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A Confidential Human Source (CHS), who is NOT in a position to testify, provided the following information:

United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, employee, BRUCE IVINS, informed fellow employees that he has not been at work recently. IVINS, however, did not disclose the reason for his absence from work.

CHS also reported that USAMRIID fax line number is located in the office of office is of USAMRIID's Division.
On June 6, 2008, was interviewed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Amerithrax Task Force Frederick, Maryland office. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, as well as being reminded of a previous Non-Disclosure Agreement Form signed, provided the following information:

was asked to recall the joint research project was involved with was tasked to conduct research with Bacillus anthracis (Ba).

obtained Ames Ba for research from BRUCE IVINS. indicated that to obtain Ba from IVINS since IVINS was the most knowledgeable.
Concerning the topic of BRUCE IVINS, expressed that IVINS's own behavior since the anthrax investigation began has been self destructive. Pointed to IVINS's self initiated environmental sampling shortly after the anthrax mailings as an example of IVINS own self destructive behavior. Characterized IVINS as a "fruitcake" and opined that IVINS has been somewhat of an antagonist for years at USAMRIID. Explained that since the first Gulf War, IVINS and many other researchers at USAMRIID, because of the shift in research priorities, were forced basically to conduct many menial type laboratory tasks normally reserved for laboratory technicians, not Principal Investigators. This shift in everyday work responsibilities and functions appeared to effect IVINS and he then appeared to be disgruntled at times.

IVINS tended to internalize his frustration and would not confront anyone. According to IVINS would hold a grudge and would not let it go.

Continued that is not aware of any specific negative feelings IVINS may have towards politicians, New Yorkers, or any media outlets or media personalities.
is aware of IVINS penchant for writing letters to various newspaper editors. recollected that occasionally, IVINS, would make inappropriate references pertaining to the Jewish faith. Apparently, according to , for no reason whatsoever, explained that the remarks were not necessarily derogatory in nature but described them as simply inappropriate.

Upon being advised by the interviewing agents that some significant discrepancies had been identified pertaining to IVINS submission of various Ba slants in 2002 to the FBI repository (FBIR) commented that IVINS may have just been "screwing with people's heads."

advised that IVINS has been preparing slants for thirty-five (35) years.
Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [redacted]  
Date of Birth (DOB): [redacted]  

I was interviewed as pre-arranged on the morning of May 28, 2008. I was already familiar with the identity of the interviewing agents. After being advised of the nature of the interview, I provided the following information:

I advised that since the November 2007, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) interviews of BRUCE IVINS and the searches of IVINS's work space at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), everybody at USAMRIID has been quiet and scared. IVINS has not been at work for the past several weeks and the general consensus among USAMRIID employees is that IVINS is out of work on some kind of medical disability, possibly related to having some kind of nervous breakdown. I advised that the majority of USAMRIID employees feel bad for IVINS.

I indicated that I have not spoken to IVINS since the timeframe and that I had spoken to IVINS sometime in December 2007 and advised IVINS to keep his enemies close to him as "you never can tell who your supporters are."

I advised that if we were IVINS, too would probably do the same thing, that is to point the finger at others in efforts to remove the shadow of suspicion from yourself.
elaborated that when trying to analyze IVINS thought and behavioral process one needs to comprehend the anthropological aspect of a person and completely immerse oneself in his personality. Advised that investigators need to understand that IVINS is a conspiracy theorist and is someone who is very nervous and paranoid. Explained IVINS behavior of pointing the finger at others is simply the result of IVINS being put in a "pressure cooker" and having no other alternative. Elaborated that IVINS has been under a lot of strain and pressure over the recent years. Partly due to the anthrax letter investigation, but also due to the over-all climate at USAMRIID since the late 1990s and early 2000s. During this time frame USAMRIID's research emphasis and subsequent funding began to shift from vaccine related research to therapeutic related research. According to this aspect along with the pressures of the FBI investigation caused IVINS to go into a "preservation" type behavior whereby he responded to this type pressure by lashing out or blaming others, such as for the anthrax-laced letter mailings.

Advised that he arrived at USAMRIID at approximately the same time had left. Had heard stories about from various USAMRIID employees.

Up until as recently as November 2007, advised that IVINS still occasionally brings up the name and implies that could very well be the mailer of the anthrax letters. IVINS would point out to and others who would listen that

Indicated, based on second hand information passed down to over the years from IVINS, that motive for mailing the anthrax laced letters was to hurt the institution (USAMRIID).
advised that back in the to early time frame, IVINS's work group, consisting of IVINS, was a very tight knit group. Upon being advised that IVINS has also cast suspicion to FBI investigators that may have been responsible for the anthrax-laced letter mailings, expressed disappointment and surprise that IVINS pointed the finger at indicated that over the years had never heard IVINS express such a belief and in fact, name rarely ever came up in conversation, even in conversation at various social gatherings outside of USAMRIID

IVINS frequently liked to joke about being suspects. according to IVINS, was the FBI's number one suspect while IVINS remained in the top five. According to IVINS, was in the top ten of the FBI's anthrax investigation suspect list.

was asked to give opinions of former USAMRIID employee indicated that was a very bright and capable

reiterated that IVINS's pointing the finger at is surprising but not shocking. explained that IVINS's behavior is like that of a trapped animal. to this day, does not believe that IVINS had anything to do with the anthrax mailings. Reflecting back, recalled that IVINS "took a lot of heat" for his involvement in conducting unauthorized and self-initiated environmental sampling of various Bacteriology Division work space shortly after USAMRIID received the anthrax
laced letters for analysis. [ ] expressed that [ ] was of the belief that IVINS conducted the unauthorized environmental sampling simply out of concern for the safety of USAMRIID personnel and for no other reason.

As the interview continued, [ ] was given the opportunity to review several e-mail communications authored by IVINS over the past several years whereby IVINS frequently refers to [ ] replied that the e-mails make IVINS appear to be schizophrenic.

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is this e-mail)

[ ] has kicked around various theories and ideas with IVINS and others pertaining to the various possibilities as to how the anthrax powder used in the mailings was created. [ ] was just kicking around ideas, including the notion that one could better make anthrax powder using a drying agent such as acetone.

Over the years, particularly in the late 1990's and early 2000 time frame, IVINS has appeared to become jealous of [ ]. Jealous in the sense that IVINS is resentful that due to the shift in research priorities from vaccine to [ ] indicated that for many years IVINS had been the number one Bacteriology researcher at USAMRIID as far as being able to write proposals and obtain subsequent funding for research projects. [ ] further clarified that as a result in the shift in research strategies, researchers like IVINS and [ ] were at a disadvantage. Whereas because of the funding obtained by researchers like IVINS and [ ] use to pay the salaries of the
Continuation of FD-302 of ___________________________, On 05/28/2008, Page 5

Other Bacteriology scientists, ___________________________ advised that he still currently considers IVINS a very valuable scientist.

______ simply commented that IVINS is resentful of ______ and is stewing internally. ______ reiterated that feels bad for IVINS and that ______ really likes him a lot.

IVINS while outwardly laughing at the many anthrax investigation jokes, in retrospect has been internalizing the joking around and letting it bother him. ______ indicated that although IVINS appears to have been bothered by the many jokes leveled at him and the investigation, he also never spoke up or suggested that the joking stop. In fact, IVINS often was right in the middle of the jokes, frequently as the instigator.

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is this e-mail)

In an e-mail dated _________ whereby IVINS cast suspicion on _________ has not personally benefitted financially but that USAMRIID as a whole has benefitted.

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is this e-mail)
advised that did not discuss the morphological similarities of the anthrax evidentiary powders with that of the Ba obtained from IVINS publicly until sometime after the Vanity Fair article addressing this same issue was published.

was shown two photographs of Ames Ba identified as and advised that had never before seen the photographs. Pertaining to photograph

(WPO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication are the two photocopies of Ba shown to
was asked to opine on IVINS's frequent and lengthy late night activity in the hot suites at USAMRIID during the mailing window of the anthrax-laced letters. opined that although unusual, IVINS has always worked frequent late night hours in the hot suites. advised that even in the very recent past, IVINS still continued to come into USAMRIID at very odd hours. even spoke to IVINS about his continuing to draw attention to himself by working odd and late night hours and informed IVINS that his behavior was self destructive. did not offer an opinion as to the lack of justification IVINS provided investigators pertaining to his late night hot suite activity. expressed that IVINS was possibly attempting to "spring a trap" on investigators by constantly casting suspicion on other researchers at USAMRIID.

IVINS has not divulged any information to indicative of IVINS having any kind of mental health issues. opined that because of the advent of USAMRIID's Personal Responsibility Program (PRP), employees are less likely to divulge such personal information for fear of reprisal. advised that until November 2007, nobody at USAMRIID would have "red flagged" IVINS as a person of interest. advised that has not had any communications, with IVINS since

advised that employee morale at USAMRIID is low, and attributed the low morale to the recent "DAG" inspection. indicated that USAMRIID employees are angry and ready to leave in droves as a result of managements current decision making process described as "Does it pass the Washington Post test?" Meaning is there a politically correct aspect to scientific research problems.

was unaware of IVINS interest in sororities and could not provided any information linking IVINS to New Jersey. specifically queried concerning the nature of questioning both subjected to at advised IVINS to just be truthful. also indicated that also queried about the
opined that whomever mailed the anthrax-laced letters must have possessed and prepared the anthrax powder quite some time prior to September 11, 2001. was also of the opinion that if the anthrax-laced letters originated from USAMRIID then the act of preparing the anthrax powder and loading the envelopes would have to be done in a class 3 hood in Building. Whoever perpetrated the mailings had to have tremendous knowledge pertaining to how to dry Ba. characterized the anthrax powder as incredible and reiterated that the anthrax mailings were very premeditated. opined that the anthrax-laced letter that was mailed to Florida is the "odd ball" mailing and that investigative efforts should hone in on that mailing.

In closing, reiterated that does not believe that IVINS had anything to do with the anthrax-laced letters and opined that all the e-mails whereby IVINS is casting suspicion on those around him is simply IVINS's way of getting back at USAMRIID and is a result of his suffering from some form of paranoia. opined that IVINS is just trying to protect himself.
The following investigation was conducted on July 16-17, 2008, by Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

As previously reported trash cover operations have been conducted in support of the above captioned investigation and one such operation recovered [redacted] Division Alert Roster for civilian personnel assigned to the same at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. [redacted] database queries on [redacted] associated with this Alert Roster were conducted by writer. It should be noted that in some instances derogatory results will be addressed under separate communication(s).

Through investigation the following USAMRIID Division personnel are further defined as:

Case ID: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID  Serial: 1814
LAST NAME: IVINS
FIRST NAME: BRUCE
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 8/05/2008

To: Washington Field Attn: SA________________ AMERITHRAX-2

From: Laboratory
ORS/ Hazardous Materials Response Unit Contact: SSA________________

Approved By: ____________________________
Drafted By: ______________________________

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending)

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184;
OO:WF.

Synopsis: FBI Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) assets provided safety, scientific, and logistical support for the searches of multiple sites at the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Disease (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland and a single family residence to include up to ________ vehicles located at ________ Military Road, Frederick, Maryland on November 1-2, 2007 as requested by the Washington Field Division.


Details: The Washington Field Division provided the following background information to HMRU. Analysis of the spores used in the Fall 2001 anthrax attacks identified the organisms to be the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis. The anthrax spore powders recovered from the anthrax letters addressed to the New York Post (Post) and Tom Brokaw (Brokaw) contain low levels of a non-anthracis Bacillus contaminant. The non-anthracis Bacillus contaminant has not been detected in the anthrax spore powders recovered from the envelopes mailed to either Senators Leahy or Daschle.

Originally, the species of the non-anthracis Bacillus contaminant was incorrectly identified by multiple laboratories, however, upon thorough characterization and genetic sequencing, the contaminant was identified to be a strain of Bacillus subtilis. This is a significant factor for the search operations outlined herein. Since Bacillus organisms can be misidentified to belong to other Bacillus species, the guideline for the collection of cultures consistent with the Bacillus contaminant will be to collect...
non-anthracis Bacillus cultures.

Bacillus subtilis is a non-pathogenic bacterium found ubiquitously in the environment. However, genomic DNA sequencing of the specific isolate of Bacillus subtilis discovered within the Post and Brokaw anthrax powders reveals that it is genetically distinct from other known isolates of Bacillus subtilis. Analyses of the Bacillus subtilis from both the Post and the Brokaw envelopes revealed that these two isolates are identical.

USAMRIID is a military research institute located on the Fort Detrick, U.S. Army Post in Frederick, Maryland. Prior to the anthrax attacks in the Fall of 2001, USAMRIID was one of sixteen (16) U.S. laboratories which possessed the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis. Phenotypic and genetic analyses of more than 1,000 Ames samples from the sixteen (16) laboratories has led investigators to conclude that the Bacillus anthracis used in the anthrax letter attacks was derived from a sample known as RMR-1029. At the time of its creation, RMR-1029 consisted of a large batch of pure, highly concentrated, Bacillus anthracis Ames spores, assembled for the purpose of conducting numerous anthrax aerosol challenges at USAMRIID. RMR-1029 was stored in the containment suite within Building of USAMRIID under the custody and control of Dr. Bruce Edwards Ivins.

The Bacillus subtilis contaminant is not detected in RMR-1029 by phenotypic or genetic analyses. It is not known how the Bacillus subtilis contaminant came to be in the Post and Brokaw spore powders. Since the contaminant is not found in RMR-1029 and not found in the spore material mailed to Senators Leahy and Daschle, it is reasonable to conclude that the contaminant was introduced during the growth process of the evidentiary material. Taken together, the presence of the Bacillus subtilis contaminant, and the phenotypic differences of the evidentiary spore powders, it is presumed that, on two separate occasions, a sample of RMR-1029 was used to grow spores, dried to a powder, packaged in an envelope with a threat letter, and mailed to the victims.

In November of 2006, upon consent provided by USAMRIID Command, strains of Bacillus subtilis, were collected from Dr. Ivins's stock collection. All of the collected samples compared negatively to the Bacillus subtilis contaminant isolated from the Post and Brokaw envelopes. In June of 2007, upon consent provided by USAMRIID Command, environmental samples were collected from space and equipment; but, ultimately compared negatively to the evidentiary Bacillus subtilis contaminant.

On November 1-2, 2007, the Washington Field Office (WFO) AMERITHRAX Squads, with assistance from the Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU), the Evidence Response Team (ERT), the Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT), and the Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) conducted searches of
the residence of Dr. Ivins, his vehicles, and his work and office spaces within building 1425 of USAMRIID.

The searches began in the evening hours in an attempt to minimize interference and contact with USAMRIID personnel, and possible media exposure of the searches and search personnel. As such, all discussions regarding these searches were treated as Law Enforcement Sensitive and only shared with those persons with a clear need to know.

FBI Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) assets provided safety, scientific, and logistical support for the searches of multiple sites at the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Disease (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland and a single family residence to include up to [number of vehicles] vehicles located at [location] Military Road, Frederick, Maryland on November 1-2, 2007 as requested by the Washington Field Division. As such the HMRU considers this lead covered.

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD (AMERITHRAX-2)

AT WASHINGTON DC

Read and Clear.
Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/18/2008

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

AMX-2

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (X) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) 18/19

Title: (X) AMERITHRAX; MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: (X) To update captioned investigation.

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

Reference: (S) 279A-WF-222936, Serial 6584
(S) 279A-WF-222936-IT, Serial 12
(S) 279A-WF-222936-IT, Serial 669
(S) 279A-WF-222936-LEAD, Serial 753
(S) 279A-WF-222936-POI, Serial 995
(S) 279A-WF-222936-POI, Serial 1347
(S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 485
(S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 489
(S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1098
(S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1207
(S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1243
(S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1578
(S) 279A-WF-222936-302, Serial 988
(S) 279A-WF-222936-302, Serial 4372
(S) 279A-WF-222936-302, Serial 4867

Details: (S) Pursuant to Major Case 184, investigative efforts sought to identify those countries possessing the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis; the bacterium responsible for the disease anthrax, and the same bacterium used in the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. On 12/12/2001, the office, as well other numerous FBI offices, were directed to

SECRET/NOFORN
To: Washington Field  From: Washington Field  
Re: [S] 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/18/2008

conduct comprehensive interviews at foreign Universities and entities handling virulent Bacillus anthracis or possessing the capabilities to handle virulent Bacillus anthracis (279A-WF-222936-IT, Serial 12).

(S/NF) While numerous domestic and foreign institutions and entities have been identified as possessing the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis, investigative efforts to date have identified one domestic institution, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, as necessitating additional investigative scrutiny. USAMRIID has been identified as being one such U.S. repository for the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis. Between 1995 and 2001, twenty-one foreign nationals from the__________________________________________________________ have been identified as visiting USAMRIID. In order to determine if the ____________________________________ visitors had access to the Bacteriology Division containment suites housing the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis the investigation took a tripartite approach to the matter: (1) Exhaustive database queries from within the FBI and outside the FBI were conducted to determine if any of the 21 individuals had any International Terrorism (IT) or Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) nexus, (2) their USAMRIID point of contacts (POCs) were thoroughly interviewed and/or investigated, and (3) the ______________________________________ was interviewed, if warranted.

The database queries referenced supra were conducted first and have been documented under a separate heading (279A-WF-222936-LEAD, Serial 753).

The requests to visit USAMRIID by these 21 foreign nationals from the________________________________________ can be directly related to seven (7) USAMRIID POCs.

Through interview(s) and investigation it was determined that________________________________________ and ____________________________________________

SECRET/NOFORN
positions at USAMRIID and did not have access to locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*. Furthermore, as it relates to their foreign visitor(s) from the was escorted while at USAMRIID

For the remaining four (4)

(SECRET/NOFORN)
To: Washington Field  From: Washington Field
Re: (S) 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/18/2008

There has been no evidence or allegation(s) discovered to date that would suggest that the or one of its citizens were involved in or had knowledge of the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001.

Unless or until such evidence or allegation(s) are discovered, no further investigation of said foreign visitors to USAMRIID is warranted.

**

SECRET/NOFORN
Social Security Account Number (SSAN): __________ Date of Birth (DOB): __________ was interviewed as pre-arranged on the morning of July 21, 2008. was already familiar with the identity of the interviewing agents. After being advised of the nature of the interview, provided the following information:

Prior to any questioning was advised of BRUCE IVINS's recent behavior and IVINS's unspecific threats to possibly harm those around him or those who work with him. indicated that had already heard "through the grapevine" at USAMRIID that IVINS's doctor had reported to law enforcement authorities that IVINS was going to hurt himself and others. assumed that could possibly be a person IVINS would purportedly target. advised that the day before IVINS was escorted from USAMRIID by law enforcement officials, had crossed paths with IVINS at USAMRIID and that IVINS appeared to be in good spirits and that IVINS was actually singing in the hallways.

was asked to recall a specific incident which took place at USAMRIID pertaining to submission of a Bacillus anthracis (Ba) sample known as Ames Spores. specifically recalled the sample in question and also recalled some of the various issues and circumstances pertaining to this submission. advised that had previously been questioned by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents pertaining to this precise Ba sample and at this time had turned over to the interviewing agents an e-mail from IVINS pertaining to this submission matter. was shown a copy of the e-mail from IVINS to with the subject line, "Ames strain recognized the e-mail and confirmed it as appearing to be the same e-mail had turned over to FBI in a previous interview.

indicated that to the best of recollection, back in the time frame, IVINS was asked to submit Ba sample to the FBI Repository (FBIR) opined that because sample was listed on IVINS's Ba Inventory sheet as being located in Building IVINS,
indicated that Ba sample was not (i.e. never on inventory) and that was not conducting any type of research with this sample. reiterated that was simply doing IVINS a favor by looking for it in Building

advised that was unable to locate the sample in question in laboratory space in Building (room advised that since could not locate the sample recalled that IVINS came in to USAMRIID over the weekend in Building and also could not locate the sample advised that IVINS could not look for the sample in the laboratory suites over the weekend because IVINS did not have access (PIN code) to those suites. advised that the suites in would have been accessible only to those that had a PIN code for those suites, and IVINS did not have a PIN code to knowledge.

recalled that after not being able to locate the sample of Ba over the weekend, IVINS, the following Monday, asked to go into the suites to look for the sample. apparently located the Ba sample in a refrigerator located in the suites in Building was given a floor plan of Building and identified room or room as the indicated that IVINS frequently used room to aliquot material in preparation for animal challenges but that IVINS had to be allowed access to the suites (i.e. some one have to let him into room or . re-iterated IVINS did not have a PIN code to room or on the hot-side of USAMRIID Building

Upon further review of the IVINS' e-mail mentioned above, advised that did not find it unusual for IVINS to be uncertain of the parentage of the Ba sample in question. reiterated that because several years had elapsed since this incident could not recall all of the specific details surrounding this sample and its submission went on to advise that to recollection, once located sample the material was given subsequently prepared slants of the material and submitted the slants to the FBIR opined that once had located the material either handed it to or simply placed it in refrigerator in room advised that after preparing the slants he could not recall
specifically what had done with the tube of remaining Ba material but believed that turned over the remaining Ba to FBI Agent.

may have documentation or laboratory notes which would indicate the transfer of the Ba from to whomever advised that was fairly certain that did not transfer the remaining Ba material to IVINS because that would have created unnecessary paperwork documenting the transfer of Ba from one building to another (Building to also may have destroyed the remaining Ba but will records to determine if any documentation exists which would corroborate either the destruction (autoclave) or the transfer of the remaining Ba.

asked if recalled receiving FBI instructions pertaining to the submission of Ba samples to the FBIR. advised that did receive instructions and as a matter of fact, advised that disagreed with some of the methods outlined in the submission instructions. In particular, disagreed with the instructions that dealt with the thawing of material before submitting the slants to the FBIR. It was belief that the viability of the material is significantly decreased by 90% to 95% each and every time thawing is achieved.

if the material is in a tube, would vortex the material. If the Ba material is in a flask, would swirl and loop the material and would run fluid in the pipette up and down to mix it. indicated that would find it very "odd" if someone had not swirled the material prior to obtaining an aliquot and placing onto a slant.

guessed that because at USAMRIID conducted research on the evidentiary anthrax powder and
conduct research utilizing other separate stocks of Ba material that cross contamination occurring between all of these samples was a distinct possibility advised that back during the anthrax laced letter mailing time frame, security and movement of people and biological material in and out of USAMRIID was significantly more lax that it is today.

Recalled that most of the samples previously maintained in the cold room were anthrax samples These samples were destroyed when the cold room was cleaned out some years ago.

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is the e-mail referenced throughout this report as well as the USAMRIID floor plans that viewed whereby identified the location of the flask and its storage in USAMRIID building
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Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 8
Page 27 ~ b2, b6, b7C, b7E
Page 28 ~ b2, b6, b7C, b7E
Page 29 ~ b2, b6, b7C, b7E
Page 30 ~ b2, b6, b7C, b7E
Page 31 ~ b2, b6, b7C, b7E
Page 32 ~ b2, b6, b7C, b7E
Page 33 ~ b2, b6, b7C, b7E
Page 40 ~ b6, b7C, b7D