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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

Attn:

Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Date: 09/29/2006

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending)-Vo03

Title: AMERITHRAX

Major Case 184

Synopsis: To provide a periodic update regarding the United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft. Detrick, MD. Building [_____] Suites [_____]. These suites are known locations for work with and storage of Bacillus anthracis Ames.

Details: For a comprehensive overview of Suite [_____] activity, co-worker observations, unidentified individual identification, fermentors usage, Ames sample issues, Genealogy, and [_____] Lyophilized Ba, the following individuals have been interviewed in this effort:

Currently pending interviews include:

Suites [_____]

Individuals were interviewed to determine unusual suite activity in the laboratory. [_____] provided the following information regarding [_____] actions [sic] had legitimate access to [_____] but would [_____] to avoid the hassle of having to shower out of [_____] and then shower into [_____]. No one recalled any unknown individuals or unusual
activity in Suites No dry powder work was observed in Suites or in other locations at USAMRIID. It was believed that this type of work would not go unnoticed. It was mentioned, however, that there was a benchtop SpeedVac in several locations used to dry small quantities of material for analysis.

Fermentor

Identification and tracking of fermentors in place at USAMRIID positively identified one fermentor as having been in place in Building Room around the time of the anthrax mailings. Additional fermentors of interest have been identified for location, materials used, and operator with an undetermined final disposition date. The fermentors ranged in volume from 150-Liters to 5-Liters. The two largest fermentors were manufactured by New Brunswick Inc. and were not portable. These could not likely have been used in a discreet manner. The 5-L fermentor also manufactured by New Brunswick was lent to by Bruce Ivins. indicated the New Brunswick fermentors were likely to predate 2001. Further analysis would be required to determine which fermentors were up and running between 09/11/01 and 10/9/2001.

Ames Samples

Interviews were conducted to determine Ames distribution, disposal, and storage as performed by personnel. Within the Division it was general knowledge that Ba Ames was stored in Suites recalled being cluttered with flasks and plates containing prepared media; believed spore solutions of anthrax were stored there as well. Two -70°C freezers were located in the hallways of Suites Any researcher with access to the suites had access to the freezers and their contents.

There were no sign-in/sign-out procedures and it was at the discretion of the individual investigator to control the dissemination of their materials. In interview stated that did not remember signing any paper work in order to receive Ames samples from Ivins. believed worked with Ba Ames received from worked with Ba Ames from and believed it originated from Ivins, was uncertain as to whether or not received virulent Ames from Ivins or but mentioned it was possible.
To: Washington Field  From: Washington Field

There was no consistent method for the disposal of materials, as many researchers would autoclave their own waste, while others would leave items in or around the autoclave until it reached capacity.

Genealogy

Interviews were conducted to discriminate between Ba Ames samples by tracking dissemination of spore stocks and dilutions, specifically RMR 1029 "Dugway Spores" because of its commonalities with the Ames strain used in the anthrax mailings of 2001. The flask labeled "RMR 1029 GLP Ames Spores Oct 97" could not be definitively identified, although several individuals did recognize the handwriting to be similar to that of Ivins. Due to the volume of glassware in and around Building 1425 and Building 1412, no one could place this flask at a particular location or time frame. maintained a copy of the Reference Material Receipt (RMR) 1029 after receipt of a couple of milliliters of Ba Ames from Ivins and because had earlier observed maintain a similar document in a notebook. indicated that Ivins did not record the Ba Ames transferred to him. Ivins also provided a tube containing approximately one milliliter of a purified 10^9 concentrated sample of Ba Ames for a 2001 challenge in which assisted

Lyophilized Ba

In the Building Suite walk-in refrigerator, two Nunc boxes containing lyophilization vials were found. The depicted handwriting on the boxes stated, This location was utilized by for sample storage. stated that were assigned a project to but did not recognize the vials. recognized the box of vials and acknowledged the writing on the box was own. indicated the vials must have been there before arrived came across the vials during an inventory of Suite It has not been determined where the material in the vials was lyophilized.

Observation of Coworkers

Observations provided by the interviewees were to include the name of persons they had direct contact with in the
suites, with additional observations including information about

There were no unusual activities or statements made by co-workers that would lead interviewees to suspect someone’s involvement in the anthrax mailings of 2001.

Interviewees that knew did not mention any unusual behaviors performed by

It was known to many researchers that

No one witnessed allowing unfettered access to lab or other Suites to individuals not permitted to be there. It is believed all of work was done with attenuated strains of anthrax and was in accordance with duties. In an interview stated that did not have a good relationship with Ivins.

was mostly described as a competent worker who was supportive of individuals. No one made mention of involvement with any unusual activity. was described as regarding his desire to be in control of his work life because was in control of his home life. 10

Ivins was described as odd by many individuals. It was further explained that he may be socially inept, but that he was in general a "good" guy. No one believed that his personality translated to his work in a negative way. Ivins was described as professionally competent, intelligent, and someone who liked to joke around. No one mentioned witnessing any unusual activities performed by him.

Investigative Goals

Ongoing initiatives include: interviewing the remaining individuals, detailing the activities of individuals who accessed the containment areas of Suites from approximately 9/1/2001 to 10/15/2001 using detailed analysis of time and attendance schedules and keycard access records, and lab notebook reviews to conduct a comparative study of the timeline versus statements made in interviews for significant persons. Information will be plotted in chart format by the general analysts. The individuals identified as having accessed the between 9/1/2001 and 10/15/2001 are:
To: Washington Field
From: Washington Field

As more information is developed during this initiative, goals will be reevaluated as needed.

The investigation is continuing.

1. (U) FD-302 of (01-23-06) - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1463
2. (U) FD-302 of (02-13-06) - Sub POI Serial 1487
3. (U) EC to WFO from WFO (09-07-06) - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1598.
4. (U) FD-302 of (01-23-06) - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1463
5. (U) FD-302 of (02-13-06) - Sub POI Serial 1487
6. (U) FD-302 of (01-23-06) - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1463
7. (U) FD-302 of (02-13-06) - Sub 302 Serial 4561
8. (U) FD-302 of (03-15-06) - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1520
9. (U) FD-302 of (02-13-06) - Sub POI Serial 1487
10. (U) FD-302 of (03-29-06) - Sub 302 Serial 4678
Synopsis: To compile all information regarding the distribution of Ames strain stock RMR-1029 which tested positive for genotypes A1, A3, and D.

Enclosure: A one (1) page spreadsheet of quantities, dates, researchers, and reference serials/notebooks of Bacillus anthracis spore production transfers of RMR-1029 spore material.

Details: By way of background, in July, 2006 an investigative initiative was established to compile all information regarding the genealogy of Ames strain samples testing positive for genotypes A1, A3, and D. It was subsequently determined that all samples testing positive for the A1, A3, and D genotypes were identified as being sub-samples of RMR-1029.

On 09/21/2006 and 09/22/2006 SAs conducted a detailed review of inventory for RMR-1029, provided by Bruce Ivins, FD-302s, electronic communications, and subpoenaed material such as scientific notebooks and other relevant materials.
To: Laboratory  From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 10/02/2006

material transfer paperwork in order to substantiate all transfers of RMR-1029 spore material from the time of its inception on 10/22/1997 through the window of opportunity for the second anthrax mailing in October of 2001.

Noted transfers of material were substantiated using laboratory notebooks 3745, 3945, 4000, 4010, 4237, and 4251. A final AMERITHRAX-2 developed inventory control sheet was generated taking into account transfers of material as well as material used for quality assurance testing and within lab (Ivins' scientific group) animal challenges which were not originally identified on the maintained inventory for RMR-1029.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Log Date</th>
<th>Quantity (mL)</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03/17/98</td>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Microscopic examinations/encapsulation study</td>
<td>See pages 73-78, notebook 4010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/20/98</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bruce Ivins</td>
<td>Spores irradiated for endotoxin/phenol analysis</td>
<td>See page 4010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/13/98</td>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Protocol D98-03 under</td>
<td>FD-302 sub-USAMRIID #1472 dated 1/24/06 and EC sub-USAMRIID #1456, dated 01/11/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/17/98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aerisolization study</td>
<td>See page 4010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/16/99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bruce Ivins</td>
<td>On 3/16/1999 Bruce determined the CFU of RMR-1029. Determined to be 2.3 x 10^4/ml.</td>
<td>See page 91, notebook 4010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/23/99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bruce Ivins</td>
<td>B97-05, sub-cutaneous injection</td>
<td>See Notebook 4010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/24/99</td>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Washed spores--2.3x10^4/ml--&gt;2x10^4/ml</td>
<td>See FD-302 sub-USAMRIID #1459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/27/99</td>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Sub-cutaneous injection</td>
<td>See Notebook 4010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/05/99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bruce Ivins</td>
<td>Projected aerisolization study--postponed</td>
<td>See Notebook 4010</td>
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<tr>
<td>05/11/99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bruce Ivins</td>
<td>Sub-cutaneous injection</td>
<td>See Notebook 4010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/19/99</td>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Sub-cutaneous injection</td>
<td>See Notebook 4010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/19/99</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bruce Ivins</td>
<td>B97-03, sub-cutaneous injection</td>
<td>See Ivins notebook #3745 page 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/15/99</td>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Aerisolization study</td>
<td>FD-302 sub-USAMRIID #1472 dated 1/24/06 and EC sub-USAMRIID #1456, dated 01/11/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/22/00</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Irradiated)</td>
<td>See Notebook 4010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/22/00</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>See Notebook 4010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/03/00</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>B00-003 Part 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>See Page mentioned page on 01/11/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/28/00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Battelle</td>
<td>Anthracis death using fixative/Gm killing</td>
<td>See page Notebook 4010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/07/00</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>B00-003 Part 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>See EC sub-USAMRIID #1456, dated 01/11/2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>07/10/00</td>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Repeat EM experiment</td>
<td>See page Notebook 4010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/28/00</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>See FD-302 sub-302, #3605 dated 4/15/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/04/00</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>F00-11 Bioport</td>
<td></td>
<td>See EC sub-USAMRIID #1456, dated 01/11/2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

03/07/01 0.5 |           |           | University of New Mexico. Samples submitted to the repository were negative for A1, A3, and D1. Note: UNM’s Biosafety level (BSL) 3 suite was not ready for laboratory work at the time this sample was shipped. The Ba was placed in storage until after the 2001 anthrax attacks, when the BSL-3 suite was completed. | See Sub 302 Serial 3403, MAIN Serial 6492, Sub Lab Serial 1266. USAMRIID Form 11r indicates that the sample was 1029, shipped on 3/7/01 but the conc. list was 3x10^9/ml, and tested at 7x10^8/ml by Ivins added this on 4/9/04, going over the 11r forms he realized the omission from the log and added it. The concs., omission from the log, and neg, genetic assays indicate that the sample was not actually RMR-1029. See Notebook #4000 Page 42. |

04/06/01 60 |           | B00-003 Part 3 |                                                                 | See EC sub-USAMRIID #1456, dated 01/11/2006                                                                                              |

05/01/01 30 | Battelle | Form 11r indicates 50 ml of spores (3.9x10^10/ml) were sent! |                                                                 |                                                                                                                                       |

06/15/01 30 | Battelle | Form 11r indicates 30 ml of spores (3.9x10^10/ml) were sent! |                                                                 |                                                                                                                                       |

07/09/01 50 | Ivins    | B00-003 Part 4 |                                                                 | See EC sub-USAMRIID #1456, dated 01/11/2006                                                                                              |

08/27/01 9 |           | Aerisolization study |                                                                 | See EC sub-USAMRIID #785, dated 05/11/2004                                                                                               |

10/04/01 10 |           | Aerisolization study |                                                                 | See EC sub-USAMRIID #763 and sub-MAIN 6263 |
On October 2, 2006, the date of birth [redacted], United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), office number [redacted] was interviewed at Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

confirmed the existence of a unit called the Elite Rover Observer Force (EROF) at USAMRIID which falls under the supervision of the Biosafety Officer.

advised, to the best of recollection, the EROF was initially created shortly after September 11, 2001, as a response by USAMRIID management to increase the level of security in the labs.

The EROF was originally back in 2001 and [redacted] recalled that approximately

The EROF is staffed totally by soldiers who are tasked with conducting random and unannounced observations of research activity within the Biosafety Level-2 (BSL) and BSL-3 suites in Buildings 1412 and 1425. The observations are conducted on all shifts and the times of observation are kept a secret from non-EROF personnel. Due to safety concerns, EROF personnel are not permitted into BSL-4 areas to conduct spot observations. Observations are accomplished by merely peering into the various labs from hallway or door windows, making note of any workplace activity that appears suspicious or unusual. [redacted] reiterated EROF personnel do not enter laboratories within the containment suites rather they merely peer into the labs from the hallway. Also, not all EROF personnel were vaccinated and as such wore respirators while walking down the hallways in the BSL-3 containment suites.
advised that since its inception back in 2001, the EROF's role at USAMRIID has somewhat diminished due to the installation of video cameras throughout the various labs in Building 1425. However, Building 1412 still has a significant number of labs which have not been equipped with video cameras and therefore continues to receive a lot of attention from the EROF.

was specifically asked if had any recollection of former USAMRIID named confirmed knowing and offered that appeared to advised that however, did not appear to have any malicious intentions. As far as work is concerned, frequently worked in the labs and was not sure why.

and was primarily worn when conducting research in lab suites advised that these suits are not required to be worn when conducting research with Bacillus anthracis (Ba). explained that Ba is categorized as a BSL-2 level biological agent; however, USAMRIID for safety reasons, classifies Ba as a BSL-3 organism. advised that the Safety Office at USAMRIID maintains records as to the assignment of these suits.

recalled working on a project with

has not seen in a while and believes is currently residing in indicated that may be able to locate a phone number for but that USAMRIID employee would also be able to provide a current number for because

was asked to explain the process at USAMRIID pertaining to environmental swabbing of the various labs advised that environmental swabbing is conducted in the various
labs on a weekly basis and is done by the suite supervisors or their designee. There are no outside validation studies conducted on the environmental swabbing efforts. The weekly swabbing is an in-house quality assurance safety program which was developed back in 2002 as a result of a Ba exposure incident involving BRUCE IVINS and the FBI's anthrax laced letter evidence. Advised that since the 2002 incident, all floors have to be mopped weekly with bleach and all of the linens have to be autoclaved prior to leaving USAMRIID for the off site laundry. Contract custodians are prohibited from entering any and suites.
The following investigation was conducted by SA______ in rooms______ at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland on October 5, 2006:

BRUCE EDWARD IVINS, born April 22, 1946, advised that every female FBI Special Agent (SA) that he has encountered is very attractive. This includes SAs______ and______. IVINS believes that the FBI intentionally hires attractive female SAs so that they will be more effective interviewers of male suspects. IVINS indicated that______ thought that SA______ is attractive.

IVINS asked SA______ what the standard issue weapons of FBI SAs were upon their completion of the FBI academy. IVINS indicated that he had just returned from North Carolina where he was visiting his brother.

IVINS is happy that his laboratory, room______ Building______ USAMRIID, now has a keypad on the door controlling access to the lab. IVINS believes that both the keypad and the cameras installed his lab are a good thing, particularly given the fact that there are so many anthrax spores currently stored there.
Precedence: PRIORITY  Date: 10/12/2006

To: Washington Field  Attn: SSA

From: Washington Field  Contact: SA

Approved By:  
Drafted By:  

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID  (Pending) - 1615

Title: AMERITHRAX; MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To report results of investigation.

Details: Special Agent (SA) examined available telephonic records in an attempt to identify particular telephone extensions to exact locations at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland. Investigation was hampered by the following technical considerations:

-Historical USAMRIID telephone records were maintained in a batch format by year encompassing the period of time between 1997 and 2005.
-The location of a particular extension in many instances changed over time.
-Some records are accurate and reflect the USAMRIID building number, as well as a particular location (i.e. Room B413); however, in many instances the room location field is blank or was otherwise not recorded.

Although available records were in many instances incomplete, a substantial volume of intelligence value was gleaned pertaining to USAMRIID building 1425. A query of available electronic records for "1425" and "USAMRIID" met with 921 results. A thorough examination of the same has definitively identified the twenty-one (21) unique telephone numbers to locations within USAMRIID 1425 germane to the above captioned investigation:
To: Washington Field  From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/12/2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>LOCATIONS</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

Division Numbers:

A query of the above mentioned numbers in ________ met with negative results; whereas, a query in ________ database for the same met with positive results for ________ is definitively associated as an alternate work number for Dr. Bruce E. Ivins (279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1345).

Writer recognizes it is likely other extensions are/were associated with particular rooms within the ________ hot suites; however, available records do not permit one to definitively associate a particular extension to a particular location other than the above mentioned six (6) numbers.
To: Washington Field  From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/12/2006

A query of met with negative results; whereas, a query in database for the same met with positive results for as well as was the listed work telephone of (279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 114). It should be noted access investigation was concluded on 12/15/2003; no derogatory information was discovered.

was the listed work telephone of (279A-WF-222936-LAB, Serial 984).

was not employed at USAMRIID until after the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001; however, as it relates to the access to room and the rest of the not suite may warrant further investigation. Writer will contact the Pittsburgh Division Case Agent and inform the same.

Area Numbers:

A query in met with negative results; whereas, a query in database for the same met with positive results for (279A-WF-222936-LAB, Serial 1076, 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1271, as well as a document dated

As it relates to the AMERITHRAX investigation, has been linked to the at USAMRIID, and specifically circa Previous AMERITHRAX reporting identifies work number as the same. It should be noted the same reporting identified has a USAMRIID point of contact for foreign visiting scientist (FVS); investigation
produced no derogatory information pertaining to [redacted] or [redacted] FVS; furthermore, investigation determined [redacted] did not access or attempt to access locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis while stationed at USAMRIID.

A printout of the above mentioned 921 electronic records pertaining to USAMRIID building 1425 (242 pages) will be sent to FBIHQ for uploading into the AMERITHRAX Major Case Database. Intelligence value gleaned from examination of available electronic records pertaining to USAMRIID building 1412 will be addressed under a separate communication.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field
   AMX-2
   Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) - 1619

Title: AMERITHRAX;
   MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To report results of investigation.

Details: Special Agent (SA) 

completed an investigation pertaining to former United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) employee, Social Security Account Number (SSAN): The investigation was predicated upon access to location(s) at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis.

Knowledge and Experience:

graduated with a degree in from. Concurrent to undergraduate education, was also . Upon graduation from

attended College for before transferring to graduated from the University of with a degree in. Upon graduation

reported to

USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, Maryland.

was assigned to the from through where was a
To: Washington Field  From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/10/2006

This is the only time period had access to the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis prior to the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001.

Access:

Laboratory was located in USAMRIID building room research did not pertain to Bacillus anthracis; rather, has never worked with the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis or any of its components. Laboratory was "cold," and contained no Select Agents. Advised was in the and hot suites on a handful of occasions.

Account of suite activity was verified via available USAMRIID keycard access records. A thorough review of USAMRIID keycard access records indicated entered the hot suite via the keypad once on and during normal business hours. USAMRIID keycard access records for indicated no unusual "after hour" activity nor any attempts to access other location(s) at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis.

Indicated entered the suites in an effort conducted no "bench work" pursuant to this effort; rather watched an individual he referred to as then later, watched the same recalled also entered the suite to conduct equipment inventory; however, available keycard access records do not support contention conducted equipment inventories within the hot suite.

Keycard access records indicated occasional "piggybacking": specifically, during normal business hours, into the change room on as well as out of the change room. On 06/30/1999 keycard access records indicated did not have sufficient time to enter either the hot suite and abscond with the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis before next recorded keycard activity.

Advised never left the hot suite with the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis or any other Select Agent, nor did anyone ask to do so. No evidence or allegation(s) were discovered to refute statement.
To: Washington Field
From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/10/2006

B3/B4 Specific Intelligence:

Although USAMRIID keycard access records did not support contention of additional hot suite access pursuant to equipment inventories, was knowledgeable of the following:

To the best of knowledge access to the hot suites was electronically controlled via a unique Personal Identification Number (PIN). was unaware as to the existence of a "generic" code one would use to covertly enter the B3/B4 hot suites.

Although "piggybacking" occurred at USAMRIID, never observed anyone ever piggybacking into the hot suite.

never observed anyone from another Division, specifically the Virology Division, within the hot suite.

indicated could not recall observing any additional fermentors located within the hot suites aside from the "big one" in the suite. never observed a lyophylizer within the hot suite. The only lyophylizer recalled was in the suites. This lyophylizer was not a large port-style lyophylizer; rather, a small bench top type.

The Division's Select Agents were stored in freezers located within the hallways of the hot suites. To recollection these freezers were locked via a combination padlock, similar to what one would observe on a gym locker. had no knowledge as to which freezer(s) contained the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis.

Specific Co-workers:

noted since leaving USAMRIID has been a regular attendee of Per had told that believed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was listening to home and work telephonic conversations.

Per prior to 2001 Bruce Ivins was a jovial guy with a good sense of humor and personality. noted that since 2001 and specifically the FBI investigation of the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001, Ivins's personality has change. opined the FBI investigation has taken an emotional toll on
To: Washington Field  From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/10/2006

Ivins. Per Ivins also stated he believed the FBI was listening to his telephonic home and work conversations. 

[ ] interacted with [ ] on three occasions.

Knowledge of [ ] recalled one instance when [ ] was walking by division office, [ ] introduced to [ ] and spoke about [ ] book which was on [ ] desktop. 

Pertaining to the other two occasions, [ ] had no derogatory information to report; however, noted on [ ] observed [ ] saw [ ] exiting USAMRIID

[ ] advised [ ] had no knowledge of [ ] interacting at USAMRIID or socially.

A thorough review of available 2001 residential telephone records pertaining to [ ] was unremarkable. 

Furthermore, a query of [ ] met with negative results.

Connectivity to New Jersey:

[ ] stated [ ] did not travel to New Jersey in 2001. A thorough review of residential telephone records, as well as credit card statements pertaining to [ ] indicate no connectivity to New Jersey, specifically there was no evidence [ ] called anyone or anything in New Jersey in 2001, nor was there any evidence of interstate travel to New Jersey in 2001.

Time line

Investigation and interview determined [ ] had no interstate travel in 2001, specifically [ ] worked and resided in [ ] in 2001. Inasmuch as investigation produced no derogatory information pertaining to [ ] as well as no evidence or allegation(s) were discovered to suggest [ ] had interstate travel, no further investigation
p pertaining establishing a more detailed time line for □ is warranted.

Miscellaneous:

Nonproductive Investigation:

□ has no current wants or warrants nor any identifiable criminal history.

□ An review of available electronic records pertaining to produced no derogatory information.

□ An ACS database query for □ residential address met with negative results.

□ An ACS database query for □ met with positive results; however, no derogatory information was discovered and no reporting was noted aside from what was reported in the above captioned investigation.

□ As previously noted, a query for □ met with negative results.

□ No motive was identified through investigation nor interview.

Summary:

□ A thorough investigation (4 inserts and 6 FD-302s) indicated although □ has a pertinent educational and scientific background, as well as □ had access to the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis while at USAMRIID, no evidence or allegation(s) were discovered to suggest □ was involved in, or otherwise had additional knowledge pertinent to, the investigation of the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. Unless or until such evidence or allegation(s) are discovered, no further investigation of □ is warranted.
The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent [Redacted] on 10/25/2006:

Off-line NCIC checks were performed on all vehicles owned by BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS for the time frame of 1/1/2000 through 12/31/2002. The searches were performed using the Vehicle Identification Numbers (VIN) and license plate tag information for each vehicle. The following tags and VINS were searched:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tag</th>
<th>VIN</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Make</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>SATURN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HONDA</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>DODGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HONDA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 3/31/2001 at 11:01 p.m., a vehicle bearing tags [Redacted] was entered into the NCIC computer by the Frederick, Maryland Police Department.

On 2/9/2001 at 10:34 a.m., a vehicle bearing [Redacted] was entered into the NCIC computer by the Maryland State Police, Westminster Station.

According to [Redacted] CJIS, in order for a nation wide license plate search to be conducted, a state identifier is not used. For example, if plates in both Maryland and Texas are 123-ABC, the off-line search does not differentiate between the two states and all "hits" of the tag 123-ABC will be returned. This being said, three "hits" were returned from tags consistent with the five tags listed above. This results are as follows:

On 7/12/2002 at 10:03 p.m., a vehicle bearing tags [Redacted] was entered into the NCIC computer by the Lamar County Enhanced 911 Center, telephone number (601) 794-8610.

On 7/10/2002 at 7:29 p.m., a vehicle bearing tags [Redacted] was entered into the NCIC computer by the Louisiana State Police, telephone number (504) 925-6325.

On 6/29/2002 at 10:56 p.m., a vehicle bearing tags [Redacted] was entered into the NCIC computer by the Lamar County Enhanced 911 Center, telephone number (601) 794-8610.
An www.atxp.com search revealed that there are vehicles registered in Mississippi (where Lamar County is located) and in Louisiana bearing the identical license plates listed above. Based on this fact and information gathered during the investigation to date, it does not appear that these "hits" were generated by vehicles owned by Ivins.

The abovementioned off-line searched are attached to and made part of this document.
TITLE: 2006000000
ROUTE TO: 
ADDRESS: 
EXTENSION: 
COMMENTS: 

TYPE: HYP     NEED: . UNI     FILE: 
BEGIN DATE: 20000101     END DATE: 20011231     LIST TYPE: 

FILE SIZE: 000000000     COUNT: 000000     RANDOM NUMBER

IMAGE INDICATOR: 
FIELDS SEARCHED: 

ORI IS FREDERICK PD
301 694-2100

ORI IS MD STATE POLICE WESTMINSTER
410 386-3000

THE DATA PROVIDED IS FROM THE BDAT THROUGH THE FOLLOWING DATE: 12-31-2001
***END OF REPORT***
REPORT DATE: 10-25-2006
TITLE: 2006000000
ROUTE TO: 
ADDRESS: 
EXTENSION: 
COMMENTS: 

TYPE: HYP  NEED: UNI  FILE: 
BEGIN DATE: 20020101  END DATE: 20021231  LIST TYPE: LST
FILE SIZE: 000000000  COUNT: 000000  RANDOM NUMBER
LIST:

IMAGE INDICATOR: 
FIELDS SEARCHED: 

ORI IS LAMAR COUNTY ENHANCED 911 CENTER 601 794-8610
ORI IS LOUISIANA STATE POLICE 504 925-6325
ORI IS LAMAR COUNTY ENHANCED 911 CENTER 601 794-8610

THE DATA PROVIDED IS FROM THE BDAT THROUGH THE FOLLOWING DATE: 12-31-2002
***END OF REPORT*** REPORT DATE: 10-25-2006
The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent ____________ on October 20, 2006 and November 1, 2006:

On October 20, 2006, writer requested that the Maryland Motor Vehicles Administration (MVA) conduct a records search on any and all vehicles owned by BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, ____________

On November 1, 2006, the results of the abovementioned search were received by writer. According to the search results, the following vehicles were owned by the Ivins family during 2001:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Make</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>VIN</th>
<th>Date Purchased</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honda</td>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>DqMe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dodge</td>
<td>Van</td>
<td>cnp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ivins purchased the following vehicles subsequent to 2001:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Make</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>VIN</th>
<th>Date Purchased</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saturn</td>
<td>SL1</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honda</td>
<td>Sedan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honda</td>
<td>Sedan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The original search results received from MVA are attached to and made part of this document.
U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, NW

October 20, 2006

To Whom it May Concern:

In relation to a criminal investigation, I am respectfully requesting any and all MVA records associated with the following individuals, including any and all vehicles registered to any of these individuals during 2001. If you could also search their home address of that would be appreciated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>SSN</th>
<th>DOB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bruce Ivins</td>
<td>280-44-5449</td>
<td>04/22/1946 - T-152-048-188-310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Any questions can be directed to Special Agent Any results can be faxed to me at Thank you in advance for your help.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Special Agent
AS MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE STATE OF MARYLAND AND BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME UNDER THE TRANSPORTATION ARTICLE, MARYLAND VEHICLE LAW, I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, THAT THE FOLLOWING IS A TRUE COPY TAKEN FROM THE ORIGINAL NOW ON FILE AND PART OF THE RECORDS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION.

--END OF RECORD--

MARYLAND AND FEDERAL LAW PROHIBITS UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION FROM MVA RECORDS. VIOLATION OF THESE PROVISIONS IS A MISDEMEANOR PUNISHABLE BY A FINE UP TO $1000 DOLLARS. AS WITNESS, MY HAND AND THE SEAL OF THIS ADMINISTRATION THE DAY AND YEAR SET OPPOSITE.
### DRIVER RECORD ABBREVIATION CODES

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>Abeyance</td>
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<td>ABM</td>
<td>Action/Adjudication</td>
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<td>ADM</td>
<td>Administration/Administrative</td>
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<td>AEP</td>
<td>Alcohol Education Program</td>
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<td>Agreement</td>
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<td>YD</td>
<td>Youth Driver Improvement Program</td>
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<td>YLO</td>
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<td>YO</td>
<td>and</td>
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<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>Points Expired</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Driver License Restriction Codes** (as they appear on back of driver license):
- A - Limited (non-recovered)
- A - Limited (recovered)
- B - Corrective license
- C - Special license, hazard control (less than 18 months)
- D - Probated or Probation, Probation
- E - Alcohol Ignition Interlock Device
- F - Outside mirror
- G - Limited to certain vehicles only
- H - Hazardous materials

**Restriction Codes**:
- I - Limited (non-recovered)
- I - Limited (recovered)
- J - Class A & B busantee (owner operator)
- K - CDL limited only
- L - Vehicles without airbag
- M - Exempt class A & B bus
- N - Except class A & B bus
- O - Other
- Z - Other

**Additional Codes**:
- C - Commercial Driver License
- T - Temp Tag
- X - X-Certified
- Y - Y-Certified

**Special Codes**:
- A - A & B bus
- B - Bus
- C - Class A
- D - Commercial
- E - Emancipated minor
- F - First time
- G - Grant
- H - Hazard
- I - Inactive
- J - Judicial
- K - Key
- L - Limited
- M - Moped
- N - Nonresident
- O - Other
- P - Permit
- Q - Qu projected
- R - Reduced
- S - Suspension
- T - Temporary
- U - Under
- V - Valid
- W - Waiver
- X - X-Certified
- Y - Y-Certified
- Z - Other

**Note**: The codes listed are for information only and should be cross-referenced for accuracy.
The following items have been altered:

- Certificate of Origin
- Title Application (VR5)
- Odometer Statement
- Dealer Reassignment
- [ ] Other Title

Comments:

Signatures on back are for seller & co-sellers.

Co-seller's signature was accidentally signed on the buyer's line.

Sincerely,
To Whom it May Concern:

In relation to a criminal investigation, I am respectfully requesting any and all MVA records associated with the following individuals, including any and all vehicles registered to any of these individuals during 2001. If you could also search their home address of that would be appreciated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>SSN</th>
<th>DOB</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bruce Ivins</td>
<td>280-44-5449</td>
<td>04/22/1946 - T-152-048-188-310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Any questions can be directed to Special Agent at. Any results can be faxed to me at Thank you in advance for your help.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Special Agent

324556168
29019556
AS MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE STATE OF MARYLAND AND BY VIRTUE OF
THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME UNDER THE TRANSPORTATION ARTICLE, MARYLAND
VEHICLE LAW, I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, THAT THE
FOLLOWING IS A TRUE COPY TAKEN FROM THE ORIGINAL NOW ON FILE AND PART OF THE
RECORDS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I-152-098-188-310</th>
<th>SUS.REV: NO</th>
<th>PRIVACY: YES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS</td>
<td>5-10</td>
<td>150</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- END OF RECORD -
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 222936

601 4th Street, NW

October 20, 2006

To Whom it May Concern:

In relation to a criminal investigation, I am respectfully requesting any and all MVA records associated with the following individuals, including any and all vehicles registered to any of these individuals during 2001. If you could also search their home address of [ ] that would be appreciated.

Name          SSN          DOB
Bruce Ivins  280-44-5449  04/22/1946 - [ ]

Any questions can be directed to Special Agent [ ] at [ ]. Any results can be faxed to me at [ ]. Thank you in advance for your help.

Sincerely,

[ ]

Special Agent
AS MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE STATE OF MARYLAND AND BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME UNDER THE TRANSPORTATION ARTICLE, MARYLAND VEHICLE LAW, I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, THAT THE FOLLOWING IS A TRUE COPY TAKEN FROM THE ORIGINAL NOW ON FILE AND A PART OF THE RECORDS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION.

( ) APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL DRIVERS LICENSE
( ) APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL DRIVERS LICENSE
( ) APPLICATION FOR CORRECTED DRIVERS LICENSE
( ) APPLICATION FOR DUPLICATE DRIVERS LICENSE
( ) APPLICATION FOR MOPED LICENSE
( ) APPLICATION FOR IDENTIFICATION CARD
( ) VEHICLE TITLE NUMBER
( ) VEHICLE REGISTRATION TAG NUMBER
( ) VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
( ) CORRESPONDENCE DATED:

( X ) OUR RECORDS FAIL TO REFLECT ANY INFORMATION FOR:

( X ) OTHER:

NO RECORD OF TITLE OR REGISTRATION INFORMATION

MARYLAND AND FEDERAL LAW PROHIBITS UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION FROM MVA RECORDS. VIOLATION OF THESE PROVISIONS IS A MISDEMEANOR PUNISHABLE BY A FINE UP TO $1000 DOLLARS. AS WITNESS, MY HAND AND THE SEAL OF THIS ADMINISTRATION THE DAY AND YEAR SET OPPOSITE.
U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, NW

October 20, 2006

To Whom it May Concern:

In relation to a criminal investigation, I am respectfully requesting any and all MVA records associated with the following individuals, including any and all vehicles registered to any of these individuals during 2001. If you could also search their home address of that would be appreciated.

Name: Bruce Evans
SSN: 280-44-5449
DOB: 04/22/1946 - T-152-098-188-310

Any questions can be directed to Special Agent at Any results can be faxed to me at Thank you in advance for your help.

Sincerely,

Special Agent
AS MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE STATE OF MARYLAND AND BY VIRTUE OF
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AS WITNESS, MY HAND AND THE SEAL OF THIS
ADMINISTRATION THE DAY AND YEAR SET OPPOSITE.

OCT 23 2006

[Signature]

DR-050 (10-09)
In Reply, Please Refer to File No. 222936

To Whom it May Concern:

In relation to a criminal investigation, I am respectfully requesting any and all MVA records associated with the following individuals, including any and all vehicles registered to any of these individuals during 2001. If you could also search their home address of that would be appreciated.

Name: Bruce Ivins
SSN: 280-44-5449
DOB: 04/22/1946 - T-152-098-688-310

Any questions can be directed to Special Agent at Any results can be faxed to me at Thank you in advance for your help.

Sincerely,

Special Agent
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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

To Whom it May Concern:

In relation to a criminal investigation, I am respectfully requesting any and all MVA records associated with the following individuals, including any and all vehicles registered to any of these individuals during 2001. If you could also search their home address of that would be appreciated.

Name                   SSN       DOB
Bruce Ivins            280-44-5449 04/22/1946

Any questions can be directed to Special Agent Any results can be faxed to me at Thank you in advance for your help.

Sincerely,

Special Agent
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In Reply, Please Refer to File No. 222936

To Whom it May Concern:

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Name: Bruce Ivins  
SSN: 280-44-5449  
DOB: 04/22/1946 - T-152-048-188-310

Any questions can be directed to Special Agent at Any results can be faxed to me at Thank you in advance for your help.

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Special Agent
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Precedence: ROUTINE  
Date: 11/06/2006

To: WMD Directorate Laboratory 
Attn: SSA

Washington Field 
Attn: ADIC Joseph Persichini, Jr. A/SAC

From: Washington Field 
Amerithrax-2
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending)
279A-WF-222936-SCI34 (Pending)

Title: AMERITHRAX;
     MAJOR CASE 184;
     OO:WF

Synopsis: Law Enforcement Operations Order concerning search of U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, commencing on 11/10/2006.

Reference: 1) 09/19/2006 meeting between Amerithrax, CBSU, WFO ERT, WFO HMRT, and HMRU personnel at the FBI Laboratory, Quantico, VA. 2) 11/02/2006 meeting between Amerithrax and HMRU personnel at the FBI Laboratory, Quantico, VA.

Enclosure(s): 1) One page diagram of the containment suites within Building USAMRIID, 2) One page list of items required for search titled, "HMRU Item List."
To: WMD Directorate  From: Washington Field

Details: On 11/10/2006, the Washington Field Office (WFO) AMERITHRAX Task Force, with the assistance from the Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) and the WFO Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT), will conduct a search of Bio-Safety Level 3 laboratory suites at USAMRIID. The suites are located in building and are designated suites The purpose of the search is to collect 1) non-anthracs species of Bacillus isolates currently located in 2) aliquots from samples of Renocal/Hypaque located in room of the suite, and 3) general evidence to include notes, envelopes, paper envelope bands, tape, items with pieces of tape, and documents that may be evidence of involvement in the anthrax mailings.

It is anticipated that this search will be conducted pursuant to consent. Consent to search will be requested from USAMRIID on Thursday November 9, 2006. In the event that consent is denied, the search will proceed under the authority of a previously obtained search warrant issued in the District of Columbia. Application for the warrant will be presented to the U.S. District Court, Washington D.C. on November 7, 2006. All search personnel will be advised of the authority (consent or warrant) by which the search is to proceed.

Background

Bacillus subtilis

The anthrax spore powder recovered from the anthrax envelopes addressed to the New York Post and Tom Brokaw contains low levels of a bacterial contaminant identified as a strain of Bacillus subtilis. The Bacillus subtilis contaminant has not been detected in the anthrax spore powder recovered from the envelopes mailed to either Senators Leahy or Daschle. Bacillus subtilis is a non-pathogenic bacterium found ubiquitously in the environment. However, genomic DNA sequencing of the specific isolate of Bacillus subtilis discovered within the New York Post and Tom Brokaw anthrax powders reveals that it is genetically distinct from over seventy (70) isolates of Bacillus subtilis tested to date. Analysis of the Bacillus subtilis from the New York Post and Tom Brokaw envelopes revealed that these two isolates are identical.

RMR-1029

USAMRIID is a military research institute located on the base of Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland. Prior to the anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, USAMRIID was one of sixteen (16) U.S. laboratories which possessed the Ames strain of Ba which was used in the attacks. Genetic analyses conducted by the AMERITHRAX investigation, with the assistance of several contract
To: WMD Directorate  From: Washington Field

Laboratories as well as the FBI Laboratory, has led investigators to conclude that the Bacillus anthracis used in the anthrax letter attacks is directly related to Reference Material Receipt-1029 (RMR-1029). RMR-1029 was a large Bacillus anthracis Ames strain spore batch produced to conduct numerous anthrax aerosol challenges. RMR-1029 was produced in 1997 by scientists in the Bacteriology Division at USAMRIID and was stored in the containment suite within Building of USAMRIID.

Investigation has determined that research strains of Bacillus subtilis, that have not yet been compared to the Bacillus subtilis isolated from the New York Post and Tom Brokaw anthrax powders, are located in the containment suites within Building USAMRIID. In April of 2005, a notebook labeled "Cultures Frozen in Bruce Ivins" was provided to the FBI. The book is an inventory of the organisms in the storage boxes within a -70°C freezer located in the hallway of the suite. Many Bacillus species, to include Bacillus subtilis, are listed within the book. All of the samples of non-anthracis Bacillus located within these storage boxes will be seized. These samples will then be packaged and transported to the National Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC) where they will be analyzed.

Operation Execution
Search Assignments

1) Outside Containment Suites:
   WFO On-Scene Commander:
   SSA:

   WFO Deputy On-Scene Commander:
   SSA:
   WFO Team Member:
   SA:
   WFO Team Member:
   SA:
   HMRU Team Leader:
   SSA:
   HMRU Scientist:

2) Containment Suite Search Team:
   Search Team Leader:
   WFO SA:
   - search of -70°C freezer
   - search of remaining lab rooms within
   Search Team Members:
   WFO SA:
   - assist with search of -70°C freezer, photograph log(s)
   CBSU SSA:
   - assist with search of -70°C freezer, evidence log(s)
   WFO SA:
   - mirror hard drive of computer within
   - search of
   WFO SA:
   - assist with mirror hard drive of computer within
   - assist with search of

3) Surveillance Team:
   Surveillance Team Leader:
   WFO SA:
   WFO SOG Point of Contact
   Surveillance Team Members:
   WFO SA:
   WFO SA:
To: WMD Directorate  From: Washington Field

Communications

Radio Communications: Radio channels have been reserved for the purpose of this search.

Stationary phone lines: A hardline phone exists in the hallway of the containment suite. Once inside Search Team Member, Special Agent will provide the phone extension to the On Scene Commander and the Surveillance Team Leader who will distribute the number to the appropriate personnel.

Medical Resources

The nearest medical facility is Frederick Memorial Hospital, 400 West 7th Street, Frederick, MD, 21701, phone (240) 566-3300.

Directions to Frederick Memorial Hospital: From USAMRIID’s front gate, go straight out the main USAMRIID gate, drive away (southeast) on 7th Street. Go under Route 15 Overpass. Frederick Memorial Hospital is on the right.

In the event of an emergency in the suite, to include exposures, USAMRIID’s Special Immunizations Program duty nurse should be contacted at is a medical contact for extreme medical emergencies inside the containment areas.

FBI Deadly Force Policy (eff. 7/1/2004 as stated in an EC written by dated on 7/7/2004):

Law enforcement officers of the Department of Justice may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to another person.
To: WMD Directorate  From: Washington Field

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

WMD DIRECTORATE
AT WASHINGTON D.C.

For information.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

LABORATORY
AT HMREU, QUANTICO, VA

AMERITHRAX requests that HMREU provide personnel and materials necessary to conduct a hazardous material search at USAMRIID.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

LABORATORY
AT CBSU, QUANTICO, VA

AMERITHRAX requests that CBSU provide personnel and materials necessary to conduct a hazardous material search at USAMRIID.

Set Lead 4: (Action)

WASHINGTON FIELD
AT HMRT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

AMERITHRAX requests that WFO, HMRT provide personnel and materials necessary to conduct a hazardous material search at USAMRIID.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD
To: WMD Directorate  From: Washington Field  

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

For information.
**HMRU Item List**

Orange Suitcase  
Large Cooler  
Digital Cameras (preferably the ones that like AA batteries)  
Underwater Camera Housings  
Memory Sticks  
Purple Nitriles (3 each M, L, and XL)  
Ziploc-type bags (for cryovials to cryoboxes)  
Biohazard bags for trash  
ICHEM jars  
Disposable pipets  
Sample Kit  
Duct tape  
Hype wipes  
Decon Buckets  
Bleach  
Pre-mixing Bleach spray bottles  
Lab Mat  
Paper Towels  
  
Multi-Rae  
Ludlum  

**WFO Supplies and Paperwork:**

Non-disclosures  
FD-597s  
Admin paperwork  
  
HazMat Camera, housing, memory sticks, batteries, etc...  
HazMat Computer  
Rite -n- Rain DuraLabels  
Rite -n- Rain Graph paper (for extra notes)  
Rite -n- Rain Evidence Logs  
Rite -n- Rain Photo Logs  
Clip boards  
Evidence Photo Scales  
Sharpies (Fine and Large tipped)  
Evidence Tape  
Stapler  
Batteries (AAs)  
  
Dry Ice (USAMRIID)
On 12/01/2006, I was interviewed at the U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES, (USAMRIID), Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, I voluntarily provided the following information:

I have been employed in the Division of USAMRIID since [date]. When I first started working at USAMRIID, I worked with [department]. Currently, I work in [department].

I have used a lyophilizer on several occasions while employed at USAMRIID to dry purified [material]. The lyophilizer uses has always been located in the suite of building [building number], which is a suite of laboratories used by Division employees. There is no anthrax work in suite [suite number] however, work is performed there.

Everyone entering suite [suite number] walks past the lyophilizer. Prior to the events of 09/11/2001, there was a second entrance located at the opposite end of the hallway (relative to the current entrance), that provided access into the suite. Sometime after 09/11/2001, that entrance was locked for security purposes. A partial schematic of building [building number] was provided to [individual] who noted the location of the lyophilizer on the schematic. [Individual] denoted that the lyophilizer was located in the [suite number].

The Division does not have any other lyophilizers. [Individual] has seen, what he believes to be a newer model of the Division lyophilizer, in the Division.
believes BRUCE IVINS is responsible for the lyophilizer, since it is on IVINS's hand receipt, but does not believe IVINS showed how to use it. There are instructions posted on the lyophilizer and believes IVINS' referred to the instructions.

was shown printouts of e-mails dated in which is requesting IVINS to show how to use the lyophilizer. was familiar with the e-mails, but was not sure that IVINS showed how to use the lyophilizer, stating that the lyophilizer was easy to use (user friendly) and the instructions posted on the lyophilizer were good.

The first time used the lyophilizer had difficulties after the defrost cycle. opened the door to the cold trap and the water inside (condensate from the lyophilized samples) spilled out. stated that the vacuum pump oil for the lyophilizer had not been changed since

According to the lyophilizer is rarely used (maybe once every two months). (writer believes to be) who uses it to and never pre-scheduled the use of the lyophilizer, although, would occasionally put a note on the lyophilizer prior to use. IVINS sometimes made comments about use of the lyophilizer, so, oftentimes would tell IVINS before used the lyophilizer. preparations took the lyophilizer to complete, but wanted to be sure the preparations were completely dry so would add to assure complete dryness.

The cloth was to keep out dust. had no problems with cross-contamination since all of samples were the same. agreed that it was theoretically possible to cross-contaminate samples when drying them together. When the lyophilization was complete the that had sublimated from the samples, would have condensed as ice in the cold trap. Once the ice in the cold trap thawed, the water would be removed.
did not know the original reasoning behind purchasing the lyophilizer, but it is set up for stoppering, using vials with rubber caps. The main chamber is refrigerated in order to keep samples cold. According to drying spores is a, "no-no". never saw the front of the lyophilizer obscured in any way.

The lyophilizer is somewhat noisy, such that you would notice if it were running from but not from the hallway. Once the lyophilizer is started, it takes approximately 1 hour for the sample chamber to achieve -40 degrees Celsius. The lyophilizer would be ready in about 5 minutes if you were not interested in cooling down the sample chamber. Once the lyophilization is complete, it takes only minutes to get the samples out, however, it could take hours to thaw the cold trap depending on the volume of ice present.

Neither nor

Room belongs to IVINS.

escorted the interviewing agents to suite and started up the lyophilizer. The lyophilizer is further described as a

provided the interviewing agents with an article describing the lyophilization a 2 page document provided by which describes a copy of the "Operational Instructions for Lyophilizer" (1 page), and the manufacturer's "Operation Summary" (1 page). These items are included in the IA along with the original notes of the interview, the two e-mails as shown to and one partial schematic with indication of the lyophilizer location.

was glad to help, and was agreeable to re-contact by the interviewing agents.
The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent...

During the course of the Amerithrax investigation, numerous pieces of digital evidence have been obtained either by search warrant or via a consent search. Writer reviewed five digital images associated with BRUCE P. IVINS, including his home computer, his United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) office workstation, his B4/B5 USAMRIID workstation, his USAMRIID user directory and various pieces of loose media. During the review of these items, follow up work was deemed necessary on certain items in order to determine their investigative merit. This investigative document is meant to memorialize the investigative work performed on the digital evidence collected from IVINS' home computer. A summary of the work performed is as follows:

A user of IVINS' home computer searched for at US Search. ACS and UNI checks of were met with negative results. A google.com search revealed a telephone number. 

A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number with negative results. Searches of google.com were negative.

A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number with negative results. Verison of Maryland was subpoenaed to determine the subscriber. The subpoena returned as the subscriber to this number. ACS and UNI checks were negative on.

A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number. Searches of google.com were negative.
A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number [redacted] with negative results. The date the reverse lookup was performed is unknown. Searches of [redacted] google.com were negative. Verizon Wireless subpoena results indicated that the number was subscribed to by [redacted] not further identified, from January 19, 2000 through January 8, 2004 and effective February 27, 2004 [redacted] was subscribed to by [redacted] ACS and UNI checks on both [redacted] were negative.

A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number [redacted] with negative results. [redacted] was negative but google.com reported that the number was subscribed to by [redacted] Verizon of Maryland confirmed that the phone number belonged to [redacted] ACS check of [redacted] was negative. Due to commonality of [redacted] name, a UNI check offered multiple unfocused results. Additionally, a user of IVINS' computer performed a search at PeopleData for [redacted] The search was met with negative results because the website required a $25.00 for the search and it does not appear as if the fee was paid to receive the results.

A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number [redacted] [redacted] was negative but google.com reported that the number was subscribed to by Nissan Pavilion. Verizon Virginia also reported that the number is subscribed to by Nissan Pavilion, 7800 Cellar Door Drive, Bristow, Virginia 20136 [Agent note: Nissan Pavilion is an outdoor concert venue near Manassas, Virginia].

A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number [redacted] search revealed that

A user of IVINS' home computer searched for [redacted]. The search was performed at US Search. An ACS search was met with negative results. A UNI search revealed numerous results on [redacted] but that could be attributed to [redacted] in Maryland or Virginia.

A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number [redacted] was
A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number with negative results. Searches of google.com were negative. Subpoena results from Cingular Wireless identified the subscriber as negative. Due to commonality of name, an UIN check offered multiple unfocused results.

A user of IVINS' computer performed a reverse telephone lookup of phone number with negative results. google.com searches of the number were met with negative results. A subpoena return from Nextel is pending to determine the subscriber.

A user of IVINS' computer performed a reverse telephone lookup of phone number with negative results. google.com searches of the number were met with negative results. A subpoena return from Verizon Maryland is pending to determine the subscriber.

A Yahoo! People Search was conducted on the last name and Ithaca, New York on IVINS' home computer. The search returned the names has performed additional work on This work is documented under separate cover.

A user of IVINS' computer used Mapquest.com to obtain directions from an unidentified address on to Washington Dulles International Airport. Investigation revealed that there are only


ACS and UIN checks for all of the abovementioned names and addresses were met with negative results.
A search was performed on IVINS's computer for hotel rooms in Fort Lauderdale, Florida from April 1 to April 5, 2002 on Lodging.com. Investigation to date has not revealed if anybody from IVINS' family traveled to Fort Lauderdale, and if so, why they traveled.

A United States Postal Service track and confirm notice was found on IVINS' computer. SA forwarded the tracking number, EU41 2171 516U S, to United States Postal Inspection Service. SA opined that he would be able to obtain the shipping information associated with the abovementioned tracking number.

Two hotmail.com inbox web pages were found on IVINS' computer. The pages were the email inbox for hotmail.com user skymasterson77@hotmail.com. The inbox included three emails, from three different accounts, from a known associate of IVINS. One address was not present in the "From" line, but full name appeared. Another address was. This appears to be a spam email as well because of the use of initials and presumably a reference to .

The last associated email address was (the rest is cut off), but presumably the address ended. Another email in the inbox was from . An email was also in the mailbox from MSN Communities (the host provider of hotmail.com) with the subject line of "You are now a member of blindfolded." This appears to be a chat group that IVINS has joined associated with blindfolding. Investigation to date has revealed that IVINS was interested in blindfolding and kidnapping websites and chat rooms. The last email in the inbox appears to be junk mail asking IVINS to signup for credit of some sort.

As mentioned above, HANK NUWER is an author specializing in hazing issues. Using amazon.com, IVINS pulled up information on two of NUWER's books, "The Hazing Reader" and "Wrongs of Passage: Fraternities, Sororities, Hazing, and Binge Drinking." It is unclear whether IVINS purchased these books.
A truncated email was found that appears to be between IVINS and [blank]. The email discusses a

Ivins asked if "there are genetic/biological factors to sexual preferences and appetites. I remember that my 'interest' was present way before I reached 10 years of age." Ivins' "interest" is not known to investigators. If appropriate, during the next interview of Ivins it should be asked what his "interest" is.

In another email between IVINS and [blank], IVINS states that, "The only reason I've stayed [blank]. The FBI wondered why I spent so much time at work, but I didn't tell them it was, in large part, to get away from home." If appropriate, during the next interview of Ivins it should be asked why he did not tell us this information and if there is any additional information he is not telling us.

On February 15, 2002, IVINS purchased a [blank] from Major League Baseball's website. The total purchase was for $44.8[truncated] and was shipped to [blank]. The States. It should be noted that [blank] was living in [blank]. Ivins Customer number on mlb.com is 915039634 and the order number was DR917546095. This order number will be subpoenaed to determine what credit card IVINS used to make the purchase.

Ivins reviewed the Yahoo! member profile of [blank]. The profile listed the following particulars for [blank].

- Real Name:
- Nickname:
- Location:
- Age:
- Gender:

A subpoena will be sent to Yahoo! in order to gain additional information about [blank].
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription: 11/29/2006

Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [Redacted]

Date of Birth (DOB): [Redacted] was interviewed, as pre-arranged, at [Redacted] place of employment, address: the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, on the morning of November 28, 2006. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents (SAs) and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

(WFO NOTE: maintained in the FD-340 associated with communication is a non-disclosure agreement form [Redacted] voluntarily signed.)


During this period, [Redacted] performed perfunctory duties included [Redacted].

[Redacted] advised to the best of recollection [Redacted] did not possess the knowledge or experience necessary to propagate Bacillus anthracis while at USAMRIID; however, [Redacted] noted minimal knowledge or experience was needed to propagated Bacillus anthracis. [Redacted] opined if [Redacted] indeed grew Bacillus anthracis at USAMRIID, it was pursuant to toxin production and was grown on non-sporeulation media; however, [Redacted] reiterated, to the best of [Redacted] recollection, [Redacted] did not grow Bacillus anthracis at USAMRIID.

[Redacted] advised to the best of recollection [Redacted] did not produce Bacillus anthracis spores at USAMRIID. [Redacted] opined [Redacted].

Investigation on 11/29/2006 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1642 Date dictated N/A

by [Redacted]

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if assisted for once when the weather (snow) precluded from reaching USAMRIID, then probably would be surprised if actually did that for Bacillus anthracis spores as it was not generally necessary to wash the vegetative cells for further experimentation. had no recollection of assisting in such a manner. noted that for

advised had access to the hot side of USAMRIID building. Throughout the period of time between may have been peripherally involved in aerosol challenges pursuant to Division routinely requested the laboratory technicians from the Division to assist in the aerosol challenge. Division laboratory technicians supported the anthrax-aerosol challenges by transporting animals to and from the animal room and the aerosol challenge room, as well as possibly plating. reiterated had no specific recollection of assisting in the transport of animals used in the anthrax challenges; however, the practice of using Division laboratory technicians in this manner was common. In addition recalled there was an extended period of time, months to a year, that and during this extended period

(WFO NOTE: maintained in the FD-340 associated with this communication are USAMRIID floor plans was provided for review.)

indicated had hot suites in USAMRIID building and indicated the same on the provided floor plans. further explained, the hallway was divided off and the posterior aspect of the hallway contained various freezers. The other half of the hallway, nearest the change rooms, was otherwise cordoned off to create offices. reiterated, was not in the hot suite, rather the hot suite and the hot suite.
advised sera derived from animals previously exposed to Bacillus anthracis was considered "hot," and as such any immunological work needing to be conducted on the same would have to occur within a hot suite. opined perhaps this would account for keypad activity at the hot suite; however, noted had not been in a hot suite since noted an ELISA or TNA was a regimented protocol with extended incubation periods whereby one could exit the hot suite and re-enter at a later time if one didn't mind taking multiple showers during the day. advised it would likely take longer than ten minutes for an individual conducting an ELISA to enter the hot suite, conduct the required step(s), and exit the hot suite.

noted the rabbits utilized in the rPA study were purchased from Covance. Due to space limitations at USAMRIID in the rabbits were immunized at Covance at later shipped to USAMRIID for the anthrax-challenges and subsequent experimentations. advised USAMRIID personnel, such as BRUCE IVINS, went to Covance. advised was certain only the vaccine was taken to Covance, as the Covance facility was not equipped to handle infectious agents.

advised was knowledgeable of further advised went to house on several occasions. indicated it was likely had told and possibly others at USAMRIID was from however had no specific recollection of such a conversation. opined it was unlikely was the mailer. continued if was upset with USAMRIID then it would make sense for to mail the anthrax to person(s) directly affiliated with USAMRIID or to the institution itself. opined the perpetrator(s) of the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001 have a nefarious intelligence nexus, as the mailings were, in opinion, designed to increase public awareness to a perceived weakness or inadequacy in U.S. biodefense preparedness.

advised outside interests involved
advised □ had no knowledge of whether or not □ maintained a security clearance while at USAMRIID. □ noted aside from □ did not host or otherwise sponsor any foreign visiting scientist to USAMRIID.

□ advised □ was overheard telling other Division personnel following FBI administered polygraph pursuant to the investigation pertaining to the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. □ advised other □ Division personnel, such as □ had expressed similar comments. □ advised □ due to □ vehement opposition of the use of a polygraph as an investigative tool as it was not admissible in court and also based upon the negative comments and experiences of □ fellow USAMRIID employees.

□ advised □ was in occasional email or telephonic contact with □

Through interview and observation □ is further described as:

LAST NAME: □
FIRST NAME: □
MIDDLE INITIAL: □
RACE: □
SEX: □
DOB: □
SSAN: □
WORK TELEPHONE: □
EMPLOYER: □
EMPLOYER ADDRESS: □
USAMRIID Porter Street
Fort Detrick, Maryland
MISCELLANEOUS: □
was telephonically interviewed, as pre-arranged, on the morning of January 08, 2007. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agent (SA) and the nature of the interview, provided the following information:

[Handwritten notes and entries]

Recalled during last interview with writer, circa December 2006, had mentioned a current USAMRIID employee had told about activities conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that purportedly occurred in the Division hot suites in November 2006. Advised further advised had heard this information secondhand, and not directly from.

Agreed to contact writer should recall any additional pertinent information.
was interviewed, as pre-arranged, on the morning of December 20, 2006, at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agent (SA) and the nature of the interview, provided the following information:

advised USAMRIID IT services maintained no documentation which coherently placed a particular computer, at a particular location, at a particular date. further advised a computer in a hot suite that is scheduled for replacement is decontaminated by the hot suite personnel and brought to IT services. Once at IT services, files from the old computer are transferred to the replacement computer. advised these transferred files typically contain files which were saved to the root C-drive on the old computer. advised the best of knowledge, temporary internet files and cookies were not transferred. clarified, typically only documents saved onto the C-drive of the old computer were transferred to the new computer.

1. IT services received a ticket from USAMRIID employee, BRUCE IVINS, on July 19, 2001, with a request for IT services to set up a Macintosh computer, and for use in the hot suite. the IP address from IVINS’s office computer, located in Room 1425 and the MAC address of USAMRIID building 1425 was had no knowledge if was ever connected to the internet while in the hot suite.

2. Computer although currently in the hot suite in room was not always in the hot suite. On September

Investigation on 12/20/2006 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID Date dictated N/A

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On 12/20/2006, Page 2

11, 2002, and on November 21, 2002, was not in the hot suite, rather it was located in the suite, room. At some point it was moved from the suite, and on January 02, 2003, was located in the However, additional records dated March 14, 2003, placed in the suite. Finally, on July 02, 2003, records indicated would be taken into the suite to replaced a leased unit.

3. On September 02, 2003, was scheduled to be placed in the hot suite, room replaced a leased unit identified as and may be more knowledgeable. indicated that prior to September 02, 2003, there was leased computer, in the hot suite, room and which was previously not in any hot suite, replaced the leased unit. that indicated if was even located in the hot suite or connected to the internet during the September 11, 2001, time frame. had no direct knowledge as to what data, if any, was transferred from nor whether were internet connected computers. reiterated, to the best of recollection, a computer from a hot suite is decontaminated and brought to IT services and the files are transferred from the old computer to the new computer.

Attached hereto and considered part of this document are the agreed to contact the interviewing SA should recall any additional pertinent information.
**User ID** | 002073  
---|---  
**Login ID** | IvinsBE  
**First Name** | Bruce  
**Last Name** | Ivins  
**e-mail ID** | Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID  
**Phone** | 1425  
**Bldg** | 1425  
**Ext** |  
**Room** |  
**Call ID** | 00069073  
**Stopwatch** | 13:46  
**Status** | Closed  
**MMCN** |  
**F0599** |  
**IP 1** | 140.139.166.20  
**MMCN 2** | F1326  
**IP 2** | 140.139.165.179  
**MMCN 3** |  
**IP 3** |  
**MMCN 4** |  
**IP 4** |  
**USAMRIID Help Desk**

**Call Description**
Bruce would like MMCN E7380 Macintosh to be setup with USAMRIID applications and E-Mail profiles for Bruce will have all passwords in an envelope.

**Problem Type** | Workstation Related  
**User's sense of urgency** |  
**Module** | Setup/Inst/Conf  
**Item** | PowerMac  
**Call Type** | Macintosh  
**System** | Hardware  
**Origin** | USAMRIID  
**RIIDProject** | APC  

**Priority** | 2  
**First Closed (HD use only)** |  
**Check to Send Survey** |  

**Solution**
setup mac. added the persons who gave me a password. tests fine

**Tracker**

**Source** | Phone  
**Activity** |  
**Cause** | New Requirement  
**Chronology**

**Received by** | 07/19/2001 09:32:24am  
**Last Update** | 12/02/2002 02:19:52pm  
**Closed By** | 07/19/2001 11:33:09am

**Task Fees** | 0.00

**USAMRIID View**

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No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s)

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