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Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

April 13, 2017

MR. JOHN GREENEWALD, JR. THE BLACK VAULT

FOIPA Request No.: 1363963-000

Subject: Terrorism and Counterintelligence Threat

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions:

Section 552		Section 552a
☑ (b)(1)	☑ (b)(7)(A)	(d)(5)
(b)(2)	(b)(7)(B)	☐ (j)(2)
☑ (b)(3)	✓ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
50 U.S.C. 3024(i)(1)	☑ (b)(7)(D)	(k)(2)
	☑ (b)(7)(E)	(k)(3)
	(b)(7)(F)	☐ (k)(4)
(b)(4)	(b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
(b)(5)	(b)(9)	□ (k)(6)
☑ (b)(6)		☐ (k)(7)
11 pages were reviewed and 11 page	s are being released.	
Document(s) were located which o Agency (ies) [OGA].	riginated with, or contained info	ormation concerning, other Government
This information has been refe We are consulting with anothe when the consultation is comple	r agency. The FBI will corresp	and direct response to you. pond with you regarding this information
In accordance with standard FBI pexemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. § 552/552a existence of your subject's name on a	(b)(7)(E)/(j)(2)], this response	exemption (b)(7)(E) and Privacy Act neither confirms nor denies the

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S. C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist. Enclosed for your information is a copy of the Explanation of Exemptions.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us."

The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request. Your patience is appreciated.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIAonline portal by creating an account on the following web site: https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/home. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, or by emailing ogis@nara.gov. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@ic.fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s). If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

Enclosed are reprocessed documents in response to your Mandatory Declassification Review.


EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual:
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence:
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service he release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.



SECRET/MOFORN/FISA (5)

b3



Key Judgmentsⁱ

	(S) (S)	The Atlanta Domain Team assesses with moderate-high confidence the and assesses with moderate confidence the The Atlanta Domain Team assesses with low confidence the The Atlanta Domain Team assesses with low confidence the	b1 b3
	(5)		b7E
	(S)	The Atlanta Domain Team assesses with moderate to high confidence the	
		Background:	
(S)	(U)		b1 b3 b7E
		Details: i (U) High Confidence generally indicates that judgments are based on high-quality information from multiple sources or from a single highly reliable source, and/or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment. (U) Medium Confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible, but can be interpreted in various ways, or is not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. (U) Low Confidence generally means that the information's credibility and/or plausibility is questionable, the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or that the FBI has significant concerns or problems with the sources.	
	(S) (S)	ii Includes both foreign-born X	b1 b3

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 $(U) \ O\!f\!ficial \ Presence \ and \ Leadership/Structure$ (S)(8) The Atlanta Division has b1 b3 **(S)** b7E **(S)** \times b1 (5) b3 (5)(U) Asymmetric Presence X (5) b1 b3 b1 $\{S\}$ b3



 $(U)\ \textit{Threat to US Technologies and Potential Procurement}$

	%//NF) The Atlanta Domain Team assesses with low confidence the	
(S) (S)		b1 b3 b7E
(S)	×	
(S)	X	
(S)	X	b1 b3
(S)		
(S)		
(S)	X	

SECRET//NOFORN/FISA	
(5)	b1 b3
(S)	
Additional Collection Activity: Assisting, Assessing, and Influe	
The Atlanta Domain Team assesses with moderate to high (S)	confidence the b1 b3 b7E
(S)	
(S) X	
	b1 b3
(S) X	
(5)	

viii a collaborative source with indirect access, some of whose reporting has been corroborated for two years ix a collaborative source with indirect access, some of whose reporting has been corroborated for two years



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(U) Cross-program Links			
(%) The presents			_
by Ting presents	While FBI reporting in	ndicates some	
	Th	ere are also indications that	
21 In addition	source renorting which	was partially corroborated	hv
anomer source moteates an			
Outlook:		,	
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Source Coverage:			
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Intelligence Gaps: (5) (5) (5) (5) b1 b3 (5) (S) (5) Recommendations: **(S)** b1 b3 b1 (S) b3 b7E (S)



(5)	A	Appendix A: The	eat Justifica	<u>tion Matrix</u>		h1
,	Threat Assessment Table					b1 b3
(S)		-	Threat Level	Confidence Level	Description	
1 ₩ }	ý	Physical Means/Tools				·········
	Capability	Knowledge				
	Ü	Sophistication				
(S)		Association				
	Intent	Activity Risk				
(S)	Criticality *potential for *	Violence Economic Impact National Security Public Trust				
(S)	Vulnerability	Target Richness Defense Access				

SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

b1 b3 b7E



(U) Domain Management Threat Assessment Methodology

Capability	Low	Medium	High
Physical Means/Tools	Has identified tools and/or needs	Has the ability to readily obtain materials or already has some materials	Possesses requisite materials and tools
Knowledge	Actors rarely exhibit a specialized skill set and do not seek training	Actors occasionally exhibit a specialized skill set but are actively seeking training related to that skill set	Actors routinely exhibit a specialized skill set and actively seek training related to skill set
Sophistication	Actors have little or no organizational structure, exhibit a limited if not absent ability to adapt and/or modify their techniques	Actors occasionally employ highly structured, long term plans, rarely exhibit an ability to adapt and/or modify their techniques as appropriate	Actors routinely employ highly structured, long- term plans, regularly exhibiting an ability to adapt, modify their techniques as appropriate and avoid detection
Associations	Actors have no connections to persons of concern to the FBI or Intelligence Community	Actors have connections to persons of concern to the FBI or Intelligence Community within Domain	Actors have multiple connections to persons of concern to the FBI or Intelligence Community within and outside domain

Intent	Low	Medium	High
Activity	Actors have vocalized desires but has taken little or no action to achieve goal	Actors have occasionally taken some action to achieve goal	Actors have made continuous and dedicated actions to achieve goal
Acceptance of Risk	Avoids Risk	Willingness to accept minimal risk	Willing to accept substantial risk





Criticality	Low	Medium	High
Violence	Aggression and violent actions rarely result in death or psychological trauma	Aggression and violent actions typically result in moderate loss of life or bodily harm or is expected to result in severe psychological trauma	Aggression and violent actions typically result in substantial loss of life or severe bodily harm and often include collateral damage
Economic Impact	Actor(s) poses to exact thousands of dollars in loses to US entities	Actor(s) poses to exact millions to tens of millions of dollars in losses to US entities	Actor(s) poses to exact hundreds of millions to billions of dollars in losses to US entities
National Security	Actor(s) specifically targets US entities, potentially resulting in damage to US national security, regional infrastructure or the nation's critical infrastructure	Actor(s) specifically targets US entities, potentially resulting in serious damage to US national security or the nation's critical infrastructure	Actor(s) specifically targets US entities, potentially resulting in grave damage to US national security or the nation's critical infrastructure
Public Trust	Actions affect local levels of public trust only	Actions affect regional levels of public trust only	Actions affect national levels of public trust

Vulnerability	Low	Medium	High
Target Richness	Traditional singular targets	Traditional type pf target but many them in domain	Non-traditional targets, many potential targets in domain
Defenses	Well-protected and difficult to exploit	Simple security that requires threat to have a plan and basic level of skill to overcome	No defenses, target easily attacked or compromised
Access	Actor(s) do not have access to target	Actor(s) have indirect access or the potential to obtain direct access to target	Actor(s) have direct access to target



Appendix B: Common Operational Pictures

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	End Notes:]
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		b3
	⁹ FBI Intelligence Assessment, (U) The Foreign Intelligence Threat in the United States, dated 25	
	November 2008	
5)		b1 b3
(U)	²⁰ FBI Intelligence Assessment, (U) FBI Cyber National Threat Assessment - 2008, dated 22 June 2009. 21 FBI EC. (SX) dated 10 August 2009.	b7A b1
(S)		b3

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