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and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

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Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D.C. 20535

October 2, 2017

MR. JOHN GREENEWALD, JR.  
SUITE 1203  
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD  
CASTAIC, CA 91384-4520

FOIPA Request No.: 1380738-000  
USSS Tracking No.: 20121400  
Subject: Assassination Attempts on George  
W. Bush, September 11, 2001 and May 10,  
2005  
(USSS 20121400 and USSS 20121408)

Dear Mr. Greenwald:

While processing your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the United States Secret Service located FBI information in their records. This material was referred to the FBI for direct response to you.

Enclosed are copies of the referred material. Deletions have been made pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section(s) 552 as noted below. See the enclosed form for an explanation of these exemptions.

**Section 552**

**Section 552a**

- (b)(1)
- (b)(2)
- (b)(3)
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- (b)(4)
- (b)(5)
- (b)(6)

- (b)(7)(A)
- (b)(7)(B)
- (b)(7)(C)
- (b)(7)(D)
- (b)(7)(E)
- (b)(7)(F)
- (b)(8)
- (b)(9)

- (d)(5)
- (j)(2)
- (k)(1)
- (k)(2)
- (k)(3)
- (k)(4)
- (k)(5)
- (k)(6)
- (k)(7)

25 pages were reviewed and 13 pages are being released.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request. Your patience is appreciated.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIAonline portal by creating an account on the following web site: <https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, or by emailing [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov). Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing [foipaquestions@fbi.gov](mailto:foipaquestions@fbi.gov). If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Hardy", with a stylized flourish at the end.

David M. Hardy  
Section Chief,  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Records Management Division

Enclosures

This material is being provided to you at no charge.

## EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1380738-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 12

- Page 3 ~ b7F;
- Page 4 ~ b7F;
- Page 5 ~ b7F;
- Page 6 ~ b7F;
- Page 7 ~ b7F;
- Page 8 ~ b7F;
- Page 9 ~ b7F;
- Page 10 ~ b7F;
- Page 11 ~ b7F;
- Page 12 ~ b7F;
- Page 13 ~ b7F;
- Page 14 ~ b7F;

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XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X For this Page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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(B)(6), (B)(7)C

**From:** Paarmann, Bryan [redacted]

b6 per FBI

**Sent:** Thursday, May 12, 2005 12:37 PM

b7C

**To:** [redacted] (B)(6), (B)(7)C, (B)(7)E

**Cc:** [redacted] (B)(6), (B)(7)C

**Subject:** Georgian Decision of Experts

Attached is the report we received today, 5/12/2005 from the Division of Criminal Examination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. It is a report of their examination of the device.

[redacted] (B)(6), (B)(7)C

USSS/TSD

<<Georgian Decision of Experts.pdf>>


*C. Bryan Paarmann,*

Legal Attache, FBI

US Embassy - Tbilisi, Georgia

ofc. [redacted]

cell [redacted]



5/12/2005

9/21/05  
[Handwritten signature]

Referred to FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-29-2017 BY J75J65T61 NSICG

**Decision of Experts**

May 10-th, 2005 in the Main Division of Criminal Examination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia was conducted an examination of the delivered substance. Two unsealed packets of polyethylene were presented for examination. As the result, the following information was identified:

Fingerprints were not discovered on the presented object.

Samples of odour tracks were taken from the object.

The experts provisionally gave the packets

b7F per FBI

The presented objects were examined visually and were compared with data of catalogue after which was identified that the

Technical damages are on the frame; in some places paint is scraped which makes difficult to read the writing.

REFERRED - FBI

FBI

**URGENT REPORT**

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-29-2017 BY J75J65T61 NSICG

**DATE: 05/10/2005**

**TO: THE DIRECTOR**

*JP 5/10/05*

**CC: SIOC  
OIO  
CTD  
CID**



b6 per FBI  
b7C

**FROM: LEGAT TBILISI**

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Legat C. Bryan Paarmann**



**PREPARER OF URGENT REPORT: Legat C. Bryan Paarmann**

**SUBJECT: Attempt to kill or injure the President of the United States or to disrupt a rally in which the President was speaking.**

**DESCRIPTION OF MATTER:** The President of the United States (POTUS), the First Lady, and the Secretary of State have just concluded a overnight visit to Georgia as the final stop in a four leg tour commemorating the end of the Second World War. The capstone event of this visit was a public speech given in an open venue known as Freedom Square. The speech was given at this venue from approximately 1:25 pm to 2:30 pm local time and then the President proceeded to the airport, boarded Air Force One and was wheels up by approximately 3:00 pm.

At 3:00 pm, the Minister of Internal Affairs (MOIA) Vano Merabishvili contacted Legat Tbilisi and requested a meeting for 4:30 pm. At this meeting, the Minister related the following: At approximately 1:30 pm, as POTUS was beginning his speech, an unknown individual tossed what is believed to be a RGD-5 handgrenade of Armenian manufacture and it landed approximately 61 feet from the right front corner of the main stage. The grenade was wrapped in a handkerchief, struck the bill of a child's baseball cap, and fell to the ground. Junior Lieutenant [redacted] of the Georgian Special State Protective Service (SSPS) was standing next to the child and bent down to investigate the strange object. Immediately seeing what he recognized as a disengaged handgrenade spoon and peeking inside the handkerchief to see what appeared to be a handgrenade, he tucked it inside his jacket and ran approximately 500 meters from the venue sight to an underground subway entrance. He then called his supervisor [redacted] of the SSPS. [redacted] then called his senior [redacted] of the SSPS. [redacted] called [redacted] of the MOIA who dispatched a Georgian EOD team to the sight. In the meantime, fearing that the grenade was still too close, instructions were given to move the grenade to a Police Car another 100 meters from the venue sight.

*9/10/07  
BK  
A*

At approximately 2:40 pm the Georgian EOD team arrived and secured the device and removed it from the area.

The Georgian Government is conducting initial forensic examination of this device. Initial information provided to Legat Tbilisi indicate that it was a real handgrenade but that it failed to detonate [redacted] Georgian authorities have b7F per FBI promised to provide whatever physical evidence is requested for independent FBI examination. USSS, FBI, nor any American authorities were notified at the time, that a potential device had been found until well after POTUS had left Georgia. The reason quoted to Legat Tbilisi was that the Georgian authorities wanted to be absolutely certain in their reporting and did not want to raise a false alarm thus ending the speech and causing embarrassment.

Of note is that prior to the speech at approximately 10:00 am, the crowd estimated at 50,000 plus, overwhelmed the magnetometer crews and as a result, the crowd was largely unscreened. The crowd was very benign however and did not appear hostile in any way. They were very supportive and no hostile messages were seen among them. Repeated Threat Intelligence sweeps through the crowd prior to the event conducted by Legat Tbilisi and USSS failed to yield any hostile intent among the onlookers.

Investigative action taken by Legat Tbilisi thus far includes crime scene photography, on scene measurements, and on scene interviews of all pertinent parties involved in this incident to include Junior Lieutenant [redacted] who recovered the grenade, all supervisors who were notified, and [redacted] b6 per FBI [redacted] of the Prosecutor General's office who observed the final trajectory of the grenade as it b7C struck the child's cap and fell to the ground. Georgian authorities are reviewing all videotapes from the speech and have promised results will be provided. Legat Tbilisi has briefed USSS Protective Intelligence and Regional Office personnel, DSS/DOS Protective Intelligence personnel, and is in close and continuous coordination with the Georgian authorities. The U.S. Ambassador to Georgia has been briefed and is aware of the situation.

Investigation continues in Tbilisi.

b7E per FBI

b7F

On 06/12/2005 [redacted]

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(D)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

b6 per FBI

b7C

b7E

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)  
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

On 06/18/2005, SA [redacted] (FBI) contacted SA [redacted] (FBI) and sent him five photographs of the crowd in Freedom Square on 05/10/2005. These pictures purport to include images of a male in a heavy leather coat holding a handkerchief substantially similar to the suspect handkerchief. At this time, it is believed that this is the suspicious individual as described by [redacted] (Reference is made to the five photographs of the crowd at Freedom Square containing the image of a man holding a red, checkered handkerchief). As of this writing, [redacted] has not had the opportunity to positively identify the man in the photographs as the one she saw on 05/10/2005.

On 06/20/2005, Georgian authorities issued a [redacted] notice to all Georgian law enforcement bodies and provided them with both the composite sketch and the photographs of the subject [redacted]

The Georgian MOIA is currently using the photos of the subject to identify additional potential witnesses from the crowd in and around the subject on 05/10/2005.

DEVICE(S):

The following information is submitted per USSS Investigative Manual, INT-9:

Warnings: No prior warning made  
Explosive: [redacted]  
Type: [redacted]  
Outermost container: Red, tartan-colored handkerchief  
Fuse functioning: [redacted]

b7F per FBI

Target(s): George W. Bush, President of the United States,  
Laura Bush, First Lady of the United States,  
Mikhail Saakashvili, President of Georgia,  
Sandra Roelofs, First Lady of Georgia.

Exact location: 61 feet from front right corner of stage.  
Method of Delivery: Thrown  
Claimed?: No group has claimed responsibility.  
Motivation: Unknown.  
Device Disposition: Failed to detonate/Rendered safe

SUSPECTS / DEFENDANTS:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

FBI analysis of the device has confirmed that the malfunction of the hand grenade was caused by the use of the handkerchief. [redacted]

b7E per FBI  
b7F

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

EXAMS CONDUCTED:

None by USSS.

DATABASE SEARCHES CONDUCTED:

None.

EVIDENCE / CONTRABAND / PERSONAL PROPERTY:

All evidence in this case is in the custody of Georgian authorities or released to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for further processing and/or retention.

ATTACHMENTS (FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER):

FBI Laboratory report # 050519014 ZW, dated 5/27/05, to Section Chief (b)(6),(b)(7)(C), Per USSS (faxed to ID/FIB/JTTF on 6/2/05)

RP

(B)(6), (B)(7)C

(B)(6), (B)(7)C

**From:** Berlin Resident Office [ber@officialmail.usss.treas.gov]  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 19, 2005 8:48 AM  
**To:** jfi@officialmail.usss.treas.gov; par@officialmail.usss.treas.gov;  
ber@officialmail.usss.treas.gov  
**Subject:** 671.000 (127-671-35925/127-672-21527) UNKNOWN SUBJECT (CONTINUED) -  
CORRECTED COPY

//PRIORITY//

\*\*MESSAGE BEING RESENT WITH CORRECTED CASE NUMBERS\*\*

U.S. SECRET SERVICE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

*T (30 days) 6/17/05*

**FROM:** Berlin Resident Office **FILE:** \*\*127-671-35925\*\*  
**XREF:** \*\*127-672-21527\*\*  
**XREF:** 175A-WF-231771 (FBI)

**TO:** Headquarters (ID/IB/JTTF-FI)

**INFO:** Paris Field Office

**SUBJECT:** Unknown Subject

**CLASS:** N/A

**STATUS:** Continued

*the original report was received on  
05/17/05. This report was not  
re-typed  
D-S.*

**REPORTING AGENT:** (B)(6), (B)(7)C

**TYPE OF REPORT:** Investigative (05/15/05 - 05/18/2005)  
Request for Investigation Other District (IOD)

**SYNOPSIS:**

The FBI, USSS, and Georgian authorities continue to interview potential witnesses and suspects.

Georgian authorities issued a press statement on 05/16/2005.

FBI Legat Paarmann issued a press statement on 05/18/2005.

(B)(6), (B)(7)C

Hair samples were recovered from the previously-submitted handkerchief, which was used to wrap the subject device.

ID is requested to conduct an IOD as specified.

**INTRODUCTION:**

Reference is made to the previous Memorandum Report in this case, dated 5/17/05 (covering 05/10/20 - 05/14/05), by SA (B)(6), (B)(7)C

Reference is made to the 5/16/05 tel/con between ATSAIC (B)(6), (B)(7)C and DSAIC (B)(6), (B)(7)C (B)(6), (B)(7)C ID regarding Berlin's request for IOD in this case.

Reference is made to FBI form 302, (B)(6), (B)(7)C dated 05/18/2005, by SA (B)(6), (B)(7)C (B)(6), (B)(7)C FBI, and faxed to JTTF on 05/18/2005.

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44

Reference is made to FBI form 302, (B)(6), (B)(7)C dated 05/18/2005, by SA (B)(6), (B)(7)C USSS, and faxed to JTTF on 05/18/2005.

Reference is made to FBI form 302, (B)(6), (B)(7)C dated 05/18/2005, by SA (B)(6), (B)(7)C (B)(6), (B)(7)C FBI, and faxed to JTTF on 05/18/2005.

Reference is made to FBI form 302, (B)(6), (B)(7)C dated 05/18/2005, by SA (B)(6), (B)(7)C USSS, and faxed to JTTF on 05/18/2005.

Copy of press statement issued by Legat (B)(6), (B)(7)C on 05/18/2005, and faxed to the ID Duty Desk on 05/18/2005.

DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION:

On 05/16/2005, the Georgian MOIA released a press statement on the internet (<http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=9895>) offering 20000 Georgian Lari (approximately \$10,900) for information leading to the capture of the person who threw "an object, wrapped in a red handkerchief" during the President's speech in Freedom Square on 5/10/05.

*ble 7C*

(B)(6), (B)(7)C  
(B)(6), (B)(7)C According to Georgian sources, (B)(6), (B)(7)C was overheard making statements to the effect that he intended to throw a flash-bang type device during the Presidential speeches on Freedom Square. These items were sent to the FBI Laboratory for further analysis.

On 05/16/2005, the Georgian MOIA turned over a videocassette of crowd footage recorded during the event at Freedom Square. This video was transported to the FBI Laboratory for further analysis.

On 05/16/2005, the FBI Laboratory provided preliminary findings regarding the previously submitted tartan handkerchief. The FBI Lab was able to recover three hairs from the handkerchief.

1. 1 body hair from a Caucasian male with brown hair; and
2. 1 hair from a dog with short hair; and
3. 1 hair from a dog with long hair.

Efforts to extract DNA continue. Further, exclusionary hair samples are being sought from anyone who came into contact with the grenade prior to it being sealed in an evidence container.

(B)(6), (B)(7)C

(B)(6), (B)(7)C Reference is made to the FBI form 302, (B)(6), (B)(7)C dated 05/17/2005, by SA (B)(6), (B)(7)C FBI. No leads were generated.

(B)(6), (B)(7)C

(B)(6), (B)(7)C Reference is made to the FBI form 302, (B)(6), (B)(7)C dated 05/18/2005, by SA (B)(6), (B)(7)C FBI.

(B)(6), (B)(7)C

(B)(6), (B)(7)C Reference is made to the FBI form 302, (B)(6), (B)(7)C dated 05/18/2005, by SA (B)(6), (B)(7)C USSS).

On 05/18/2005 at 1300 HRS (local), Legat Bryan Paarmann issued a prepared statement on Georgian television soliciting information and/or relevant video footage regarding the incident at Freedom Square. Further, Legat Paarmann revealed that the grenade was, in fact, real and announced a 20000 Lari reward for information leading to an arrest and conviction (Reference is made to the document labeled, "Statement" by Legat Paarmann).

SUSPECTS / DEFENDANTS:

(B)(6), (B)(7)C - SUSPECT (Foreign)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE

File: 671.000

DATE: May 18, 2005

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: ATSAIC (B)(6), (B)(7) IDDD

SUBJECT: Joint Georgian/US Press Statement on 5/18/05

TO: SAIC Intelligence Division

Reference is made to the "Georgian press release conference/statement on 5/17/05", undated Memo

Reference is made to Memorandum of ATSAIC (B)(6), (B)(7) Tbilisi Press Release, dated 5/18/05.

On 5/18/05 at approximately 0500 hrs EST (1300 hrs local), a joint Georgian/US press statement was conducted in Tbilisi, Georgia regarding the handgrenade incident during the POTUS visit to Tbilisi, Georgia on 5/10/05. The statement (copy attached to this memo), was made by the FBI LEGAT and was followed up with a brief statement by a Georgian Official. It is unknown the content of the Georgian Officials statement. The joint press statement lasted approximately 5 minutes and did not include any questions.

## NOTIFICATIONS:

INT Supr.	DSAIC (B)(6), (B)(7)C	0600 hrs (Copy)
OPR	AD/ DAD (B)(6), (B)(7)C	0645 hrs
OPO	ASAIC (B)(6), (B)(7)C	0705 hrs (Copy)
OPA	SAIC (B)(6), (B)(7)C	0800 hrs (Copy)
INV	DAD (B)(6), (B)(7)C	0740 hrs (Copy)
Deputy Dir	D.D. (B)(6), (B)(7)C	0730 hrs (Copy)
PDL	SA (B)(6), (B)(7)C	0700 hrs (Copy)
JOC ATSAIC/PPD/VPD/UD	via SA (B)(6), (B)(7)C	0700 hrs (Copy)
HLS/ADM	DAD (B)(6), (B)(7)C	0600 hrs
NSC	ATSAIC (B)(6), (B)(7)C	0700 hrs (Copy)

1/21/07  
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STATEMENT

At approximately 1:30 pm on May 10, 2005 while the President of the United States was making his remarks on Freedom Square, a handgrenade was tossed in the general ~~direction of the main stage and landed within 100 feet of~~ the podium. From initial qualified inspection, this handgrenade appears to be a live device that simply failed to function due to a light strike on the blasting cap induced by a slow deployment of the spoon activation device. Both Georgian and American experts have inspected and are inspecting this device under rigorous laboratory conditions and a detailed report will be completed. The grenade was wrapped in a dark Tartan colored cloth handkerchief when it was tossed into the crowd listening to the President's speech. We consider this act to be a threat against the health and welfare of both the President of the United States and the President of Georgia as well as the multitude of Georgian people that had turned out at this event.

The FBI is conducting and leading the investigation into this incident from the American side and is in coordination and is actively sharing information with the United States Secret Service, the Diplomatic Security Service, and other appropriate American authorities. We are in close cooperation and working side by side with the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs to solve this crime. We are gratified and extremely pleased with the effort, professionalism, dedication, and level of cooperation that the Ministry of Internal Affairs has displayed thus far and are confident that together with the help and support of the Georgian public that we will move forward in this investigation.

To this end, we urge anyone that saw the device being thrown or who has any information whatsoever about the person that threw this handgrenade to contact via telephone or email, the Georgian authorities at this displayed telephone number or email address in order that together we may bring this perpetrator that threatened the life of so many to justice. There is a reward being offered of 20,000 Laris for information that leads to the arrest and conviction of this individual. Furthermore, if you have private video or still photographs of this general area, we would urge you to provide them to the appropriate authorities. Thank you.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# memorandum

U.S. SECRET SERVICE

File: 671.000

DATE: May 17, 2005

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: ATSAIC (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) IDDD

SUBJECT: Tbilisi, Georgia Press Release

TO: SAIC Intelligence Division

Reference is made to the "Georgian press release conference/statement on 5/17/05", undated Memo.

On 5/17/05 at 0630 hrs EST, ATSAIC (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) USSS/INT provided the following information to the IDDD.

On 5/16/05, the Georgian Interior Ministry announced during a press release they were offering approximately \$10,900 USD for information leading to the capture of the person(s) who threw an object wrapped in a red handkerchief into the crowd during a POTUS event in Tbilisi, Georgia on 5/10/05. The Georgian press has referred to this object as an inactive hand grenade.

It is noted that this press release was announced without the approval and/or consent of the FBI LEGAT in Tbilisi, Georgia. Additionally no mention was made that the reward money is being provided by the FBI.

On 5/17/05 at 1200 hrs (EST), 2000 hrs local, the FBI LEGAT will have a meeting with the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs. At this time it will be requested that a joint Georgian/US press statement be made stating that the object thrown was a live grenade that malfunctioned and was a potential threat to the Georgian and US President's as well as all the Georgian people at the event. It will be requested that no question be permitted during this statement. Additionally, it will urge anyone with information, video or photos to come forward. This meeting will request the establishment of a reward hot line and reiterate the \$10,900 USD reward.

On 5/17/05, at approximately 1500 hrs (EST), the IDDD was notified that the above press release has been agreed to and is expected to be released in Georgia on 5/18/05.

GEORGIAN PRESS CONFERENCE/STATEMENT ON 5/17/05

On 5/16/05 at approximately 8pm. (Tbilisi, Georgia time), ATSAIC Mike Lashlee was notified by the Tbilisi, Georgia FBI LEGAT that the Georgian Ministry of Interior has advised that on Tuesday, 5/17/05 they were going to schedule some type of press release or conference concerning the hand grenade incident that occurred during President Bush's visit to Georgia. The LEGAT was unable to provide any additional details as to the format of this event, i.e. a simple statement concerning the incident or if it will be a Q&A type of event. As of this writing the USSS has not been invited to participate and it is unclear as to whether or not the FBI has been invited to participate. According to the LEGAT, a time was not provided.

Due to the fact that Tbilisi, Georgia is 8 hours ahead of WDC we need to make notifications to the following HQ Offices so no one is surprised if it is in the news tomorrow morning.

ADPR  
ADPO  
ADINV  
AD ~~OPA~~  
AD ~~HLS~~ ADW  
DEP DR  
PDL  
PPD JOC

AD (B)(6), (B)(7)C  
5:0 (B)(6), (B)(7)C  
DAD (B)(6), (B)(7)C  
ATSAIC (B)(6), (B)(7)C  
DAD (B)(6), (B)(7)C  
(B)(6), (B)(7)C  
(B)(6), (B)(7)C  
SA ATSAIC (B)(6), (B)(7)C

VIA DAD (B)(6), (B)(7)C 1400  
1749 1025  
via ASAIC (B)(6), (B)(7)C 1620 hrs.  
via ASAIC (B)(6), (B)(7)C 1610 hrs.  
1752  
1753 via 1176 via 11924  
- via SA  
V a S A (B)(6), (B)(7)C