On April 21, 2003, [redacted] was interviewed at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, provided the following information:

- took the agents on a walk through the areas [redacted] reviewed in detail the areas.
- From the perspective of looking through the crash door of Suite [redacted] a Biosafety Level (BSL) [redacted] primary laboratory work area was the office was [redacted] lab, where [redacted] used some equipment, was still looking through the crash door, the cold room was room on the right and the animal room was room on the left. Although these were the primary areas where

Investigation on 04/21/2003 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

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The agents were able to enter as it is a area. did not have the combination to the door to the suite nor the key to, however both were unlocked.

would everything on the laboratory bench in with the exception of the computer which was not in the room when worked there.

also worked in Building, however the agents would not have been able to see work area from

After the completion of the walk through Building and the agents met privately without to complete the interview.
Continuation of FD-302 of 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID on 04/21/2003

I does not recall being in the irradiation room. I thinks that the irradiation area is down either the or hallway and that has walked down that hallway and past the doorway to the irradiation room. Lab did send some items to be irradiated, but those items would have been taken to the Office of Radiation Safety first and then sent through that office to be irradiated.

I only knows of one lyophilizer at USAMRIID, the large lyophilizer in the hallway of Suite in Building IVINS manipulated most of the controls.

Anyone with access to or in the Bacteriology Division would have had access to the lyophilizer. People in other divisions at USAMRIID would have had to ask someone for access to the machine. This lyophilizer has never been in a hot suite.

does not have an automatic teller machine (ATM) card. Has a credit card number: does not recall making any large purchases during the fall of 2001.

provided the agents with several documents to illustrate whereabouts during September and October 2001. These documents are contained in the 1A envelope and are summarized as follows:
Seven checks including:

recalled two other areas of Building where had been during the time that the FBI's evidence was being examined.
On April 17, 2003, [date of birth] was interviewed at [place of employment] by Special Agent [FBI], and Postal Inspector [United States Postal Inspection Service]. After being advised of the identities of the investigators and the purpose of the interview, [name] provided the following information:

- resides at [address], and the telephone number is [phone number] in the Office at the [address] has held the current position since [date]
- worked at the [United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)] from [date]
- was a [position] of the [USAMRIID] and had access to Buildings [ ] and [ ] and was authorized to use the [suites].
- occupied the office rarely, but kept several of items in the room. [name] did not recall the room number, but indicated that room sounded correct.
- diagramed the setup of the office for the investigators. This diagram, signed and dated by [signature]
Continuation of FD-302 of _______________. On 04/17/2003. Page 2

maintained in a 1A envelop (FD-340). There were two telephones in the office, one on _______ desk and the other on _______ desk.

but had never spoken to _______ did not recall _______ ever using the telephones in office area.

did not recall the room numbers of the suites _______ utilized. Also worked occasionally of the _______ in Building _______ in laboratory space belonging to _______ and _______.

had multiple responsibilities during _______ tenure at USAMRIID.

maintained laboratory notebooks in the office area on the _______ floor of Building _______. Would document work on loose paper while inside the _______ suite, then later tape the pages in _______ notebook. _______ notebook was organized chronologically, thus documentation of the progress of each of _______ projects was intermingled.

The Special Pathogens Branch of the DSD maintained an archive of virtually all B.a. strains at USAMRIID in a -80°C freezer in a _______ suite, Building _______. Estimated that there were thousands of cryovials of primary stocks corresponding to the hundreds of B.a. strains in the archive. For each B.a. strain, there were at least 3-5 cryovials of primary original stock. These primary stocks were generated from cultures of the
original slants. The Special Pathogens Branch laboratory in Building____ was located _______ and the freezer was in the first room of the____ suite.____ did not recall the freezer being locked, but indicated that access to the suite was limited.

For those strains which were used most often, more vials of the primary stocks were maintained. B.a. Ames was used regularly as a virulent strain, thus several vials of primary stock were present in the archive. Of the thousands of cryovials of B.a. strains, ______ estimated that there were 80 or less tubes of Ames; no more than a cryovial box full.____ believed that the change in the notation on the B.a. Ames stocks from 'FTD1004' to 'BA1004' was part of the re-inventory process. To create more uniformity in the archiving system, the original coding of the stocks was changed and 'BA' used to represent 'Bacillus anthracis'.
Each cryovial of primary stock in the archive contained approximately 0.5 mL of material. A secondary stock of a given B.a. strain was generated from the corresponding primary stock; however, most of the vials in the archive were never used in this manner. To generate a secondary stock of a particular strain, a loop of approximately 10 microliters (µL) was pulled from a primary stock and cultured on either agar or broth media.

never worked with the original Ames slants and was not aware of how the Ames original slants were received by USAMRII. never saw any of the original Ames materials and was not sure if the primary stocks in the archive were derived directly from the original slant. had no knowledge of the B.a. Ames stocks generated by BRUCE IVINS and believed that IVINS was gone by the time that arrived at USAMRII and thought that he gave his B.a. Ames stocks to

described in detail the procedures for the shipping of pathogenic samples. The guidelines differed for the transport of virulent and avirulent organisms. For requests of virulent materials, such as B.a. Ames, regulations were followed, as defined by the Select Agents Program of the CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC). To receive Select Agents, the requester had to be registered with the CDC. Prior to shipment of the pathogenic materials, transfer paperwork, or EAI01 documents, were processed through the appropriate channels.
The predominant request was for B.a. Sterne, an avirulent strain, as this was a commonly used control in experimental research. Recalled sending both Ames and Vollum B.a. strains on occasion. Could not identify the facilities that requested B.a. Ames. Was funded through the DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA) and materials were often shipped to other facilities under the same DARPA program. Recalled the frequent exchange of materials with the UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND and a facility in CHICAGO. Was not sure whether these exchanges included B.a. Ames, but indicated that the UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND did not have Ames, nor the BSL laboratory capabilities to handle that type of pathogen.

The primary stocks of myriad B.a. strains were maintained in the Special Pathogens Branch suite in Building To generate a vial of material for transfer to another facility, typically, the amount prepared matched exactly the requested amount. Since B.a. Sterne was requested most frequently, extra vials of secondary stocks were sometimes prepared to fill future requests.

Due to the special packaging requirements of temperature sensitive materials, the procedure used to prepare requested materials for shipment was modified. Modifications included preparing multiple aliquots in excess of the amount requested and lyophilizing of these secondary stocks. The lyophilized materials could be maintained in the refrigerator or at room temperature. Transport was then possible without the additional temperature requirements.

There may have been two lyophilizers in Building used to dry samples for shipment. One lyophilizer was under
I could not recall, one way or the other, if lyophilized samples of B.a. Ames for shipment. I was sure that this procedure was used for shipments of B.a. Sterne and other organisms. I did not recall any requests for specific, or high, concentrations of organisms. Researchers typically wanted just enough to start a culture of their own.

Packaging and labeling of the pathogenic materials was in accord with the guidelines established by the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (DOT). Several layers of packaging were employed, including initial packaging of the materials, followed by placement in a can and outer box. EAI01 documentation was included along with the package and copies kept at USAMRIID. Files should remain at USAMRIID documenting all of the materials shipped by during tenure at USAMRIID.

____ contacted telephonically in December 2001, after the anthrax mailings and inquired if recalled preparing B.a. Ames from _______.

_______ told that ______ did not recall, but suggested that notebooks at USAMRIID would indicate what prepared and to which laboratories ______ sent samples. ______ mentioned that investigators were tracking all B.a. Ames materials at USAMRIID.

____ was aware that the
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA maintained B.a. Sterne and B.a. delta Ames, both avirulent strains. Most of the spore preparations were generated for personnel in the Special Pathogens Branch of the DSD. Spore preparations were also provided for DNA extractions by scientists conducting PCR experiments. Small amounts of spore material, 10 mL or less, were supplied for a given PCR study.
vaguely the room walk-in cooler, but did not remember utilizing the space for samples. The walk-in cooler may have been used to store laboratory supplies, such as agar plates, did not recall storing samples in the room cooler, but reminded the Investigators that was not in Building all that much. did not receive spore preparations from other scientists. 

did not recall making spore preparations for shipment to other facilities. did not recall sending out any B.a. Ames spore preparations. If bacterial spore preparations were sent out, they would have been shipped in liquid form.

could not identify by name other researchers at USAMRIID working with B.a. Ames.

did not recall seeing during tenure at USAMRIID never met and still does not know what looks like. Building was shared by the entire and the same people came and went in the hot suites. did not recall seeing anyone that did not belong. did not recall ever talking to on the telephone.
On March 3, 2003, the interviewee was interviewed at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, he provided the following information:

These documents are attached herein. SA photocopied the complete file, which is contained in a 1A envelope.

In September 2002, SA Baltimore FBI, requested a mini timeline for each letter. SA advised that the communication logs for the evidence have a lot of information about where the letters went, but the logs also have a lot of holes.

At this point in the interview, SA left the room to photocopy the Daschle letter case file.

The Daschle letter was given sample number SPS0257.07. The letter went in and out of Room during the time that

Investigation on 03/03/2003 at Fort Detrick, Maryland
File # 279A-WF-222936-302, 279A-BA-C101392 - Y62 Date dictated N/A V/N
by SA 3345

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the FBI was photographing it, but there is no documentation of this movement. There is also no documentation of the Daschle letter going to Room for examination by a Postal Inspector who was looking at the postal barcode. knows that the Daschle letter went into Suite and showed the Agents the handwritten chain of custody that documents the letter being handed over to BRUCE IVINS. was probably the person who irradiated the Daschle letter.

The Daschle letter was handled by the following individuals: IVINS FBI; and a Postal Inspector whose name could not recall. and both handled the letter in Suite and they both primarily worked alone with the letter.

The Daschle letter may have been handled by the following individuals:

The Post letter was given sample number SPS02.88.01A and was stored in Suite. The powder from the Post letter was given sample number SPS02.88.01B. The Post letter went to the office of Radiation and Safety on October 23, 2001.

The Post letter was handled by the following individuals:

The Post letter may have been handled by the following individuals:

The Leahy letter was given sample number SPS02.266.02A and the Leahy envelope was given sample number SPS02.266.02B. advised that a lot of preparation went into the work with the
Leahy letter because of lessons that were learned from working the Daschle letter.

The following individuals handled the Leahy letter:

The following individuals may have handled the Leahy letter:

The Brokaw letter and envelope were given sample number SPS02.044.02. The Brokaw letter was received at USAMRIID prior to the receipt of the Daschle letter. Advised that these photos all look like they were taken in

At this point in the interview, SA returned from photocopying the Daschle letter case file. There was not a lot of documentation of the work done with the Brokaw letter and that thinks someone "got in trouble" over it.
Continuation of FD-302

I grew B.a. on agar. A culture collection was kept of the hot side of Building [ ] for which people grew different strains of organisms.
These samples are stored in a freezer in the hallway near Room ___ in Building ___. Each tube is labeled as Bacillus anthracis with a BACI number or whichever genus it was. For example, Ames was labeled as BACI.008. Each tube was inventoried and if they were losing tubes they would have known. However, someone could have taken a tube, thawed it, plated it, and put the tube back.

In response to a question regarding whether there was any lab where a lot of B.a. could be grown without being noticed, advised that there are a lot of people who have their own rooms. gave the example of ___ who left in Suite __ for almost one year. The gossip at USAMRIID is that a lot of things went out the door during ___ when ___ was at USAMRIID,
279A-WF-222936-302, 279A-BA-C101392, 279A-WF-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 on 03/03/2003, Page 6,

[Redacted text]

thinks that directed that the Daschle letter be given to IVINS for spore concentration determination.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible Anthrax Exposures

1. Beginning on 15 October 2001, the Special Pathogens Sample Test Laboratory began processing environmental samples that may have been contaminated with purified or partially purified Bacillus anthracis spores. and I decided that the form of this threat was more dangerous than samples processed previously. Without comprehensive knowledge about the virulence of the threat, we were concerned that some employees may be inadequately protected and asked for a health survey of our employees by physicians from the Special Immunization Program. Some employees were placed on antibiotic prophylaxis as a conservative response. This action was not taken because of any particular "accident;" but to more aggressively survey our staff to protect their health and safety.

2. Beginning on 15 October 2001, all credible threat materials and powders were processed at in suite by training personnel.

3. The POC for this action is the undersigned at
On April 11, 2003, [Redacted] was interviewed telephonically at place of employment, the United State Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of the identity of the Agent and the purpose of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

During an interview on March 10, 2003, [Redacted] described the Bacillus anthracis (B.a.) Ames aerosol challenges conducted at USAMRIID during the 1997-1999 time frame. [Redacted] provided additional information regarding the post-challenge B.a. concentration determinations. [Redacted] believed that the post-challenge plating was conducted using Tryptic Soy Agar (TSA). BRUCE IVINS performed the plating and would know the type of agar used. The liquid collected by the All Glass Impingers (AGIs) during these challenge experiments was plated in rooms and of Building . All post-challenge plating has been conducted in these areas since the completion of Building renovations in 1996 or 1997. Prior to that time, researchers from the various USAMRIID divisions would plate the AGI liquids in their respective laboratories.

The post-challenge plates were typically placed in biohazard bags and additional plastic packaging after use. These bags were then taken to the basement for autoclaving. Due to the negative pressure and dry atmosphere in rooms and [Redacted] believed that the agar plates would dry out fairly quickly if left in the aerosol challenge laboratory after use.

Investigation on 04/11/2003 at Fort Detrick, Maryland (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated

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On April 29, 2003, [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the UNITED STATES ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), FORT DETRIC, MARYLAND (MD), telephone [redacted] by Special Agents (SAs) AND [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

---

1. Primary work areas are rooms [redacted] and [redacted] of Building [redacted] has also utilized rooms [redacted] and [redacted] in the basement, rooms [redacted] and [redacted] indicated these rooms on a floor plan of USAMRIID provided by the Agents. This floor plan is maintained in a [redacted] envelope (FD-340).

---

2. [redacted] recalled one lyophilizer, purchased in the mid 1980s, in Building [redacted] indicated that the MMCN number could be used to determine the exact purchase date. [redacted] was listed on the hand receipt corresponding to this instrument. The lyophilizer was located originally in room [redacted] then moved to room [redacted] in early 2001. Those with access to the containment facility in Building [redacted] no matter their division, had access to the lyophilizer. Personnel at USAMRIID would not notice if the lyophilizer was used at night or on the weekend.

---

3. [redacted] recalled that BRUCE IVINS, and other researchers no longer at USAMRIID also used the machine. [redacted] did not know what agents or materials were lyophilized by these scientists. Since the early 1990s, use of the instrument has been very infrequent. IVINS and [redacted] were the last to use the lyophilizer in the mid to late 1990s [redacted] did not know whether Bacillus anthracis (B.a.) had ever been dried using this lyophilizer. [redacted] indicated that tests to detect the presence of B.a. may yield negative results, as this lyophilizer has been decontaminated with paraformaldehyde.

---

Beginning in 1999, Medical Maintenance was contacted numerous times to diagnose problems with the lyophilizer.
provided the Agents with Automated Maintenance Request forms related to the maintenance of the lyophilizer. The original documents are maintained in a 1A envelope (FD-340). In May 2001, the lyophilizer was decontaminated, removed from the containment area of Building I and taken to LETTERKENNY, an Army depot for old equipment. A replacement lyophilizer was purchased and placed in room I. According to __________ the new lyophilizer has not been used. __________ came to USAMRIID in approximately __________ does not have hands-on experience with the B.a. organism. __________ has never cultured B.a. or produced B.a. spores.
In addition, may have obtained spores from or IVINS.

Piggy backing into the hot suites of Building has been nonexistent since the heightening of security measures following the terror attacks of 09/11/2001. Prior to that time, security around USAMRIID was more lax. At times, one person would gain access to the hot suite by entering a personal key code, open the door when given the green light, and allow the next person to follow into the suite without key code re-entry. There would be no record of the second person entering the suite, as exit from the suite required pushing a button, rather than entering a personalized key code. Piggy backing does occur throughout the cold side of USAMRIID, although it was more frequent prior to 09/11/2001.

 remembered from tenure at USAMRIID. knew who was and recalled exchanging casual 'hellos'. recognized and knew position and for whom worked.

did not do much to call attention to recalled seeing in the containment suite of Building between Buildings and , and at desk just off of the . In addition, recalled seeing work in room of Building.

knew of work only through was a working in the same group as . Most of knowledge of derived from gossip and stories told by caretakers and other individuals at USAMRIID. was a person of interest in the anthrax investigation, recalled that USAMRIID personnel were instructed not to 'mushroom this thing' by talking.

never discussed anthrax related issues with was not aware of any associations had with New Jersey, Princeton, storage facilities, or other companies. In
addition, [redacted] was unaware of any association of [redacted] with SENATOR DASCHLE, SENATOR LEAHY, or the NEW YORK POST. [redacted] had no personal knowledge of how [redacted] accessed the internet at USAMRIID, but indicated that there were a lot of ways [redacted] did not hear stories of chemical and biological warfare directly from [redacted] but recalled being told by caretakers and others of stories.

[redacted] had access to B.a. Ames, as did anyone with authorization to enter the hot side of Building [redacted]. It was common for the researchers in the building to be aware of which biological organisms were studied by others. [redacted] advised that if a person knew what he was doing, he would have an easy time of taking B.a. from USAMRIID. [redacted] did not store samples in room [redacted] did not recall seeing [redacted] in room [redacted]
Social Security Account Number was interviewed at place of employment, the UNITED STATES ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIONDISEASES (USAMRIID), FORT DETRICK, MARYLAND (MD), telephone AND by Special Agents (SAs) After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview, provided the following information:

- primary work areas are Suites and of Building and room on the cold side of Building. Bacteriology and animal studies are conducted in Suites and.
- On occasion, has used the microscope on Building on the cold side. indicated that piggy backing does occur throughout USAMRIID; however, has never seen it happen when personnel are entering the hot suites.

wears gloves in the laboratory when handling vials of bacteria and for any manipulation of organisms. is typically without gloves when retrieving chemicals and media from the shelves and when working with noninfectious materials. does not wear gloves when handles the following equipment: computers, telephones, microscopes and instrument controls.

has not used a lyophilizer during tenure at USAMRIID. maintains a lyophilizer in of Building. The instrument is accessible to everyone, as it is on the cold side of the suite. Before 09/11/2001, was not locked during the day, but was locked at night. The Principle Investigator (PI), IVINS in this case, would be contacted for permission to use the lyophilizer. never saw the lyophilizer in use and did not believe that it was ever located in a hot suite.
obtained wet B.a. Ames spores for the experiments from IVINS. IVINS' laboratory grew the spores in Leighton Doi liquid media, using a shaker and a three day incubation period in the dark.

At the conclusion of the experiments, autoclaved the B.a. Ames spores obtained from IVINS.

The spores for the project were obtained from IVINS and were grown in LB broth at 37°C in a small flask. Antibiotics were used to select clones with the GFP plasmid. The Ames stock obtained from IVINS was autoclaved.

made spores using non-virulent B.a. strains. The production method depended on the strain being used. SBA plates were used most often; however, B.a. Sterne was grown using
did not participate in opening the letters from the anthrax mailings of September and October 2001. I never handled any of the letters and did not conduct analyses on any of the materials obtained from the letters. BRUCE IVINS, were the principal players in the handling of the letter evidence.

I did not interact with while was at USAMRIID. The first time I recalled seeing was knowledge of was based on hearsay, rather than personal experience. I recalled
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/05/2003

Social security number [5] was interviewed at place of employment, UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland. Phone number [5] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [5] provided the following information:


[5] has never lyophilized Ba and does not know of anyone who has ever lyophilized live Ba spores. [5] The lyophilizer is manufactured by Virtis and came to USAMRIID in 2002. The USAMRIID identifier for the lyophilizer is MMCN number [5].

[5] This instrument is manufactured by Virtis and was purchased by USAMRIID in 1995. The other lyophilizer is located in Room [5] in Building [5] and was also manufactured by Virtis. This instrument came to USAMRIID in 1988. [5] believes that this lyophilizer was used to freeze-dry Ba spores produced by [5] and [5]. These spores were lyophilized on an old Virtis lyophilizer that is now located in Room [5]. According to [5] the Ba that was

Investigation on 05/01/2003 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated

by USPI

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Continuation of FD-302 of 

lyophilized contained only killed, irradiated spores. had no knowledge of anyone ever lyophilizing live Ba.

The laboratories in Building were always designated as "hot suites". Anyone who had access to these "hot suites" had access to the walk-in cooler in where 

[Redacted] does not recall any instances of any individuals who violated USAMRIID security protocol by improperly using their access badge or "piggy backing" into any part of the facility. never noticed any suspicious activity by any individuals and never saw any unauthorized personnel use any of equipment.

[Redacted] had only cursory knowledge of and did not associate with on a regular basis. never worked with and did not recall ever seeing in laboratory.
On April 23, 2003, social security account number [redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, provided the following information:

- did not handle the letters or envelopes from the mailings.

Piggybacking through doors around the institute is frequent, however there is not any piggybacking into hot suites because a key code is needed to enter them.


- left USAMRIID [redacted] after [redacted] began employment there. [redacted] did not know of any association that [redacted] may have had with New Jersey or with Princeton University. [redacted] never heard [redacted] make any comments about Senator Tom Daschle, Senator Patrick Leahy, Tom Brokaw, or the New York Post.

- had no knowledge of [redacted] discussing anthrax with anyone. [redacted] probably accessed the internet from [redacted] office at USAMRIID, and [redacted] did not know where [redacted] office was located.
279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of ____________________________ On 04/23/2003 Page 2

[Redacted] did not know where [Redacted] worked while at USAMRIID, nor where stored work materials.

The only lyophilizer at USAMRIID that [Redacted] knows of is located in the hallway of Suite [Redacted]; has never used that lyophilizer, and [Redacted] does not know how to operate it. It is used approximately one time per year. [Redacted] did not know if the lyophilizer had ever been in a hot suite. Anyone with access to Suite [Redacted] which would be everyone in the Division, has access to the lyophilizer. [Redacted] does not know of anyone outside the division who has access to the lyophilizer.

During the spring of 2001, Suite [Redacted] was shut down for renovation. [Redacted] has made a lot of B.a. Ames spore preparations. [Redacted] was trained to make spores using the Leighton Doi broth method only, provided the agents with a copy of the Leighton Doi protocol, which is included in the 1A envelope. [Redacted] provided the following description of how [Redacted] made Ames spore preparations:
Spores were transported from Building I to Building via a metal transport box that was decontaminated by bleach and ultraviolet light. IVINS transported the spores, and this was usually done as IVINS came in early to heat shock the spores.

A Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Safety Regulatory Form EA101 would be filled out and signed by the chain

of command at USAMRIID for shipment outside of USAMRIID. For movement inside USAMRIID, an internal document needed to be completed. B.a. could be shipped in either liquid or frozen form and had no knowledge of samples being lyophilized and shipped outside of USAMRIID.
On May 1, 2003, [redacted] was interviewed at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted] did not directly handle the letters, envelopes, or material from the Daschle, Leahy, Brokaw, or New York Post mailings. [Redacted] is currently working with the FBI as [redacted] very rarely works in the laboratory. The lab space occupied by [redacted] in Building [redacted] includes [redacted] There is some piggybacking through doors around the institute, however there should not be any piggybacking into hot suites. [Redacted] had no knowledge of the presence or location of any lyophilizers at USAMRIID.

[Redacted] does not think [redacted] has ever seen the original Bacillus anthracis (B.a.) Ames samples.

SUB 302 - 3453

Investigation on 05/01/2003 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A

by SA

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The group has not received Ames spores from outside sources. Ames stock is internal and initially came from either BRUCE IVINS or suite. The fully virulent B.a. Ames spore preps are stored in suite.
Piggybacking sometimes occurs through doorways at USAMRIID, but it does not happen in the hot suites because of security and safety reasons. _____ advised that one could "get in trouble" for piggybacking into a hot suite.

The only lyophilizer at USAMRIID that _____ was aware of is located in Suite _____ in Building _____ He advised that this lyophilizer is never used and thinks that it has always been located in Biosafety Level (BSL) _____ laboratory space. Anyone has access to the lyophilizer, as a badge is not needed to gain access to the area where it is located.

_____ advised that a speed vac, an instrument used to precipitate deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), can be used as an alternative to a lyophilizer for drying material. Speed vacs can only be used for very small samples, such as those that could be contained in an Eppendorf tube. An older speed vac is located in
Suite [redacted] but it does not work very well. A newer speed vac was brought into Suite [redacted] recently, and there are a number of speed vacs located throughout USAMRIID.

[redacted] began employment at USAMRIID in [redacted].

During the fall of 2001, [redacted] handled any of the letters, envelopes, or material from the Daschle, Leahy, Brokaw, or New York Post letters.

When the Daschle letter arrived at USAMRIID, [redacted] recalled that the text of the Daschle letter alarmed [redacted] as did the quantity and quality of the material. The material was extremely powdery. The large amount of material present, as well as the lack of clumping were evident when viewed through the microscope.

[redacted] worked with the Daschle letter in the hood in Suite [redacted] thinks that the Bacillus anthracis (B.a.) spores found
on the cold side through the IVINS' independent swabbing project were from the Daschle letter material.

There is a rule at USAMRIID that individuals are supposed to wear gloves when working in the hood. USAMRIID does not want people to wear gloves in the hallways or in other "grey areas".

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] has never seen the original B.a. Ames material and does not know where it is located.
Continuation of FD-302 of _________________________, On 04/24/2003, Page 4

does not ship B.a. Ames spores and does not share spore preps with anyone at USAMRIID. has not received any B.a. Ames spores from anyone within or outside the institute.

has not worked with _________________________

does not have access to Building because does not have the necessary vaccinations. Therefore has not stored any of material in the Room walk in cooler.

did not know _________________________ and has never spoken to _______ did not begin employment at USAMRIID until after had already left. has heard from people at USAMRIID that was seen at _________________________
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