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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Confidential Human Source (CHS) Reporting Document

Reporting Date: 06/06/2008

Case ID: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) -1800
[redacted] (Pending)

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Contact Date: 06/05/2008

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Location: Manassas, Virginia

Written by: SA [redacted]
Other(s) Present:

[redacted] b6
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Source Reporting:

A Confidential Human Source (CHS), who is NOT in a position to testify, provided the following information:

United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, employee, BRUCE IVINS, informed fellow employees that he has not been at work recently. IVINS, however, did not disclose the reason for his absence from work.

CHS also reported that USAMRIID fax line number [redacted] is located in the office of [redacted] office is [redacted] of USAMRIID's [redacted] Division.

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[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/25/2008

On June 6, 2008, [redacted] Social Security
Account Number (SSAN): [redacted], Date of Birth (DOB): [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Amerthrax Task Force Frederick, Maryland office. After being
advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the
interview, as well as being reminded of a previous Non-Disclosure
Agreement Form [redacted] had signed, [redacted] provided the following
information:

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[redacted] was asked to recall the joint research
project [redacted] was involved with [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

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[redacted] was tasked to [redacted]
conduct research with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba). [redacted]

[Redacted block]

[redacted] obtained Ames Ba for [redacted] research from
~~BRUCE~~ IVINS. [redacted] indicated that [redacted] to
obtain Ba from IVINS since IVINS was the most knowledgeable

Investigation on 06/06/2008 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1808 Date dictated N/A

SA [redacted]
by PI [redacted]

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FILENAME: [redacted] 608

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/06/2008, Page 2

USAMRIID scientist at the time pertaining to Ba. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Concerning the topic of BRUCE IVINS, [redacted] expressed that IVINS's own behavior since the anthrax investigation began has been self destructive. [redacted] pointed to IVINS's self initiated environmental sampling shortly after the anthrax mailings as an example of IVINS own self destructive behavior. [redacted] characterized IVINS as a "fruitcake" and opined that IVINS has been somewhat of an antagonist for years at USAMRIID. [redacted] explained that since the first Gulf War, IVINS and many other researchers at USAMRIID, because of the shift in research priorities, were forced basically to conduct many menial type laboratory tasks normally reserved for laboratory technicians, not Principal Investigators. This shift in everyday work responsibilities and functions appeared to effect IVINS and he then appeared to be disgruntled at times. [redacted]

[redacted]

IVINS tended to internalize his frustration and would not confront anyone. According to [redacted] IVINS would hold a grudge and would not let it go.

[redacted] continued that [redacted] is not aware of any specific negative feelings IVINS may have towards politicians, New Yorkers, or any media outlets or media personalities. [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 06/06/2008, Page 3

is aware of IVINS penchant for writing letters to various newspaper editors. _____ recalled that occasionally, IVINS, _____ would make inappropriate references pertaining to the Jewish faith. Apparently, according to _____ for no reason whatsoever. _____ explained that the remarks were not necessarily derogatory in nature but described them as simply inappropriate.

Upon being advised by the interviewing agents that some significant discrepancies had been identified pertaining to IVINS submission of various Ba slants in 2002 to the FBI repository (FBIR) _____ commented that IVINS may have just been "screwing with people's heads." _____

_____ advised that IVINS has been preparing slants for thirty-five (35) years.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/19/2008

[redacted] also known as [redacted]
Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [redacted] Date of Birth
(DOB) [redacted] was interviewed as pre-arranged on the
morning of May 28, 2008. [redacted] was already familiar with the
identity of the interviewing agents. After being advised of the
nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] advised that since the November 2007, Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) interviews of BRUCE IVINS and the
searches of IVINS's work space at the United States Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), everybody at
USAMRIID has been quiet and scared. IVINS has not been at work for
the past several weeks and the general consensus among USAMRIID
employees is that IVINS is out of work on some kind of medical
disability, possibly related to having some kind of nervous
breakdown. [redacted] advised that the majority of USAMRIID employees
feel bad for IVINS.

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[redacted] indicated that [redacted] has not spoken to IVINS since the
[redacted] time frame and that [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] had
spoken to IVINS sometime in December 2007 and advised IVINS to keep
his enemies close to him as "you never can tell who your supporters
are."

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that if [redacted] were
IVINS [redacted] too would probably do the same thing, that is to point the
finger at others in efforts to remove the shadow of suspicion from
yourself.

Investigation on 05/28/2008 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1809

Date dictated N/A

by PI
SA

File # HH302508

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-BEI

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 05/28/2008 , Page 2

[REDACTED] elaborated that when trying to analyze IVINS thought and behavioral process one needs to comprehend the anthropological aspect of a person and completely immerse oneself in his personality. [REDACTED] advised that investigators need to understand that IVINS is a conspiracy theorist and is someone who is very nervous and paranoid. [REDACTED] explained IVINS behavior of pointing the finger at others is simply the result of IVINS being put in a "pressure cooker" and having no other alternative. [REDACTED] elaborated that IVINS has been under a lot of strain and pressure over the recent years. Partly due to the anthrax letter investigation, but also due to the over-all climate at USAMRIID since the late 1990s and early 2000s. - During this time frame USAMRIID's research emphasis and subsequent funding began to shift from vaccine related research to therapeutic related research. According to [REDACTED] this aspect along with the pressures of the FBI investigation caused IVINS to go into a "preservation" type behavior whereby he responded to this type pressure by lashing out or blaming others, such as [REDACTED] for the anthrax-laced letter mailings.

[REDACTED] advised that he arrived at USAMRIID at approximately the same time [REDACTED] had left. [REDACTED] had heard stories about [REDACTED] from various USAMRIID employees. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Up until as recently as November 2007, [REDACTED] advised that IVINS still occasionally brings up the name [REDACTED] and implies that [REDACTED] could very well be the mailer of the anthrax letters. IVINS would point out to [REDACTED] and others who would listen that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indicated, based on second hand information passed down to [REDACTED] over the years from IVINS, that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] motive for mailing the anthrax laced letters was to [REDACTED] to hurt the institution (USAMRIID).

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/28/2008, Page 3

[REDACTED] advised that back in the [REDACTED] to early [REDACTED] time frame, IVINS's work group, consisting of IVINS, [REDACTED] was a very tight knit group. Upon being advised that IVINS has also cast suspicion to FBI investigators that [REDACTED] may have been responsible for the anthrax-laced letter mailings, [REDACTED] expressed disappointment and surprise that IVINS pointed the finger at [REDACTED] indicated that over the years [REDACTED] had never heard IVINS express such a belief and in fact, [REDACTED] name rarely ever came up in conversation, even in conversation at various social gatherings outside of USAMRIID [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IVINS frequently liked to joke about being suspects. [REDACTED] according to IVINS, [REDACTED] was the FBI's number one suspect while IVINS [REDACTED] remained in the top five. According to IVINS, [REDACTED] was in the top ten of the FBI's anthrax investigation suspect list.

[REDACTED] was asked to give [REDACTED] opinions of former USAMRIID employee [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] was a very bright and capable [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reiterated that IVINS's pointing the finger at [REDACTED] is surprising but not shocking. [REDACTED] explained that IVINS's behavior is like that of a trapped animal. [REDACTED] to this day, does not believe that IVINS had anything to do with the anthrax mailings. Reflecting back, [REDACTED] recalled that IVINS "took a lot of heat" for his involvement in conducting unauthorized and self initiated environmental sampling of various Bacteriology Division work space shortly after USAMRIID received the anthrax

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-BEI

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/28/2008, Page 4

laced letters for analysis. [REDACTED] expressed that [REDACTED] was of the belief that IVINS conducted the unauthorized environmental sampling simply out of concern for the safety of USAMRIID personnel and for no other reason.

As the interview continued, [REDACTED] was given the opportunity to review several e-mail communications authored by IVINS over the past several years whereby IVINS frequently refers to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] replied that the e-mails make IVINS appear to be schizophrenic. [REDACTED]

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is this e-mail)

[REDACTED] has kicked around various theories and ideas with IVINS and others pertaining to the various possibilities as to how the anthrax powder used in the mailings was created. [REDACTED] was just kicking around ideas, including the notion that one could better make anthrax powder using a drying agent such as acetone. [REDACTED]

over the years, particularly in the late 1990's and early 2000 time frame, IVINS has appeared to become jealous of [REDACTED]. Jealous in the sense that IVINS is resentful that due to the shift in research priorities from vaccine to [REDACTED]

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is this e-mail)

[REDACTED] indicated that for many years IVINS had been the number one Bacteriology researcher at USAMRIID as far as being able to write proposals and obtain subsequent funding for research projects. [REDACTED] further clarified that as a result in the shift in research strategies, researchers like IVINS and [REDACTED] were at a disadvantage. Whereas because of the funding obtained by researchers like IVINS and [REDACTED] use to pay the salaries of the

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-BEI

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 05/28/2008, Page 5

other Bacteriology scientists, [redacted]

[redacted] advised that he still currently considers IVINS a very valuable scientist.

[redacted]

[redacted] simply commented that IVINS is resentful of [redacted] and is stewing internally. [redacted] reiterated that [redacted] feels bad for IVINS and that [redacted] really likes him a lot. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] IVINS while outwardly laughing at the many anthrax investigation jokes, in retrospect has been internalizing the joking around and letting it bother him. [redacted] indicated that although IVINS appears to have been bothered by the many jokes leveled at him and the investigation, he also never spoke up or suggested that the joking stop. In fact, IVINS often was right in the middle of the jokes, frequently as the instigator.

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is this e-mail)

In an e-mail dated [redacted] whereby IVINS cast suspicion on [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] has not personally benefitted financially but that USAMRIID as a whole has benefitted.

[redacted]

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is this e-mail)

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-BEI

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 05/28/2008, Page 6

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] did not discuss the morphological similarities of the anthrax evidentiary powders with that of the *Ba* obtained from IVINS publicly until sometime after the Vanity Fair article addressing this same issue was published.

[redacted] was shown two photographs of Ames *Ba* identified as [redacted] and [redacted] advised that [redacted] had never before seen the photographs. Pertaining to photograph

[redacted]

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication are the two photocopies of *Ba* shown to [redacted])

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-BEI

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 05/28/2008, Page 7

_____ was asked to opine on IVINS's frequent and lengthy late night activity in the hot suites at USAMRIID during the mailing window of the anthrax-laced letters. _____ opined that although unusual, IVINS has always worked frequent late night hours in the hot suites. _____ advised that even in the very recent past, IVINS still continued to come into USAMRIID at very odd hours. _____ even spoke to IVINS about his continuing to draw attention to himself by working odd and late night hours and _____ informed IVINS that his behavior was self destructive. _____ did not offer an opinion as to the lack of justification IVINS provided investigators pertaining to his late night hot suite activity. _____ expressed that IVINS was possibly attempting to "spring a trap" on investigators by constantly casting suspicion on other researchers at USAMRIID.

_____ IVINS has not divulged any information to _____ indicative of IVINS having any kind of mental health issues. _____ opined that because of the advent of USAMRIID's Personal Responsibility Program (PRP), employees are less likely to divulge such personal information for fear of reprisal. _____ advised that until November 2007, nobody at USAMRIID would have "red flagged" IVINS as a person of interest. _____ advised that _____ has not had any communications, _____ with IVINS since _____

_____ advised that employee morale at USAMRIID is low, and _____ attributed the low morale to the recent "DAG" inspection. _____ indicated that USAMRIID employees are angry and ready to leave in droves as a result of managements current decision making process described as "Does it pass the Washington Post test?" Meaning is there a politically correct aspect to scientific research problems.

_____ was unaware of IVINS interest in sororities and could not provided any information linking IVINS to New Jersey.

_____ IVINS had specifically queried _____ concerning the nature of questioning both _____ subjected to at _____ advised IVINS to just be truthful. _____ also indicated that _____ also queried _____ about the _____

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/28/2008, Page 8

[REDACTED] opined that whomever mailed the anthrax-laced letters must have possessed and prepared the anthrax powder quite some time prior to September 11, 2001. [REDACTED] was also of the opinion that if the anthrax-laced letters originated from USAMRIID then the act of preparing the anthrax powder and loading the envelopes would have to be done in a class 3 hood in Building [REDACTED]. Whoever perpetrated the mailings had to have tremendous knowledge pertaining to how to dry Ba. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] characterized the anthrax powder as incredible and reiterated that the anthrax mailings were very premeditated. [REDACTED] opined that the anthrax-laced letter that was mailed to Florida is the "odd ball" mailing and that investigative efforts should hone in on that mailing.

In closing, [REDACTED] reiterated that [REDACTED] does not believe that IVINS had anything to do with the anthrax-laced letters and opined that all the e-mails whereby IVINS is casting suspicion on those around him is simply IVINS's way of getting back at USAMRIID and is a result of his suffering from some form of paranoia. [REDACTED] opined that IVINS is just trying to protect himself.

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

[Redacted]

The following investigation was conducted on July 16-17, 2008, by Special Agent [Redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

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As previously reported trash cover operations have been conducted in support of the above captioned investigation and one such operation recovered [Redacted] Division Alert Roster for civilian personnel assigned to the same at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] database queries on [Redacted]

[Redacted] associated with this Alert Roster were conducted by writer. It should be noted that in some instances derogatory results will be addressed under separate communication(s).

Through investigation the following USAMRIID [Redacted] Division personnel are further defined as:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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LAST NAME: IVINS
FIRST NAME: BRUCE

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 8/05/2008

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To: Washington Field

Attn: SA [redacted]
AMERITHRAX-2

From: Laboratory
ORS/ Hazardous Materials Response Unit
Contact: SSA [redacted]

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Approved By: [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

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Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending)

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184;
OO:WF.

Synopsis: FBI Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) assets provided safety, scientific, and logistical support for the searches of multiple sites at the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Disease (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland and a single family residence to include up to [redacted] vehicles located at [redacted] Military Road, Frederick, Maryland on November 1-2, 2007 as requested by the Washington Field Division.

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Reference: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1763.

Details: The Washington Field Division provided the following background information to HMRU. Analysis of the spores used in the Fall 2001 anthrax attacks identified the organisms to be the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis. The anthrax spore powders recovered from the anthrax letters addressed to the New York Post (Post) and Tom Brokaw (Brokaw) contain low levels of a non-anthraxis Bacillus contaminant. The non-anthraxis Bacillus contaminant has not been detected in the anthrax spore powders recovered from the envelopes mailed to either Senators Leahy or Daschle.

Originally, the species of the non-anthraxis Bacillus contaminant was incorrectly identified by multiple laboratories, however, upon thorough characterization and genetic sequencing, the contaminant was identified to be a strain of Bacillus subtilis. This is a significant factor for the search operations outlined herein. Since Bacillus organisms can be misidentified to belong to other Bacillus species, the guideline for the collection of cultures consistent with the Bacillus contaminant will be to collect

non-anthraxis Bacillus cultures.

Bacillus subtilis is a non-pathogenic bacterium found ubiquitously in the environment. However, genomic DNA sequencing of the specific isolate of Bacillus subtilis discovered within the Post and Brokaw anthrax powders reveals that it is genetically distinct from other known isolates of Bacillus subtilis. Analyses of the Bacillus subtilis from both the Post and the Brokaw envelopes revealed that these two isolates are identical.

USAMRIID is a military research institute located on the Fort Detrick, U.S. Army Post in Frederick, Maryland. Prior to the anthrax attacks in the Fall of 2001, USAMRIID was one of sixteen (16) U.S. laboratories which possessed the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis. Phenotypic and genetic analyses of more than 1,000 Ames samples from the sixteen (16) laboratories has led investigators to conclude that the Bacillus anthracis used in the anthrax letter attacks was derived from a sample known as RMR-1029. At the time of its creation, RMR-1029 consisted of a large batch of pure, highly concentrated, Bacillus anthracis Ames spores, assembled for the purpose of conducting numerous anthrax aerosol challenges at USAMRIID. RMR-1029 was stored in the [redacted] containment suite within Building [redacted] of USAMRIID under the custody and control of Dr. Bruce Edwards Ivins.

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The Bacillus subtilis contaminant is not detected in RMR-1029 by phenotypic or genetic analyses. It is not known how the Bacillus subtilis contaminant came to be in the Post and Brokaw spore powders. Since the contaminant is not found in RMR-1029 and not found in the spore material mailed to Senators Leahy and Daschle, it is reasonable to conclude that the contaminant was introduced during the growth process of the evidentiary material. Taken together, the presence of the Bacillus subtilis contaminant, and the phenotypic differences of the evidentiary spore powders, it is presumed that, on two separate occasions, a sample of RMR-1029 was used to grow spores, dried to a powder, packaged in an envelope with a threat letter, and mailed to the victims.

In November of 2006, upon consent provided by USAMRIID Command, strains of Bacillus subtilis, were collected from Dr. Ivins's stock collection. All of the collected samples compared negatively to the Bacillus subtilis contaminant isolated from the Post and Brokaw envelopes. In June of 2007, upon consent provided by USAMRIID Command, environmental samples were collected from [redacted] space and equipment; but, ultimately compared negatively to the evidentiary Bacillus subtilis contaminant.

On November 1-2, 2007, the Washington Field Office (WFO) AMERITHRAX Squads, with assistance from the Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU), the Evidence Response Team (ERT), the Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT), and the Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) conducted searches of

the residence of Dr. Ivins, his vehicles, and his work and office spaces within building 1425 of USAMRIID.

The searches began in the evening hours in an attempt to minimize interference and contact with USAMRIID personnel, and possible media exposure of the searches and search personnel. As such, all discussions regarding these searches were treated as Law Enforcement Sensitive and only shared with those persons with a clear need to know.

FBI Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) assets provided safety, scientific, and logistical support for the searches of multiple sites at the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Disease (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland and a single family residence to include up to [] vehicles located at [] Military Road, Frederick, Maryland on November 1-2, 2007 as requested by the Washington Field Division. As such the HMRU considers this lead covered.

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LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD (AMERITHRAX-2)

AT WASHINGTON DC

Read and Clear.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS
ON 12-08-2008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/18/2008

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

AMX-2

Contact: SA [redacted]

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Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

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Case ID #: (S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) -1819

Title: (S) AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: (S) To update captioned investigation.

~~Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1~~

- Reference: (S) 279A-WF-222936, Serial 6584
- (S) 279A-WF-222936-IT, Serial 12
- (S) 279A-WF-222936-IT, Serial 669
- (S) 279A-WF-222936-LEAD, Serial 753
- (S) 279A-WF-222936-POI, Serial 995
- (S) 279A-WF-222936-POI, Serial 1347
- (S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 485
- (S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 489
- (S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1098
- (S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1207
- (S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1243
- (S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1578
- (S) 279A-WF-222936-302, Serial 988
- (S) 279A-WF-222936-302, Serial 4372
- (S) 279A-WF-222936-302, Serial 4867

Details: (S) Pursuant to Major Case 184, investigative efforts sought to identify those countries possessing the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*; the bacterium responsible for the disease anthrax, and the same bacterium used in the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. On 12/12/2001, the [redacted] office, as well other numerous FBI offices, were directed to


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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~



(S)



To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
(U) Re: (S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/18/2008

conduct comprehensive interviews at foreign Universities and entities handling virulent *Bacillus anthracis* or possessing the capabilities to handle virulent *Bacillus anthracis* (279A-WF-222936-IT, Serial 12). [redacted]

[redacted]

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(U) (S/NF) While numerous domestic and foreign institutions and entities have been identified as possessing the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*, investigative efforts to date have identified one domestic institution, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, as necessitating additional investigative scrutiny. USAMRIID has been identified as being one such U.S. repository for the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*. Between 1995 and 2001, twenty-one foreign nationals from the [redacted] [redacted] have been identified as visiting USAMRIID. In order to determine if the [redacted] visitors had access to the Bacteriology Division containment suites housing the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* the investigation took a tripartite approach to the matter: (1) Exhaustive database queries from within the FBI and outside the FBI were conducted to determine if any of the 21 individuals had any International Terrorism (IT) or Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) nexus, (2) their USAMRIID point of contacts (POCs) were thoroughly interviewed and/or investigated, and (3) the [redacted] was interviewed, if warranted.

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(U) (S) The database queries referenced *supra* were conducted first and have been documented under a separate heading (279A-WF-222936-LEAD, Serial 753).

(U) (S) The requests to visit USAMRIID by these 21 foreign nationals from the [redacted] can be directly related to seven (7) USAMRIID POCs. [redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted] Through interview(s) and investigation it was determined that [redacted] and [redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: ~~(S)~~ 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/18/2008

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(U)

positions at USAMRIID and did not have access to locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*. Furthermore, as it relates to their foreign visitor(s) from the [redacted] was escorted while at USAMRIID [redacted]

[redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~

For the remaining four (4) [redacted]

[redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~

[redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~

[redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~

[redacted]

(U)

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/18/2008

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[Redacted]

(U)

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] There has been no evidence or allegation(s) discovered to date that would suggest that the [Redacted] or one of its citizens were involved in or had knowledge of the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001.

(U)

(S)

Unless or until such evidence or allegation(s) are discovered, no further investigation of said [Redacted] foreign visitors to USAMRIID is warranted.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 07/21/2008

[redacted] also known as [redacted]
Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [redacted] Date of Birth
(DOB): [redacted] was interviewed as pre-arranged on the
morning of July 21, 2008. [redacted] was already familiar with the
identity of the interviewing agents. After being advised of the
nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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Prior to any questioning [redacted] was advised of BRUCE
IVINS's recent behavior and IVINS's unspecific threats to possibly
harm those around him or those who work with him. [redacted] indicated
that [redacted] had already heard "through the grapevine" at USAMRIID that
IVINS's doctor had reported to law enforcement authorities that
IVINS was going to hurt himself and others. [redacted] assumed that [redacted]
[redacted] could possibly be a person IVINS would purportedly target.
[redacted] advised that the day before IVINS was escorted from USAMRIID
by law enforcement officials, [redacted] had crossed paths with IVINS at
USAMRIID and that IVINS appeared to be in good spirits and that
IVINS was actually singing in the hallways.

123 [redacted]

[redacted] was asked to recall a specific incident which took
place at USAMRIID [redacted] pertaining to [redacted] submission
of a *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) sample known as Ames Spores [redacted].
[redacted] specifically recalled the sample in question and also recalled
some of the various issues and circumstances pertaining to this
submission. [redacted] advised that [redacted] had previously been questioned by
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents [redacted]
pertaining to this precise Ba sample and at this time [redacted] had
turned over to the interviewing agents an e-mail from IVINS
pertaining to this submission matter. [redacted] was shown a copy of the
[redacted] e-mail from IVINS to [redacted] with the subject line,
"Ames strain [redacted] recognized the e-mail and confirmed
it as appearing to be the same e-mail [redacted] had turned over to FBI in a
previous interview.

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[redacted] indicated that to the best of [redacted] recollection,
back in the [redacted] time frame, IVINS was asked to submit Ba
sample [redacted] to the FBI Repository (FBIR). [redacted] opined that
because sample [redacted] was listed on IVINS's Ba inventory sheet as
being located in Building [redacted] IVINS, [redacted]

Investigation on 07/21/2008 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1821

Date dictated N/A

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by PI [redacted]
SA [redacted]

FILE NAME: [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 07/21/2008 , Page 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indicated that *Ba* sample [REDACTED] was not [REDACTED] (i.e. never on [REDACTED] inventory) and that [REDACTED] was not conducting any type of research with this sample. [REDACTED] reiterated that [REDACTED] was simply doing IVINS a favor by looking for it in Building [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] was unable to locate the sample in question in [REDACTED] laboratory space in Building [REDACTED] (room [REDACTED] advised that since [REDACTED] could not locate the sample [REDACTED] recalled that IVINS came in to USAMRIID over the weekend in Building [REDACTED] and also could not locate the sample. [REDACTED] advised that IVINS could not look for the sample in the [REDACTED] laboratory suites over the weekend because IVINS did not have access (PIN code) to those suites. [REDACTED] advised that the [REDACTED] suites in [REDACTED] would have been accessible only to those that had a PIN code for those suites, and IVINS did not have a PIN code to [REDACTED] knowledge.

[REDACTED] recalled that after not being able to locate the sample of *Ba* over the weekend, IVINS, the following Monday, asked [REDACTED] to go into the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] suites to look for the sample. [REDACTED] apparently located the *Ba* sample in a refrigerator located in the [REDACTED] suites in Building [REDACTED] was given a floor plan of Building [REDACTED] and identified room [REDACTED] or room [REDACTED] as the [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] indicated that IVINS frequently used room [REDACTED] to aliquot material in preparation for animal challenges but that IVINS had to be allowed access to the [REDACTED] suites (i.e. some one have to let him into room [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] re-iterated IVINS did not have a PIN code to room [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] on the hot-side of USAMRIID Building [REDACTED]

Upon further review of the IVINS' e-mail mentioned above, [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] did not find it unusual for IVINS to be uncertain of the parentage of the *Ba* sample in question. [REDACTED] reiterated that because several years had elapsed since this incident, [REDACTED] could not recall all of the specific details surrounding this sample and its submission. [REDACTED] went on to advise that to [REDACTED] recollection, once [REDACTED] located sample [REDACTED] the material was given [REDACTED] subsequently prepared slants of the material and submitted the slants to the FBIR. [REDACTED] opined that once [REDACTED] had located the material [REDACTED] either handed it to [REDACTED] or simply placed it in [REDACTED] refrigerator in room [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advised that after preparing the slants he could not recall [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 07/21/2008, Page 3

specifically what _____ had done with the tube of remaining Ba material but believed that _____ turned over the remaining Ba to FBI Agent _____

_____ may have documentation or laboratory notes which would indicate the transfer of the Ba from _____ to whomever _____ advised that _____ was fairly certain that _____ did not transfer the remaining Ba material to IVINS because that would have created unnecessary paperwork documenting the transfer of Ba from one building to another (Building _____ to _____ also

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_____ may have destroyed the remaining Ba but will _____

_____ records to determine if any documentation exists which would corroborate either the destruction (autoclave) or the transfer of the remaining Ba. _____

_____ asked if _____ recalled receiving FBI instructions pertaining to the submission of Ba samples to the FBIR. _____ advised that _____ did receive instructions and as a matter of fact, _____ advised that _____ disagreed with some of the methods outlined in the submission instructions. In particular, _____ disagreed with the instructions that dealt with the thawing of material before submitting the slants to the FBIR. It was _____ belief that the viability of the material is significantly decreased by 90% to 95% each and every time thawing is achieved.

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_____ if the material is in a tube, _____ would vortex the material. If the Ba material is in a flask, _____ would swirl and loop the material and would run fluid in the pipette up and down to mix it. _____ indicated that _____ would find it very "odd" if someone had not swirled the material prior to obtaining an aliquot and placing onto a slant.

_____ hypothesized that because _____ at USAMRIID conducted research on the evidentiary anthrax powder and

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[REDACTED]

, On 07/21/2008 , Page 4

conducted research utilizing other separate stocks of *Ba* material that cross contamination occurring between all of these samples was a distinct possibility. [REDACTED] advised that back during the anthrax laced letter mailing time frame, security and the movement of people and biological material in and out of USAMRIID was significantly more lax that it is today.

[REDACTED] recalled that most of the samples previously maintained in the cold room on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] were anthrax samples named [REDACTED]. These samples were destroyed when the cold room was cleaned out some years ago.

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(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is the e-mail referenced throughout this report as well as the USAMRIID floor plans that [REDACTED] viewed whereby [REDACTED] identified the location of the flask and its storage in USAMRIID building [REDACTED].

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FOIPA
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