Jan 27, 2003 late in the afternoon.

### **January 28, 2003    Tuesday**

I sent the following email to Campbell:

Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2003 1:38 pm Tile Damage

I sent the following email to Mark Shuart to inform him of what was going on after he called me to inquire regarding things he had heard:

Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2003 2:15 pm Foam and Tile

And Carlisle replied with the following email:

Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2003 13:29:58 RE: Tile Damage

### **January 29, 2003    Wednesday**

Had a three way telephone call with Carlisle Campbell and Howard Law and other folks at Ames VMS to discuss progress on the load-persistence simulations. After that we

asked if Howard Law had been officially “asked” or “cleared” to do any simulations to support getting some “background” information in the simulator regarding what might happen if one were to land with two flat tires. Nobody had ever expressed any knowledge that the main gear door was actually involved in the damage area but we just felt that we should do everything we could to get as much info as possible to cover as many bases as possible.

I sent the following email to Mark Shuart to inform him of what was going on:  
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2003 3:51 pm Tile Damage Update

**January 30, 2003 Thursday**

In late afternoon I had a telephone conversation with Campbell who mentioned that they had been in a Landing Gear PRT (Problem Resolution Team?) meeting...this is a normal meeting not related to the issue at hand, I don't believe. They have them probably weekly whether they're flying or not I think. Apparently there were some comments by the Mission Operations folks about the thermal issue and them having to do some talking about making sure they had as many contingency plans figured out as possible since everybody wants to be ready for anything. Since Carlisle and I had been talking, we discussed as many bad things regarding the main gear as we could think of and it became apparent to me after doing some calculations that if the tires failed in the wheel well the door would be blown off and there could be big problems. Other things we discussed were the pyros that help deployment as a backup...etc. I asked Carlisle if he thought it was appropriate to voice these scenarios to MOD guys and he agreed it was a good thing so that we felt like we had done our best job of helping the system not let some worst-case scenarios slip thru the cracks.

I sent the following email to David Lechner at JSC (he's associated with the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) and we've worked together often)

Date: Thurs, 30 Jan 2003 6:22 pm Main Gear Breach Concerns

**January 31, 2003 Friday**

I received a telephone call from David Lechner thanking me for voicing the scenarios in the email and he said they were having all kinds of discussions about being ready for various contingencies so that they would be ready to advise the Mission Management Team if necessary for them to make any decisions they may have to during entry. I can't speak for David, but I had no actual concern that anything disastrous would occur. We discussed a belly landing at length and why that apparently is considered to be a loss-of-vehicle event.

I received the following email from David Lechner in response to my email the night before:

Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2003 12:17:34 RE: Main Gear Breach Concerns



From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "Bob Daugherty" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: FW: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT  
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:06:03 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 24, 2003 10:32 AM  
**To:** CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA); RICHART, JENE A. (JSC-MS2) (NASA)  
**Cc:** MADDEN, CHRISTOPHER B. (CHRIS) (JSC-ES3) (NASA)  
**Subject:** FW: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT

Here is the Orbiter thermal/stress assessment. I do not have the system integration (Carlos Ortiz/Boeing) debris trajectory analysis charts yet. Both were presented to MER team and MMT this morning. There is good potential for tile replacement and maybe local overheating of structure, but no burn-through. Though the assessment states, so far, that no safety of flight issues exist, there is open work on one more case, the MLG Door tiles. The MER team understood this open work, but in my opinion the MMT with Linda Ham did not get the full message of open work remaining.

Rodney Rocha  
Structural Engineering Division (ES-SED)

ES Div. Chief Engineer (Space Shuttle DCE)  
Chair, Space Shuttle Loads & Dynamics Panel

Mail Code ES2 Phone 281-483-8889

-----Original Message-----

**From:** White, Doug [mailto:Doug.White@USAHQ.UnitedSpaceAlliance.com]  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 23, 2003 10:23 PM  
**To:** Wilder, James; Reeves, William D; CURRY, DONALD M. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); SCHOMBURG, CALVIN (JSC-EA) (NASA); LEVY, VINCENT M. (JSC-EG) (NASA); ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Subject:** FW: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT

Potential tile damage charts for the MMT tomorrow morning. Mike Dunham will pitch these.

Doug White  
Director, Operations Requirements  
281 282-2879 office  
281 282-4438 fax  
877 497-0336 pager  
8774970336@archwireless.net  
600 Gemini  
Houston, TX 77058

"Never let the fear of striking out get in your way." -Babe Ruth

-----Original Message-----

From: Dunham, Michael J [mailto:Michael.J.Dunham@boeing.com]  
Sent: Thursday, January 23, 2003 8:36 PM  
To: EXT-Madera, Pamela L; EXT-White, Doug; Alvin Beckner-Jr (E-mail); Bo Bejmuk (E-mail); David Camp (E-mail); Douglas Cline (E-mail); Ed Alexander (E-mail); Frances Ferris (E-mail); Garland Parlier (E-mail); John Mulholland (E-mail); Mark Pickens (E-mail); Michael Burghardt (E-mail); Mike Fuller (E-mail); Norm Beougher (E-mail); Scott Christensen V (E-mail); Steve Harrison (E-mail)  
Subject: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT

<<Debris.ppt>>

Michael J. Dunham  
Boeing/Orbiter SSM - Stress, Loads and Dynamics  
(281)-853-1697  
(281)-853-1525 (Fax)  
(281)-621-1924 (Pager)

Debris.ppt

From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "'Bob Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: FW: STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Meeting  
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:14:10 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 23, 2003 7:59 AM  
**To:** SHACK, PAUL E. (JSC-EA42) (NASA); SERIALE-GRUSH, JOYCE M. (JSC-EA) (NASA); KRAMER, JULIE A. (JSC-EA4) (NASA); CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA); MILLER, GLENN J. (JSC-EA) (NASA)  
**Subject:** FW: STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Meeting

FYI.

Rodney Rocha  
Structural Engineering Division (ES-SED)

ES Div. Chief Engineer (Space Shuttle DCE)  
Chair, Space Shuttle Loads & Dynamics Panel

Mail Code ES2 Phone 281-483-8889

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Madera, Pamela L [mailto:pam.l.madera@usahq.unitedspacealliance.com]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 22, 2003 11:22 AM  
**To:** CURRY, DONALD M. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); LEVY, VINCENT M. (JSC-EG) (NASA); KOWAL, T. J. (JOHN) (JSC-ES3) (NASA); DERRY, STEPHEN M. (STEVE) (JSC-EG3) (NASA); Nagle, Scott M; Carlos Ortiz (E-mail); GOMEZ, REYNALDO J. (RAY) (JSC-EG3) (NASA); DISLER, JONATHAN M. (JON) (JSC-SX) (LM); Jacobs, William A  
**Cc:** 'Scott Christensen V (E-mail)'; 'Norman Ignacio (Nacho) (E-mail)'; CHAO, DENNIS; Stoner-1, Michael D; 'Carlos Ortiz (E-mail)'; 'Michael J Dunham (E-mail)'; Sebesta, Stephen P; CORONADO, DIANA; 'Craig Madden' (E-mail); Bell, Dan R.; Gordon, Michael P.; 'Paul A Parker (E-mail)'; ISHMAEL, MOHAMED I. (GEORGE) (JSC-NC) (SAIC); ALEXANDER, ED  
**Subject:** STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Meeting

Rodney Rocha has conference room 221 in JSC Building 13 available for today's 1:00 PM telecon. Located on second floor. The dial in number is the same as below. I propose the following agenda:

Review of transport analysis (Carlos Ortiz - charts attached)  
Discussion of appropriate Particle Size (Ortiz, Disler, all)  
Review of Flight Design Plans for Assessing Options (Bill Jacobs)  
Status of Impact Damage Assessment (P. Parker)  
Status of Thermal Analysis (Norm Ignacio/Dennis Chao)  
Approach for stress assessment (Dunham)  
Discussion on Need/Rationale for Mandatory Viewing of damage site (All)

<<STS-107 Preliminary Debris Assessment - rev2.ppt>>

Pam Madera  
Vehicle and Systems Analysis Subsystem Area Manager  
Phone: 281-282-4453  
Pager: 877-254-8252  
(I can receive a short alpha numeric page by addressing e-mail to:  
877-254-8252@archwireless.net)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Madera, Pamela L



**Sent:** Monday, January 20, 2003 5:47 PM

**To:** CURRY, DONALD M; ROCHA, ALAN RODNEY; LEVY, VINCENT M; KOWAL, T JOHN; DERRY, STEPHEN M

**Cc:** 'Scott Christensen V (E-mail)'; 'Norman Ignacio (Nacho) (E-mail)'; CHAO, DENNIS; Stoner-1, Michael D; 'Carlos Ortiz (E-mail)'; 'Michael J Dunham (E-mail)'; Sebesta, Stephen P; CORONADO, DIANA; 'Craig Madden' (E-mail); Bell, Dan R.; Gordon, Michael P.; Paul A Parker (E-mail)

**Subject:** STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Plans

The Boeing/USA team would like to meet with you Tuesday at 2:00 on meet-me-line number 877-668-7953 P/C 276237 to discuss analysis plans for assessing the STS-107 Debris Impact.

**Pam Madera**

Vehicle and Systems Analysis Subsystem Area Manager

Phone: 281-282-4453

Pager: 877-254-8252

(I can receive a short alpha numeric page by addressing e-mail to:  
877-254-8252@archwireless.net)

STS-107 Preliminary Debris Assessment - rev2.ppt

From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "'Bob Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: FW: STS-107 Wing Debris Impact on Ascent: Final analysis case completed  
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:16:52 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: KOWAL, T. J. (JOHN) (JSC-ES3) (NASA)  
> Sent: Monday, January 27, 2003 10:35 AM  
> To: ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
> Cc: ROGERS, JOSEPH E. (JOE) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); GALBREATH, GREGORY F.  
> (GREG) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); JACOBS, JEREMY B. (JSC-ES4) (NASA); CURRY, DONALD  
> M. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); RICKMAN, STEVEN L. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); SCHOMBURG,  
> CALVIN (JSC-EA) (NASA); CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA);  
> MADDEN, CHRISTOPHER B. (CHRIS) (JSC-ES3) (NASA)  
> Subject: RE: STS-107 Wing Debris Impact on Ascent: Final analysis  
> case completed

>  
> I talked to Ignacio about the analysis he ran. In the case he ran, the  
> large gouge is in the acreage of the door. If the gouge were to occur in  
> a location where it passes over the thermal barrier on the perimeter of  
> the door, the statement that there is "no breaching of the thermal and gas  
> seals" would not be valid. I think this point should be clarified;  
> otherwise, the note sent out this morning gives a false sense of security.

>  
> John Kowal  
> ES3/Thermal Branch  
> NASA-Johnson Space Center  
> (281) 483-8871

>  
>  
> -----Original Message-----

> From: ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
> Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2003 7:45 PM  
> To: SHACK, PAUL E. (JSC-EA42) (NASA); MCCORMACK, DONALD L. (DON)  
> (JSC-MV6) (NASA); OUELLETTE, FRED A. (JSC-MV6) (NASA)  
> Cc: ROGERS, JOSEPH E. (JOE) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); GALBREATH, GREGORY F.  
> (GREG) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); JACOBS, JEREMY B. (JSC-ES4) (NASA);  
> SERIALE-GRUSH, JOYCE M. (JSC-EA) (NASA); KRAMER, JULIE A. (JSC-EA4)  
> (NASA); CURRY, DONALD M. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); KOWAL, T. J. (JOHN) (JSC-ES3)  
> (NASA); RICKMAN, STEVEN L. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); SCHOMBURG, CALVIN (JSC-EA)  
> (NASA); CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
> Subject: STS-107 Wing Debris Impact on Ascent: Final analysis case  
> completed

>  
> As you recall from Friday's briefing to the MER, there remained open work  
> to assess analytically predicted impact damage to the wing underside in  
> the region of the main landing gear door. This area was considered a low  
> probability hit area by the image analysis teams, but they admitted a  
> debris strike here could not be ruled out.

>  
> As with the other analyses performed and reported on Friday, this

- > assessment by the Boeing multi-technical discipline engineering teams also
- > employed the system integration's dispersed trajectories followed by
- > serial results from the Crater damage prediction tool, thermal analysis,
- > and stress analysis. It was reviewed and accepted by the ES-DCE (R. Rocha)
- > by Sunday morning, Jan. 26. The case is defined by a large area gouge
- > about 7 inch wide and about 30 inch long with sloped sides like a crater,
- > and reaching down to the densified layer of the TPS.
- >
- > SUMMARY: Though this case predicted some higher temperatures at the outer
- > layer of the honeycomb aluminum face sheet and subsequent debonding of the
- > sheet, there is no predicted burn-through of the door, no breaching of the
- > thermal and gas seals, nor is there door structural deformation or thermal
- > warpage to open the seal to hot plasma intrusion. Though degradation of
- > the TPS and door structure is likely (if the impact occurred here), there
- > is no safety of flight (entry, descent, landing) issue.
- >
- > Note to Don M. and Fred O.: On Friday I believe the MER was thoroughly
- > briefed and it was clear that open work remained (viz., the case
- > summarized above), the message of open work was not clearly given, in my
- > opinion, to Linda Ham at the MMT. I believe we left her the impression
- > that engineering assessments and cases were all finished and we could
- > state with finality no safety of flight issues or questions remaining.
- > This very serious case could not be ruled out and it was a very good thing
- > we carried it through to a finish.
- >
- >
- > Rodney Rocha (ES2) x38889
- > \* Division Shuttle Chief Engineer (DCE), ES-Structural Engineering
- > Division
- > \* Chair, Space Shuttle Loads & Dynamics Panel
- >
- >



Aircraft Landing Dynamics Facility  
Langley Research Center  
Hampton, VA 23681-2199

### FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

TO: Howard Lfw  
FAX NUMBER: 650 604 7484  
TELEPHONE NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_  
LOCATION: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_  
TELEPHONE NUMBER: (757) \_\_\_\_\_  
FAX NUMBER: (757) 864-8090

COMMENTS: DRAWING STRUT  
MODEL - FLOW CHART  
COULDN'T FIND PLOT

Number of pages including lead: 6

Signature: Bob D Date: 1/27/03

National Aeronautics and  
Space Administration

Langley Research Center  
Hampton, Virginia  
23665



497

Copy to Attn of:

TO: NASA Johnson Space Center  
Attn: VA/Richard Colonna, Manager, STS  
Orbiter and GFE Projects Office

FROM: 497/Aerospace Technologist, Impact Dynamics Branch, SDD

SUBJECT: Results of Roll-on-Rim Capability Tests

A series of tests have been completed at the Langley Research Center's Aircraft Landing Dynamics Facility (ALDF) to determine the roll-on-rim capability of the Orbiter main wheel. Both a standard flight wheel inner half and a modified inner wheel half were tested. In addition, data were gathered to identify the behavior of a deflated tire during and after touchdown. This information is helpful in simulating a landing if a tire has deflated in orbit, a highly unlikely condition.

Because of the vertical load capability of the ALDF, only inner wheel halves were tested to identify their failure modes. This allowed full-scale loads to be applied to the wheel bead flanges. In our opinion, this testing mode does not compromise the validity of the results.

A standard flight wheel had previously been rolled on the B.F. Goodrich dynamometer wheel at rated load and at a speed of approximately 10 mph. It developed a crack and lost a small portion of bead flange after about 4,000 ft. and the test was stopped. The dynamometer surface was smooth steel. A similar test was conducted at the ALDF with a standard inner wheel half loaded to half the rated load. The surface was a simulated KSC runway. After about 650 ft., a portion of the bead flange failed and during the next revolution, the wheel half completely collapsed.

The first high-speed test involved landing a standard inner wheel half and observing its behavior. The wheel half was landed at a sink rate of 2.6 ft./sec. and forward speed of 150 kts. A rubber strap was attached to the wheel to facilitate spin-up and minimize wheel spin-up damage. Vertical load was about 25,000 lb. during this test. During spin-up and within the first 25 ft. of roll, the bead flange zippered off in 4 in. pieces. Ten feet later, the bead seat flange area and tube well disintegrated. Down load buffers, which limited travel of the drop test carriage, prevented the load from being applied to the wheel center section following wheel flange failure.

The next test was run to examine what benefit could be gained by using an inner wheel half with a much stronger bead flange (at a weight penalty of about 4 lbs. per inner wheel half). Touchdown conditions on this wheel half were 157 kts. groundspeed and 2.8 fps sink rate. This wheel survived spin-up and was loaded to about 65,000 lb. After about 130 ft., the wheel half disintegrated. Rolling resistance during this test was 5 percent of wheel vertical load.

The next test was designed to investigate the roll-on-center section capability of the wheel after the bead flanges and tube well have failed, but the center section did not spin-up and the wheel was skidded down the runway. The test speed was 159 kts. and the vertical load was about 70,000 lb. During the 450 ft. long slide, about 3 in. of wheel was worn away, and the friction coefficient was about .2.

The last test involved landing and rolling out on a tire deflated before the test to simulate a tire that has deflated in the wheel well either on the launch pad or in orbit. The conditions of this test included a ground speed of 157 kts. and a sink rate of 2.8 fps. Vertical load was maintained at 70,000 lb. The flat tire rolled approximately 1,050 ft. and produced a friction coefficient between .15 and .20. The tire disintegrated after a roll of 1,050 ft. Thereafter, the wheel rolled for 500 ft. on the intact beads that remained attached to the wheel. Rolling resistance while on the beads was .1.

These results indicate that no significant roll-on-rim capability is present in either the standard or modified inner wheel half. It appears that wheel failure at speeds of 160 kts. will undoubtedly result in some damage to the orbiter due to flying debris. Unfortunately, no method of predicting this damage is known. Most of the highest energy debris should be found in the 30-90 degree arc behind the wheel, with 90 degrees being vertical. Tire failure will result in the loss of large pieces of the 200 lb. tire, and prediction of these trajectories is also impossible.

A set of guidelines for predicting wheel failure along with an event flow chart is enclosed. Note that some of the events are only engineering judgments based on extremely limited test data.

It is assumed that some portion of this data along with the 1/3 scale skid results will be used to determine where to land the orbiter should a flat tire be detected in orbit. Although some damage to the orbiter is likely during a concrete runway landing with a flat tire, the unknown behavior of the tire and wheel on the lakebed surface during failure coupled with the lack of friction coefficient data on the lakebed surface at high bearing pressures is cause for concern. If flat tire lakebed landings are being considered, it is recommended that, at a minimum, tests be conducted at a lakebed site using a bare wheel loaded to 120,000 lb. using the towable load cart available at Edwards Air Force Base. If the wheel fails at low speed, then failure at high speed is almost certain. If the wheel simply digs in, then no information is gained as to high speed behavior. This test is inexpensive and capable of producing data that could help in the decision of where to land if an orbiter tire has lost pressure.

If you have any questions, feel free to contact Sandy Stubbs or me at FTS 928-2796.

Robert H. Daugherty

Enclosures  
Set of Guidelines  
Flowchart

cc (w/o Encl.):  
101/Files  
118/SD  
244/SDD  
497/IDB  
497/RHDaugherty

NASA JSC  
CB/JCasper  
ES4/BHolder  
ES6/CCampbell  
EH221/HLaw  
GA/BDO'Connor

B. F. Goodrich Co.  
Aerospace and Defense Div.  
Attn: J. Warren  
P.O. Box 340  
Troy, OH 45373

Rockwell International  
AC19/MPorter  
12214 Lakewood Blvd.  
Downey, CA 90241

### GUIDELINES FOR SIMULATING TIRE FAILURES

#### DEFINITIONS:

"GOOD" TIRE: One that is inflated

"FLAT" TIRE: One that has lost air but did not blow up due to overload

"FAILED" TIRE: One that has :  
Blown up due to overload or  
Disintegrated due to flat tire roll.


1. Rolling on a "GOOD" TIRE:  $\mu = .02$
2. Rolling on a "FLAT" TIRE:  $\mu = .2$
3. Rolling on the bead:  $\mu = .1$
4. Rolling on the rim flange or center section:  $\mu = .05$
5. Skidding on center section, brake parts, axle, etc.:  $\mu = .2$
6. Below about 40 fps, number 5 above ramps from  $\mu = .2$  to  $\mu = .7$  as speed approaches 0.

#### COMMENTS


NOTE: \* indicates lower confidence than other comments

1. Flat tires can survive 1000' if loaded 70K or less.
2. Good tires loaded above 180K fail immediately.
3. \*Failed tires roll on beads for 1000' if wheel loads are < 100K.
4. \*If rolling on beads and wheel loads exceed 100K, then bead fails and rim flange breaks in 50'.
5. Center section may survive any length (flowchart assumes 0 length).
6. \*For 1 good tire and 1 flat tire and strut load < 180K then strut drag  $\mu = .04 + .016 \times$  deflection of good tire.





Note: Dt = Deflection of good tire : should range from 0 to 10 in.



From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "'Bob Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: FW: Video you sent  
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:59:53 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Thanks. That's why they need to get all the facts in early on--such as look at impact damage from the spy telescope. Even then, we may not know the real effect of the damage.

The LaRC ditching model tests 20 some years ago showed that the Orbiter was the best ditching shape that they had ever tested, of many. But, our structures people have said that if we ditch we would blow such big holes in the lower panels that the orbiter might break up. Anyway, they refuse to even consider water ditching any more--I still have the test results[ Bailout seems best.

**From:** Robert H. Daugherty [mailto:robert.h.daugherty@nasa.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 27, 2003 3:35 PM  
**To:** CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Subject:** Video you sent

WOW!!!

I bet there are a few pucker strings pulled tight around there!

Thinking about a belly landing versus bailout..... (I would say that if there is a question about main gear well burn thru that its crazy to even hit the deploy gear button...the reason being that you might have failed the wheels since they are aluminum..they will fail before the tire heating/pressure makes them fail..and you will send debris all over the wheel well making it a possibility that the gear would not even deploy due to ancillary damage...300 feet is the wrong altitude to find out you have one gear down and the other not down...you're dead in that case)

Think about the pitch-down moment for a belly landing when hitting not the main gear but the trailing edge of the wing or body flap when landing gear up...even if you come in fast and at slightly less pitch attitude...the nose slapdown with that pitching moment arm seems to me to be pretty scary...so much so that I would bail out before I would let a loved one land like that.

My two cents.


See ya,  
Bob

At 03:04 PM 1/27/2003, you wrote:

-----Original Message-----

**From:** SMITH, JAMES P. (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 22, 2003 7:15 AM  
**To:** DL ES2 Branch; DL ES2 Contractors  
**Subject:** FW: STS-107 Post-Launch Film Review - Day 1

Watch the video first and see if you can spot anything.



From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "'Robert H. Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: RE: Tile Damage  
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2003 13:29:58 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

I have not heard anything new. I'll let you know if I do.


CCC


-----Original Message-----

From: Robert H. Daugherty [mailto:r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov]  
Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2003 12:39 PM  
To: CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
Subject: Tile Damage

Any more activity today on the tile damage or are people just relegated to crossing their fingers and hoping for the best?

See ya,  
Bob





Hi David,

I talked to Carlisle a bit ago and he let me know you guys at MOD were getting into the loop on the tile damage issue. I'm writing this email not really in an official capacity but since we've worked together so many times I feel like I can say pretty much anything to you. And before I begin I would offer that I am admittedly erring way on the side of absolute worst-case scenarios and I don't really believe things are as bad as I'm getting ready to make them out. But I certainly believe that to not be ready for a gut-wrenching decision after seeing instrumentation in the wheel well not be there after entry is irresponsible. One of my personal theories is that you should seriously consider the possibility of the gear not deploying at all if there is a substantial breach of the wheel well. The reason might be that as the temps increase, the wheel (aluminum) will lose material properties as it heats up and the tire pressure will increase. At some point the wheel could fail and send debris everywhere. While it is true there are thermal fuses in the wheel, if the rate of heating is high enough, since the tire is such a good insulator, the wheel may degrade in strength enough to let go far below the 1100 psi or so that the tire normally bursts at. It seems to me that with that much carnage in the wheel well, something could get screwed up enough to prevent deployment and then you are in a world of hurt. The following are scenarios that might be possible...and since there are so many of them, these are offered just to make sure that some things don't slip thru the cracks...I suspect many or all of these have been gone over by you guys already:

1. People talk about landing with two flat tires...I did too until this came up. If both tires blew up in the wheel well (not talking thermal fuse and venting but explosive decomp due to tire and/or wheel failure) the overpressure in the wheel well will be in the 40 + psi range. The resulting loads on the gear door ( a quarter million lbs) would almost certainly blow the door off the hinges or at least send it out into the slip stream...catastrophic. Even if you could survive the heating, would the gear now deploy? And/or also, could you even reach the runway with this kind of drag?
2. The explosive bungies...what might be the possibility of these firing due to excessive heating? If they fired, would they send the gear door and/or the gear into the slipstream?
3. What might excessive heating do to all kinds of other hardware in the wheel well...the hydraulic fluid, uplocks, etc? Are there vulnerable hardware items that might prevent deployment?
4. If the gear didn't deploy ( and you would have to consider this before making the commitment to gear deploy on final) what would happen control-wise if the other gear is down and one is up? (I think Howard Law and his community will tell you you're finished)
5. Do you belly land? Without any other planning you will have already committed to KSC. And what will happen during derotation in a gear up landing (trying to stay away from an asymmetric gear situation for example) since you will be hitting the aft end body flap and wings and pitching down extremely fast ala the old X-15 landings? My guess is you would have an extremely large vertical decel situation up in the nose for the crew. While directional control would be afforded in some part by the drag chute...do you want to count on that to keep you out of the moat?
6. If a belly landing is unacceptable, ditching/bailout might be next on the list. Not a good day.
7. Assuming you can get to the runway with the gear deployed but with two flat tires, can the commander control the vehicle both in pitch and lateral directions? One concern is excessive

drag (0.2 g's) during TD throughout the entire saddle region making the derotation uncontrollable due to saturated elevons...resulting in nose gear failure? The addition of crosswinds would make lateral control a tough thing too. Simulating this, because it is so ridiculously easy to do (sims going on this very minute at AMES with load-persistence) seems like a real no-brainer.

Admittedly this is over the top in many ways but this is a pretty bad time to get surprised and have to make decisions in the last 20 minutes. You can count on us to provide any support you think you need.

Best Regards,  
Bob



From: "LECHNER, DAVID F. (JSC-DF52) (USA)" <david.f.lechner1@jsc.nasa.gov>  
To: "'Robert H. Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Cc: M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov, H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov,  
"CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
Subject: RE: Main Gear Breach Concerns  
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2003 12:17:34 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Bob,

I really appreciate the candid remarks. As always your points have generated extremely valuable discussion in our group. Thank you. We have been discussing and continue to discuss the all possible scenarios, signatures and decisions. Your input is beneficial. Like everyone, we hope that the debris impact analysis is correct and all this discussion is mute.

David F-M Lechner  
Space Shuttle Mechanical Systems  
Mechanical, Maintenance, Arm & Crew Systems (MMACS)  
United Space Alliance, Johnson Space Center  
(281) 483-1685

-----Original Message-----

From: Robert H. Daugherty [mailto:r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov]  
Sent: Thursday, January 30, 2003 5:23 PM  
To: LECHNER, DAVID F. (JSC-DF52) (USA)  
Cc: M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov; H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov; CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
Subject: Main Gear Breach Concerns

Hi David,

I talked to Carlisle a bit ago and he let me know you guys at MOD were getting into the loop on the tile damage issue. I'm writing this email not really in an official capacity but since we've worked together so many times I feel like I can say pretty much anything to you. And before I begin I would offer that I am admittedly erring way on the side of absolute worst-case scenarios and I don't really believe things are as bad as I'm getting ready to make them out. But I certainly believe that to not be ready for a gut-wrenching decision after seeing instrumentation in the wheel well not be there after entry is irresponsible. One of my personal theories is that you should seriously consider the possibility of the gear not deploying at all if there is a substantial breach of the wheel well. The reason might be that as the temps increase, the wheel (aluminum) will lose material properties as it heats up and the tire pressure will increase. At some point the wheel could fail and send debris everywhere. While it is true there are thermal fuses in the wheel, if the rate of heating is high enough, since the tire is such a good insulator, the wheel may degrade in strength enough to let go far below the 1100 psi or so that the tire normally bursts at. It seems to me that with that much carnage in the wheel well, something could get screwed up enough to prevent deployment and then you are in a world of hurt. The following are scenarios that might be possible...and since there are so many of them,

these are offered just to make sure that some things don't slip thru the cracks...I suspect many or all of these have been gone over by you guys already:

1. People talk about landing with two flat tires...I did too until this came up. If both tires blew up in the wheel well (not talking thermal fuse and venting but explosive decomp due to tire and/or wheel failure) the overpressure in the wheel well will be in the 40 + psi range. The resulting loads on the gear door ( a quarter million lbs) would almost certainly blow the door off the hinges or at least send it out into the slip stream...catastrophic. Even if you could survive the heating, would the gear now deploy? And/or also, could you even reach the runway with this kind of drag?
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6. If a belly landing is unacceptable, ditching/bailout might be next on the list. Not a good day.
7. Assuming you can get to the runway with the gear deployed but with two flat tires, can the commander control the vehicle both in pitch and lateral directions? One concern is excessive drag (0.2 g's) during TD throughout the entire saddle region making the derotation uncontrollable due to saturated elevons...resulting in nose gear failure? The addition of crosswinds would make lateral control a tough thing too. Simulating this, because it is so ridiculously easy to do (sims going on this very minute at AMES with load-persistence) seems like a real no-brainer.

Admittedly this is over the top in many ways but this is a pretty bad time to get surprised and have to make decisions in the last 20 minutes. You can count on us to provide any support you think you need.

Best Regards,  
Bob

**Timeline, Email Traffic, and Comments Regarding ALDF Personnel Involvement  
with STS 107 Columbia Flight**

Bob Daugherty

**January 27, 2003    Monday**

Received a telephone call from Carlisle Campbell at JSC...works for the engineering directorate in Mechanical Systems...involved with doors, hatches, landing gear, etc for the Orbiter. Have worked with Carlisle for almost 20 years on landing and tire-related issues. He asked if I had heard about the issue with foam debris impacting the orbiter during ascent and I replied I had not. He filled me in on the issue, and mentioned that "people" were talking about not knowing exactly where the impact location was on the bottom of the orbiter but that some people mentioned that the gear door might be a vulnerable place to get damaged because of the nature of the thermal seal there. He mentioned that there had been lots of analysis, that the analysis said they didn't think there was a safety of flight issue, but that the gear door was in the "predicted target zone" of the impact. He emailed me two powerpoint documents that discussed the analysis and showed the predicted impact area. He mentioned the fact that "people" were throwing around possible worst-case scenarios regarding landing with two flat tires. This was the main reason for talking to us since we have previously provided JSC and the simulation folks, years ago, with models for just such a landing (not for the reason of them failing due to thermal damage...but just for covering all the bases and not caring why they might be flat). It just so happened that this very week, the astronaut training session at the Ames VMS was occurring where we already were looking at the effects of landing with one tire flat (again, the reason for such was not important), and whether or not the second tire on the strut would fail due to overload. We have done a lot of work on a load-persistence model we developed here at Langley and that was being evaluated. The astronauts were also looking for ground handling techniques that could help prevent the second tire from failing if they had a single tire flat at touchdown. So Carlisle and I knew the simulation community was in a position to very easily and quickly simulate a landing with two flat tires. We discussed the fact that "orbiter management" had not approved such simulations...I can't say whether its because they hadn't yet been approached or they just didn't think it was appropriate since the analysis of the thermal damage did not suggest a safety of flight concern. We then got Howard Law , JSC, Guidance and Control simulation engineer on the phone who was at Ames helping to run the load-persistence testing and asked him about whether they could easily do the simulation we thought would be good to do (the two flat tires) since it is just good engineering practice to simulate anything you can to gather contingency information. We discussed what their simulations had shown during the load persistence runs where the second tire had failed and now you were sliding on two flat tires. We determined that at low speed they were not using our models for drag correctly so I went and got together some old model information for sliding on a dragging strut and faxed him a flow chart for that model out at Ames. We also discussed the fact that some people at JSC were of the opinion that acquiring more information and visualizing the damage area was a good thing to pursue and talked about the options regarding ground based telescopes, EVA's, etc. This discussion was simply two engineers talking...nothing special since neither of us have any expertise in this area. He mentioned that at that point there were no plans to

visualize the damage since the orbiter had no arm, an EVA is very difficult due to the location underneath and lack of hand-holds, and that some thought that ground based telescopes might not have the resolution needed for a good view. We agreed that we thought it made good engineering sense to visualize the damage but were of the opinion that since folks higher up than us were pressing that issue we would not stick our nose in their business...we were just two engineers talking amongst ourselves.

**January 27, 2003    Monday**

Received several emails from Campbell showing the powerpoint presentations on the tile damage, and a video of the impact of the debris taken from behind the left wing (impact itself hidden from view):

Email subject lines:

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:04:04 : STS-107 Post-Launch Film Review - Day 1

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:06:03 FW: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:14:10 FW: STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Meeting

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:16:52 FW: STS-107 Wing Debris Impact on Ascent: Final analysis case completed

I then watched the video and replied with the following email:

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 4:35 Video you sent

Carlisle then replied with the following email:

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:59:53 FW: Video you sent

Faxed the dragging strut model to Howard Law on the same day Jan 27, 2003 late in the afternoon.

**January 28, 2003    Tuesday**

I sent the following email to Campbell:

Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2003 1:38 pm Tile Damage

I sent the following email to Mark Shuart to inform him of what was going on after he called me to inquire regarding things he had heard:

Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2003 2:15 pm Foam and Tile

And Carlisle replied with the following email:

Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2003 13:29:58 RE: Tile Damage

**January 29, 2003    Wednesday**

Had a three way telephone call with Carlisle Campbell and Howard Law and other folks at Ames VMS to discuss progress on the load-persistence simulations. After that we

asked if Howard Law had been officially “asked” or “cleared” to do any simulations to support getting some “background” information in the simulator regarding what might happen if one were to land with two flat tires. Nobody had ever expressed any knowledge that the main gear door was actually involved in the damage area but we just felt that we should do everything we could to get as much info as possible to cover as many bases as possible.

I sent the following email to Mark Shuart to inform him of what was going on:  
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2003 3:51 pm Tile Damage Update

**January 30, 2003 Thursday**

In late afternoon I had a telephone conversation with Campbell who mentioned that they had been in a Landing Gear PRT (Problem Resolution Team?) meeting...this is a normal meeting not related to the issue at hand, I don't believe. They have them probably weekly whether they're flying or not I think. Apparently there were some comments by the Mission Operations folks about the thermal issue and them having to do some talking about making sure they had as many contingency plans figured out as possible since everybody wants to be ready for anything. Since Carlisle and I had been talking, we discussed as many bad things regarding the main gear as we could think of and it became apparent to me after doing some calculations that if the tires failed in the wheel well the door would be blown off and there could be big problems. Other things we discussed were the pyros that help deployment as a backup...etc. I asked Carlisle if he thought it was appropriate to voice these scenarios to MOD guys and he agreed it was a good thing so that we felt like we had done our best job or helping the system not let some worst-case scenarios slip thru the cracks.

I sent the following email to David Lechner at JSC (he's associated with the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) and we've worked together often)

Date: Thurs, 30 Jan 2003 6:22 pm Main Gear Breach Concerns

**January 31, 2003 Friday**

I received a telephone call from David Lechner thanking me for voicing the scenarios in the email and he said they were having all kinds of discussions about being ready for various contingencies so that they would be ready to advise the Mission Management Team if necessary for them to make any decisions they may have to during entry. I can't speak for David, but I had no actual concern that anything disastrous would occur. We discussed a belly landing at length and why that apparently is considered to be a loss-of-vehicle event.

I received the following email from David Lechner in response to my email the night before:

Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2003 12:17:34 RE: Main Gear Breach Concerns

From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "Bob Daugherty" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: FW: STS-107 Post-Launch Film Review - Day 1  
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:04:04 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** SMITH, JAMES P. (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 22, 2003 7:15 AM  
**To:** DL ES2 Branch; DL ES2 Contractors  
**Subject:** FW: STS-107 Post-Launch Film Review - Day 1

Watch the video first and see if you can spot anything.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Pedraza, Michael A [mailto:michael.a.pedraza@usago.ksc.nasa.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 21, 2003 8:35 PM  
**Subject:** STS-107 Post-Launch Film Review - Day 1

**Michael Pedraza**  
**Storekeeper/Expediter**  
**MSC-44 RPSF**  
**USK-337**  
**Phone 861-6452**  
**Fax 861-0374**

(. . . (\* . . . \*\* . . . \*) . . . )  
« . . . \*Supply & Support\* . . . »  
(. . . (\* . . . \*\* . . . \*) . . . )

Attached is the Day 1 report and an MPG of Anomaly #1.

107film1.pdf

E212.mpg

From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "'Bob Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: FW: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT  
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:06:03 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 24, 2003 10:32 AM  
**To:** CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA); RICHART, JENE A. (JSC-MS2) (NASA)  
**Cc:** MADDEN, CHRISTOPHER B. (CHRIS) (JSC-ES3) (NASA)  
**Subject:** FW: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT

Here is the Orbiter thermal/stress assessment. I do not have the system integration (Carlos Ortiz/Boeing) debris trajectory analysis charts yet. Both were presented to MER team and MMT this morning. There is good potential for tile replacement and maybe local overheating of structure, but no burn-through. Though the assessment states, so far, that no safety of flight issues exist, there is open work on one more case, the MLG Door tiles. The MER team understood this open work, but in my opinion the MMT with Linda Ham did not get the full message of open work remaining.

Rodney Rocha  
Structural Engineering Division (ES-SED)

ES Div. Chief Engineer (Space Shuttle DCE)  
Chair, Space Shuttle Loads & Dynamics Panel

Mail Code ES2 Phone 281-483-8889

-----Original Message-----

**From:** White, Doug [mailto:Doug.White@USAHQ.UnitedSpaceAlliance.com]  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 23, 2003 10:23 PM  
**To:** Wilder, James; Reeves, William D; CURRY, DONALD M. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); SCHOMBURG, CALVIN (JSC-EA) (NASA); LEVY, VINCENT M. (JSC-EG) (NASA); ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Subject:** FW: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT

Potential tile damage charts for the MMT tomorrow morning. Mike Dunham will pitch these.

Doug White  
Director, Operations Requirements  
281 282-2879 office  
281 282-4438 fax  
877 497-0336 pager  
8774970336@archwireless.net  
600 Gemini  
Houston, TX 77058

"Never let the fear of striking out get in your way." -Babe Ruth

-----Original Message-----

From: Dunham, Michael J [mailto:Michael.J.Dunham@boeing.com]  
Sent: Thursday, January 23, 2003 8:36 PM  
To: EXT-Madera, Pamela L; EXT-White, Doug; Alvin Beckner-Jr (E-mail); Bo Bejmuk (E-mail); David Camp (E-mail); Douglas Cline (E-mail); Ed Alexander (E-mail); Frances Ferris (E-mail); Garland Parlier (E-mail); John Mulholland (E-mail); Mark Pickens (E-mail); Michael Burghardt (E-mail); Mike Fuller (E-mail); Norm Beougher (E-mail); Scott Christensen V (E-mail); Steve Harrison (E-mail)  
Subject: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT

<<Debris.ppt>>

Michael J. Dunham  
Boeing/Orbiter SSM - Stress, Loads and Dynamics  
(281)-853-1697  
(281)-853-1525 (Fax)  
(281)-621-1924 (Pager)

Debris.ppt



From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "'Bob Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: FW: STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Meeting  
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:14:10 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 23, 2003 7:59 AM  
**To:** SHACK, PAUL E. (JSC-EA42) (NASA); SERIALE-GRUSH, JOYCE M. (JSC-EA) (NASA); KRAMER, JULIE A. (JSC-EA4) (NASA); CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA); MILLER, GLENN J. (JSC-EA) (NASA)  
**Subject:** FW: STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Meeting

FYI.

Rodney Rocha  
Structural Engineering Division (ES-SED)

ES Div. Chief Engineer (Space Shuttle DCE)  
Chair, Space Shuttle Loads & Dynamics Panel

Mail Code ES2 Phone 281-483-8889

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Madera, Pamela L [mailto:pam.l.madera@usahq.unitedspacealliance.com]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 22, 2003 11:22 AM  
**To:** CURRY, DONALD M. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); LEVY, VINCENT M. (JSC-EG) (NASA); KOWAL, T. J. (JOHN) (JSC-ES3) (NASA); DERRY, STEPHEN M. (STEVE) (JSC-EG3) (NASA); Nagle, Scott M; Carlos Ortiz (E-mail); GOMEZ, REYNALDO J. (RAY) (JSC-EG3) (NASA); DISLER, JONATHAN M. (JON) (JSC-SX) (LM); Jacobs, William A  
**Cc:** 'Scott Christensen V (E-mail)'; 'Norman Ignacio (Nacho) (E-mail)'; CHAO, DENNIS; Stoner-1, Michael D; 'Carlos Ortiz (E-mail)'; 'Michael J Dunham (E-mail)'; Sebesta, Stephen P; CORONADO, DIANA; 'Craig Madden' (E-mail); Bell, Dan R.; Gordon, Michael P.; 'Paul A Parker (E-mail)'; ISHMAEL, MOHAMED I. (GEORGE) (JSC-NC) (SAIC); ALEXANDER, ED  
**Subject:** STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Meeting

Rodney Rocha has conference room 221 in JSC Building 13 available for today's 1:00 PM telecon. Located on second floor. The dial in number is the same as below. I propose the following agenda:

Review of transport analysis (Carlos Ortiz - charts attached)  
Discussion of appropriate Particle Size (Ortiz, Disler, all)  
Review of Flight Design Plans for Assessing Options (Bill Jacobs)  
Status of Impact Damage Assessment (P. Parker)  
Status of Thermal Analysis (Norm Ignacio/Dennis Chao)  
Approach for stress assessment (Dunham)  
Discussion on Need/Rationale for Mandatory Viewing of damage site (All)

<<STS-107 Preliminary Debris Assessment - rev2.ppt>>

Pam Madera

Vehicle and Systems Analysis Subsystem Area Manager

Phone: 281-282-4453

Pager: 877-254-8252

(I can receive a short alpha numeric page by addressing e-mail to:

877-254-8252@archwireless.net)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Madera, Pamela L

**Sent:** Monday, January 20, 2003 5:47 PM

**To:** CURRY, DONALD M; ROCHA, ALAN RODNEY; LEVY, VINCENT M; KOWAL, T JOHN; DERRY, STEPHEN M

**Cc:** 'Scott Christensen V (E-mail)'; 'Norman Ignacio (Nacho) (E-mail)'; CHAO, DENNIS; Stoner-1, Michael D; 'Carlos Ortiz (E-mail)'; 'Michael J Dunham (E-mail)'; Sebesta, Stephen P; CORONADO, DIANA; 'Craig Madden' (E-mail); Bell, Dan R.; Gordon, Michael P.; Paul A Parker (E-mail)

**Subject:** STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Plans

The Boeing/USA team would like to meet with you Tuesday at 2:00 on meet-me-line number 877-668-7953 P/C 276237 to discuss analysis plans for assessing the STS-107 Debris Impact.

**Pam Madera**

Vehicle and Systems Analysis Subsystem Area Manager

Phone: 281-282-4453

Pager: 877-254-8252

(I can receive a short alpha numeric page by addressing e-mail to:

877-254-8252@archwireless.net)

STS-107 Preliminary Debris Assessment - rev2.ppt

From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "'Bob Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: FW: STS-107 Wing Debris Impact on Ascent: Final analysis case completed  
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:16:52 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: KOWAL, T. J. (JOHN) (JSC-ES3) (NASA)  
> Sent: Monday, January 27, 2003 10:35 AM  
> To: ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
> Cc: ROGERS, JOSEPH E. (JOE) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); GALBREATH, GREGORY F.  
> (GREG) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); JACOBS, JEREMY B. (JSC-ES4) (NASA); CURRY, DONALD  
> M. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); RICKMAN, STEVEN L. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); SCHOMBURG,  
> CALVIN (JSC-EA) (NASA); CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA);  
> MADDEN, CHRISTOPHER B. (CHRIS) (JSC-ES3) (NASA)  
> Subject: RE: STS-107 Wing Debris Impact on Ascent: Final analysis  
> case completed

>  
> I talked to Ignacio about the analysis he ran. In the case he ran, the  
> large gouge is in the acreage of the door. If the gouge were to occur in  
> a location where it passes over the thermal barrier on the perimeter of  
> the door, the statement that there is "no breaching of the thermal and gas  
> seals" would not be valid. I think this point should be clarified;  
> otherwise, the note sent out this morning gives a false sense of security.

>  
> John Kowal  
> ES3/Thermal Branch  
> NASA-Johnson Space Center  
> (281) 483-8871

> -----Original Message-----

> From: ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
> Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2003 7:45 PM  
> To: SHACK, PAUL E. (JSC-EA42) (NASA); MCCORMACK, DONALD L. (DON)  
> (JSC-MV6) (NASA); OUELLETTE, FRED A. (JSC-MV6) (NASA)  
> Cc: ROGERS, JOSEPH E. (JOE) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); GALBREATH, GREGORY F.  
> (GREG) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); JACOBS, JEREMY B. (JSC-ES4) (NASA);  
> SERIALE-GRUSH, JOYCE M. (JSC-EA) (NASA); KRAMER, JULIE A. (JSC-EA4)  
> (NASA); CURRY, DONALD M. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); KOWAL, T. J. (JOHN) (JSC-ES3)  
> (NASA); RICKMAN, STEVEN L. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); SCHOMBURG, CALVIN (JSC-EA)  
> (NASA); CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
> Subject: STS-107 Wing Debris Impact on Ascent: Final analysis case  
> completed

>  
> As you recall from Friday's briefing to the MER, there remained open work  
> to assess analytically predicted impact damage to the wing underside in  
> the region of the main landing gear door. This area was considered a low  
> probability hit area by the image analysis teams, but they admitted a  
> debris strike here could not be ruled out.

>  
> As with the other analyses performed and reported on Friday, this

- > assessment by the Boeing multi-technical discipline engineering teams also
- > employed the system integration's dispersed trajectories followed by
- > serial results from the Crater damage prediction tool, thermal analysis,
- > and stress analysis. It was reviewed and accepted by the ES-DCE (R. Rocha)
- > by Sunday morning, Jan. 26. The case is defined by a large area gouge
- > about 7 inch wide and about 30 inch long with sloped sides like a crater,
- > and reaching down to the densified layer of the TPS.
- >
- > SUMMARY: Though this case predicted some higher temperatures at the outer
- > layer of the honeycomb aluminum face sheet and subsequent debonding of the
- > sheet, there is no predicted burn-through of the door, no breaching of the
- > thermal and gas seals, nor is there door structural deformation or thermal
- > warpage to open the seal to hot plasma intrusion. Though degradation of
- > the TPS and door structure is likely (if the impact occurred here), there
- > is no safety of flight (entry, descent, landing) issue.
- >
- > Note to Don M. and Fred O.: On Friday I believe the MER was thoroughly
- > briefed and it was clear that open work remained (viz., the case
- > summarized above), the message of open work was not clearly given, in my
- > opinion, to Linda Ham at the MMT. I believe we left her the impression
- > that engineering assessments and cases were all finished and we could
- > state with finality no safety of flight issues or questions remaining.
- > This very serious case could not be ruled out and it was a very good thing
- > we carried it through to a finish.
- >
- >
- > Rodney Rocha (ES2) x38889
- > \* Division Shuttle Chief Engineer (DCE), ES-Structural Engineering
- > Division
- > \* Chair, Space Shuttle Loads & Dynamics Panel
- >
- >



Aircraft Landing Dynamics Facility  
Langley Research Center  
Hampton, VA 23681-2199

### FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

TO: Howard LFW  
FAX NUMBER: 650 604 7484  
TELEPHONE NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_  
LOCATION: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_  
TELEPHONE NUMBER: (757) \_\_\_\_\_  
FAX NUMBER: (757) 864-8090

COMMENTS: DRAGGING STRUT  
MODEL - FLOW CHART -  
COULDN'T FIND PLOT

Number of pages including lead: 6

Signature: BDD Date: 1/27/03

National Aeronautics and  
Space Administration

Langley Research Center  
Hampton, Virginia  
23665



Reply to Attn of

497

TO: NASA Johnson Space Center  
Attn: VA/Richard Colonna, Manager, STS  
Orbiter and GFE Projects Office

FROM: 497/Aerospace Technologist, Impact Dynamics Branch, SDD

SUBJECT: Results of Roll-on-Rim Capability Tests

A series of tests have been completed at the Langley Research Center's Aircraft Landing Dynamics Facility (ALDF) to determine the roll-on-rim capability of the Orbiter main wheel. Both a standard flight wheel inner half and a modified inner wheel half were tested. In addition, data were gathered to identify the behavior of a deflated tire during and after touchdown. This information is helpful in simulating a landing if a tire has deflated in orbit, a highly unlikely condition.

Because of the vertical load capability of the ALDF, only inner wheel halves were tested to identify their failure modes. This allowed full-scale loads to be applied to the wheel bead flanges. In our opinion, this testing mode does not compromise the validity of the results.

A standard flight wheel had previously been rolled on the B.F. Goodrich dynamometer wheel at rated load and at a speed of approximately 10 mph. It developed a crack and lost a small portion of bead flange after about 4,000 ft. and the test was stopped. The dynamometer surface was smooth steel. A similar test was conducted at the ALDF with a standard inner wheel half loaded to half the rated load. The surface was a simulated KSC runway. After about 650 ft., a portion of the bead flange failed and during the next revolution, the wheel half completely collapsed.

The first high-speed test involved landing a standard inner wheel half and observing its behavior. The wheel half was landed at a sink rate of 2.6 ft./sec. and forward speed of 150 kts. A rubber strap was attached to the wheel to facilitate spin-up and minimize wheel spin-up damage. Vertical load was about 25,000 lb. during this test. During spin-up and within the first 25 ft. of roll, the bead flange zippered off in 4 in. pieces. Ten feet later, the bead seat flange area and tube well disintegrated. Down load buffers, which limited travel of the drop test carriage, prevented the load from being applied to the wheel center section following wheel flange failure.

The next test was run to examine what benefit could be gained by using an inner wheel half with a much stronger bead flange (at a weight penalty of about 4 lbs. per inner wheel half). Touchdown conditions on this wheel half were 157 kts. groundspeed and 2.8 fps sink rate. This wheel survived spin-up and was loaded to about 65,000 lb. After about 130 ft., the wheel half disintegrated. Rolling resistance during this test was 5 percent of wheel vertical load.

The next test was designed to investigate the roll-on-center section capability of the wheel after the bead flanges and tube well have failed, but the center section did not spin-up and the wheel was skidded down the runway. The test speed was 159 kts. and the vertical load was about 70,000 lb. During the 450 ft. long slide, about 3 in. of wheel was worn away, and the friction coefficient was about .2.

The last test involved landing and rolling out on a tire deflated before the test to simulate a tire that has deflated in the wheel well either on the launch pad or in orbit. The conditions of this test included a ground speed of 157 kts. and a sink rate of 2.8 fps. Vertical load was maintained at 70,000 lb. The flat tire rolled approximately 1,050 ft. and produced a friction coefficient between .15 and .20. The tire disintegrated after a roll of 1,050 ft. Thereafter, the wheel rolled for 500 ft. on the intact beads that remained attached to the wheel. Rolling resistance while on the beads was .1.

These results indicate that no significant roll-on-rim capability is present in either the standard or modified inner wheel half. It appears that wheel failure at speeds of 160 kts. will undoubtedly result in some damage to the orbiter due to flying debris. Unfortunately, no method of predicting this damage is known. Most of the highest energy debris should be found in the 30-90 degree arc behind the wheel, with 90 degrees being vertical. Tire failure will result in the loss of large pieces of the 200 lb. tire, and prediction of these trajectories is also impossible.

A set of guidelines for predicting wheel failure along with an event flow chart is enclosed. Note that some of the events are only engineering judgments based on extremely limited test data.

It is assumed that some portion of this data along with the 1/3 scale skid results will be used to determine where to land the orbiter should a flat tire be detected in orbit. Although some damage to the orbiter is likely during a concrete runway landing with a flat tire, the unknown behavior of the tire and wheel on the lakebed surface during failure coupled with the lack of friction coefficient data on the lakebed surface at high bearing pressures is cause for concern. If flat tire lakebed landings are being considered, it is recommended that, at a minimum, tests be conducted at a lakebed site using a bare wheel loaded to 120,000 lb. using the towable load cart available at Edwards Air Force Base. If the wheel fails at low speed, then failure at high speed is almost certain. If the wheel simply digs in, then no information is gained as to high speed behavior. This test is inexpensive and capable of producing data that could help in the decision of where to land if an orbiter tire has lost pressure.

If you have any questions, feel free to contact Sandy Stubbs or me at FTS 928-2796.

Robert H. Daugherty

Enclosures  
Set of Guidelines  
Flowchart

cc (w/o Encl.):  
101/Files  
118/SD  
244/SDD  
497/IDB  
497/RHDaugherty

NASA JSC  
CB/JCasper  
ES4/BHolder  
ES6/CCampbell  
EH221/HLaw  
GA/BDO'Connor

B. F. Goodrich Co.  
Aerospace and Defense Div.  
Attn: J. Warren  
P.O. Box 340  
Troy, OH 45373

Rockwell International  
AC19/MPorter  
12214 Lakewood Blvd.  
Downey, CA 90241



### GUIDELINES FOR SIMULATING TIRE FAILURES

#### DEFINITIONS:

"GOOD" TIRE: One that is inflated

"FLAT" TIRE: One that has lost air but did not blow up due to overload


"FAILED" TIRE: One that has :  
Blown up due to overload or  
Disintegrated due to flat tire roll.

- |  |             |
|--|-------------|
| 1. Rolling on a "GOOD" TIRE:   | $\mu = .02$ |
| 2. Rolling on a "FLAT" TIRE:   | $\mu = .2$  |
| 3. Rolling on the bead:  | $\mu = .1$  |
| 4. Rolling on the rim flange or center section:  | $\mu = .05$ |
| 5. Skidding on center section, brake parts, axle, etc.:  | $\mu = .2$  |
| 6. Below about 40 fps, number 5 above ramps from $\mu = .2$ to $\mu = .7$ as speed approaches 0. |             |


#### COMMENTS

NOTE: \* indicates lower confidence than other comments

1. Flat tires can survive 1000' if loaded 70K or less.
2. Good tires loaded above 180K fail immediately.
3. \*Failed tires roll on beads for 1000' if wheel loads are < 100K.
4. \*If rolling on beads and wheel loads exceed 100K, then bead fails and rim flange breaks in 50'.
5. Center section may survive any length (flowchart assumes 0 length).
6. \*For 1 good tire and 1 flat tire and strut load < 180K then strut drag  $\mu = .04 + .016 \times$  deflection of good tire.



Note: DI = Deflection of good tire : should range from 0 to 10 in.



From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "'Bob Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: FW: Video you sent  
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:59:53 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Thanks. That's why they need to get all the facts in early on--such as look at impact damage from the spy telescope. Even then, we may not know the real effect of the damage.

The LaRC ditching model tests 20 some years ago showed that the Orbiter was the best ditching shape that they had ever tested, of many. But, our structures people have said that if we ditch we would blow such big holes in the lower panels that the orbiter might break up. Anyway, they refuse to even consider water ditching any more--I still have the test results[ Bailout seems best.

**From:** Robert H. Daugherty [mailto:robert.h.daugherty@nasa.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 27, 2003 3:35 PM  
**To:** CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Subject:** Video you sent

WOW!!!

I bet there are a few pucker strings pulled tight around there!

Thinking about a belly landing versus bailout..... (I would say that if there is a question about main gear well burn thru that its crazy to even hit the deploy gear button...the reason being that you might have failed the wheels since they are aluminum..they will fail before the tire heating/pressure makes them fail..and you will send debris all over the wheel well making it a possibility that the gear would not even deploy due to ancillary damage...300 feet is the wrong altitude to find out you have one gear down and the other not down...you're dead in that case)

Think about the pitch-down moment for a belly landing when hitting not the main gear but the trailing edge of the wing or body flap when landing gear up...even if you come in fast and at slightly less pitch attitude...the nose slapdown with that pitching moment arm seems to me to be pretty scary...so much so that I would bail out before I would let a loved one land like that.

My two cents.

See ya,


Bob

At 03:04 PM 1/27/2003, you wrote:

-----Original Message-----

**From:** SMITH, JAMES P. (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 22, 2003 7:15 AM  
**To:** DL ES2 Branch; DL ES2 Contractors  
**Subject:** FW: STS-107 Post-Launch Film Review - Day 1

Watch the video first and see if you can spot anything.



From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "'Robert H. Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: RE: Tile Damage  
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2003 13:29:58 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

I have not heard anything new. I'll let you know if I do.


CCC


-----Original Message-----

From: Robert H. Daugherty [mailto:r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov]  
Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2003 12:39 PM  
To: CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
Subject: Tile Damage

Any more activity today on the tile damage or are people just relegated to crossing their fingers and hoping for the best?

See ya,  
Bob





Hi David,

I talked to Carlisle a bit ago and he let me know you guys at MOD were getting into the loop on the tile damage issue. I'm writing this email not really in an official capacity but since we've worked together so many times I feel like I can say pretty much anything to you. And before I begin I would offer that I am admittedly erring way on the side of absolute worst-case scenarios and I don't really believe things are as bad as I'm getting ready to make them out. But I certainly believe that to not be ready for a gut-wrenching decision after seeing instrumentation in the wheel well not be there after entry is irresponsible. One of my personal theories is that you should seriously consider the possibility of the gear not deploying at all if there is a substantial breach of the wheel well. The reason might be that as the temps increase, the wheel (aluminum) will lose material properties as it heats up and the tire pressure will increase. At some point the wheel could fail and send debris everywhere. While it is true there are thermal fuses in the wheel, if the rate of heating is high enough, since the tire is such a good insulator, the wheel may degrade in strength enough to let go far below the 1100 psi or so that the tire normally bursts at. It seems to me that with that much carnage in the wheel well, something could get screwed up enough to prevent deployment and then you are in a world of hurt. The following are scenarios that might be possible...and since there are so many of them, these are offered just to make sure that some things don't slip thru the cracks...I suspect many or all of these have been gone over by you guys already:

1. People talk about landing with two flat tires...I did too until this came up. If both tires blew up in the wheel well (not talking thermal fuse and venting but explosive decomp due to tire and/or wheel failure) the overpressure in the wheel well will be in the 40 + psi range. The resulting loads on the gear door ( a quarter million lbs) would almost certainly blow the door off the hinges or at least send it out into the slip stream...catastrophic. Even if you could survive the heating, would the gear now deploy? And/or also, could you even reach the runway with this kind of drag?
2. The explosive bungies...what might be the possibility of these firing due to excessive heating? If they fired, would they send the gear door and/or the gear into the slipstream?
3. What might excessive heating do to all kinds of other hardware in the wheel well...the hydraulic fluid, uplocks, etc? Are there vulnerable hardware items that might prevent deployment?
4. If the gear didn't deploy ( and you would have to consider this before making the commitment to gear deploy on final) what would happen control-wise if the other gear is down and one is up? (I think Howard Law and his community will tell you you're finished)
5. Do you belly land? Without any other planning you will have already committed to KSC. And what will happen during derotation in a gear up landing (trying to stay away from an asymmetric gear situation for example) since you will be hitting the aft end body flap and wings and pitching down extremely fast a la the old X-15 landings? My guess is you would have an extremely large vertical decel situation up in the nose for the crew. While directional control would be afforded in some part by the drag chute...do you want to count on that to keep you out of the moat?
6. If a belly landing is unacceptable, ditching/bailout might be next on the list. Not a good day.
7. Assuming you can get to the runway with the gear deployed but with two flat tires, can the commander control the vehicle both in pitch and lateral directions? One concern is excessive



drag (0.2 g's) during TD throughout the entire saddle region making the derotation uncontrollable due to saturated elevons...resulting in nose gear failure? The addition of crosswinds would make lateral control a tough thing too. Simulating this, because it is so ridiculously easy to do (sims going on this very minute at AMES with load-persistence) seems like a real no-brainer.

Admittedly this is over the top in many ways but this is a pretty bad time to get surprised and have to make decisions in the last 20 minutes. You can count on us to provide any support you think you need.

Best Regards,  
Bob

From: "LECHNER, DAVID F. (JSC-DF52) (USA)" <david.f.lechner1@jsc.nasa.gov>  
To: "'Robert H. Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Cc: M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov, H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov,  
"CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
Subject: RE: Main Gear Breach Concerns  
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2003 12:17:34 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Bob,

I really appreciate the candid remarks. As always your points have generated extremely valuable discussion in our group. Thank you. We have been discussing and continue to discuss the all possible scenarios, signatures and decisions. Your input is beneficial. Like everyone, we hope that the debris impact analysis is correct and all this discussion is mute.

David F-M Lechner  
Space Shuttle Mechanical Systems  
Mechanical, Maintenance, Arm & Crew Systems (MMACS)  
United Space Alliance, Johnson Space Center  
(281) 483-1685

-----Original Message-----

From: Robert H. Daugherty [mailto:r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov]  
Sent: Thursday, January 30, 2003 5:23 PM  
To: LECHNER, DAVID F. (JSC-DF52) (USA)  
Cc: M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov; H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov; CAMPBELL,  
CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
Subject: Main Gear Breach Concerns

Hi David,

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Admittedly this is over the top in many ways but this is a pretty bad time to get surprised and have to make decisions in the last 20 minutes. You can count on us to provide any support you think you need.

Best Regards,  
Bob

**Timeline, Email Traffic, and Comments Regarding ALDF Personnel Involvement  
with STS 107 Columbia Flight**

Bob Daugherty

<p><b>Revision A...included Jan 29 email to Shuart ...listed but failed to copy email itself into document...pg 21</b></p>
--

**January 27, 2003      Monday**

Received a telephone call from Carlisle Campbell at JSC...works for the engineering directorate in Mechanical Systems...involved with doors, hatches, landing gear, etc for the Orbiter. Have worked with Carlisle for almost 20 years on landing and tire-related issues. He asked if I had heard about the issue with foam debris impacting the orbiter during ascent and I replied I had not. He filled me in on the issue, and mentioned that "people" were talking about not knowing exactly where the impact location was on the bottom of the orbiter but that some people mentioned that the gear door might be a vulnerable place to get damaged because of the nature of the thermal seal there. He mentioned that there had been lots of analysis, that the analysis said they didn't think there was a safety of flight issue, but that the gear door was in the "predicted target zone" of the impact. He emailed me two powerpoint documents that discussed the analysis and showed the predicted impact area. He mentioned the fact that "people" were throwing around possible worst-case scenarios regarding landing with two flat tires. This was the main reason for talking to us since we have previously provided JSC and the simulation folks, years ago, with models for just such a landing (not for the reason of them failing due to thermal damage...but just for covering all the bases and not caring why they might be flat). It just so happened that this very week, the astronaut training session at the Ames VMS was occurring where we already were looking at the effects of landing with one tire flat (again, the reason for such was not important), and whether or not the second tire on the strut would fail due to overload. We have done a lot of work on a load-persistence model we developed here at Langley and that was being evaluated. The astronauts were also looking for ground handling techniques that could help prevent the second tire from failing if they had a single tire flat at touchdown. So Carlisle and I knew the simulation community was in a position to very easily and quickly simulate a landing with two flat tires. We discussed the fact that "orbiter management" had not approved such simulations...I can't say whether its because they hadn't yet been approached or they just didn't think it was appropriate since the analysis of the thermal damage did not suggest a safety of flight concern. We then got Howard Law, JSC, Guidance and Control simulation engineer on the phone who was at Ames helping to run the load-persistence testing and asked him about whether they could easily do the simulation we thought would be good to do (the two flat tires) since it is just good engineering practice to simulate anything you can to gather contingency information. We discussed what their simulations had shown during the load persistence runs where the second tire had failed and now you were sliding on two flat tires. We determined that at low speed they were not using our models for drag correctly so I went and got together some old model information for sliding on a dragging strut and faxed him a flow chart for that model out at Ames. We also discussed the fact that some people at JSC were of the opinion that acquiring more information and visualizing the damage area was a good thing to pursue and talked about the options regarding ground based telescopes, EVA's,

etc. This discussion was simply two engineers talking...nothing special since neither of us have any expertise in this area. He mentioned that at that point there were no plans to visualize the damage since the orbiter had no arm, an EVA is very difficult due to the location underneath and lack of hand-holds, and that some thought that ground based telescopes might not have the resolution needed for a good view. We agreed that we thought it made good engineering sense to visualize the damage but were of the opinion that since folks higher up than us were pressing that issue we would not stick our nose in their business...we were just two engineers talking amongst ourselves.

### **January 27, 2003    Monday**

Received several emails from Campbell showing the powerpoint presentations on the tile damage, and a video of the impact of the debris taken from behind the left wing (impact itself hidden from view):

Email subject lines:

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:04:04 : STS-107 Post-Launch Film Review - Day 1

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:06:03 FW: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:14:10 FW: STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Meeting

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:16:52 FW: STS-107 Wing Debris Impact on Ascent: Final analysis case completed

I then watched the video and replied with the following email:

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 4:35 Video you sent

Carlisle then replied with the following email:

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:59:53 FW: Video you sent

Faxed the dragging strut model to Howard Law on the same day Jan 27, 2003 late in the afternoon.

### **January 28, 2003    Tuesday**

I sent the following email to Campbell:

Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2003 1:38 pm Tile Damage

I sent the following email to Mark Shuart to inform him of what was going on after he called me to inquire regarding things he had heard:

Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2003 2:15 pm Foam and Tile

And Carlisle replied with the following email:

Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2003 13:29:58 RE: Tile Damage

### **January 29, 2003    Wednesday**

Had a three way telephone call with Carlisle Campbell and Howard Law and other folks at Ames VMS to discuss progress on the load-persistence simulations. After that we asked if Howard Law had been officially “asked” or “cleared” to do any simulations to support getting some “background” information in the simulator regarding what might happen if one were to land with two flat tires. Nobody had ever expressed any knowledge that the main gear door was actually involved in the damage area but we just felt that we should do everything we could to get as much info as possible to cover as many bases as possible.

I sent the following email to Mark Shuart to inform him of what was going on:  
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2003 3:51 pm Tile Damage Update

**January 30, 2003 Thursday**

In late afternoon I had a telephone conversation with Campbell who mentioned that they had been in a Landing Gear PRT (Problem Resolution Team?) meeting...this is a normal meeting not related to the issue at hand, I don't believe. They have them probably weekly whether they're flying or not I think. Apparently there were some comments by the Mission Operations folks about the thermal issue and them having to do some talking about making sure they had as many contingency plans figured out as possible since everybody wants to be ready for anything. Since Carlisle and I had been talking, we discussed as many bad things regarding the main gear as we could think of and it became apparent to me after doing some calculations that if the tires failed in the wheel well the door would be blown off and there could be big problems. Other things we discussed were the pyros that help deployment as a backup...etc. I asked Carlisle if he thought it was appropriate to voice these scenarios to MOD guys and he agreed it was a good thing so that we felt like we had done our best job or helping the system not let some worst-case scenarios slip thru the cracks.

I sent the following email to David Lechner at JSC (he's associated with the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) and we've worked together often)

Date: Thurs, 30 Jan 2003 6:22 pm Main Gear Breach Concerns

**January 31, 2003 Friday**

I received a telephone call from David Lechner thanking me for voicing the scenarios in the email and he said they were having all kinds of discussions about being ready for various contingencies so that they would be ready to advise the Mission Management Team if necessary for them to make any decisions they may have to during entry. I can't speak for David, but I had no actual concern that anything disastrous would occur. We discussed a belly landing at length and why that apparently is considered to be a loss-of-vehicle event.

I received the following email from David Lechner in response to my email the night before:

Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2003 12:17:34 RE: Main Gear Breach Concerns

From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "Bob Daugherty" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: FW: STS-107 Post-Launch Film Review - Day 1  
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:04:04 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** SMITH, JAMES P. (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 22, 2003 7:15 AM  
**To:** DL ES2 Branch; DL ES2 Contractors  
**Subject:** FW: STS-107 Post-Launch Film Review - Day 1

Watch the video first and see if you can spot anything.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Pedraza, Michael A [mailto:michael.a.pedraza@usago.ksc.nasa.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 21, 2003 8:35 PM  
**Subject:** STS-107 Post-Launch Film Review - Day 1

**Michael Pedraza**  
**Storekeeper/Expediter**  
**MSC-44 RPSF**  
**USK-337**  
**Phone 861-6452**  
**Fax 861-0374**

(0.0 ("\* . . . \*\* . . . \*\*") . . .  
« . . . \*Supply & Support\* . . . »  
(.0 (. . . \* . . . \* . . . ) 0.0)

Attached is the Day 1 report and an MPG of Anomaly #1.

107film1.pdf

E212.mpg



From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "'Bob Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: FW: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT  
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:06:03 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 24, 2003 10:32 AM  
**To:** CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA); RICHART, JENE A. (JSC-MS2) (NASA)  
**Cc:** MADDEN, CHRISTOPHER B. (CHRIS) (JSC-ES3) (NASA)  
**Subject:** FW: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT

Here is the Orbiter thermal/stress assessment. I do not have the system integration (Carlos Ortiz/Boeing) debris trajectory analysis charts yet. Both were presented to MER team and MMT this morning. There is good potential for tile replacement and maybe local overheating of structure, but no burn-through. Though the assessment states, so far, that no safety of flight issues exist, there is open work on one more case, the MLG Door tiles. The MER team understood this open work, but in my opinion the MMT with Linda Ham did not get the full message of open work remaining.

Rodney Rocha  
Structural Engineering Division (ES-SED)

ES Div. Chief Engineer (Space Shuttle DCE)  
Chair, Space Shuttle Loads & Dynamics Panel

Mail Code ES2 Phone 281-483-8889

-----Original Message-----

**From:** White, Doug [mailto:Doug.White@USAHQ.UnitedSpaceAlliance.com]  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 23, 2003 10:23 PM  
**To:** Wilder, James; Reeves, William D; CURRY, DONALD M. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); SCHOMBURG, CALVIN (JSC-EA) (NASA); LEVY, VINCENT M. (JSC-EG) (NASA); ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Subject:** FW: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT

Potential tile damage charts for the MMT tomorrow morning. Mike Dunham will pitch these.

Doug White  
Director, Operations Requirements  
281 282-2879 office  
281 282-4438 fax  
877 497-0336 pager  
8774970336@archwireless.net  
600 Gemini  
Houston, TX 77058

"Never let the fear of striking out get in your way." -Babe Ruth

-----Original Message-----

From: Dunham, Michael J [mailto:Michael.J.Dunham@boeing.com]  
Sent: Thursday, January 23, 2003 8:36 PM  
To: EXT-Madera, Pamela L; EXT-White, Doug; Alvin Beckner-Jr (E-mail); Bo Bejmuk (E-mail); David Camp (E-mail); Douglas Cline (E-mail); Ed Alexander (E-mail); Frances Ferris (E-mail); Garland Parlier (E-mail); John Mulholland (E-mail); Mark Pickens (E-mail); Michael Burghardt (E-mail); Mike Fuller (E-mail); Norm Beougher (E-mail); Scott Christensen V (E-mail); Steve Harrison (E-mail)  
Subject: STS-107 Debris Briefing for MMT

<<Debris.ppt>>

Michael J. Dunham  
Boeing/Orbiter SSM - Stress, Loads and Dynamics  
(281)-853-1697  
(281)-853-1525 (Fax)  
(281)-621-1924 (Pager)

Debris.ppt

From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "'Bob Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: FW: STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Meeting  
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:14:10 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 23, 2003 7:59 AM  
**To:** SHACK, PAUL E. (JSC-EA42) (NASA); SERIALE-GRUSH, JOYCE M. (JSC-EA) (NASA); KRAMER, JULIE A. (JSC-EA4) (NASA); CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA); MILLER, GLENN J. (JSC-EA) (NASA)  
**Subject:** FW: STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Meeting

FYI.

Rodney Rocha  
Structural Engineering Division (ES-SED)

ES Div. Chief Engineer (Space Shuttle DCE)  
Chair, Space Shuttle Loads & Dynamics Panel

Mail Code ES2 Phone 281-483-8889

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Madera, Pamela L [mailto:pam.l.madera@usahq.unitedspacealliance.com]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 22, 2003 11:22 AM  
**To:** CURRY, DONALD M. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); LEVY, VINCENT M. (JSC-EG) (NASA); KOWAL, T. J. (JOHN) (JSC-ES3) (NASA); DERRY, STEPHEN M. (STEVE) (JSC-EG3) (NASA); Nagle, Scott M; Carlos Ortiz (E-mail); GOMEZ, REYNALDO J. (RAY) (JSC-EG3) (NASA); DISLER, JONATHAN M. (JON) (JSC-SX) (LM); Jacobs, William A  
**Cc:** 'Scott Christensen V (E-mail)'; 'Norman Ignacio (Nacho) (E-mail)'; CHAO, DENNIS; Stoner-1, Michael D; 'Carlos Ortiz (E-mail)'; 'Michael J Dunham (E-mail)'; Sebesta, Stephen P; CORONADO, DIANA; 'Craig Madden' (E-mail); Bell, Dan R.; Gordon, Michael P.; 'Paul A Parker (E-mail)'; ISHMAEL, MOHAMED I. (GEORGE) (JSC-NC) (SAIC); ALEXANDER, ED  
**Subject:** STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Meeting

Rodney Rocha has conference room 221 in JSC Building 13 available for today's 1:00 PM telecon. Located on second floor. The dial in number is the same as below. I propose the following agenda:

Review of transport analysis (Carlos Ortiz - charts attached)  
Discussion of appropriate Particle Size (Ortiz, Disler, all)  
Review of Flight Design Plans for Assessing Options (Bill Jacobs)  
Status of Impact Damage Assessment (P. Parker)  
Status of Thermal Analysis (Norm Ignacio/Dennis Chao)  
Approach for stress assessment (Dunham)  
Discussion on Need/Rationale for Mandatory Viewing of damage site (All)

<<STS-107 Preliminary Debris Assessment - rev2.ppt>>

Pam Madera

Vehicle and Systems Analysis Subsystem Area Manager

Phone: 281-282-4453

Pager: 877-254-8252

(I can receive a short alpha numeric page by addressing e-mail to:  
877-254-8252@archwireless.net)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Madera, Pamela L

**Sent:** Monday, January 20, 2003 5:47 PM

**To:** CURRY, DONALD M; ROCHA, ALAN RODNEY; LEVY, VINCENT M; KOWAL, T JOHN; DERRY, STEPHEN M

**Cc:** 'Scott Christensen V (E-mail)'; 'Norman Ignacio (Nacho) (E-mail)'; CHAO, DENNIS; Stoner-1, Michael D; 'Carlos Ortiz (E-mail)'; 'Michael J Dunham (E-mail)'; Sebesta, Stephen P; CORONADO, DIANA; 'Craig Madden' (E-mail); Bell, Dan R.; Gordon, Michael P.; Paul A Parker (E-mail)

**Subject:** STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Plans

The Boeing/USA team would like to meet with you Tuesday at 2:00 on meet-me-line number 877-668-7953 P/C 276237 to discuss analysis plans for assessing the STS-107 Debris Impact.

**Pam Madera**

Vehicle and Systems Analysis Subsystem Area Manager

Phone: 281-282-4453

Pager: 877-254-8252

(I can receive a short alpha numeric page by addressing e-mail to:  
877-254-8252@archwireless.net)

STS-107 Preliminary Debris Assessment - rev2.ppt

From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "'Bob Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: FW: STS-107 Wing Debris Impact on Ascent: Final analysis case completed  
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 14:16:52 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: KOWAL, T. J. (JOHN) (JSC-ES3) (NASA)  
> Sent: Monday, January 27, 2003 10:35 AM  
> To: ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
> Cc: ROGERS, JOSEPH E. (JOE) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); GALBREATH, GREGORY F.  
> (GREG) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); JACOBS, JEREMY B. (JSC-ES4) (NASA); CURRY, DONALD  
> M. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); RICKMAN, STEVEN L. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); SCHOMBURG,  
> CALVIN (JSC-EA) (NASA); CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA);  
> MADDEN, CHRISTOPHER B. (CHRIS) (JSC-ES3) (NASA)  
> Subject: RE: STS-107 Wing Debris Impact on Ascent: Final analysis  
> case completed

>

> I talked to Ignacio about the analysis he ran. In the case he ran, the  
> large gouge is in the acreage of the door. If the gouge were to occur in  
> a location where it passes over the thermal barrier on the perimeter of  
> the door, the statement that there is "no breaching of the thermal and gas  
> seals" would not be valid. I think this point should be clarified;  
> otherwise, the note sent out this morning gives a false sense of security.

>

> John Kowal  
> ES3/Thermal Branch  
> NASA-Johnson Space Center  
> (281) 483-8871

>

>

> -----Original Message-----

> From: ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
> Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2003 7:45 PM  
> To: SHACK, PAUL E. (JSC-EA42) (NASA); MCCORMACK, DONALD L. (DON)  
> (JSC-MV6) (NASA); OUELLETTE, FRED A. (JSC-MV6) (NASA)  
> Cc: ROGERS, JOSEPH E. (JOE) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); GALBREATH, GREGORY F.  
> (GREG) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); JACOBS, JEREMY B. (JSC-ES4) (NASA);  
> SERIALE-GRUSH, JOYCE M. (JSC-EA) (NASA); KRAMER, JULIE A. (JSC-EA4)  
> (NASA); CURRY, DONALD M. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); KOWAL, T. J. (JOHN) (JSC-ES3)  
> (NASA); RICKMAN, STEVEN L. (JSC-ES3) (NASA); SCHOMBURG, CALVIN (JSC-EA)  
> (NASA); CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
> Subject: STS-107 Wing Debris Impact on Ascent: Final analysis case  
> completed

>

> As you recall from Friday's briefing to the MER, there remained open work  
> to assess analytically predicted impact damage to the wing underside in  
> the region of the main landing gear door. This area was considered a low  
> probability hit area by the image analysis teams, but they admitted a  
> debris strike here could not be ruled out.

>

> As with the other analyses performed and reported on Friday, this

- > assessment by the Boeing multi-technical discipline engineering teams also
- > employed the system integration's dispersed trajectories followed by
- > serial results from the Crater damage prediction tool, thermal analysis,
- > and stress analysis. It was reviewed and accepted by the ES-DCE (R. Rocha)
- > by Sunday morning, Jan. 26. The case is defined by a large area gouge
- > about 7 inch wide and about 30 inch long with sloped sides like a crater,
- > and reaching down to the densified layer of the TPS.
- >
- > SUMMARY: Though this case predicted some higher temperatures at the outer
- > layer of the honeycomb aluminum face sheet and subsequent debonding of the
- > sheet, there is no predicted burn-through of the door, no breaching of the
- > thermal and gas seals, nor is there door structural deformation or thermal
- > warpage to open the seal to hot plasma intrusion. Though degradation of
- > the TPS and door structure is likely (if the impact occurred here), there
- > is no safety of flight (entry, descent, landing) issue.
- >
- > Note to Don M. and Fred O.: On Friday I believe the MER was thoroughly
- > briefed and it was clear that open work remained (viz., the case
- > summarized above), the message of open work was not clearly given, in my
- > opinion, to Linda Ham at the MMT. I believe we left her the impression
- > that engineering assessments and cases were all finished and we could
- > state with finality no safety of flight issues or questions remaining.
- > This very serious case could not be ruled out and it was a very good thing
- > we carried it through to a finish.
- >
- >
- > Rodney Rocha (ES2) x38889
- > \* Division Shuttle Chief Engineer (DCE), ES-Structural Engineering
- > Division
- > \* Chair, Space Shuttle Loads & Dynamics Panel
- >
- >



Aircraft Landing Dynamics Facility  
Langley Research Center  
Hampton, VA 23681-2199

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

TO: Howard LFW  
FAX NUMBER: 650 604 7484  
TELEPHONE NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_  
LOCATION: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_  
TELEPHONE NUMBER: (757) \_\_\_\_\_  
FAX NUMBER: (757) 864-8090

COMMENTS: DRAGGING STRUT  
MODEL - FLOW CHART -  
COULDN'T FIND PLOT

Number of pages including lead: 6

Signature: BDD Date: 1/27/03

National Aeronautics and  
Space Administration

Langley Research Center  
Hampton, Virginia  
23665



Reply to Attn of: 497

TO: NASA Johnson Space Center  
Attn: VA/Richard Colonna, Manager, STS  
Orbiter and GFE Projects Office

FROM: 497/Aerospace Technologist, Impact Dynamics Branch, SDD

SUBJECT: Results of Roll-on-Rim Capability Tests

A series of tests have been completed at the Langley Research Center's Aircraft Landing Dynamics Facility (ALDF) to determine the roll-on-rim capability of the Orbiter main wheel. Both a standard flight wheel inner half and a modified inner wheel half were tested. In addition, data were gathered to identify the behavior of a deflated tire during and after touchdown. This information is helpful in simulating a landing if a tire has deflated in orbit, a highly unlikely condition.

Because of the vertical load capability of the ALDF, only inner wheel halves were tested to identify their failure modes. This allowed full-scale loads to be applied to the wheel bead flanges. In our opinion, this testing mode does not compromise the validity of the results.

A standard flight wheel had previously been rolled on the B.F. Goodrich dynamometer wheel at rated load and at a speed of approximately 10 mph. It developed a crack and lost a small portion of bead flange after about 4,000 ft. and the test was stopped. The dynamometer surface was smooth steel. A similar test was conducted at the ALDF with a standard inner wheel half loaded to half the rated load. The surface was a simulated KSC runway. After about 650 ft., a portion of the bead flange failed and during the next revolution, the wheel half completely collapsed.

The first high-speed test involved landing a standard inner wheel half and observing its behavior. The wheel half was landed at a sink rate of 2.6 ft./sec. and forward speed of 150 kts. A rubber strap was attached to the wheel to facilitate spin-up and minimize wheel spin-up damage. Vertical load was about 25,000 lb. during this test. During spin-up and within the first 25 ft. of roll, the bead flange zippered off in 4 in. pieces. Ten feet later, the bead seat flange area and tube well disintegrated. Down load buffers, which limited travel of the drop test carriage, prevented the load from being applied to the wheel center section following wheel flange failure.



The next test was run to examine what benefit could be gained by using an inner wheel half with a much stronger bead flange (at a weight penalty of about 4 lbs. per inner wheel half). Touchdown conditions on this wheel half were 157 kts. groundspeed and 2.8 fps sink rate. This wheel survived spin-up and was loaded to about 65,000 lb. After about 130 ft., the wheel half disintegrated. Rolling resistance during this test was 5 percent of wheel vertical load.

The next test was designed to investigate the roll-on-center section capability of the wheel after the bead flanges and tube well have failed, but the center section did not spin-up and the wheel was skidded down the runway. The test speed was 159 kts. and the vertical load was about 70,000 lb. During the 450 ft. long slide, about 3 in. of wheel was worn away, and the friction coefficient was about .2.

The last test involved landing and rolling out on a tire deflated before the test to simulate a tire that has deflated in the wheel well either on the launch pad or in orbit. The conditions of this test included a ground speed of 157 kts. and a sink rate of 2.8 fps. Vertical load was maintained at 70,000 lb. The flat tire rolled approximately 1,050 ft. and produced a friction coefficient between .15 and .20. The tire disintegrated after a roll of 1,050 ft. Thereafter, the wheel rolled for 500 ft. on the intact beads that remained attached to the wheel. Rolling resistance while on the beads was .1.

These results indicate that no significant roll-on-rim capability is present in either the standard or modified inner wheel half. It appears that wheel failure at speeds of 160 kts. will undoubtedly result in some damage to the orbiter due to flying debris. Unfortunately, no method of predicting this damage is known. Most of the highest energy debris should be found in the 30-90 degree arc behind the wheel, with 90 degrees being vertical. Tire failure will result in the loss of large pieces of the 200 lb. tire, and prediction of these trajectories is also impossible.

A set of guidelines for predicting wheel failure along with an event flow chart is enclosed. Note that some of the events are only engineering judgments based on extremely limited test data.

It is assumed that some portion of this data along with the 1/3 scale skid results will be used to determine where to land the orbiter should a flat tire be detected in orbit. Although some damage to the orbiter is likely during a concrete runway landing with a flat tire, the unknown behavior of the tire and wheel on the lakebed surface during failure coupled with the lack of friction coefficient data on the lakebed surface at high bearing pressures is cause for concern. If flat tire lakebed landings are being considered, it is recommended that, at a minimum, tests be conducted at a lakebed site using a bare wheel loaded to 120,000 lb. using the towable load cart available at Edwards Air Force Base. If the wheel fails at low speed, then failure at high speed is almost certain. If the wheel simply digs in, then no information is gained as to high speed behavior. This test is inexpensive and capable of producing data that could help in the decision of where to land if an orbiter tire has lost pressure.

If you have any questions, feel free to contact Sandy Stubbs or me at FTS 928-2796.

Robert H. Daugherty

Enclosures  
Set of Guidelines  
Flowchart

cc (w/o Encl.):  
101/Files  
118/SD  
244/SDD  
497/IDB  
497/RHDaugherty

NASA JSC  
CB/JCasper  
ES4/BHolder  
ES6/CCampbell  
EH221/HLaw  
GA/BDO'Connor

B. F. Goodrich Co.  
Aerospace and Defense Div.  
Attn: J. Warren  
P.O. Box 340  
Troy, OH 45373

Rockwell International  
AC19/MPorter  
12214 Lakewood Blvd.  
Downey, CA 90241

## GUIDELINES FOR SIMULATING TIRE FAILURES

### DEFINITIONS:

"GOOD" TIRE: One that is inflated

"FLAT" TIRE: One that has lost air but did not blow up due to overload


"FAILED" TIRE: One that has :  
Blown up due to overload or  
Disintegrated due to flat tire roll.

- |  |             |
|--|-------------|
| 1. Rolling on a "GOOD" TIRE:   | $\mu = .02$ |
| 2. Rolling on a "FLAT" TIRE:   | $\mu = .2$  |
| 3. Rolling on the bead:  | $\mu = .1$  |
| 4. Rolling on the rim flange or center section:  | $\mu = .05$ |
| 5. Skidding on center section, brake parts, axle, etc.:  | $\mu = .2$  |
| 6. Below about 40 fps, number 5 above ramps from $\mu = .2$ to $\mu = .7$ as speed approaches 0. |             |


### COMMENTS

NOTE: \* indicates lower confidence than other comments

1. Flat tires can survive 1000' if loaded 70K or less.
2. Good tires loaded above 180K fail immediately.
3. \*Failed tires roll on beads for 1000' if wheel loads are < 100K.
4. \*If rolling on beads and wheel loads exceed 100K, then bead fails and rim flange breaks in 50'.
5. Center section may survive any length (flowchart assumes 0 length).
6. \*For 1 good tire and 1 flat tire and strut load < 180K then strut drag  $\mu = .04 + .016 \times$  deflection of good tire.



Note: DI = Deflection of good tire : should range from 0 to 10 in.



carlisle.c.campbell1@jsc.nasa.gov, 04:35 PM 1/27/2003, Video you sent

To: carlisle.c.campbell1@jsc.nasa.gov  
From: "Robert H. Daugherty" <robert.h.daugherty@nasa.gov>  
Subject: Video you sent  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
Attached:

WOW!!!  
I bet there are a few pucker strings pulled tight around there!  
Thinking about a belly landing versus bailout..... (I would say that if there is a question about main gear well burn thru that its crazy to even hit the deploy gear button...the reason being that you might have failed the wheels since they are aluminum..they will fail before the tire heating/pressure makes them fail..and you will send debris all over the wheel well making it a possibility that the gear would not even deploy due to ancillary damage...300 feet is the wrong altitude to find out you have one gear down and the other not down...you're dead in that case)  
Think about the pitch-down moment for a belly landing when hitting not the main gear but the trailing edge of the wing or body flap when landing gear up...even if you come in fast and at slightly less pitch attitude...the nose slapdown with that pitching moment arm seems to me to be pretty scary...so much so that I would bail out before I would let a loved one land like that.  
My two cents.  
See ya,  
Bob

At 03:04 PM 1/27/2003, you wrote:

-----Original Message-----  
From: SMITH, JAMES P. (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2003 7:15 AM  
To: DL ES2 Branch; DL ES2 Contractors

Sends the current message(s) to the Trash mailbox.

From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "'Bob Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: FW: Video you sent  
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:59:53 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Thanks. That's why they need to get all the facts in early on--such as look at impact damage from the spy telescope. Even then, we may not know the real effect of the damage.

The LaRC ditching model tests 20 some years ago showed that the Orbiter was the best ditching shape that they had ever tested, of many. But, our structures people have said that if we ditch we would blow such big holes in the lower panels that the orbiter might break up. Anyway, they refuse to even consider water ditching any more--I still have the test results[ Bailout seems best.

**From:** Robert H. Daugherty [mailto:robert.h.daugherty@nasa.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 27, 2003 3:35 PM  
**To:** CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Subject:** Video you sent

WOW!!!

I bet there are a few pucker strings pulled tight around there!

Thinking about a belly landing versus bailout..... (I would say that if there is a question about main gear well burn thru that its crazy to even hit the deploy gear button...the reason being that you might have failed the wheels since they are aluminum..they will fail before the tire heating/pressure makes them fail..and you will send debris all over the wheel well making it a possibility that the gear would not even deploy due to ancillary damage...300 feet is the wrong altitude to find out you have one gear down and the other not down...you're dead in that case)

Think about the pitch-down moment for a belly landing when hitting not the main gear but the trailing edge of the wing or body flap when landing gear up...even if you come in fast and at slightly less pitch attitude...the nose slapdown with that pitching moment arm seems to me to be pretty scary...so much so that I would bail out before I would let a loved one land like that.

My two cents.


See ya,  
Bob

At 03:04 PM 1/27/2003, you wrote:

-----Original Message-----

**From:** SMITH, JAMES P. (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 22, 2003 7:15 AM  
**To:** DL ES2 Branch; DL ES2 Contractors  
**Subject:** FW: STS-107 Post-Launch Film Review - Day 1

Watch the video first and see if you can spot anything.



From: "CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
To: "Robert H. Daugherty" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: RE: Tile Damage  
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2003 13:29:58 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

I have not heard anything new. I'll let you know if I do.


CCC

-----Original Message-----


From: Robert H. Daugherty [mailto:r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov]  
Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2003 12:39 PM  
To: CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
Subject: Tile Damage


Any more activity today on the tile damage or are people just relegated to crossing their fingers and hoping for the best?

See ya,  
Bob









Hi David,

I talked to Carlisle a bit ago and he let me know you guys at MOD were getting into the loop on the tile damage issue. I'm writing this email not really in an official capacity but since we've worked together so many times I feel like I can say pretty much anything to you. And before I begin I would offer that I am admittedly erring way on the side of absolute worst-case scenarios and I don't really believe things are as bad as I'm getting ready to make them out. But I certainly believe that to not be ready for a gut-wrenching decision after seeing instrumentation in the wheel well not be there after entry is irresponsible. One of my personal theories is that you should seriously consider the possibility of the gear not deploying at all if there is a substantial breach of the wheel well. The reason might be that as the temps increase, the wheel (aluminum) will lose material properties as it heats up and the tire pressure will increase. At some point the wheel could fail and send debris everywhere. While it is true there are thermal fuses in the wheel, if the rate of heating is high enough, since the tire is such a good insulator, the wheel may degrade in strength enough to let go far below the 1100 psi or so that the tire normally bursts at. It seems to me that with that much carnage in the wheel well, something could get screwed up enough to prevent deployment and then you are in a world of hurt. The following are scenarios that might be possible...and since there are so many of them, these are offered just to make sure that some things don't slip thru the cracks...I suspect many or all of these have been gone over by you guys already:

1. People talk about landing with two flat tires...I did too until this came up. If both tires blew up in the wheel well (not talking thermal fuse and venting but explosive decomp due to tire and/or wheel failure) the overpressure in the wheel well will be in the 40 + psi range. The resulting loads on the gear door ( a quarter million lbs) would almost certainly blow the door off the hinges or at least send it out into the slip stream...catastrophic. Even if you could survive the heating, would the gear now deploy? And/or also, could you even reach the runway with this kind of drag?
2. The explosive bungies...what might be the possibility of these firing due to excessive heating? If they fired, would they send the gear door and/or the gear into the slipstream?
3. What might excessive heating do to all kinds of other hardware in the wheel well...the hydraulic fluid, uplocks, etc? Are there vulnerable hardware items that might prevent deployment?
4. If the gear didn't deploy ( and you would have to consider this before making the commitment to gear deploy on final) what would happen control-wise if the other gear is down and one is up? (I think Howard Law and his community will tell you you're finished)
5. Do you belly land? Without any other planning you will have already committed to KSC. And what will happen during derotation in a gear up landing (trying to stay away from an asymmetric gear situation for example) since you will be hitting the aft end body flap and wings and pitching down extremely fast a la the old X-15 landings? My guess is you would have an extremely large vertical decel situation up in the nose for the crew. While directional control would be afforded in some part by the drag chute...do you want to count on that to keep you out of the moat?
6. If a belly landing is unacceptable, ditching/bailout might be next on the list. Not a good day.
7. Assuming you can get to the runway with the gear deployed but with two flat tires, can the commander control the vehicle both in pitch and lateral directions? One concern is excessive

drag (0.2 g's) during TD throughout the entire saddle region making the derotation uncontrollable due to saturated elevons...resulting in nose gear failure? The addition of crosswinds would make lateral control a tough thing too. Simulating this, because it is so ridiculously easy to do (sims going on this very minute at AMES with load-persistence) seems like a real no-brainer.

Admittedly this is over the top in many ways but this is a pretty bad time to get surprised and have to make decisions in the last 20 minutes. You can count on us to provide any support you think you need.

Best Regards,  
Bob

From: "LECHNER, DAVID F. (JSC-DF52) (USA)" <david.f.lechner1@jsc.nasa.gov>  
To: "Robert H. Daugherty" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>  
Cc: M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov, H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov,  
"CAMPBELL, CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)"  
<carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov>  
Subject: RE: Main Gear Breach Concerns  
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2003 12:17:34 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Bob,

I really appreciate the candid remarks. As always your points have generated extremely valuable discussion in our group. Thank you. We have been discussing and continue to discuss the all possible scenarios, signatures and decisions. Your input is beneficial. Like everyone, we hope that the debris impact analysis is correct and all this discussion is mute.

David F-M Lechner  
Space Shuttle Mechanical Systems  
Mechanical, Maintenance, Arm & Crew Systems (MMACS)  
United Space Alliance, Johnson Space Center  
(281) 483-1685

-----Original Message-----

From: Robert H. Daugherty [mailto:r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov]  
Sent: Thursday, January 30, 2003 5:23 PM  
To: LECHNER, DAVID F. (JSC-DF52) (USA)  
Cc: M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov; H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov; CAMPBELL,  
CARLISLE C., JR (JSC-ES2) (NASA)  
Subject: Main Gear Breach Concerns

Hi David,

I talked to Carlisle a bit ago and he let me know you guys at MOD were getting into the loop on the tile damage issue. I'm writing this email not really in an official capacity but since we've worked together so many times I feel like I can say pretty much anything to you. And before I begin I would offer that I am admittedly erring way on the side of absolute worst-case scenarios and I don't really believe things are as bad as I'm getting ready to make them out. But I certainly believe that to not be ready for a gut-wrenching decision after seeing instrumentation in the wheel well not be there after entry is irresponsible. One of my personal theories is that you should seriously consider the possibility of the gear not deploying at all if there is a substantial breach of the wheel well. The reason might be that as the temps increase, the wheel (aluminum) will lose material properties as it heats up and the tire pressure will increase. At some point the wheel could fail and send debris everywhere. While it is true there are thermal fuses in the wheel, if the rate of heating is high enough, since the tire is such a good insulator, the wheel may degrade in strength enough to let go far below the 1100 psi or so that the tire normally bursts at. It seems to me that with that much carnage in the wheel well, something could get screwed up enough to prevent deployment and then you are in a world of hurt. The following are scenarios that might be possible...and since there are so many of them,

these are offered just to make sure that some things don't slip thru the cracks...I suspect many or all of these have been gone over by you guys already:

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Admittedly this is over the top in many ways but this is a pretty bad time to get surprised and have to make decisions in the last 20 minutes. You can count on us to provide any support you think you need.

Best Regards,  
Bob

X-Sender: s.j.scotti@pop.larc.nasa.gov  
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2003 15:06:20 -0500  
To: "SHUART, MARK J" <M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov> From: "Stephen J. Scotti" <s.j.scotti@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Columbia support estimates  
Cc: <j.s.harrison@larc.nasa.gov>, <e.j.siochi@larc.nasa.gov>, <d.l.dicus@larc.nasa.gov>, <d.r.ambur@larc.nasa.gov>, <m.p.nemeth@larc.nasa.gov>, <h.m.adelman@larc.nasa.gov>, <l.g.horta@larc.nasa.gov>

Mark

Per your request. Had not heard back from Howard Adelman, so I guessed his numbers. -Steve

Guesstimates - Projected WF (% available time) and Net funding needed over next 4 months

AMPB

3 equivalent persons (Mia, Brian, Erik, Wally, Craig)

1 ATTB Technician

Net Funding:

Analytical Support - \$30K  
Org overhead (\$19K/equiv person) - \$57K

MDB

Projected activities: reconstruction, fault tree analysis, analysis support & impact testing if requested

70% Mike Nemeth  
60% Mark Hilberger  
60% Rick Young

50% ATTB RCHD Technician

Net funding:

50% Allan Waters - \$30K  
Org overhead ~ \$36.1K

MTSB

Projected activities: Team leadership/coordination, reconstruction, fault tree analysis, AAAC support, analysis support & thermal testing if requested

80% Steve Scotti  
80% Kim Bey  
80% Max Blosser  
80% Chris Lang  
40% Kamran Daryabeigi - Wind Tunnel Support 50% Sandra Walker - Thermal  
Analysis  
30% Keith Bird - Material analysis  
  
50% ATTB RCHC Technician

Net funding:

10% Dave Mercer - \$4K  
75% Lynn Bowman - \$45K  
75% Thermal Analyst - \$40K  
Analytical Support \$30K  
Org overhead \$83K

SDB

Projected activities: Impact Analysis & Test support

1 equivalent person

Net funding:

50% equivalent contractor \$30K  
Org overhead \$19K

--

----- Dr.  
Stephen J. Scotti (s.j.scotti@larc.nasa.gov) Head, Metals and Thermal  
Structures Branch (MTSB) MS 396  
B1267, Rm 142  
6 East Reid Street  
NASA Langley Research Center  
Hampton, VA 23681-2199  
Branch Home Page: <http://smc.larc.nasa.gov/mtsb> tel. (757) 864 - 5431  
fax (757) 864 - 7943  
-----

X-Sender: r.h.daugherty@pop.larc.nasa.gov Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2003 15:35:36 - 0500

To: john.barry-1@nasa.gov

From: "Robert H. Daugherty" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Email Traffic From Robert Daugherty Cc: M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov, H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov

Maj. General Barry,

Please find attached a document my management asked me to prepare which outlines the email traffic into and out from myself regarding the events in the week prior to the Columbia accident. I have added verbiage detailing the telephone conversations I had as best as I could recall them. Looking forward to discussing this information with you this evening at 5:30 CST. I may be reached at [REDACTED]. Lt. Clark has my cell phone number if I cannot be reached at the above number for some reason.

Best Regards,  
Bob Daugherty

Attachment converted: Adelman:ALDF Timeline.doc 2 (WDBN/MSWD) (000C1928)

(See Adelman-3 for attachment)



X-Sender: h.k.henry@pop.larc.nasa.gov  
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2003 19:53:08 -0500  
To: <AHostetler@timesdispatch.com>  
From: "H. Keith Henry" <h.k.henry@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Fwd: Re: tires  
Cc: "Robert H. Daugherty" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>,  
M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov, H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov

Hello, AJ. You and I covered this in our telephone conversation earlier this evening. I will be asking follow-up questions for you and a couple other folks tomorrow.

keith

X-Sender: r.h.daugherty@pop.larc.nasa.gov Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2003 17:37:15 - 0500  
To: <AHostetler@timesdispatch.com>  
From: "Robert H. Daugherty" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Re: tires  
Cc: M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov, H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov

Ms. Hostetler,

Thank you for your inquiry of us here at the Aircraft Landing Dynamics Facility. The person best able to respond to your inquiry would be Mr. Keith Henry in our Public Affairs Office which is part of our Office of External Affairs. Mr. Henry may be reached by email at the following address:

H.K.HENRY@LaRC.NASA.GOV

or by telephone at (757) 864-6120

Our Public Affairs Office will be happy to assist you in any way they can.

Very Best Regards,  
Bob Daugherty

At 04:24 PM 2/10/2003, you wrote:

Mr. Daugherty: I understand that you have been involved in projects at Langley using the Advanced Dynamics Landing Facility to test new radial tires for Michelin. I have been told that during the Columbia's recent, tragic mission that Langley responded to a request from Johnson for information on what to do if a tire was blown during the shuttle's landing.

Could you please direct me to someone with the ADLF who could confirm and/or elaborate on Johnson's request and Langley's role in that?

Many thanks,

A.J. Hostetler  
Science Writer  
Richmond Times-Dispatch  
P.O. Box 85333  
Richmond, VA 23293  
<mailto:ahostetler@timesdispatch.com>ahostetler@timesdispatch.com 804-649-6355 (o)  
804-775-8059 (fax)

--  
\*\*\*\*\* H.  
Keith Henry 757-864-6120 M.S. 115  
fax 864-8199  
Deputy, Office of Public Affairs h.k.henry@larc.nasa.gov NASA, Langley  
Research Center  
Hampton, VA 23681-2199 http://oea.larc.nasa.gov/  
\*\*\*\*\*

X-Sender: r.s.pappa@pop.larc.nasa.gov  
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2003 11:05:20 -0500  
To: Bob Daugherty <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov>,  
Howard Adelman <h.m.adelman@larc.nasa.gov>, Mark Shuart  
<m.j.shuart@larc.nasa.gov>,  
Tom Noll <t.e.noll@larc.nasa.gov>,  
Keith Henry <h.k.henry@larc.nasa.gov>  
From: "Richard S. Pappa" <r.s.pappa@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Fwd: Today on  
SPACE.com -- Thursday, February 13, 2003

I assume you've already seen this article posted on-line. Just wanted to be  
sure... It just arrived in my mail box.

Richard

SpaceFlight:

\* NASA E-mail Discussed Landing Disaster Scenarios  
[http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/sts107\\_email\\_030212.html](http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/sts107_email_030212.html)

A NASA engineer advised mission controllers two days before shuttle  
Columbia's landing to be ready to make tough choices in the final minutes  
just in case heat shield tiles on the landing gear door were damaged during  
launch.

X-Sender: w.k.belvin@pop.larc.nasa.gov  
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2003 08:30:13 -0500  
To: H M Adelman <H.M.Adelman@larc.nasa.gov> From: Keith Belvin  
<w.k.belvin@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: FYI

Howard,

FYI. This is an article quoting Bob Daugherty's email.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A287-2003Feb12.html>

File: Kathy Sawyer of the Post.doc

X-Sender: k.l.smith@pop.larc.nasa.gov

Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2003 13:57:40 -0500

To: H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov

From: Karen Smith <k.l.smith@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Phone message from Washington Post

Kathy Sawyer of the Washington Post read about emails that were released. She would like you to call her at 202-841-6156.

Thank you,  
Karen Smith

Adelman-17

Filename: Public Charts  
Sensor Data.doc

X-Sender: r.h.daugherty@pop.larc.nasa.gov Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2003 10:08:24 -  
0500  
To: M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov  
From: "Robert H. Daugherty" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Public  
Charts Of Sensor Data  
Cc: H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov

Hi Mark,

Attached is a powerpoint file with about 25 charts off of a public NASA  
spaceflight site that shows sensor data with indicators of what's "good"  
data, both nominal and off-nominal, and also sensor system failures. Very  
interesting...especially if you scroll through the charts somewhat quickly.  
Bob

Attachment converted: Adelman:Columbia Sensor Timeline Charts (SLD3/PPT3)  
(000BF426)

*See Daugh-102 for attachment*

*Adelman-20*

Filename: Revision 1 of  
-timeline.doc

X-Sender: r.h.daugherty@pop.larc.nasa.gov Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2003 09:19:38 -  
0500  
To: john.barry-1@nasa.gov  
From: "Robert H. Daugherty" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Revision  
Of Daugherty's ALDF Timeline Document Cc: M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov,  
H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov

General Barry,

It was my pleasure to speak with you yesterday evening. As you recall, at  
the very beginning of our conversation I mentioned that as I read over the  
timeline document I had prepared earlier, it struck me that an email I had  
remembered writing (though its existence was listed in the timeline) had not  
actually been reproduced in the package. I've added that email into this  
revised document. It is on page 21 of the document and is a note I sent to  
my Director for Structures with some comments to update him on how it seemed  
"things" were going regarding the simulations we thought were important.

Please feel free to contact me at any time at my office number (757) 864-  
1309 or my cell phone number [REDACTED] I look forward to assisting the  
Board in any way possible.

Best Regards,  
Bob Daugherty

Attachment converted: Adelman:ALDF Timeline\_Rev A.doc (WDBN/MSWD) (000C1F56)

(see [http://foia.larc.nasa.gov/Timeline\\_RevA.pdf](http://foia.larc.nasa.gov/Timeline_RevA.pdf)  
for attachment)

Adelman - 21

Filename: Re - Any Contacts  
in past.doc

X-Sender: j.l.gaspar@pop.larc.nasa.gov  
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2003 15:16:08 -0500  
To: "Howard M. Adelman" <h.m.adelman@larc.nasa.gov> From: "James L. Gaspar"  
<j.l.gaspar@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Re: Fwd: Any contacts in past

FYI,

Here's an article quoting Bob Daugherty on the Columbia...

<http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/space/1775775>

At 02:08 PM 2/12/2003, you wrote:

Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2003 13:33:31 -0500

To: d.l.dicus@larc.nasa.gov, J.S.HARRISON@larc.nasa.gov,  
E.R.GENERAZIO@larc.nasa.gov, t.e.noll@larc.nasa.gov, B.PERRY@larc.nasa.gov,  
h.m.adelman@larc.nasa.gov, L.G.HORTA@larc.nasa.gov,  
s.j.scotti@larc.nasa.gov, d.r.ambur@larc.nasa.gov,  
C.A.POUPARD@larc.nasa.gov, C.C.CANNON@larc.nasa.gov,  
D.M.HEATH@larc.nasa.gov, M.P.NEMETH@larc.nasa.gov, j.b.ransom@larc.nasa.gov,  
e.j.siochi@larc.nasa.gov, s.r.cole@larc.nasa.gov, j.h.starnes@larc.nasa.gov,  
i.s.raju@larc.nasa.gov From: "Mark J. Shuart" <m.j.shuart@larc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: Any contacts in past

Folks,

One of the questions that came up today was, has LaRC ever been contacted before while a Shuttle mission was underway. Thanks for any info you have.....Mark

Let me know if the answer is yes.

Thanks,  
Howard

Dr. Howard M. Adelman  
Head, Structural Dynamics Branch  
NASA Langley Research Center  
Mail Stop 230  
Building 1293B, Room 131 Phone: (757) 864-2804  
4B West Taylor Street FAX: (757) 864-8808  
Hampton, VA 23681-0001 Email: h.m.adelman@larc.nasa.gov

Adelman-23



To: "Stephen J. Scotti" <s.j.scotti@larc.nasa.gov> From: "Howard M. Adelman"  
<h.m.adelman@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Re: Columbia support estimates  
Cc: "Shuart, Mark" <m.j.shuart@larc.nasa.gov> Bcc:  
X-Attachments:

Steve:

I tried to reach you by phone but without success. Anyway, I believe the contractor cost is a bit low (\$40 K might be better.) Also, Lisa Jones sent a package to Mark Saunders (at his request) describing the IDRF capabilities. If he asks for some test support, that would affect the costs. We have not yet heard from Saunders about this yet. Thanks,  
Howard

Mark  
Per your request. Had not heard back from Howard Adelman, so I guessed his numbers. -Steve

Guesstimates - Projected WF (% available time) and Net funding needed over next 4 months

AMPB

3 equivalent persons (Mia, Brian, Erik, Wally, Craig)

1 ATTB Technician

Net Funding:

Analytical Support - \$30K  
Org overhead (\$19K/equiv person) - \$57K

MDB

Projected activities: reconstruction, fault tree analysis, analysis support & impact testing if requested

70% Mike Nemeth  
60% Mark Hilberger  
60% Rick Young

50% ATTB RCHD Technician

Net funding:

50% Allan Waters - \$30K  
Org overhead ~ \$36.1K

MTSB

Projected activities: Team leadership/coordination, reconstruction, fault tree analysis, AAAC support, analysis support & thermal testing if requested

- 80% Steve Scotti
- 80% Kim Bey
- 80% Max Blosser
- 80% Chris Lang
- 40% Kamran Daryabeigi - Wind Tunnel Support 50% Sandra Walker - Thermal Analysis
- 30% Keith Bird - Material analysis
  
- 50% ATTB RCHC Technician

Net funding:

- 10% Dave Mercer - \$4K
- 75% Lynn Bowman - \$45K
- 75% Thermal Analyst - \$40K
- Analytical Support \$30K
- Org overhead \$83K

SDB

Projected activities: Impact Analysis & Test support

1 equivalent person

Net funding:

- 50% equivalent contractor \$30K
- Org overhead \$19K

--

----- Dr.  
Stephen J. Scotti (s.j.scotti@larc.nasa.gov) Head, Metals and Thermal Structures Branch (MTSB) MS 396  
B1267, Rm 142  
6 East Reid Street  
NASA Langley Research Center  
Hampton, VA 23681-2199  
Branch Home Page: <http://smc.larc.nasa.gov/mtsb> tel. (757) 864 - 5431  
fax (757) 864 - 7943

-----

X-Sender: r.h.daugherty@pop.larc.nasa.gov Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2003 16:34:09 -  
0500

To: "Howard M. Adelman" <h.m.adelman@larc.nasa.gov> From: "Robert H.  
Daugherty" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Re: Handling Media  
Contacts

Hi Howard,

Am getting a million as you can imagine. All are being referred to Keith. Am  
gonna put a message on my (incessantly ring) phone to direct people to  
Keith. As you recall, I have leave scheduled for tomorrow and Friday and  
this is a very good time to exercise that so I'll be off then. Please  
reinforce to Jeanne that I would not like my cell phone number given out to  
anyone but you guys can absolutely call me. I know I don't have to say that  
but figured I would. Thanks alot. Bob

At 04:01 PM 2/12/2003, you wrote:

SDB:

Just a reminder. Any reporters who contact you concerning the Columbia  
accident are to be referred to Keith Henry in the Office of External Affairs  
864-6120.

Thanks,  
Howard

Dr. Howard M. Adelman  
Head, Structural Dynamics Branch  
NASA Langley Research Center  
Mail Stop 230  
Building 1293B, Room 131 Phone: (757) 864-2804  
4B West Taylor Street FAX: (757) 864-8808  
Hampton, VA 23681-0001 Email: h.m.adelman@larc.nasa.gov

Filename: Re - Revision of  
timeline.doc

From: "BARRY, JOHN (JSC-MA) (NASA)" <john.barry-1@nasa.gov> To: "'Robert H. Daugherty'" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov> Cc: M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov, H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov Subject: RE: Revision Of Daugherty's ALDF Timeline Document Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2003 12:20:05 -0600

Bob--thanks. Got it.

JB

-----Original Message-----

From: Robert H. Daugherty [mailto:r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov] Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2003 8:20 AM To: BARRY, JOHN (JSC-MA) (NASA) Cc: M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov; H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov Subject: Revision Of Daugherty's ALDF Timeline Document

General Barry,

It was my pleasure to speak with you yesterday evening. As you recall, at the very beginning of our conversation I mentioned that as I read over the timeline document I had prepared earlier, it struck me that an email I had remembered writing (though its existence was listed in the timeline) had not actually been reproduced in the package. I've added that email into this revised document. It is on page 21 of the document and is a note I sent to my Director for Structures with some comments to update him on how it seemed "things" were going regarding the simulations we thought were important.

Please feel free to contact me at any time at my office number (757) 864-1309 or my cell phone number [REDACTED]. I look forward to assisting the Board in any way possible.

Best Regards,  
Bob Daugherty

Adelman - 27

Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2003 21:53:42 +0100  
From: "Cruijssen Henk J." <hj-cruijssen@planet.nl> Subject: Shuttle MLG gear doors ??  
To: m.j.shuart@larc.nasa.gov, david.f.lechner1@jsc.nasa.gov, r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov, H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov, carlisle.c.campbell@nasa.gov  
Cc: "Cruijssen Henk (UAC)" <hj-cruijssen@planet.nl>, Cruijssen Henk <H.Cruyssen@dutchspace.nl> Importance: Normal  
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)

Dear Sir

I read with utmost interest your e-mail from the NASA website (i.e. e-mail of 31 January 2003). I have some questions you may easily answer, as they puzzle me. I am an engineering manager at the Dutch Space Structures and Mechanical division called Dutch Space in Leiden . The Netherlands : We are as a company involved in mechanisms for solar arrays, for the European Robotic Arm on the ISS, but also in launch vehicles such as the ARIANE 5 and also such as re-entry vehicles rudders like the hot rudder of the X-38 vehicle of which we delivered the rudders via ESA to NASA'. I know you are very busy with the FAR, so if you have no time I understand completely. Just trying to think in parallel.....(maybe along the complete wrong track, but that's typical for FMECA and FAR analyses, I would say)

First of all, I understand that the doors are closed by a special procedure, using a kind of broom stick to close the doors. Is this correct.....??  
Apparently, the doors then fall into an over-centre lock.??

1. How is this controlled and how is it guaranteed that the doors are 100% closed but that there is no such a play in the mechanism or in the door levers, such that a partially opening could occur ??.
2. A small opening of the doors could occur unnoticed if the switches are ill set, still the doors could be blocked by the over center locking mechanism. A partly opening may not be critical (TBC/ Acoustics and sinus and random vibrations) during the ascent, but will be very critical during re entry.....A gap in reentry technology is devastating.
3. As the temperature sensors in the wheel bay go off-line, or even out of order, one could think that the cable bundle for the telemetry is subjected to degradation / abrasion. Is it possible by evaluating the sequence in telemetry drop-out to determine which part of the cable gets the intense heat (twisted cable may give an indication of the spot??)
4. Is there a duct running from the leading edge to the wheel bay?? As the leading edge is damaged (is this confirmed yet ?? ) some gaseous plasma could reach the inner wheel bay?? How?
5. Are there any other places other than the wheel bay (but close by) of which the temperature has been monitored and show erroneous telemetry readings?  
Other question related to the tiles:
6. Have impact damage analyses also been executed on so called degraded tiles i.e. tiles which have been used more times or bond line for thermal

expansion compensation of which the bond line has been hardened due to thermal cycling effects?? Sincerely yours

Henk J. Cruijssen

Engineering Manager

Structures & Mechanical Systems

Dutch Space

2303 DB Leiden

The Netherlands

[h.crujssen@dutchspace.nl](mailto:h.crujssen@dutchspace.nl)

[http://www.dutchspace.nl](http://www.dutchspace.nl/00index/00index2.htm)

[hj-crujssen@planet.nl](mailto:hj-crujssen@planet.nl)

Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2003 09:28:42 -0500  
To: d.l.dicus@larc.nasa.gov, J.S.HARRISON@larc.nasa.gov,  
E.R.GENERAZIO@larc.nasa.gov, t.e.noll@larc.nasa.gov, B.PERRY@larc.nasa.gov,  
h.m.adelman@larc.nasa.gov, L.G.HORTA@larc.nasa.gov,  
s.j.scotti@larc.nasa.gov, d.r.ambur@larc.nasa.gov,  
C.A.POUPARD@larc.nasa.gov, s.p.hahn@larc.nasa.gov, D.M.HEATH@larc.nasa.gov,  
M.P.NEMETH@larc.nasa.gov, j.b.ransom@larc.nasa.gov,  
e.j.siochi@larc.nasa.gov, s.r.cole@larc.nasa.gov, "BARNES, ROBERT S"  
<R.S.BARNES@larc.nasa.gov>, "SAUNDERS, MARK P" <M.P.SAUNDERS@larc.nasa.gov>  
From: "Mark J. Shuart" <m.j.shuart@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Status on SMC  
Columbia activities Cc: "WYATT, CYNTHIA A" <C.A.WYATT@larc.nasa.gov>

Folks,  
Attached is the electronic version of the status report I turned in today.  
Thanks for all your help in pulling it together.....Mark Attachment  
converted: Adelman:SMC\_Status2.doc (WDBN/MSWD) (000C085B) --  
Mark J. Shuart, PhD  
Director for Structures & Materials  
NASA Langely Research Center  
Hampton, VA 23681



Columbia Investigation - SMC Status  
February 14, 2003  
MJShuart

Structures & Materials has 4 activities underway:

1. Nondestructive Evaluation Team  
Team Lead ÷ Dr. Eric Maderas

Objective ÷ Use advanced NDE technologies in thermal, high-power and nonlinear ultrasonics, scanning microwave, and reverse geometry x-ray to evaluate the integrity of the SOFI and its bond to the ET surface

Support requested by MSFC (Paul Munafo) and Code Q (Jim Lloyd)  
Evaluating techniques for application  
Coordinating experts from Johns Hopkins and Iowa State (per MSFC approval)  
Have received 2-ft by 2-ft by 4-in piece of SOFI sprayed on an aluminum plate to develop techniques; SOFI sample received from MAF/New Orleans  
No completion date give; expect to complete studies by March 21, 2003

As of today, the Team also received a request from JSC (David Stanley/George Studor) to support the development of an  $\pi$ EVA hand-held Eddy Current Inspection System\_

Resources for next 4 months: \$285K, 1.5 FTE (does not include travel)

2. Impact Testing Team  
Team Lead ÷ Dr. Steve Scotti

Objective ÷ Assist in the development of test techniques to quantify impact damage effects on Shuttle tiles

Support requested by JSC (Steve Rickman)  
Collecting reports and data of previous testing at LaRC  
Fault tree being defined  
Identifying personnel and facility resources to support fault tree

Resources for next 4 months: \$300K, 4 FTE (does not include travel)

3. Orbiter Reconstruction Team  
Team Lead ÷ Charles Poupard

Objective ÷ Assist in the orbiter reconstruction at KSC

Support requested by Code A (Fred Gregory)  
Working to coordinate with JSC (Glenn Miller, Julie Cramer)  
Proposed team standing by for deployment (technicians, materials experts,  
structures experts)

Resources for next 4 months: 4 FTE, travel funds for 12 people for 80  
working days

4. Orbiter Tile Repair Team  
Team Lead ÷ Dr. Mark Shuart

Objective ÷ Collect information of prior studies conducted at LaRC

Support requested by Code Q (Pam Richardson)  
Retirees contacted (Bland Stein, John Buckley) and information being  
collected  
Activity should complete within 2 weeks

Resources for next 4 months: 1 FTE (no travel)

Work we could be doing

Effects on impact on reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) leading edge  
Effects of re-entry environment on damaged RCC leading edge  
Thermal analysis of damaged tiles and RCC  
Seal evaluation of landing gear doors  
Return to Flight items  
Materials synthesis, characterization, and development for SOFI, on-orbit  
tile repair  
NDE inspection methods for tile bonding (pre-launch)

Filename: Timeline and  
Email Traffic.doc

X-Sender: r.h.daugherty@pop.larc.nasa.gov Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2003 07:10:50 -  
0500

To: M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov

From: "Robert H. Daugherty" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Timeline  
and Email Traffic to/from ALDF Cc: H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov

Mark...this is a resend...sorry but I didn't get your message till just now  
(Wed morn, 7:10)...my email says it went out yesterday at 2:05....maybe it  
got lost in the system somehow. Bob

Mark,

Attached is a single file with the info we spoke about this morning. Will be  
back in the office in the morning. Bob

Attachment converted: Adelman:ALDF Timeline.doc 1 (WDBN/MSWD) (000BF19A) X-  
Sender: r.h.daugherty@pop.larc.nasa.gov Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2003 10:08:24 -  
0500

To: M.J.SHUART@larc.nasa.gov

From: "Robert H. Daugherty" <r.h.daugherty@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Public  
Charts Of Sensor Data

Cc: H.M.ADELMAN@larc.nasa.gov

Hi Mark,

Attached is a powerpoint file with about 25 charts off of a public NASA  
spaceflight site that shows sensor data with indicators of what's "good"  
data, both nominal and off-nominal, and also sensor system failures. Very  
interesting...especially if you scroll through the charts somewhat quickly.  
Bob

Attachment converted: Adelman:Columbia Sensor Timeline Charts (SLD3/PPT3)  
(000BF426)

See Daugh-102 for attachment

Adelman-32

To: "Shuart, Mark" <m.j.shuart@larc.nasa.gov>, H.K.HENRY@LaRC.NASA.GOV From:  
"Howard M. Adelman" <h.m.adelman@larc.nasa.gov> Subject: Washington Post  
Article  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:

Mark,Keith::

I wanted you to know about this article in case you haven't seen it. You  
will see that I gave Kathy Sawyer some background information before  
referring her to External Affairs.

Howard

washingtonpost.com

Engineer Wrote of Potential Disaster  
E-Mails Outlined Shuttle Scenarios

By Kathy Sawyer  
Washington Post Staff Writer  
Thursday, February 13, 2003; Page A01

HOUSTON, Feb. 12 -- Two days before the shuttle Columbia was lost, flight  
controllers at NASA's mission control in Houston had in hand e-mails from a  
NASA engineer outlining a nightmare scenario in which a tire might explode,  
producing "carnage in the wheel well" and a possible catastrophe when the  
shuttle returned from orbit.

The engineer, Robert Daugherty of NASA's Langley Research Center in Hampton,  
Va., sent the e-mail to a colleague at the Johnson Space Center in Houston  
on Jan. 30. NASA released the exchange today.

If there were a failure of the heat shielding of the wing in the area of the  
wheel well, Daugherty wrote, "at some point the wheel could fail and send  
debris everywhere. . . . With that much carnage in the wheel well, something  
could get screwed up enough to prevent deployment and then you are in a  
world of hurt." The e-mails are the first known documentation that anyone at  
NASA detailed a specific scenario during the mission in which damage to the  
heat shield might lead to disaster.

In a telephone conference with reporters, however, NASA flight officials  
played down the e-mail exchange, characterizing it as a kind of "thought  
exercise," a " 'what if' study" based on a hypothetical scenario -- part of  
a process that flight controllers are encouraged to engage in as part of  
their training and preparation for crises.

Since the second day of the mission, engineers for Boeing Co., a primary NASA contractor, had been analyzing the potential damage done by a chunk of foam insulation that broke free 81 seconds after the Jan. 16 launch and appeared to strike the leading edge or underside of the wing. Their analysis included the possibility of damage to heat-shielding tiles in the area of the wheel well, but they concluded that any damage would not threaten safety.

The particular flight controllers who triggered the e-mail exchange are specialists in landing gear and related systems, said chief flight director Milt Heflin. The back-and-forth, including Daugherty's response as well as some phone calls in addition to the e-mails, was never brought to the attention of the entire flight control team or higher management.

That was proper, Heflin and other NASA officials said, because in the end, the individuals involved in the electronic conversation concluded that the scenario was unlikely and required no unusual action. "We don't want things brought forward to us that [engineers] don't have a real concern about," Heflin said.

Daugherty prefaced his scenario by saying, "I am admittedly erring way on the side of absolute worst-case scenarios and I don't really believe things are as bad as I'm getting ready to make them out."

He wrote that extreme heating in the wheel well -- the hypothetical assumption posed to him by flight controllers in Houston -- could cause the shuttle landing gear to fail. Among the resulting possibilities he described was that if both tires blew in the wheel well, the resulting stresses "would almost certainly blow the door off the hinges or at least send it out into the slip stream . . . catastrophic."

Alternatively, if the gear did not deploy, he questioned whether a belly landing would work and noted that having the crew exit the vehicle "might be next on the list. Not a good day." In all, Daugherty outlined seven dangerous scenarios, including blowing out the wheel well doors, failure of the landing gear to lower, or a potentially disastrous attempt to land on flat tires.

The recipient of the memo, David Lechner of the space shuttle mechanical systems branch, responded the next day, Jan. 31, thanking Daugherty for his "candid remarks" and adding, "Like everyone, we hope that the debris impact analysis is correct and all this discussion is [moot]."

On Feb. 1, the day of reentry, the shuttle never made the landing strip. It broke up about 16 minutes before it was to reach Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Accident investigators continue to emphasize that the cause remains unknown.

At least some elements of the Daugherty scenario seem to have unfolded before the catastrophe.

A leading suspect as the trigger for the accident, in the view of some engineers both in and out of NASA, is a failure of the heat shielding of the left wing. Sensors in the left wheel well and around the wing began to fail or show temperature rises in the minutes and seconds before the shuttle broke up as it hurtled over Texas at an altitude of more than 200,000 feet and a velocity of 12,500 mph.

Heflin and Leroy Cain, flight director for Columbia's descent, said the flight controllers in question were satisfied with the analysis that there was no danger to the shuttle's safety but were doing a routine follow-up -- an exercise in "What if we are wrong?" This is routine training for contingencies, Heflin said, to make sure the team is prepared to take whatever action is proper -- or possible -- in case of sudden and unexpected developments.

"I certainly believe that to not be ready for a gut-wrenching decision after seeing instrumentation in the wheel well not be there after entry is irresponsible," Daugherty wrote.

Toward the end of his message, he added, "Admittedly this is over the top in many ways but this is a pretty bad time to get surprised and have to make decisions in the last 20 minutes."

NASA declined to make available Daugherty, Lechner or any other officials at the Langley center, where the e-mail had been drafted. The agency also declined to release an earlier e-mail that Daugherty sent to the Space Center about the impact of a deflated tire on the shuttle's ability to fly and land in a straight path. At NASA headquarters in Washington, spokesman Michael Braukus said this e-mail -- which Langley officials said they had -- would take too long for the agency to locate, and would have to be requested through the Freedom of Information Act.

The decision to reach out to Langley for analysis of the tire situation was itself unusual, said Howard Adelman, Daugherty's boss as head of the structural dynamics office, who has worked for NASA since 1965. "We normally are not called during [shuttle] missions," he said. "In fact, I can't think of any other case where we have been consulted."

The shuttle tires, made by B.F. Goodrich, are inflated with nitrogen gas to a pressure of 351 pounds per square inch, about 10 times higher than car tires, to withstand the bitter cold of space. The tires, which weigh about 200 pounds and cost about \$3,000 apiece, are each able to sustain only part of the shuttle's weight -- meaning that the shuttle could not land safely if

two or more of the tires were punctured or if one piece of landing gear failed to lower into position.

Heflin said he found out about the e-mail exchange Feb. 3, two days after the accident, but was not surprised. "I'm used to that kind of stuff going on all the time. . . . The process is a good one."

Once the investigative board named by NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe determines what caused the accident, Heflin said, and if the foam strike is pinpointed as the culprit, "we may have to rethink the process."

Asked if he thought the e-mail exchange would turn out to be "a biggie," Heflin said succinctly: "No, sir."

About a dozen engineers and flight controllers were privy to the informal exchange about the wheel well and tires, said flight director Cain, who also participated in the teleconference. He said he had been "intimately aware" of the analysis done on the impact of foam on the shuttle's heat shielding, which involved hundreds of people. If anyone on the flight team had any lingering concerns, they were "duty-bound" to report them up the chain to him, he said. "The fact is, they didn't have any concern."

Cain added that, when the sensors on the left wing started showing a problem, "the first thing that went through my mind was that we had a debris strike on the left wing."

Robert "Doc" Mirelson, NASA headquarters news chief, said NASA had decided to post the e-mail series early today on its Web site. He and others said the investigating board would certainly be looking into the matter.

Mirelson said this does not appear to be a case where relevant information failed to reach top management. "There's voluminous daily discussions and traffic on any number of things," he said. "To say [top space flight officials] should be monitoring exchanges between engineers, that's a stretch."

Echoing earlier remarks by shuttle manager Ronald D. Dittemore in Houston, Mirelson said, "There was complete trust in the process, complete trust in subordinates."

O'Keefe, in testimony prepared for a congressional hearing today, also said, "We had no indications that would suggest a compromise to flight safety."

Also at NASA headquarters, Braukus said no written record was available of engineers' discussions of the e-mails because it was "probably just a meeting at which they discussed this."

Staff writer R. Jeffrey Smith contributed to this report.

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