On October 8, 2003, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service interviewed the person at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), located at Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland. The duties involved investigation on the person.

Investigation on October 8, 2003 at 0839-1230

File # 279A-WF-222936USAMRIID/279A-BA-222936

Date dictated N/A

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Continuation of FD-302 of _______________ , On 10/08/03 , Page 2

role in afforded access to never went into the labs. was located in Rooms of Building Other USAMRIID employees using this office space included was the predecessor as __________ is the current __________ contained desks, file cabinets and a freezer. The freezer was used to temporarily store materials prior to and after irradiation. This freezer was not locked. The door to ______ had a key lock.

Room __________ contained Beta and Gamma radiation counters, a chemical fume hood and a radiation calibrating instrument. Room __________ was ______ circled and initialed the locations of these rooms on a floor plan that has been included in the attached 1A envelope.

__________ had access to Room ______ in Building ______ A walk-in freezer/cooler is located within the room. No radioactive material is stored there. Anyone can walk into the room. ______ avoided walking into labs where people were working.

____________________ involving infectious or non-infectious biological material. Within three days of beginning employment ______ was given samples containing Ebola virus ______ Samples containing infectious matter originating at USAMRIID were received shipments of infectious material from sources outside of USAMRIID for irradiation at the shipping and receiving area of Building ______ received from the ______ various infectious materials ______ The material was received dry and wet and presented within varying types of containers. never opened the containers. ______ never opened the containers. to the material was ______ viable material in the sample. ______

received various strains of anthrax Bacillus anthracis (Ba) for BRUCE IVINS and does not recall handling Ba.
A record was kept of all materials. The form was kept with the material. The information upon the form included, the name of the researcher, description of the material, information was also recorded in a log book maintained by the safety office.

developed an interest in infectious materials incident to work experience at USAMRIID. knew of no one extremely interested in anthrax other than recalled having a conversation with regarding the incidence was surprised to learn that there were many strains of anthrax. recalled that techniques for drying anthrax were described in KEN ALI-BACK's book (Biohazard). recalled having discussions concerning accidental and intentional outbreaks of infectious disease with other employees at USAMRIID which was common among employees. recalled that someone suggested that a crop duster or truck exhaust may be used to spread infectious material. could not recall who made that statement. recalled stating had this type of conversation with does not recall anyone specifically discussing the subject of spreading anthrax via the mail. believes that anyone who worked at USAMRIID should not be ruled out.

recalled that was involved One member of the group was very negative to funding USAMRIID and preferred that the money
be used for funding schools, housing or education. I recalled that it was a female member of the group. I does not recall the name of any of the of the tour. I feels that it is important to fund researchers full time than rely on temporary contractors.

The news has reported that the anthrax in the mail came from USAMRIID. It would not have been hard to remove anthrax from USAMRIID. Biological agents may be removed from the hot areas by secreting them on your person and walking through the shower area without showering. Showering was not an OSHA requirement but was a USAMRIID requirement that I was aware was not followed. Someone who has taken infectious material takes a chance of killing themselves. I could not identify anyone that I would suspect taking biological agents from USAMRIID. I could not identify anyone, other than that would be considered by others to be a disgruntled employee of USAMRIID. I is not aware of anyone who participated in unofficial work with Ba or its simulants. I is not aware of anyone who "piggy-backed" into and out of the hot areas of USAMRIID.

I recalled two incidents involving lax handling of dangerous items at USAMRIID. I recalled two incidents involving unknown persons that occurred around In one incident I observed loose vials under locked freezers in the hallway near the suite of rooms. I also recalled an incident involving vials that apparently fell into a freezer used to obtain dry ice. I was not aware of any areas in USAMRIID that had problems with bacterial contamination. I heard that there had been one after I left USAMRIID involving a pass through associated with a hot suite.

I does not know how to prepare anthrax for mailing. I does not know what a lyophilizer is. I does not have experience in forensic techniques. I does not recall anyone who expressed a special interest in forensic techniques. I recalled that the at USAMRIID has participated in forensic analysis. I mentioned that they were involved in examining ricin bullets. I does not have any personal or professional association with New Jersey and did not travel there in September or October of 2001.

I described that the standard SOP for decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets involved paraformaldehyde
gas and a wipe down of surfaces with a bleach solution. Anthrax researchers use bleach solutions.

does not recall seeing clear plastic containers at USAMRIID.

recalled using

recall what type of equipment delivered.

does not recall using pre-stamped postal envelopes or observing pre-stamped envelopes at USAMRIID. Personal mail cannot be mailed from USAMRIID. has not used the postal vending machines in Frederick, Maryland. has not had contact with any of the anthrax-laced envelopes. has not done any analytical work associated with this case.

recalled that continued to visit USAMRIID to assist

schedule visits so that would not be in the building

met at USAMRIID. and would be surprised if had anything to do with the mailing of the anthrax laced letters. described as outgoing.

visiting in office to discuss to prepare them for shipment to wanted to be certain that

observed a on computer screen.
told that had been contacted by

had other contact with relative to involvement in at USAMRIID. also recalled seeing in the hallways of USAMRIID. does not recall observing performing lab work at USAMRIID. does not know where stored growth material. never socialized with The subject of anthrax was never discussed. did not discuss his interest in infectious agents with
never allowed [redacted] to "piggy-back" into any areas at USAMRIID. [redacted] has not discussed books and manuscripts with [redacted] never attended any [redacted] knows of no organization to which [redacted] belongs. [redacted] is not aware of any [redacted] may have had. [redacted] left USAMRIID without saying goodbye. [redacted] does not recall seeing [redacted] after [redacted] left USAMRIID. Some researchers do stay on to finish whatever they are doing. [redacted] is not aware of [redacted] removing equipment or anything else from USAMRIID. [redacted] is not aware of [redacted] moving equipment to other areas of USAMRIID. [redacted] never observed [redacted] near the [redacted] or the [redacted] was surprised to hear, since [redacted] left USAMRIID. [redacted] remembers [redacted] showed no interest in a [redacted] at USAMRIID that [redacted] told [redacted] about. [redacted] had used the [redacted] with [redacted] made no mention of [redacted].

[redacted] has no information to provide regarding scientists visiting USAMRIID.

[redacted] would be willing to participate in a polygraph examination associated with this case.
Investigation on 10/31/2003 at 11/03/2003

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had received vaccines for and

worked only with non-lethal bacillus anthrasis (Ba). In conjunction with which is located in worked on the development of

also worked on developing a Ba vaccine while at USAMRIID. never worked with live Ba and never dried Ba.

did not engage in any virology work. worked with the never worked with smallpox, plague or ricin.

did not know BRUCE IVINS or

did not have access to the hot suites. could not recall anyone "piggybacking" through any doors but believes that if it did happen, it would only be a person recognized by others.

never heard of anyone having bioweapons nor did know anyone that held a hostile attitude towards the United States government or media. has no suspicions of anyone that could have been responsible for the anthrax mailings.

has no ties to Trenton or Princeton, New Jersey and has not traveled to New Jersey recently. did recall that was returning home from a trip spent the previous visiting with family. flew into Philadelphia International Airport. during the months of the anthrax mailings and remained at home. had been since

did maintain a notebook while working at USAMRIID. does not recall where the notebook is but believes that it would have remained at USAMRIID after left.
I would be willing to undergo a polygraph examination if it were to take place near to or at my residence.
social security number

Date of birth

interviewed at place of business, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. Telephone number was

After being advised the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[Redacted] is a [redacted] and has worked at USAMRIID since [redacted]. [Redacted] was sent to [redacted] and returned approximately [redacted].

Education includes

[Redacted] has not worked with Bacillus anthracis (Ba) except for [redacted] hasn't done any work with live anthrax. Currently works in [redacted] has worked on Ba projects doing [redacted] in [redacted]. Has been doing clinical work and protocols under BRUCE IVINS or [redacted] was not sure what strains were used.

The only individuals that [redacted] thought to have enough expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production and lyophilizing are IVINS, [redacted] and any scientist.

In [redacted] worked in rooms [redacted] stated that there were coolers in building on the second floor. They housed reagents and specimens. [Redacted] wasn't sure exactly what was stored in the coolers however, stated that it would be labeled. [Redacted] was unsure of who used this cooler and assumed anyone with access to building had access to the cooler. [Redacted] does not know what a lyophilizer is.

Investigation on 10/23/03 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID/279A-BA-C10139K Date dictated N/A

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Prior to 9/11/01, "piggy backing" happened a lot. Visiting scientists had gone into suites however, did not know who they were with or what country they were from. stated that if someone wanted to take something from USAMRIID, they could just walk off with it prior to the 9/11/01 time period.

is not aware of any hostile individuals and does not suspect anyone of the anthrax mailings. Furthermore, has not heard any rumors regarding any individual/s interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them without a specific need.

is not aware of how to weaponize Ba and has no forensic knowledge.

has a that lives in has not been there since before 9/11/01 when he traveled

The SOP's for decontamination include paraformaldehyde and ammonia bicarbonate. was not sure of the exact decon process and would have to read them. hasn't been in for years. and would know the procedures.

never noticed any plastic containers. was not aware of any work being conducted with Ba or its simulants which was unofficial or not recorded.

does not keep a lab notebook and does not recall using pre-stamped envelopes. never used any vending machines.

had nothing to do with processing of the anthrax letters.

knew on a professional level. worked for (PNU). assumed that was a research scientist working on saw in the hallways in building however, never saw in building
recalled seeing________after____left USAMRIID. believed that________was unsure of this
time period and the time period that____left USAMRIID.
was unaware that________left until____saw

never saw________"piggy back" into suites and
never saw________take equipment. never spoke about anthrax.
never saw________work with bacterial cultures. assumed that________stored________samples of________work in
building

never had any conversations with________never mentioned anthrax. talked to________on one
occasion about________

is unaware of any connections________may have
with New Jersey. ______is unaware of any social connections of
to include________

never hosted any foreign visitors.

supervisor is________also works

works the majority of________

consented to a polygraph and is scheduled for
at 10:00 a.m.
On 10/30/2003, [date of birth] (aka [social security number]) was interviewed at [place of employment: the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the investigating agents and the purpose of the interview, [name] provided the following information:

Currently employed at USAMRIID as [position] and has held this position since [date]. Has been working at USAMRIID since [date] but does not participate in [position]. Returned to USAMRIID in [date] and is a [position] at USAMRIID but does not participate in [position]. Has not been in the hot suites at USAMRIID since [date] but is currently immunized.

Not grown or cultured Bacillus anthracis (Ba), has only worked on studies related to the Ba vaccine. These studies not know of anyone who may be an expert in weaponization techniques. Assumes Bruce Ivins may know something about it as he interacts often with [name].

The following names of individuals that had clearances and vaccines, but they did not all necessarily work in the hot side of the labs: [phonetic]
Continuation of FD-302 of __________________________, On 10/30/2003

I was provided a floor plan of building of USAMRIID on which marked and initialed all areas that has worked in. A copy of the floor plan is attached.

I worked occasionally on the ______ floor of building in laboratories. At times worked in when those laboratories were used for studies on the ______

I has never used the cold storage in room ______ of building ______

I worked in the office spaces ______ and laboratories ______ on the ______ floor of building ______

never new anyone to piggy-back in or out of the hot suites.

I does not know how one could remove a select agent from the laboratories.

I does not know anyone to ever use a lyophilizer for drying live agents. I is not aware of ever using a lyophilizer in any of ______ work.

I is not aware of anyone who would want to remove a select agent or who would make one for use in an improper fashion.

I does not know of anyone who would be suspect in the mailings of the anthrax-laced letters.

I does not know of anyone with hostile views toward the government, specific politicians, the media, or others.

I does not know of anyone to having dried Ba.

I does not know of anyone with specific skills to avoid forensic techniques.
Continuation of FD-302 of ___________ , on 10/30/2003 , Page ___

does not have any personal or professional affiliation with anyone in the Trenton or Princeton New Jersey area. believes that may have family in New Jersey. may also have relatives in the New Jersey area.

is not sure of what the standard operation procedure for decontamination is.

has never seen, nor used, plastic storage containers at USAMRIID, nor does know where any may be kept.

All of research and study performance notebooks are maintained in room of building

has never purchased pre-stamped envelopes nor has ever used any of the vending machines in the Frederick, Maryland area to purchase postal products.

did not see nor handle any of the anthrax-laced letters.

has never known did not know anything about until after

has never sponsored any foreign visiting scientists.

has never known any foreign visiting scientists to be allowed in the hot suites of USAMRIID.

work hours are typically from leaves USAMRIID at about

believes that and may have been at least one of the weekends of the mailings of the anthrax-laced letters. told investigators would attempt to verify whereabouts and provide any supporting documentation to

denied having ever given anyone Ba.

denied having anything to do with the preparation or mailing of the anthrax-laced letters.
was asked to take a polygraph examination. stated that had heard "bad things" about the polygraph examination, however was willing to take the exam. is scheduled to be examined on
Date of transcription: 11/24/2003

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

On November 25, 2003, [date of birth] was interviewed at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, provided the following information:

[ ] attended College in [ ]
[ ] became [ ]

whenever [ ] is [ ] and does not suit work

The primary nature of [ ] work is [ ] throughout the lab.

During September 2001, [ ] was at [ ] title at [ ] was [ ]

Since the start of work at USAMRIID, the only work [ ] has done relating to Anthrax is with a [ ]
[ ] did not participate directly in the infection of the animals.
[ ] primary responsibility was [ ]

These samples were not cultured by [ ] The samples were handed off to lab techs or scientists who performed the cultures. [ ] did not know what strain of Bacillus anthracis [ ] was working with but [ ] did know it was from [ ]

This work was done in Building [ ] at USAMRIID, where [ ] did most of the work in 2001. [ ] worked with [ ] and BRUINS [ ] and [ ] did not recall additional names of scientists with whom [ ] worked. [ ] occasionally spoke with [ ] who was a scientist working in [ ] about their common interest in [ ]

[ ] did not directly witness piggy backing of card access into hot suites. [ ] did not work a lot during off hours. [ ] worked after hours prior to September 11, 2001, but that was when [ ] worked at [ ] and [ ] never purchased pre-

11/24/2003 Frederick, Maryland
stamped envelopes and never used the vending machines that sold them. did not know of the existence of the postal vending machines at USAMRIID. did not know what was stored in the walk-in cooler in room in Building and never had any reason to enter the cooler. does not know what bacterial contamination smells like and never noticed any decontamination agents being used in any suites to counteract contamination.

did not know but knew of recognized but did not recognize the name alone. never saw in rooms in Building never directly interacted with and never discussed with anyone else who worked in the lab. works at USAMRIID. is responsible for but was not sure of relationship with worked at USAMRIID in did not speak to about except to acknowledge having seen the individual who was the
On 11/24/2003, [date of birth] [social security number] [date of birth] was interviewed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation offices. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [providing the following information:]

[provided the following overview of [educational and career experience:]

[Graduated with [Degree in [from [Living and working in [University of Pursuing a [noted that during [was employed on a part-time basis with the [located in [direct supervisor at [was [in the [While at [worked on various projects involving [stated that during [was asked to work for [of USAMRIID on a project to [This project was very similar to what [had been working on at [direct supervisor while at USAMRIID during [was [Investigation on [11/24/2003] at [File # [c279A-WF-222936-302] [Date dictated [n/a] [by [SA]]]}

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characterized position at USAMRIID as and although primarily assigned to the he was also assigned stated that never worked with any form of anthrax while at USAMRIID and only worked in a suite a few times, always accompanied by remembers being issued a key card for access into the suite at USAMRIID.

SA then asked the relevant questions provided by WFO for interview purposes.

If never interviewed:

1. Obtain details on education, specializations, nature of work at each laboratory of employment; details on work with biological organisms (particularly Bacillus anthracis (Ba)).
   
   Answer: Covered above

2. Determine whether any work with Ba was on the living organism or only with components such as toxin, DNA, etc.
   
   Answer: has never worked with any form of anthrax

3. Obtain details on all projects involving Ba including identification of contracts, subcontractors, lab assistants, whether the work involved spores or just vegetative cells, strains used, specifically how the Ba was grown, storage technique and all storage locations, distribution to any other researchers.
   
   Answer: has never worked with any form of anthrax

4. Have you ever used the modified G sporulation media? When, on what organism and strain, where was it stored?
   
   Answer: has never worked with any form of anthrax or anthrax created using the modified G sporulation media
5. What type of culture technique did you use? Was it single colony or multiple colony culture technique? If you used both, what time-frames did you use each?

Answer: [Blank] has never worked with any form of anthrax

6. Identify any work involving the drying of Ba. Was a lyophilizer used? What was the specific technique? Are any samples of dried Ba still maintained? Were high resolution images collected?

Answer: [Blank] has used a lyophilizer in the past on various projects involving plague but never anthrax

7. Were the strains used fully characterized? Where did they originate, and where have they been disseminated? If the strain was Ames, did it come from Bruce Ivins or [Blank]

Answer: [Blank] has never worked with any form of anthrax

8. Identify any persons who have expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production, lyophilizing. Is there anyone else we should talk to about the above issues?

Answer: [Blank] does not know of any individuals with the above listed expertise

9. Identify any areas of USAMRIID which had problems with bacterial contamination, particularly virology suites.

Answer: [Blank] never heard about any issues of bacterial cross contamination.

10. Identify the areas routinely used by the employee (use floor plans).

Answer: [Blank] was unable to specifically identify lab on the blueprints provided by WFO.

11. Determine if the person used the hot areas of building. Was the walk-in cooler, room [Blank] used? Who was
observed using the walk-in cooler? Do you know what was stored there?

Answer: stated that conducted while at USAMRIID(approximately times total) was done in the laboratory building, never in building

12. Did people "piggy-back" in and out of the hot areas at USAMRIID? Were visiting scientists taken into the hot areas by USAMRIID researchers?

Answer: stated that cannot remember ever witnessing anyone "piggybacking" into the area at USAMRIID.

13. How could someone remove Select Agents from the hot areas covertly? Identify any individuals who attempted this.

Answer: believes that it would be "pretty easy" to remove select agents from the suites at USAMRIID.

stated that someone could conceal an agar plate or a small vial under in the armpit area long enough to get through the "shower-in/shower-out" process covertly.

does not know of any individuals who ever attempted to remove select agents from a lab.

14. Are you aware of anyone who said they might make a Select Agent for use in some improper fashion?

Answer: No

15. Are you aware of any persons with the access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media, or others?

Answer: No

16. Are there any persons you believe to be or suspect of possibly being associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters? Who and why?

Answer: No
17. Are there any people with whom you have worked who were lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents?

Answer: No

18. Was there anyone at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so?

Answer: No

19. How would you go about preparing dried Ba and sending it through the mail?

Answer: believes that it would be pretty tough to prepare dried Ba and put it in the mail. does not know how someone would find out what powder to link to the Ba spores to induce aerosolization. does not believe that simply opening an envelope would be enough energy to disperse the dried anthrax. believes that you would need to pressurize the envelope in some manner to ensure proper dispersal.

20. Are you aware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques?

Answer: No

21. Do you or any of your associates have any personal or professional association with Trenton, New Jersey, Princeton or other areas of New Jersey?

Answer: No

22. Did you or any of your associates travel to New Jersey in September or October 2001? Do you recall where you were during that time period?

Answer: does not believe has ever been in New Jersey and believes was in during the specified time frame.
23. Are there SOPs for decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets in your work areas? What are they?

Answer: [blank] does not know if USAMRIID has any SOPs for the decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets.

24. Has paraformaldehyde or glutaraldehyde fumigation been employed in the virology areas? When?

Answer: [blank] has no knowledge of this process.

25. Have you ever smelled bacterial decontamination agents in the virology suites?

Answer: No

26. Have you ever used plastic storage containers, such as sterilite boxes, for storage of your materials at USAMRIID? If so, how, where and when were they purchased? By whom? Did you ever notice any such storage boxes missing?

Answer: No

27. Are you aware of any work being conducted with Ba or its simulants which was unofficial or not recorded?

Answer: No

28. Was all of your work recorded in lab notebooks? Where are they stored?

Answer: [blank] stated that all of [blank] work was recorded in a lab book and [blank] would assume the lab book is in [blank] possession.

29. Did you ever purchase pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the mailings for your own use or for anyone else? If so, did you ever give them to anyone else? Where were the envelopes stored?

Answer: No
30. Did you ever use any of the vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes? If so, which machine and when?

Answer: No

31. Did you personally handle any of the anthrax-laced letters or envelopes? If so, when, what rooms, who else was present?

Answer: No

32. Did you do any analytical work on the evidence in this case? Get details.

Answer: No

Questions regarding: did not recognize name as anyone remembers from at USAMRIID during SA showed a color photograph of in an attempt to jog memory. After viewing the photograph for several seconds, stated that has never met and does not believe ever saw at USAMRIID. Therefore all of the associated questions, other than the one listed below, were not asked of

26. Is there anything we have not asked you that you could tell us which could be related to the anthrax letter mailings?

Answer: No

If interviewee hosted foreign visiting scientists:

stated that never hosted a foreign visiting scientist while working at USAMRIID during Therefore the listed questions were not asked of

If interviewee was member:
was not a member while working at USAMRIID during . Therefore the listed questions were not asked of.

The [person] can be described as follows:

- **Sex:**
- **Race:**
- **Height:** Approx.
- **Weight:** Approx.
- **Hair:**
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field
AMX 3,
Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-POI (Pending)-SS

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-SS

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: Report results of the investigation regarding

Details: An investigation of commenced because
had access to locations where the Ames strain of Bacillus
anthracis (Ba) was stored at the United States Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort
Detrick, Maryland.

   date of birth with
Social Security Account Number
   home address
   home telephone number.
   is a USAMRIID employee working as the
   in the
   at USAMRIID.
   started at USAMRIID
   in
   has held the same basic position that started in
   earned Degree in
   
To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 12/2/2003

at USAMRIID. The machines are located in rooms
provided the anthrax spores to the to infect the non-human primates.

A time-line of activities for the likely periods of the mailing of the anthrax letters from Princeton, New Jersey was compiled using USAMRIID Key Card Access records, telephone call records and credit card records. The time-line focused on any six-hour period for which would be unaccounted, with the premise that

Telephone toll records documented that telephone was registered in the name of . The telephone is a household telephone, and toll records do not indicate who specifically made the telephone calls.

Reviews of financial records and home telephone records for the year 2001 revealed no connections to New Jersey. However, personal bank accounts are with . The account is exclusively in name with the designated accounts with had a balance of approximately as of the mailing period. In addition,
documented deposits in by using Social Security Account Number. The deposits were listed for

Time-line First Mailing (5:00 p.m., 9/17/01 through 8:00 p.m., 9/18/01)
USAMRIID Facility Key Card Access records documented that [____] entered Building [____] on 9/17/01 at [____] and remained at work until [____] exit at [____]. The longest period between key card activity during work hours for which [____] was unaccounted on 9/17/01 was approximately [____] hours and [____] minutes.

After exiting USAMRIID on 9/17/01, [____] is unaccounted for during a period of [____] hours and [____] minutes until [____] badge in again on 9/18/01 at [____] exited Building [____] on 9/18/01 at [____]. The longest period between key card activity during work hours for which [____] is unaccounted for on 9/18/01 was approximately [____] hours and [____] minutes.

A review of telephone toll records showed a telephone call to [____] on 9/17/01 at 7:06 PM.

A review of [____] indicated no purchases during this time frame.

Time-line Second Mailing (3:00 p.m., 10/06/01 through 11:00 a.m., 10/09/01)

USAMRIID Facility Key Card Access records documented that [____] entered Building [____] on 10/6/01 at [____] and remained at work until [____]. On the same day, [____] residence to [____] at [____] telephone toll records documented a call from [____] residence records documented a purchase at [____] in [____] on 10/6/01.

USAMRIID Key Card Access records documented that [____] first entered USAMRIID on 10/7/01 at [____] and remained at work on 10/7/01 until [____]. There were approximately 20 hours and 36 minutes for which [____] was unaccounted between 10/6/01 at [____] PM and 10/7/01 at [____].

[____] telephone toll records documented the following calls from [____] residence on 10/7/01:

- Telephone call to [____] at 11:52 AM;
- Telephone call to [____] at 11:53 AM.

[____] credit card records documented a purchase on 10/7/01 at the [____] in [____].
USAMRIID Key Card Access records documented that 
entering USAMRIID on 10/8/01 at [_____] is unaccounted 
for during a period of approximately 18 hours and 16 minutes from 
10/17/01 at [_____] to 10/8/01 at [_____] remained at 
USAMRIID on 10/8/01 until [_____] The longest period between 
key card activities on 10/8/01 was approximately 2 hours and 5 
minutes.

[_____] is again unaccounted for during a period 
of approximately 10 hours and 45 minutes from 10/8/01 at [_____] PM 
until [_____] is recorded entering USMARIID on 10/9/01 at [_____] 
where [_____] remained until [_____] During work hours on 10/9/03, 
the longest period of time between key card activity was 
approximately 3 hours and 52 minutes.

Additional Information:

[_____] has been interviewed on at least [_____] occasions 
concerning this investigation and has been cooperative and 
forthcoming with investigators.

On [_____] voluntarily submitted to a 
polygraph examination concerning the anthrax mailings. The result 
of the examination was not indicative of deception.

In addition to the findings presented above and the 
fact that [_____] has cooperated with this investigation, no 
direct, testimonial or circumstantial evidence has been 
discovered to date which suggests that [_____] may have been 
involved in the anthrax-laced letter mailings. Unless or until 
such evidence is identified, no further investigation of [_____] is 
intended in this case.

***
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/30/2003

On 10/29/03, [ ] was interviewed at [ ]

Date of birth [ ]

Social security account number [ ]

Home phone: [ ]

Was interviewed at [ ]

By Supervisory Special Agent [ ]

Federal Bureau of Investigation and [ ]

[ ] After being advised of the identity of

the investigating agents and the purpose of the interview, [ ] provided the following information:

[ ] is currently employed at [ ]

Conducting [ ]

Studies to [ ]

Has been employed full-time at [ ] since [ ] and works primarily Monday through Friday.

[ ] Worked [ ] at the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland starting in [ ] as a [ ]

Primary [ ] in building [ ] of USAMRIID.

[ ] did not have the [ ] to enter building [ ]

during this time period.

[ ] provided the following names of co-workers with whom [ ] worked [ ] at USAMRIID:

[ ]

[ ] did not know any anthrax researchers during this time period.

[ ] went to [ ] until [ ]

[ ]

Investigation on 10/29/03 at [ ]

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C10139 Date dictated 10/30/03

By [ ]

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Continuation of FD-302 of ________________ On 10/29/03 , Page 2

was at USAMRIID working as an investigator at the time. returned to Fort Detrick for

worked full time as a Division until provided the names of individuals with whom worked during the time frame as follows:

The only bacterial researchers and investigators that I knew were MIKESELL (deceased) and PERRY.

work at USAMRIID was exclusively with

Biological agents used for investigations were always prepared by the investigators did not work with aerosol studies.

Primate necropsies were usually performed by pathologists.

did work with investigators BRUCE IVINS and conducting studies on Bacillus anthracis (Ba), however never did swabbing or streaking of agar plates nor did participate in or understand the culturing or growing process.

believes all Ba samples would have originated with BRUCE IVINS.
I did not know anyone to dry Ba nor did [ ] know what a lyophilizer was.

No one ever expressed an interest in weaponization of biological agents to [ ].

[ ] does not recall there being bacterial contamination in the [ ] areas of [ ].

During [ ] worked in building suites relative to investigations. [ ] also frequented rooms on the floor of building [ ] also worked in the [ ] where investigations were conducted.

[ ] never used the cooler in room [ ] of building could not recall spending any time in room [ ].

[ ] also worked in [ ] labs of building conducting [ ] in labs [ ].

[ ] was provided a map of buildings and [ ] marked and initialed all areas in which [ ] worked while employed at USAMRIID.

[ ] stated that "piggy-backing" in and out of the hot areas was frequent.

[ ] was not sure if visiting scientists had access to the hot areas.

Removing a biological agent would not be difficult. One could shower out with it on one's person or use the pass box. [ ] said "ice cream containers", small cardboard containers often used in the labs, could be used to carry out an agent by passing it through an ultraviolet light making the outside safe, however the inside of the container could still remain hot.

[ ] felt that safety regulations were slack at USAMRIID.

[ ] last name (phonetic) in the
does not know anyone with interests in obtaining dangerous items nor was anyone interested in gaining access to specific agents.

does not know of anyone who had hostile attitudes toward the government, politicians, the media or others.

never knew of any equipment to be missing from USAMRIID.

has no knowledge of how to prepare dried Ba and send it in the mail.

None of family or associates traveled to New Jersey in September or October of 2001.

did not know of any work to be done "off the books" at USAMRIID.

did not ever purchase mail products from vending machines in Frederick, Maryland nor has ever purchased franked envelopes.

did not know prior to the anthrax mailings. did not host any foreign visitors to USAMRIID while was employed there.

recalled that attended around the time of the first mailing in September 2001.

provided email addresses; has internet access at work. does not use the computer located at residence.

stated that key card access is recorded in and out of In the labs there is is the contact for said records.

uses a for fuel purchases.
Continuation of FO-302 of [__] , On 10/29/03 , Page 5

agreed to look for information that would show was home during the periods of the anthrax mailings and provide said documentation to investigators.

agreed to take a polygraph exam on [__]

Attached hereto and considered part of this document is a copy of the floor plans of USAMRIID provided to [__]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/24/2003

Date of Birth: [ ]

Social Security Number: [ ]

Address: [ ]

Employed as: [ ]

Telephone Number: [ ]

Telephone Number: [ ]

was interviewed at the [ ] Upon being advised of the identity of the
interviewing agent, and the nature of the interview, provided the following information:

for the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), in

was introduced to [ ] by [ ]

skeptical about [ ] Any questions, relating to duties, titles, responsibilities, etc.,
The overall belief was that [ ] was a

After not receiving any definitive information on

Opinion wise, no one knew anything about [ ]

Impression wise, [ ] was known as a [ ]

[ ] told [ ] that [ ] also told [ ] about a trip that [ ]

took to [ ]

The purpose of this trip, according to [ ] was to [ ]

sure why [ ] went on this trip with [ ]

well as [ ] bragged to [ ] that [ ] had a [ ] as

installed in [ ] car.

11/24/2003

investigation on 279A-WF-222936-LEAD at 7

File # SA [ ]

Date dictated 11/24/2003
I remembes that during duty at USAMRIID, I was never with the prior to time. The was alerted to being the at that time, was in charge of the

holds a in from University.

holds an from College, and specializes in

you consider work at USAMRIID. stated that duties at USAMRIID involved working at

only experience with Bacillus anthracis (Ba). spores, vegetative cells, and storage, is

All of work was on

both personnel, inasmuch as these individuals The vaccines received by these individuals assured their immunogenicity to work in the laboratory environment.

advised that

has no experience with the modified G sporulation media.
has studied "Unclassified" literature on the drying of Ba. According to the procedures for processing and weaponizing Ba are classified knows that Ba spores need to be between 2 to 5 microns, in order for them to be able to be inhaled and remain in the pulmonary system also knows that the spores need to be charged so that they repel each other. This charge allows the spores to remain aerosolized.

To the best of knowledge, dried Ba is still maintained at USAMRIID. has read about the testing of primates at USAMRIID. This testing would have to involve Ba that is maintained at USAMRIID. Based upon readings, Ba originally came from the USDA, around 1950. The Ames strain is the main strain of Ba. This strain was eventually applied to the weapons program. As far as knows, each strain can be traced back to its origin has no knowledge of USAMRIID ever farming/dispersing strains does not know BRUCE IVINS, or

are the individuals that knows to be experts in weaponizing Ba. who spoke at various USAMRIID courses, also spoke at the USAMRIID Medical Management of Chemical/Biological Casualties Course. After talking down about USAMRIID was never invited back.

has an article that pertains to the first meeting between The article talks about the weather and "what a great time to release whatever." The article does not talk about the manufacturing process, just the optimal time to release certain agents. This is an article that was authored by near the end of the United States offensive biological program.

worked on the "offensive" side of the weaponization program. USAMRIID is part of the "defensive" side of the weaponization program. USAMRIID also works with Aberdeen Proving Ground, for the design and production of Chemical/Biological masks.

During time at USAMRIID recalls one instance where there was an accidental release of Ba. This release coincided with the visit of a Senator from New Orleans. The Senator was touring USAMRIID at the time of the release.
is not sure of the date/time period of this release. The Ba release happened inside the "hot area." To the best of [_____] knowledge, [_____] remembers [_____] was provided with a set of floor plans for USAMRIID. The rooms marked with an "X" are areas that [_____] has worked in.

The first time was for a tour, and the second time was during the accidental Ba release. According to [_____] the cooler, room [_____] is still being used. [_____] as well as [_____] have all been in the cooler at one time or another [_____] along with various enlisted personnel.

"Piggy Backing" in the "hot area" did not occur. Having said that, there was a problem with all of the other entrances. The problem involved instances where several employees would enter the facility, after only one person was granted access. To gain access to the "hot area," one must be wearing the "blue chemical suit." Visiting scientists, as well as visitors, by protocol, must have all of their vaccines prior to entering the "hot area." Even though it is unlikely, it is possible for a visitor to gain access to the "hot area."

[_____] between 1996 and 1999, CID investigated a matter where USAMRIID soldiers manufactured illicit drugs. These soldiers used a "hot suite" as their laboratory. [_____] is not sure how they got their drugs out of the "hot area." [_____] stated, "If they can get their drugs out of there, that may be something that you want to look into." [_____] also said, "I am sure that someone can sneak something out if they want to." [_____] does not recall seeing any sensors, nor any security measures, in place to detect the removal of biological/chemical agents from USAMRIID. No one was ever "frisked" while entering or leaving USAMRIID.

[_____] is not aware of anyone who expressed a desire to make a Select Agent for use in an improper fashion; nor is [_____] aware of anyone with access and ability, who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media, or others.
Pre-September 11, 2001, remembers an incident where a foreign scientist, from New York, took a vial of Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis. This scientist took the vial to New York, after being administered the vaccine. believes that this scientist was from a Middle Eastern country. CID tracked the scientist down and recovered the vial. This scientist no longer has access to USAMRIID. advised that the FBI investigated this matter as well.

traveled to to attend the . This is a

There were no SOP's for decontamination within the of USAMRIID. Paraformaldehyde is used to defumigate the rooms within areas. and was removed from the area. This procedure was never needed while was at USAMRIID.

has never used plastic storage containers, such as sterile boxes, for storage of materials at USAMRIID. is not aware of any unrecorded/unofficial work with Ba. During time at USAMRIID, remembers a group that worked on new vaccines for Ba. All of work is recorded in

has never purchased pre-stamped envelopes, nor has ever purchased the pre-stamped envelopes from the vending machines in Frederick. has never handled any of the Anthrax-laced letters or envelopes.

sent to office of Senator Daschle. Once the letters were determined to be weaponized-Anthrax, performed screening duties on the USAMRIID personnel that examined the envelopes.

knew prior to the occasions. remembers seeing inside USAMRIID, on three occasions. remembers seeing walking around the halls of USAMRIID, unescorted, in the hallway between the series and series of offices. All three times that
Saw did not recall seeing

has never allowed to "piggy back." has never witnessed take any equipment, nor has seen move any equipment around USAMRIID.

Typically, when a scientist comes to USAMRIID, he or she is assigned for one specific task, or to work on one agent. From what could gather,

never witnessed, nor heard about, working with cultures, nor lyophilizers would have to work in the laboratory in order to work with cultures.

has never seen near the walk in cooler, room in the "hot area" of building. The only time that went to the cooler was to assist with was not an employee of USAMRIID; therefore, had no reason to be in the cooler. never asked for access to any isolates, equipment, or access to other areas of USAMRIID. does not know where ever stored any of materials or samples. never heard of any rumors that brought in samples from

According to it was rumored that told that is not sure whether this is true or not never discussed relationships with has a note that wrote to This note is written on an article that received from . The note says.

agreed to provide this article to the writer.

has never heard talk about political issues, or any issues involving advised that the FBI should talk to if they want to know about what has said about scenarios involving the production and use of bioweapons. According to is unfamiliar with any reference to nor any connections between and New Jersey.
has never spent any social time with __________________________. According to __________________________, he has only spent time with __________________________ on a social basis. He only knows about the trip(s) that __________________________ took to USAMRIID. He describes __________________________ as someone who had a way of getting things done at USAMRIID.

________________________ has never hosted a foreign scientist. However, in __________________________'s time, he did host an individual by the name of __________________________. According to __________________________, __________________________ invited __________________________ to visit USAMRIID. At no time did __________________________ ever enter any "hot areas" at USAMRIID. __________________________ was only allowed access to Ward 4, and was under strict control at all times. __________________________ was under constant supervision by __________________________. The USAMRIID does not mention in the article that __________________________ provided the interviewing agent.

________________________ also worked with __________________________ while __________________________ worked on the __________________________ project. __________________________ never requested to see __________________________. __________________________ never allowed to see, nor did __________________________ show any interest in it. __________________________ was shown a floor plan of USAMRIID and asked to circle each office that __________________________ was in.

________________________ never purchased, nor otherwise obtained any pre-stamped envelopes while at USAMRIID. __________________________ never showed any anti-American sentiments during his visit to USAMRIID.

________________________ never spent any time with the members of __________________________ while __________________________ was involved in the __________________________ project. Prior to that, it was common knowledge that __________________________ was never properly set up through proper channels; therefore, prior to September 11, 2001, __________________________ first arrived at USAMRIID, USAMRIID was trying to work a special deal with __________________________. According to __________________________, __________________________ believes that part of the deal was for __________________________.
heard rumors that [_____] had many connections with [______]. It was also rumored that the [_____] had a lot of money. Apparently, USAMRIID is no longer funded this way. USAMRIID is now funded through proper military channels.

[_____] has never attended any class, conference, or course, where [_____] are the best sources of information on [_____], who is now in [_____] was on the [_____] prior to [_____] arriving at USAMRIID. [_____] is the former [______].

After September 11, 2001, the Physicians Assistant (PA) to the White House contacted USAMRIID reference concerns about Anthrax attacks. [_____] The PA was looking for [_____] is now [_____] and is possibly still at USAMRIID.

[_____] recommends that the FBI speak with [_____] about the [_____] was being considered for a position as [_____] was the former [_____] knows that [_____] is possible that [_____] accompanied [_____] to the position. [_____] has seen photographs of [_____] agreed to provide the interviewing agent the article on the offensive side of the Botulinum toxin. This is the same article
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/12/2003

Social Security Number [ ] was interviewed by Special Agents at [ ] place of employment at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [ ] voluntarily provided the following information:

- Current position is a

- Duties are to

- Have access to Bacillus anthracis (B.a.) [ ] use both agar and broth to grow B.a. Tryptic Soy Agar (TSA) is used most often as the agar growth medium, and sometimes New Sporulation Media (NSM) is also used, but not very often. [ ] was unsure whether Modified G media is used. [ ] believes that [ ] would have laboratory notebooks that would answer that question. Both single colony and multiple colony culturing techniques have been used depending on the type of experiments. [ ] guesses that for the culturing of the Ames strain, multiple colony culturing was utilized.

- First worked with B.a. during [ ] During the first Gulf War in the 1990's, work with the Ames strain of B.a. increased as it was used as the test strain in the laboratory. [ ] has worked with, and continues to work with, live B.a. spores, but [ ] has never produced a powdered form of anthrax. [ ] believes that it would not be difficult to produce powdered B.a. One would simply culture it and dry it using a lyophilizer, and then mill it until it turns into a powder. [ ] has traced the genealogy of the Ames strain that [ ] has [ ] back to BRUCE IVINS.

Investigation on 12/12/2003 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID; 279A-BA-C101392; Date dictated N/A

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During recent years, he has not been in the "hot" suites very much. The B.a. used in laboratory is stored in the [suites]. He has never used plastic sterilite containers in USAMRIID. The research conducted by [person] was recorded in notebooks which are either stored in [library] or USAMRIID's library.

He believes that it would be very easy for anybody with access to the "hot" suites to obtain samples of anthrax or other kinds of agents. Anyone with the intent to steal it would only need to put a few spores under the fingernails, on the earlobe, or any other part of the body. Even if USAMRIID conducted security checks on people leaving the building, the spores would never be detected. As long as there are no open wounds in the area of the body that the spores are stored, the perpetrator would not be adversely affected.

Numerous foreign visiting scientists through the years. Records of these visits are kept at the front office of USAMRIID. He recalls that one was a foreign visitor from [country] who had access to the "hot" suites without the need for an escort. He perused through a file folder which was kept in a filing cabinet, and told the Agents that one was at USAMRIID in [department] for approximately [time period] or slightly more than that. He worked on [project] and seeing the differences between [comparison] did express an interest in obtaining the Ames strain and a [another strain]. However, the agreement was never finalized and [compliance] is currently in the [department].

Another foreign visiting scientist who did not require an escort was [last name unknown: LNU]. He does not believe that LNU was in the hot suites. He does not recall any other scientist who showed a special interest in the Ames strain. He has never noticed anybody in the laboratory or the "hot" suites that didn't belong or that might have aroused [suspicions].
has never been a member of the nor has ever spent time with people who were part of the

has spoken with only once or twice. specialty was spoke with about the possibility of looking at different does not know anything about whether kept at USAMRIID. also did not have any knowledge of a pulmonary anthrax sample taken from a patient that is purported to have been received by USAMRIID in the early 1990's.

has never spoken with about expertise or knowledge of anthrax.

does not remember or a project in the late 1990's.

Other than a trip in has never stayed in New Jersey. has driven through the state to get to New York, but has never stopped in New Jersey. During the week after September 11, 2001, remembers being in the Frederick, Maryland area. In October 2001, was in

was asked whether would agree to take a polygraph regarding the anthrax investigation. did not agree to take it, stating that did not believe it was necessary.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE
Date: 08/12/2003

To: Washington Field
From: Washington Field

Contact:

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-POI (Pending)
279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: Report results of elimination investigation to date regarding date of birth social security account number

Details: Began employment with the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in

Was investigated in captioned investigation based upon work with virulent Bacillus anthracis (Ba) in spore form and access to the Ames strain of Ba.

Work focused on

Has not traveled to New Jersey and does not have any family or friends in the Princeton or Trenton, New Jersey area. who resides in New Jersey.
To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 08/12/2003

Reviews of financial records from 1999 thru 2001 revealed no connections to New Jersey.

A time line of activities for the likely time periods of the mailing of the anthrax letters from Princeton, New Jersey was compiled using USAMRIID security key card access records, home telephone toll records, credit card use, and personal bank account records (via cleared checks provided) and Fort Detrick motor-pool vehicle records. The time-line focused on any applicable six hour period for which would be unaccounted, with the premise that it takes approximately six hours to drive round trip from Frederick, Maryland to Princeton, New Jersey.

Time-line First Mailing (5:00 p.m., 9/17/2001 through 8:00 p.m., 9/18/2001)

A review of USAMRIID key card access activity displays thirty (30) recorded accesses to building on 9/17/2001; the first entry "IN" at and the final exit "OUT" at

A personal check from a account of and for "Cash", was negotiated at bank, The check was endorsed on the reverse by signature and processed on 9/17/2001 at 4:48 p.m. for cash, as per the time/date stamp below the endorsement.

There is a fifteen-hour and twenty-minute period from 4:48 p.m. 9/17/2001 until enters via "IN" access to building at USAMRIID at on 9/18/2001. No records were reviewed which can demonstrate whereabouts for the fifteen-hour twenty-minute period.

stated in an interview that to the best of recollection, was home all night on 9/17/2001.

On entered "IN" building of USAMRIID and finally exited "OUT" of building at a Fort Detrick vehicle acquired by BRUCE IVINS at 7:42 a.m. as per motor-pool records, to The vehicle was returned to Fort Detrick motor-pool at 3:42 p.m. on 9/18/2001.

wrote a personal check, which was negotiated at the at on 9/18/2001 as per the endorsement stamp on the reverse side of the check.
To: Washington Field  From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 08/12/2003

made a long distance phone call on 9/18/2001 from residence at 6:16 p.m. to which lasted sixty-three minutes.

Time-Line Second Mailing (3:00 p.m., 10/6/2001 through 11:00 a.m., 10/9/2001)

made a long distance phone call from residence on 10/6/2001 at 9:50 a.m. to which lasted two minutes.

wrote and negotiated a personal check at the in at 2:20 p.m. as per the endorsement stamp on the reverse side of the check.

made a long distance phone call from residence on 10/6/2001 at 2:47 p.m. to in which lasted four minutes.

and in the evening of and were at the until late in the evening. No exact time was noted.

There is approximately a ten to twelve hour time period from the on during which no records were reviewed which can demonstrate whereabouts until at approximately on 10/7/2001. stated in an interview that was with that evening as far as can recall.

An electronic attendance record from the at provided by reports that attended that week.

There is approximately a forty-four-hour and nineteen-minute time period from approximately 10:00 a.m. on 10/7/2001 to 10/9/2001 at 7:19 a.m. during which no records were reviewed which can demonstrate whereabouts. In separate interviews, stated that as far as they could recall, was at home during this time period (10/8/2001 being a holiday).

A review of USAMRIID key card access showed that entered "IN" building at on 10/9/2001 and finally exited "OUT" at
was given a polygraph examination on which targeted any knowledge of or involvement in the anthrax mailings. The report of the polygraph examination states that no deception was indicated by during the polygraph examination.

handwriting was reviewed and compared to the writing on the anthrax-laced letters by handwriting experts on Results of the comparisons were negative.

has been interviewed several times and has cooperated fully with this investigation. is aware of and has been very helpful in identifying jointly used laboratory space and equipment as well as co-workers
No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s)

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