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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/31/2003

On 07/25/2003, [redacted] date  
of birth: [redacted] social security account number: [redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] telephone: [redacted] residence: [redacted]  
[redacted], home telephone: [redacted] was  
interviewed by [redacted], Special Agent, Federal Bureau of  
Investigation, Washington Field Office, and [redacted] Postal  
Inspector, United States Postal Inspection Service, New Jersey  
Division. After Special Agent [redacted] and Postal Inspector [redacted] showed  
[redacted] their official identification and advised [redacted] of the  
purpose for the interview, [redacted] provided the following:

[redacted] worked at the United States Army Medical Research  
Institute of Infectious Diseases ("USAMRIID"), Fort Detrick,  
Maryland from [redacted] to [redacted] worked as a  
[redacted] in the [redacted] Division. His area of  
specialization was to [redacted]

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Investigation on 07/25/2003 at [redacted]  
File # 279A-WF-222936-POI-800 <sup>1198</sup>  
279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID; 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A  
by SA [redacted] Postal Inspector [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 07/25/2003, Page 2

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[redacted] was shown floor plans of buildings [redacted] and [redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted] highlighted the areas where [redacted] the Ames Ba spores were stored (Note: the floor plans [redacted] highlighted are filed in a 1A envelope (FD-340)). [redacted] identified three rooms in Suite [redacted] of the Bacteriology Division, a [redacted] suite, [redacted] rooms [redacted] and [redacted] Room [redacted] contained a walk in refrigerator [redacted] containing Ames Ba spore cultures. The temperature of the walk in cooler was 4° Celsius.

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[redacted] believes a freezer was located in this room. [redacted] Room [redacted] contained a pass through autoclave, used for sterilization, which was accessible from the outside hallway. The autoclave was large enough to hold tall carts full of dead animals.

[redacted] identified on the floor plan for building [redacted] a passage between Suite [redacted] and Suite [redacted] of the Bacteriology Division located between rooms [redacted] and [redacted]. Anyone who had access to Suite [redacted] also had access to Suite [redacted] and vice versa.

[redacted] could not remember which room [redacted] used as [redacted] primary lab. Bruce Ivins and [redacted] both Ph.D. level investigators used room [redacted] as their primary lab. This room contained a refrigerator and/or freezer where Ba was stored. A [redacted] (sp), [redacted] worked in suite [redacted] of the [redacted] Division. Also, [redacted] worked in suite [redacted] of the [redacted] Division. [redacted] and expert in Anthrax, worked primarily in suite [redacted] of the [redacted] Division. [redacted] may currently be working at the [redacted] worked in Suites [redacted] and [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 07/25/2003, Page 3

of the \_\_\_\_\_ Division. \_\_\_\_\_ cannot remember the room \_\_\_\_\_ primarily used. Rooms \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ were used as men's change rooms. Rooms \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ were used as women's change rooms. Room \_\_\_\_\_ was used as an office and had a desk for writing. \_\_\_\_\_ lab, room \_\_\_\_\_ had a refrigerator. Room \_\_\_\_\_ contained the animal cages; room \_\_\_\_\_ had a fermenter for growing large quantities of Ba cells. Room \_\_\_\_\_ was a laboratory not used for Ba work. Room \_\_\_\_\_ served as the walk in cold room. The two labs where Ba work primarily occurred were rooms \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ however, \_\_\_\_\_ does not recall who was assigned to room \_\_\_\_\_. These labs would have had a refrigerator or freezer or both.

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The Ames Ba, along with other strains of Ba, was stored in vials kept in several freezers and refrigerators in the \_\_\_\_\_ suites \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ in the \_\_\_\_\_ Division. Purified Ames Ba spore colonies could be maintained under refrigeration for years without decaying. Anyone with access to the \_\_\_\_\_ suites \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ in the \_\_\_\_\_ Division had access to anything stored in the freezers or refrigerators. When \_\_\_\_\_ left USAMRIID in \_\_\_\_\_, The \_\_\_\_\_ suites \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ in the \_\_\_\_\_ Division housed the stock of Ames Ba at USAMRIID.

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In 1978, \_\_\_\_\_ either keys or badges were needed for access to the \_\_\_\_\_ suites. Later swipe cards were introduced which were programed to restrict entry to designated suites.

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Someone could easily grow Ames Ba and label it Ba Vollum and no one would know the difference. Likewise, someone could take a swab of Ames Ba and grow as much Ames Ba as they desired in another lab. \_\_\_\_\_ did not remove any Ames Ba spores or vegetative cells with \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_ departed from USAMRIID.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 07/25/2003, Page 4

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There were not any contractors, subcontractors or outside lab assistants that worked with Ames Ba while [redacted] was at USAMRIID. All the staff working with Ames Ba were in house staff. In room [redacted] in the [redacted] Division, a large walk-in refrigerator was dedicated to the storage of [redacted] Ba culture collections. While at USAMRIID, neither [redacted] nor any other researcher released live strains of Ames Ba to another research facility. [redacted] would have had to authorize the release of Ba strains from USAMRIID to an outside facility.

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[redacted] did not work with a lyophilizer at USAMRIID. [redacted] was not aware of any freeze dried Ames Ba spores stored at USAMRIID while [redacted] worked there. However, the technique to weaponize Ames Ba would involve [redacted]

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[redacted] from USAMRIID,

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 07/25/2003, Page 5

had the most expertise in the weaponization of Ames Ba. It is likely that anyone else with expertise in weaponization would be a Ph.D. level microbiologist.

[redacted] was unaware of any areas at USAMRIID that had problems with bacterial contamination. The [redacted] suites [redacted] and [redacted] in [redacted] were under negative pressure. The air inside vented through a filtration system with hoods that employed a germicidal light and ultraviolet light. Bacterial DNA absorb the wavelengths of this type of light and die from the absorption.

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[redacted] did not work in building [redacted] at USAMRIID. Researchers in building [redacted] did "piggyback" into and out of the hot areas; however, they were protective of their workspace and only allowed close colleagues whom they regularly worked with to follow them into the hot suites. Visiting scientists were not allowed to enter the [redacted] suites during the time [redacted] worked at USAMRIID.

Anyone with access to the [redacted] suites in the [redacted] Division could have removed a sample of Ames Ba merely by taking a drop of Ames vegetative cells and sealing them in a small tube. The tube could be carried by hand out of the [redacted] suite or wrapped in foil and placed in the pass through box in Room [redacted], Suite [redacted]. The foil would protect the Ames Ba DNA from the harmful ultraviolet light in the pass through box.

[redacted] is not aware of anyone who said they might make Ba for improper use. Likewise, [redacted] is not aware of anyone with either access and/or the knowledge to create or handle Ba who expressed hostile attitudes toward the media, the United States Senate or the Democratic Party. [redacted] does not know anyone [redacted] believes or suspects was involved with the mailings of the anthrax letters. (Note: [redacted] described in a prior interview, dated 01/19/2002, how [redacted] believes the Ba was dried and prepared for the mailings in 2001). Rather, [redacted] thinks the attacks were foreign based because they are the opposite of the mission and goal of the researchers at USAMRIID to protect the armed services and the public through development of a vaccine. [redacted] is not aware of anyone he has worked with who was lax in handling Ba or who inappropriately expressed interest in biological agents convertible to weapons. Likewise, [redacted] is not aware of anyone at USAMRIID rumored to be interested in acquiring Ba, other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them. [redacted] is not aware of anyone who expressed an interest in undermining forensic

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 07/25/2003, Page 6

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techniques. [REDACTED] is not aware of any unofficial or unrecorded work involving Ba or its simulants.

Neither [REDACTED] nor [REDACTED] associates have any personal or professional association with Trenton, New Jersey, Princeton, New Jersey, or any where else in New Jersey. Neither [REDACTED] nor [REDACTED] associates traveled to New Jersey in September and October 2001.

The standard operating procedures for decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets first involved wiping them down with bleach or a similar phenol based disinfectant. Second, washing the surfaces with water to prevent corrosion from the bleach/disinfectant. Third, switching on the cabinet's built in ultraviolet lights.

[REDACTED] did not work in the [REDACTED] Division at USAMRIID and does not know whether paraformaldehyde or glutaraldehyde fumigation was used there. However, paraformaldehyde was used in the [REDACTED] Division in room [REDACTED]. A wall was knocked down in [REDACTED] to allow the moving of a fermenter too large to fit through the doorway. After the fermenter was in place, the wall was rebuilt and resealed, but paraformaldehyde was needed to decontaminate room [REDACTED] before it was ready for use. [REDACTED] has not smelled bacterial decontamination agents in the virology suites because [REDACTED] has not worked there; however [REDACTED] has smelled bacterial decontamination agents in room [REDACTED] in the bacteriology suites.

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[REDACTED] does not remember seeing or using any plastic storage containers to store his materials at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] numbered all [REDACTED] lab notebooks and all were inventoried. [REDACTED] left them all at USAMRIID when [REDACTED] left. [REDACTED] believes they should be archived at USAMRIID but does not know where they are currently stored. [REDACTED] believes they might be stored in the library.

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[REDACTED] has not purchased pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the anthrax mailings for either [REDACTED] or someone else's use. [REDACTED] remembers using metered envelopes at USAMRIID. Likewise, [REDACTED] has not used any vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes.

[REDACTED] has never had contact with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not personally host visiting foreign scientists at USAMRIID; however, during [REDACTED] tenure there, most of the foreign visitors were from England. Security personnel

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maintained a logbook record of foreign visitors. Foreign visitors to USAMRIID were escorted at all times. They were not permitted access to any hot suites or locations where Ba was stored or utilized. As a result, there were not any opportunities for them to remove samples undetected. [REDACTED] is not aware of any foreign visitors requesting samples of any kind from USAMRIID. The Director's office coordinated all foreign visits to USAMRIID. [REDACTED] does not remember any foreign visitors displaying interest in the Ames strain of Ba, weaponization techniques or lyophilizing methods. Foreign visitors only had access to the conference room. They did not stay long enough to undergo the required series of vaccinations and background investigation to obtain a security clearance.

[REDACTED] never observed any foreign visitors using pre-stamped envelopes resembling the envelopes in the anthrax mailings. No foreign visitors to USAMRIID asked [REDACTED] where they could purchase pre-stamped envelopes in Frederick during their visit. [REDACTED] does not remember any foreign visitors expressing anti-American sentiments during their visit.

[REDACTED] was asked to account for [REDACTED] whereabouts during September 17 and 18, 2001. In turn, [REDACTED] provided copies of e-mails [REDACTED] sent during work on Monday, September 17, 2001, at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED] was asked to account for [REDACTED] whereabouts during October 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, 2001. In turn, [REDACTED] provided copies of e-mails [REDACTED] sent during work on Friday, October 5, 2001, at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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The copies of e-mails  provided are filed in a 1A (FD-340) envelope.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 06/12/2003

On June 6, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] was  
interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the UNITED STATES ARMY  
MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), [redacted]  
PORTER STREET, FORT DETRICK, MARYLAND (MD), 21702, telephone [redacted]  
[redacted] by Special Agents (SAs) [redacted] AND [redacted]  
[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing  
Agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the  
following information:

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[redacted] at  
USAMRIID, was queried regarding microorganism decontamination  
technologies and their effects on subsequent characterization  
analyses. [redacted]  
telephone [redacted] and [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone [redacted] also  
participated in the discussion.

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[redacted]

Sodium hypochlorite, a primary component of household  
bleach, denatures proteins via oxidation. Destruction of bacterial  
spores and degradation of DNA result from contact with ~5-10%  
household bleach. DNA has been detected using polymerase chain  
reaction (PCR) techniques pursuant to treatment of bacterial spores  
with bleach. Hydrogen peroxide is a strong oxidizer, known to  
cleave peptide bonds.

DNA AWAY, a caustic oxidant produced commercially, also  
destroys proteins and DNA. The effectiveness of decontamination  
with bleach, DNA AWAY and similar commercial products may be  
reduced if additional organic molecules and proteins are present  
along with the microorganisms. These additional molecules may bind  
up the decontaminating agent, thus hindering interactions with the  
target microorganisms.

Protein denaturation is the primary mechanism of  
inactivation by formaldehyde gas. Specifically, formaldehyde  
interacts with amine groups and affects carbamide linkages.  
Positive hits with PCR have been obtained after decontamination;  
however, a detectable PCR signal could require ridding the sample

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132 [redacted] .302

Investigation on 06/06/2003 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

23 File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 1218

SA [redacted]  
by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/06/2003, Page 2

of excess formaldehyde. [REDACTED] recalled a study conducted by [REDACTED] LNU and [REDACTED] (phonetic) using tissue embedded with West Nile virus and paraffin. The aim of the project was to determine the effectiveness of DNA extraction following formalin fixation of the tissue. This method of decontamination did not hinder subsequent DNA amplification; however, proteins within the tissue were affected. A methodology was developed which facilitated the release of formaldehyde from tissue using organic reagents.

Oxidation and halogenation of bacterial spores result from exposure to chlorine dioxide gas. Chlorine binds to cellular components yielding inactivation of proteins and enzymes required for cellular growth. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has researched extensively the use of chlorine dioxide as a decontaminant.

The intensity of gamma irradiation used for decontamination is typically not enough to nick strands of DNA. However, exposure to gamma rays may damage the DNA and decrease the sensitivity of PCR techniques. Significant amounts of radiation would be necessary to completely abolish a PCR signal. Generally, the degree of DNA chopping depends on the extent and intensity of exposure. DNA has also been shown to survive the autoclaving method of decontamination.

Latent fingerprints are lipid imprints which may be destroyed by alcohols, detergents and physical wiping. Gamma irradiation was not known to affect the detection of latent fingerprints. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were not aware of studies to determine the effects of formaldehyde vapor, chlorine dioxide, and hydrogen peroxide on the detection of latent fingerprints.

Bacterial spores are more resistant than vegetative cells to decontamination efforts. Generally, the effectiveness of disinfection depends on the concentration of the decontaminant and the length of exposure. Often, post-decontamination analyses yield negative culture results and positive PCR hits. These results indicate the absence of detectable levels of viable microorganisms, but the presence of characteristic DNA. When testing for the presence of microorganisms, it is important to test first for viability via culturing, followed by confirmation analyses using PCR.

[REDACTED] indicated that SA [REDACTED] was familiar with post-decontamination tests of biosafety cabinets treated with

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/06/2003, Page 3

bleach. Swipes of biosafety cabinets following decontamination yielded no growth on culture media, but detectable levels of pX01 and pX02 in some samples. A study was conducted whereby pre-decontamination sampling was used to identify the 'hottest', or most contaminated, areas in a biosafety cabinet. Detectable levels of DNA were obtained from these areas after decontamination with bleach.

The following USAMRIID personnel may provide further insights into the impact of various decontamination methods on subsequent scientific analyses: BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Internet searches may yield additional information related to decontamination of biological materials, including diagrams of key mechanisms of inactivation.

[REDACTED] provided the Agents with a manuscript containing an overview of decontamination technologies and descriptions of the mechanisms of action of numerous decontaminants on microorganisms. The document, titled DECONTAMINATION, was co-authored by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] SCIENCE

APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (SAIC), NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE AT FREDERICK, FORT DETRICK, MARYLAND, 21702, telephone [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The manuscript is maintained in a 1A envelope (FD-340) [REDACTED] also recommended the following textbook as a useful reference: DISINFECTION, STERILIZATION, AND PRESERVATION, 5th edition, Seymour S. Block, Editor, Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 2001. Photocopies of the first two pages of the textbook were provided to the Agents and are maintained in a 1A envelope.

The Agents were also provided with copies of USAMRIID'S records of transfers of *Bacillus anthracis* that occurred from 1997 through 1999, as requested in a letter dated June 5, 2003, from SSA [REDACTED] The EA101 forms provided by USAMRIID are maintained in a 1A envelope.

alta

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 09/14/2003

On September 11, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted], social security/account number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), located at Fort Detrick, Maryland 21702, work telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] felt that [redacted] was given misleading information regarding [redacted] polygraph examination. [redacted] advised that the individual who contacted [redacted] to schedule the exam said that USAMRIID had requested that [redacted] be polygraphed for reliability issues. [redacted] knew that others had similar experiences when contacted by polygraphers, and that many of them complained to [redacted] Commander of USAMRIID, about the situation. [redacted] was polygraphed on the same day as [redacted] and had the same problem.

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[redacted] provided the agents with a copy of [redacted] curriculum vitae (c.v.) which listed [redacted] home address as [redacted] home telephone [redacted] c.v. is maintained in a 1A envelope, FD-340.

[redacted] educational history, as outlined in [redacted] c.v., is as follows: [redacted] obtained his Bachelor of Science degree in [redacted] from the University of [redacted] in [redacted] his Master of Science degree in [redacted] from [redacted] University in [redacted] and his Doctor of [redacted] in [redacted] and [redacted] from the University of [redacted]

[redacted] employment history, as outlined in [redacted] c.v., is as follows:

[redacted]

Investigation on 09/11/2003 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID/279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

[redacted] 302  
[redacted]  
[redacted] Y/N [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 09/11/2003, Page 2

[redacted]

[redacted] did not work with either the Brokaw or New York Post letters, although [redacted] recalls seeing material from the Brokaw letter.

[redacted]

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[redacted] knew that [redacted] had handled the Daschle and Leahy letters, but [redacted] did not see anyone else work with the letters. [redacted] recalled [redacted] clearing people out of the lab prior to working with one of the letters.

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[redacted] The FBI photographed the letters in the Veterinary Medicine room across the hallway from [redacted]. [redacted] advised that there were flat tables in the Veterinary Medicine room that were ideal for photographing the evidence. [redacted] recalled that the letters were contained in double ziploc bags while being photographed. This activity took place after normal business hours, and [redacted] a number of technicians, and many FBI personnel were present at the time.

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During the fall of 2001, [redacted] primary work areas included the following: Building [redacted], Suite [redacted] Suites [redacted] and [redacted], Rooms [redacted] and [redacted] and the Clinical Lab sub; as well as the hot side of Building [redacted]. At that time, [redacted] anthrax studies with monkeys using B.a. obtained from [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 09/11/2003 , Page 3

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BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] only in a professional manner. They interacted at meetings, and chatted in the hallways about work and general topics, such as weekend activities. [REDACTED] was working on an Ebola project at that time, and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] never collaborated on projects. After [REDACTED] left the [REDACTED] Division, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] only exchanged greetings. [REDACTED] thought that their last conversation would have been around 1998. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of who [REDACTED] may have socialized with at USAMRIID.

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[REDACTED] did not recall [REDACTED] mentioning either New Jersey or [REDACTED] never made any comments about Senator Tom Daschle, Senator Patrick Leahy, the New York Post, or Tom Brokaw. [REDACTED] never discussed anthrax with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] only knew [REDACTED] in a virology context. [REDACTED] did not recall [REDACTED] discussing biological or chemical warfare.

[REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] but did not provide any details as to [REDACTED] work. [REDACTED] advised that it was difficult to distinguish what [REDACTED] actually told [REDACTED] from what was circulated around USAMRIID or in the media.

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[REDACTED] did not recall seeing [REDACTED] in Building [REDACTED] although [REDACTED] did see [REDACTED] in Building [REDACTED] near Suite [REDACTED] and in the [REDACTED] Division Administration area. [REDACTED] at USAMRIID, had a laboratory in Building [REDACTED] and therefore [REDACTED] may have worked in that laboratory space.

[REDACTED] learned about the history of B.a. Ames at USAMRIID after the anthrax mailings of 2001 had already taken place. [REDACTED] thought that Ames was sent in by an investigator in Iowa and isolated at USAMRIID.

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[REDACTED] a series of experiments in approximately 1998 to determine at what point B.a. could be isolated from an infected animal. Washed B.a. Ames spores obtained from IVINS were provided directly to the [REDACTED] group for the study, and IVINS conducted the quality control for the experiments. [REDACTED] laboratory group handled the spores, as well as all of the samples, after the exposures had taken place. [REDACTED] provided the agents

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[REDACTED] a reprint documenting this work in *Military Medicine*, Volume 164, December 1999, and titled "Comparison of Noninvasive Sampling Sites for Early Detection of *Bacillus anthracis* Spores from Rhesus Monkeys after Aerosol Exposure" on which the lead author was MAJOR ALEC S. HAIL. This scientific paper is maintained in the 1A envelope, FD-340.

During the same time frame in 1998, the walk-in cold room in Suite [REDACTED] was used to store *B.a.* Ames spores which had been obtained from IVINS. These spores were used in studies where human white blood cells were exposed in order to find early markers of infection.

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[REDACTED] always obtained *B.a.* spores from IVINS, as no one in [REDACTED] laboratory group grew spores.

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[REDACTED] IVINS spores were stored in a mixture of phenol and water. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not distribute or share any of IVINS *B.a.* Ames spores beyond [REDACTED] branch of [REDACTED], nor has [REDACTED] ever sent *B.a.* outside of USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of anyone at USAMRIID who has lyophilized live *B.a.* Ames. In [REDACTED] only dead *B.a.* Ames is lyophilized. The Special Pathogens Sample Test Laboratory (SPSTL) prepared dead, lyophilized *B.a.* spores of various strains for use as controls, [REDACTED]. These lyophilized spores were requested through [REDACTED]. [REDACTED], the SPSTL was beginning to initiate a complete set of paperwork, including a request form, to document such transfers; however some transfers may not have been documented. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would have information on the lyophilized spores.

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of [REDACTED] protocols for producing *B.a.* spores, and has never expressed an opinion regarding whether the *B.a.* contained in the 2001 mailings was broth or agar grown.

With regard to a list of foreign visiting scientists to USAMRIID [REDACTED] provided the following information: [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 09/11/2003, Page 5

[redacted]  
[redacted] First Name Unknown (FNU) [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] all visited USAMRIID for short meetings, and would not have had access to any laboratory spaces. Their access was limited to USAMRIID's conference rooms.

[redacted] of [redacted] visited USAMRIID for a couple of weeks in 2000 and worked in a cold laboratory on Electrochemiluminescence (ECL) antigen detection assays. [redacted] had an unescorted visitor pass, and did not have access to any "hot" laboratory spaces. [redacted] likely had the most contact with [redacted] while [redacted] was at USAMRIID. [redacted] may have taken some antibodies back to [redacted] with [redacted] however [redacted] did not transport any select agents upon [redacted] return.

[redacted] did not discuss anthrax with [redacted] and [redacted] did not work with any bacteria while [redacted] was at USAMRIID. [redacted] did not express any anti-American sentiment during [redacted] visit, nor did [redacted] ask about, or have in his possession, any pre-stamped envelopes. [redacted] most likely worked in Building [redacted] Rooms [redacted], and [redacted] Two lyophilizers were present in these rooms; however [redacted] would not have had access to these instruments.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] provided the agents with a copy of a list of [redacted] archived, received electronic mail for September 17 and 18, 2001, which is maintained in a 1A envelope, FD-340. Although [redacted] archives all of [redacted] sent electronic mail, [redacted] does not have those records for August or September of 2001. [redacted] thought that those months may have been lost during the time when there was a problem with one of the servers at USAMRIID.

[redacted] also provided the agents with a copy of [redacted] electronic calendar for the week of September 17-23, 2001, which is maintained in a 1A envelope, FD-340. Although there is one meeting

279A-WF-222936-302, 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/11/2003, Page 6

indicated for [REDACTED] on September 17, 2001, [REDACTED] could not recall if [REDACTED] attended due to [REDACTED] extensive work schedule at that time. [REDACTED] can verify that [REDACTED] was present at work during that time period.

[REDACTED] provided the agents with a copy of [REDACTED] electronic calendar for the period of October 1-14, 2001, which is maintained in a 1A envelope. Although there are appointments and activities listed for October 5-9, 2001, [REDACTED] could not be sure that [REDACTED] attended them due to [REDACTED] busy work schedule. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED] on October 6, 2001, however [REDACTED] was not certain that [REDACTED] attended [REDACTED] on October 7, 2001, as [REDACTED] may have worked at USAMRIID instead.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/16/2003

[redacted] DOB [redacted], SSN [redacted]  
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted]  
[redacted], was interviewed at the Amerithrax-3 Offsite in  
Frederick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided  
the following information:

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[redacted] received his PHD in Biology from [redacted]  
University [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] worked various places  
including [redacted] and the University of [redacted]  
[redacted]

While working at the University of [redacted] was  
assigned to a [redacted]  
[redacted] has never produced spores  
or dried any controlled substance.

[redacted] began working at the United States Army Medical  
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) on [redacted]  
[redacted] From [redacted] until approximately [redacted] worked for the  
[redacted]. While in the [redacted], [redacted]  
worked [redacted] of building [redacted] in room [redacted] and [redacted]  
worked with [redacted]

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[redacted] (ph) was responsible for [redacted]  
[redacted]

In [redacted] was moved to the [redacted]  
Currently [redacted] works on [redacted] building  
[redacted] is working with [redacted]

[redacted] The lab that [redacted] is

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b7E

Investigation on 10/16/03 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID <sup>246</sup> 279BA-C101392-1234 Date dictated 10/16/03

by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

[redacted] Y.N. [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 10/16/03, Page 2

currently working in is secured by a manual push button combination lock.

While at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] was immunized against Botulinum

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] does not have access to [REDACTED] labs or building [REDACTED] has never worked with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba).

[REDACTED] attends [REDACTED] meetings. During these meetings some individuals discuss their research and because of that fact, [REDACTED] has become familiar with names of some of the individuals who work with Ba including: Bruce Ivins, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (ph). [REDACTED] is also aware that [REDACTED] works with Ba. [REDACTED] has never discussed Ba with anyone at USAMRIID.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] does not have any personal or professional contacts in New Jersey. Occasionally, [REDACTED] has passed through New Jersey on the way to New York, but [REDACTED] does not recall going to New York close to September 11, 2001. Additionally, [REDACTED] does not know anyone that works at USAMRIID that has personal or professional contacts in New Jersey.

[REDACTED] has occasionally seen piggybacking through some of the doors at USAMRIID but advised that it is not supposed to occur.

[REDACTED] has never seen or used pre stamped envelopes. Additionally, [REDACTED] has never used or seen large sterilite containers at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] does not know anyone at USAMRIID that appears to be unstable or has discussed using any agent inappropriately. [REDACTED] does not discuss politics with [REDACTED] colleagues and has never heard anyone discussing the anthrax mailings.

[REDACTED] knew that Ba samples were going to be tested at USAMRIID however, [REDACTED] did not know that the letters were at

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 10/16/03, Page 3

USAMRIID. [redacted] did not play any role regarding the samples or letters.

[redacted] has never had a foreign visitor come to see [redacted] but [redacted] has attended lectures given by foreign scientists. [redacted] has never seen an unescorted foreign visitor and advised that they are not allowed into the laboratories.

[redacted] never saw, met or talked to [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/03/20033

To: Washington Field

Attn: SA [redacted] AMX 2  
SA [redacted] AMX 1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

From: Washington Field  
AMX 3

Contact: [redacted] Postal Inspector

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-POI (Pending)-838  
279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending)-255

Title: AMERITHRAX  
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: Report results of investigation to date regarding

Details: [redacted] has been investigated in captioned case based upon her work with and access to Bacillus anthracis (Ba).

[redacted] is a [redacted] and has been employed with the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases since [redacted] has physical access to the "hot suites" and has participated in aerosol challenges using Ba. [redacted] also received pipets of solutions from BRUCE IVINS which [redacted] spread on agar plates. [redacted] believed the solutions contained Ba although [redacted] does not know the strain.

As per FD-302, date July 28, 2003, [redacted] has no knowledge where Ba is stored at USAMRIID and has no expertise in weaponization techniques. [redacted] has not traveled to New Jersey and has no friends or relatives residing in that state.

A review of [redacted] telephone and financial records for calendar year 2001 were unremarkable and show no connection to New Jersey.

Time-line First Mailing (5:00 P.M., 9/17/2001 through 8:00 p.m., 9/18/2001)

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[redacted]  
Y\_N  
[redacted]

[redacted]

EC

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 10/03/20033

A time line of [redacted] activities for the likely periods of the mailings of the anthrax letters from Princeton, New Jersey was compiled using USAMRIID security key card access, telephone and credit card use records. The time line focused on any [redacted] hour period for which [redacted] would be unaccounted, with the premise that it takes [redacted] hours to drive round trip from [redacted] to [redacted]

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A review of [redacted] USAMRIID key card building access records reveal that on September 17, 2001 [redacted] entered building [redacted] at [redacted] hours and remained at work until [redacted] [redacted] On September 18, 2001, [redacted] entered building [redacted] at [redacted] hours and remained at work until [redacted] hours.

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A review of phone records for telephone/account number [redacted] subscriber [redacted] disclose that on September 17, 2001, at [redacted] an outgoing telephone call was made from [redacted] home telephone to [redacted] On September 18, 2001, at [redacted] an outgoing telephone call was made from [redacted] home telephone to [redacted] was interviewed in July 2003 and stated [redacted]

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[redacted] According to [redacted]  
[redacted]

A review of [redacted] credit card account history did not show any credit card transactions during the period of the first mailing.

**Time-line Second Mailing (3:00P.M., 10/6/2001 through 11:00A.M., 10/09/2001)**

A review of [redacted] credit card account history disclosed that on [redacted] transactions occurred in [redacted]

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A review of [redacted] home telephone records disclose that on October 8, 2001 at [redacted] an outgoing telephone call was made from [redacted] home to [redacted]

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On October 9, 2001, key card building access records reveal [redacted] was at USAMRIID, and entered building [redacted] at [redacted] hours and exited at [redacted] hours.

[redacted] has been interviewed on several occasions related to the investigation. Investigation to date has revealed no direct, testimonial, or circumstantial evidence which

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 10/03/20033

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indicates that [redacted] was involved in the preparation or mailing of the anthrax-laced letters.

[redacted] was interviewed about [redacted] work with Ba. in January 2002. [redacted]

[redacted]

♦♦

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/03/2003

On October 2, 2003, [redacted] born [redacted] with Social Security Account [redacted] current address [redacted] telephone number [redacted] was interviewed by Postal Inspector [redacted] and Postal Inspector [redacted] at the FBI Amerithrax III office in Frederick, Maryland. After being advised of the purpose of the interview and the identity of the interviewing Inspectors, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] works at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) as a [redacted] works in the [redacted] Division under [redacted]

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[redacted] received his Bachelor of Science Degree in [redacted] and his PhD in [redacted] from the University of [redacted] [redacted] started at USAMRIID on [redacted]

[redacted] now works in Labs [redacted] and [redacted] in building [redacted]. Prior to the September 2001 anthrax mailings [redacted] had only entered the [redacted] lab to assist in [redacted] [redacted] was decontaminated and the equipment was moved to [redacted] BRUCE IVINS had swabbed outside the suites and found anthrax spores. [redacted] was not sure what strain was discovered outside the labs. However, due to this discovery, [redacted] was taken down and decontaminated. The decontamination process was accomplished by [redacted] BRUCE IVINS, [redacted] and [redacted]

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[redacted] was aware that there were Ames spores stored in the walk-in coolers/freezers between labs [redacted] and [redacted] during the decontamination process. [redacted] knew that anthrax was stored in both liquid and frozen forms in the coolers. The materials in the coolers were moved from [redacted] to [redacted] during the cleaning process.

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Investigation on 10/3/2003 at Frederick, Maryland  
File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated n/a  
by [redacted] Postal Inspector [redacted]  
[redacted], Postal Inspector

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 10/3/2003, Page 2

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was not aware of any piggybacking into suites. The security officer, [REDACTED] is extremely cautious in terms of security.

[REDACTED] did not do any work in the [REDACTED] suites. In order to work in building [REDACTED] a scientist must have extensive vaccinations.

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[REDACTED] does not have any persons in mind concerning the mailing of the anthrax letters. [REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED] nor did [REDACTED] recall if they had ever met.

[REDACTED] stated that the whole anthrax field benefitted after the anthrax mailings. There was very little interest in the field, until after the anthrax mailings. [REDACTED] benefitted from the aftermath. [REDACTED] stated that unlike the cutting edge research on [REDACTED] anthrax is hard to work with. [REDACTED] chose to work at USAMRIID under [REDACTED] for better pay.

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[REDACTED] has never used a lyophilizer at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] was aware of one located in the cold side of the lab [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] has never used it. [REDACTED] did use a lyophilizer in graduate school.

[REDACTED] has never worked with dry anthrax spores. [REDACTED] is not aware of any studies at USAMRIID that involved dry spores. [REDACTED] is involved in using wet spores by injecting them into the test animals.

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[REDACTED] was shown a number 6 pre-stamped envelope. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] did not recall seeing one of the envelopes.

[REDACTED] examined a copy of the layout of USAMRIID building [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] suites contained walk-in coolers used for storing anthrax.

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[REDACTED] does not know anyone that lives in New Jersey. [REDACTED] passed through New Jersey two years ago on the way to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was not sure what year [REDACTED] traveled. The first year when [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] traveled to [REDACTED] they spent the night in a motel. The next year they

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/3/2003, Page 3

also traveled to \_\_\_\_\_ but returned the same day. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ traveled to \_\_\_\_\_ New Jersey during the summer of 2002 and \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ has not hosted any foreign visitors at USAMRIID.

\_\_\_\_\_ agreed to take a polygraph examination regarding the anthrax mailings.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

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Date of transcription 10/10/2003

On October 10, 2003, [redacted], born [redacted]  
[redacted] with Social Security Account Number [redacted] at [redacted]  
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted]  
was interviewed by Postal Inspector [redacted] and Postal  
Inspector [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment the United States  
Army Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After  
being advised of the purpose of the interview and the identity of  
the interviewing Inspectors, [redacted] provided the following  
information:

(A) (B)

[redacted] has worked at USAMRIID since [redacted] From [redacted]  
to [redacted] worked in [redacted] as an  
[redacted] returned to USAMRIID in [redacted]  
as a [redacted]  
[redacted] currently works in the [redacted] Division in  
the Department of [redacted] under [redacted] the Branch  
Chief.

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[redacted]

[redacted] work with anthrax was mainly [redacted]  
[redacted] while [redacted] was in [redacted] Since [redacted]  
[redacted] has worked [redacted] with viruses. [redacted]  
responsibilities include [redacted]  
[redacted] works at the direction of  
the Principle Investigators.

[redacted] is not familiar with processes for drying  
anthrax or working with a lyophilizer. [redacted] believes that  
BRUCE IVINS, [redacted] and [redacted] are the ones that would  
know how to weaponize anthrax.

While [redacted] was [redacted] worked in the labs  
where animals were used. Since [redacted] has worked in building  
[redacted] rooms [redacted] and [redacted] has access to the hot suites in  
building [redacted] and [redacted] is familiar with building [redacted]  
the walk-in coolers in room [redacted] the cold storage refrigerator in  
room [redacted] and the cold storage room in the basement. [redacted]

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Investigation on 10/10/2003 at Frederick, Maryland

258 File # 279A-WF-222936- [redacted] 701  
279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID/ 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated n/a

Y N

by [redacted] Postal Inspector [redacted]  
[redacted] Postal Inspector [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 10/10/2003 , Page 2

[REDACTED] said that in the basement there are a lot of freezers. Each freezer has a list of contact names if there is a problem with the cold storage. A person could determine if any anthrax was stored there by locating the contact person. Up until recently there were no locks on the freezers.

[REDACTED] believes that it would be easy to remove bio-agents from USAMRIID. The agents are stored in vials. They could be double bagged, decontaminated and taken out through the Airlock, via a pass box or hand carried out through the shower. [REDACTED] is not aware of anyone piggy-backing into the suites, but [REDACTED] surmised that it could be done.

[REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] while [REDACTED] worked in USAMRIID. [REDACTED] had seen [REDACTED] in buildings [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] knew that [REDACTED] was authorized to enter all areas of the facility. On occasions, [REDACTED] did work for [REDACTED] while [REDACTED] was in [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was located near [REDACTED] former office. [REDACTED] currently works in the office where [REDACTED] used to work, however they never worked in the office at the same period.

[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] was a good worker. [REDACTED] appeared to work hard and seemed bright. [REDACTED] never heard [REDACTED] express any anti-government views. [REDACTED] never heard [REDACTED] talk about anthrax.

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[REDACTED] last saw [REDACTED] at USAMRIID around February 2001. [REDACTED] was working in [REDACTED], Room [REDACTED]. When [REDACTED] exited the lab, [REDACTED] was in the hall with a tour group. [REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] was wearing [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] There was a military man and a person in a suit with him. [REDACTED] was surprised to see [REDACTED] since [REDACTED] knew that [REDACTED] had left USAMRIID and [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] what he was doing there. [REDACTED] replied that [REDACTED] could not tell [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was wearing a visitor's badge. [REDACTED] did not recognize anyone who [REDACTED] was with and did not recall the rank of the military man.

[REDACTED] would tell stories that [REDACTED] found hard to believe. [REDACTED] was in the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would stop by and talk. On one occasion [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] and soon after told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]. This caused [REDACTED] to suspect [REDACTED]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 10/10/2003, Page 3

stories so [ ] would just go [ ] way and disregard what [ ] said.

[ ] has heard rumors about [ ] around USAMRIID

[ ]

[ ] has never hosted foreign visitors at USAMRIID.  
[ ] has never purchased or seen #6 prestamped envelopes. [ ]  
said that [ ] was not involved in the anthrax mailings.

[ ] does not have any connections to New Jersey and  
did not travel to New Jersey in 2001. [ ]  
[ ] returned to USAMRIID on  
[ ]

[ ] agreed to take a polygraph examination regarding  
the anthrax mailings.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 09/25/2003

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On September 25, 2003, [redacted] born [redacted]  
[redacted] with Social Security Account Number [redacted] at [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted]  
[redacted], office telephone number [redacted] was interviewed by  
Postal Inspector [redacted] and Postal Inspector [redacted]  
at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Research  
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised  
of the identity of the interviewing Inspectors and the purpose of  
the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] is the [redacted] in the  
[redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted] started at  
USAMRIID [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] earned her Masters Degree in [redacted]  
from [redacted] in [redacted]

According to [redacted] is the anthrax specialist  
within the [redacted] When the Daschle letter arrived at USAMRIID,  
[redacted] USAMRIID wanted to make sure that  
everything was done correctly on the letter. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] returned to USAMRIID on [redacted]  
[redacted] worked up to [redacted] hours per day and tested up  
to 100 potential bio-hazard samples per day. At first they were  
testing for many different agents. After the anthrax letters were  
discovered they began testing for anthrax. [redacted]  
[redacted] worked extra hours during September to November 2001 and  
received over-time for the extra work.

Investigation on 9/25/2003 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID <sup>2165</sup> 279A-BA-C101392 <sup>1248</sup> Date dictated n/a

by [redacted] Postal Inspector [redacted]  
[redacted], Postal Inspector [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 9/25/2003, Page 2

[REDACTED]

In September 1999, [REDACTED] a study to determine the diagnostics of anthrax exposure. The study exposed monkeys to anthrax to see where they could detect anthrax exposure before the monkeys became deathly ill. BRUCE IVINS and [REDACTED] provided the anthrax spores to the [REDACTED] Division to infect the monkeys. [REDACTED] were also involved in the study. [REDACTED] was also involved, but [REDACTED] did not actually participate in the experiment. There was no dry powder anthrax used in the study. [REDACTED] informed that the aerosolization machine only works with liquid form. The study began on September 14, 1999 and the last three monkeys were exposed to anthrax on October 19, 1999. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] did not participate in the studies nor did [REDACTED] ask [REDACTED] about the studies or observe any phase of the study.

[REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] casually when [REDACTED] worked at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] was aware that [REDACTED] worked with [REDACTED] group in the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] knew that [REDACTED] worked with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] was not the type of person that [REDACTED] wanted to converse with. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never discussed science with [REDACTED] felt that [REDACTED] always appeared upbeat and happy. [REDACTED] office was located [REDACTED] said that at one time [REDACTED] was also under the [REDACTED] Division.

[REDACTED] During 1997 - 2001 the people that used the lyophilizers assigned [REDACTED] were [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The lyophilizers were used only on dead tissue, not live organisms. Everything is killed before it is lyophilized. [REDACTED] said to lyophilize live anthrax would be risky because the machine and work area could be infected. [REDACTED] used to eat their lunch [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 9/25/2003, Page 3

in [redacted] where two of the three lyophilizers are located. [redacted] said summer interns used to eat in that room as well. Since the interns were not vaccinated they could have run the risk of being exposed if live anthrax would have been lyophilized there. Only one of the two lyophilizers currently in [redacted] was in that location prior to 2001. To run the lyophilizers, a person would have to know about the machines because they are difficult to run. One is run by an old computer system and a person would need to know how to operate the machine. The lyophilizer in room [redacted] is an older model that was due for replacement but was retained due to high usage. It is a non-computerized machine but a person would have to be familiar with it to run it.

b6  
b7C

The top of the lyophilizer holds vials of the agents. The vials are opened so that the moisture can escape. The moisture condenses in the bottom of the machine in a frozen state. It is later thawed and emptied out of a rubber hose into a container and then poured down the sink. If live agents were lyophilized, it would infect the machine and area.

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
The log books were not provided to the FBI but [redacted] was compiling documents to turn over to the FBI [redacted]. The log books date back to May 1997 and include most of the items lyophilized. Sometimes items were lyophilized when the printer was down so the documents could not be printed, therefore they were not included in the notebook.

[redacted] provided copies of the 1995 organizational chart of USAMRIID as well as a copy of [redacted]. Copies of the documents are included in the attached 1A Envelope.

On occasions the [redacted] hosted foreign visitors. [redacted] would bring in foreign visitors. However, none of the visitors that [redacted] was familiar with inquired about anthrax. The visitors [redacted] were all at [redacted]

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b6  
b7C

USAMRIID to study viruses. They were involved in "Hantavirus" studies. [redacted] recalled visitors from Romania who were interested in West Nile Virus and other visitors from South America. All of the visitors [redacted] were supervised at all times. If they stayed at USAMRIID for any length of time, they were allowed to enter the [redacted] suite. No vaccinations were required for this suite. There was never any anthrax in that suite.

[redacted] examined a sample pre-stamped, #6 envelope. [redacted] stated that [redacted] never saw an envelope at USAMRIID like that nor did [redacted] know of any like that being used there.

[redacted]

[redacted] did not have any idea as to who may have done the anthrax mailings.

[redacted] recalled that during the time after 9/11/01, [redacted] was at work a lot. They worked very long hours during that period. [redacted] was not in New Jersey during the anthrax mailing times. [redacted] does take trips to [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] has no other connection to New Jersey.

[redacted]

[redacted] stated that there was nothing in [redacted] finances that would be of interest to this investigation. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] could not recall any items that would help time-line her during the mailing dates. [redacted] remembered working long hours at USAMRIID during the mailing days. [redacted]

[redacted] agreed to take a polygraph.