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On January 23, 2004, [social security account number redacted] interviewed at place of employment, the UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, work telephone [redacted] by Special Agent [redacted] and Postal Inspector [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the investigators and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

A letter and a sample arrived from Ames, Iowa, in response to canvass for B.a. isolates. The sample was not catalogued with a name, thus labeled it "Ames". Recalled that the sample arrived as a slant...
I worked with B. a. I collaborated with BRUCE IVINS, on vaccine challenge studies. All of the collaborative work involving virulent organisms were conducted.

During the estimated that I made spore preparations a total of times. Fifty milliliter suspensions of spores were generated and used in lethal dose (LD₅₀) and vaccine challenge studies generated B. a. spore preparations for each isolate used in the vaccine challenge project. Spores were grown on Sheep's Blood Agar (SBA) plates, harvested and washed with water. Phenol was added to the spores for storage.
recalled that also generated B.a. spores in the for a project aimed at

provided the following description of culturing technique: A small amount of original starting material

conducted research with virulent B.a. in suite

samples were stored in the walk-in
IVINS stepped in and assisted with research projects. IVINS helped predominantly with vaccine challenges using virulent organisms.

IVINS did not recall ever requesting samples be inventoried or destroyed. IVINS would know if any of spore preparations remained.

Indicated that must have shared B.a. with other USAMRIID scientists; however, could not identify specific incidents or individuals.

It was not unusual for strains to be shared among USAMRIID researchers. IVINS and both worked with the Ames strain of B.a. did not recall ever sending Ames outside of USAMRIID, either domestically or internationally.

Had no recollection of foreign shipments of B.a.
The USAMRIID Form 11-R shown to ______ was placed in a 1A envelope and submitted to the file.

[________ did not know why _______ wanted the materials.]

[__________ was not aware of the specifics of _______ work.]

[__________ did not contact _______ directly to request the materials.]

[__________ first met _______ while _______ was visiting USAMRIID.]

[__________ did not recall when this initial meeting occurred.]

[__________ saw _______ several times over the years at scientific conferences, but characterized their interactions as infrequent.]

[__________ saw _______ approximately at a _______ conference. The last time they talked, _______ was working with _______.]

[__________ did not recall sending B.a. to any _______.]

[__________ reiterated that _______ did not send Ames to _______.]

[__________ did not recall receiving requests for Ames from other countries or foreign scientists.]

[__________ provided the following information regarding USAMRIID scientists. PERRY MIKESELL conducted genetic studies of the B.a. plasmids. He compared the DNA extracted from the cells of different B.a. isolates.]

[__________ may have conducted studies with Ames.]
and was not aware of anyone at USAMRIID who lyophilized virulent spores. It was 'taken back' when I first learned that DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS (DPG) was making dry B.a. materials. It was understanding that the dry material was used to develop detection systems and to enhance defense preparedness against a biological weapon (BW) attack. The dry material generated by DPG was very different from the wet aerosols produced at USAMRIID.

I did not host foreign scientists or visitors at USAMRIID. I did not invite Foreign Nationals to work at USAMRIID. I worked with in the I could not recall the name of the individual, but stated that I was from and studied .

I recalled seeing a case of small, plastic freezer boxes in Suite 1. Plastic containers with rectangular fitted lids were used in a 'cold' suite, to store vials of .

I did not recall the use of large, plastic containers by researchers. I did not pay much attention to storage containers.

I was located in New Jersey, but I had never visited .

I did not recall ever meeting and I did not know of. We never had any discussions and they did not associate.

I observed an individual, dressed in all black, using the photocopy machine at the front of USAMRIID's Building 1425. I did not recall when this observation occurred. I thought that the person observed was working at USAMRIID when I first arrived. I did not attend any of presentations, nor did I participate in scientific discussions with . I has not been involved in one-on-one or group discussions with .
Continuation of FD-302 of__

of the early meetings reviewing___ and___ research using___ may have attended some ___

most often uses a plain envelope and affixes a stamp for mailing. __ has purchased pre-franked envelopes from the post office in Frederick, MD. __ has never purchased pre-franked envelopes from a vending machine. ___ may have pre-franked envelopes in ___

___ declined to submit to a voluntary polygraph. ___ informed the interviewing Agent and Postal Inspector that ___ had researched the proper use of the polygraph on the Internet and concluded that the FBI's use of the polygraph as a general screening tool was not appropriate.

___ stated that ___ had no involvement in the anthrax mailings. ___ was totally shocked when the attacks occurred. ___ was angry when the FBI's investigation started at USAMRIID. According to ___ the investigation implied that the researchers at USAMRIID were not professional. ___ could not identify any individual with whom ___ has worked that ___ would consider a possible perpetrator of the anthrax mailings. ___ did not handle the evidentiary letters or powders. ___ did not conduct any analyses using the evidentiary material.
Date of transcript 01/29/2004

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/29/2004

[Redacted]

Security Number [Redacted]

Home address [Redacted]

Employer [Redacted]

Work address [Redacted]

Home telephone number [Redacted]

Work telephone number [Redacted]

was interviewed at [Redacted]

place of employment. After being advised of the identities of

the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview,

provided the following information:

[Redacted]

Degree in

from

[Redacted]

in 1993. In

[Redacted]

to the United States Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick
was first assigned to work in the [Redacted] Division
as a [Redacted]. It should be noted that

immediate supervisor was [Redacted] worked in

the [Redacted] and was responsible for

[Redacted]

At the beginning of the interview, [Redacted] provided a

copy of Curriculum Vitae (CV). In order to more clearly

describe duties while working in the [Redacted] the following is

an excerpt from CV regarding duties from [Redacted] until

[Redacted]

While working in the [Redacted] worked in building [Redacted]

and spent most of his time in [Redacted] suites.

[Redacted] also had access to several other suites including:

[Redacted]

Investigation on 1/29/04 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 1/29/04

SA

SA

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began working at USAMRIID as immediate supervisor was 
worked in building and the hot and cold side of building was responsible for

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

has used room the walk in cooler located on the floor hot side of building. used room to research. advised that and both stored items in room. stated that everyone had a specific area within the cooler to store things. did not know what everyone else kept in room.

met sometime in advised that and had office space on the cold side of building. worked with and contact with
was limited. **never saw** in room **is** sure that **saw** in room **in building** and may have been **on the** floor hot side of building **thinks that** worked with never discussed work with **never saw** in a social setting. **never discussed** personal life, New Jersey, problems with the government or **A** with. **never saw** with a lyophilizer and **never discussed** collecting or taking lab equipment from USAMRIID. **did not realize that** had left USAMRIID until much later. Remembers that **told** and **that** was shown an envelope consistent with the ones used in the anthrax mailings of 2001. **advised that** **has never seen or used an envelope like the one** was shown. **has used** Styrofoam containers as well as small plastic containers slightly larger than a shoe box to transport items in the laboratory. **has never seen or used a sterilite type box at USAMRIID.** **does not have personal or professional associates in New Jersey, and** **has never traveled to New Jersey.** **was working for** in 2001 and does not recall taking any trips in September or October 2001. **advised that** **feels that it would have been easy for someone to remove a select agent from a hot suite. Someone could shower out with something, put it through a passbox, dunk it out or put it through an airlock or UV box.**

When asked about whether or not individuals piggyback into change rooms **replied "Oh God yeah."** **has never seen someone piggyback into a hot suite.**

**does not specifically know anyone who has a grudge against USAMRIID or the Government.** **does not know anyone who tried to or was willing to misuse a select agent.** **does not suspect anyone of being involved with the mailing**
of Ba in 2001. Advised that occasionally people left because of a Reduction in Force (RIF) and stated that one woman used to picket the front gate of USAMRIID because of an RIF. Was not impressed with. Felt that they were not safe and their labs were dirty. Recalls seeing plates just sitting out in one of laboratories used by. There were various laboratory technicians assigned to but was unable to pinpoint which technicians were sloppy.

Described various decontamination procedures used by in building at USAMRIID. Advised that

Ba research is conducted in BSL-2 and BSL-3 suites. Believes that the following investigators have worked with Ba: and. Does not know.
Attached hereto and considered part of this document is the CV provided by [Redacted].
Date of transcription 02/09/2004

Social Security Number, born,

was interviewed by

of the FBI. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and purpose of the interview, provided the following information:

United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID),

USAMRIID from

at USAMRIID was as a

Investigation on 2/02/2004 at

File # 279A-WF-222936 SUB LEAD AND SUB USAMRIID Date dictated 2/05/2004

This document contains

it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
said that he didn't work on any projects nor was he aware of any projects involving Bacillus anthracis.

stated that he has never used the

Has never used any type of culture technique, either single colony or multiple colony techniques.

has no experience, nor has he ever worked on any projects involving the drying of Bacillus anthracis.

has never fully characterized a string of anthrax and has no information about where it would have originated, or if it was the Ames strain, or if it came from Bruce Ivins or

When asked if he could identify any persons who had expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production or lyophilizing, responded that he has been working at USAMRIID for some time and had worked at USAMRIID when the facility developed biological weapons. was further described as

stated that he would probably know how to weaponize anthrax and how to conduct spore production. When asked about, he could not say that he was aware if he had expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production or lyophilizing.

had heard that but had only met once with no significant contact/conversation during that meeting. had heard a lot of talk regarding . People at USAMRIID, in general, liked thought was cordial and was nice to work with.

stated that possibly had more contact with  because

When asked if he could identify areas of USAMRIID which had problems with bacterial contamination (specifically suites), had heard that they had done random testing in Building and allegedly found loose anthrax spores in the hallway but was not sure which hallway. attempted to point
out on one of the provided schematics of the buildings where thought they found the spores.

When asked if could identify the areas where routinely worked, pointed out places on the building schematics where generally worked during his time at USAMRIID.

was asked if had ever used the hot areas of Building and that had never visited the hot areas. does not know where room was and never needed to go there.

When asked if people piggy-backed in and out of hot areas at USAMRIID, assumed that the answer would be yes because people routinely piggy-backed going in and out of most rooms at USARID. Piggy-backing occurred routinely in areas being worked in. figured that if people piggy-backed in non hot zone areas figured they wouldn't change their habits while going in and out of the hot zones.

was asked how someone could remove select agents from hot areas covertly and if could identify anyone who might have talked about removing select agents or who might try to remove a select agent out of a hot area. opinion was that felt that, overall, security was lacking at USAMRIID. had never visited hot areas and does not remember if anyone talked or joked about it. felt security was a joke and that a lot of faith was placed in the trust-worthiness of the employees and felt that anyone could walk out with anything if they really wanted to. There were no x-ray devices to screen ingoing or outgoing people or baggage. Once a person is assigned to USAMRIID they receive a computer controlled access card. The access cards were not color-coded according to access level. Often, access cards were lost, borrowed or shared by workers when they need to go in and out of areas when they didn't have their card with them. For example, heard people offer to lend their access cards when they needed to go out to their car or go to a snack machine. believed that personnel did not take security measures very serious at USAMRIID. However, was not aware of any theft or attempts to steal select agents from the hot areas.

was not aware of anyone who said they might make a select agent for use in improper fashion.
was not aware of any persons with access or ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents or expressed hostile attitudes towards any political organizations, the media or others.

When was asked if there were persons believed to be or suspect possibly associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters could not provide a specific name, but said that if was to suspect someone of the mailing, for absolutely no reason that could justify would say would pick identified because has been working at USAMRRIID and during the time they were making biological weapons for the US government. believes that misses glory days when was creating weapons and that is why is "a very bitter and pissed off old but is thought of very highly at USAMRRIID and stated there is a lot of "ass-kissing" of in that regard. heard, via rumor mill, that is paid approximately per hour for expertise as for USAMRRIID. stated that did not spend anytime with therefore, does not come to mind as someone who might have sent the anthrax letters. mentioned there were that remembered who might have the expertise to do something like the anthrax mailings. provided the name (phonetic spelling) as someone who might have the expertise to do something like the anthrax mailings. is allegedly a food chain, but had only seen once before and never had any direct contact with All other speakers that was aware of were all from within USAMRRIID and they were all either doctors, military officers, or both.

is not aware of any people with whom worked with who were lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents. was impressed with the professionalism exhibited by everyone worked with.

was not aware of anyone being involved or interested in gaining access to anthrax or other biological chemical agents nor having the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so.
When asked how would go about preparing dry Bacillus anthracis and sending to through the mail, said probably kill in the process therefore wouldn't even try.

was asked if was aware of anyone who expressed special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques and was not able to provide a name of anyone thought would fit this description. Neither nor any of associates had any personal or professional association with Trenton, New Jersey, Princeton or other areas of New Jersey.

did not travel nor is aware of any of associates' travel to New Jersey in September or October 2001.

stated that did not work in an area that had level or level bio safety cabinets, therefore was unaware of any special standard operational procedures for decontamination of and bio safety cabinets.

stated that had been used in work area in the lab.

has never smelled bacterial decontamination agents in the suite because has never visited the suite.

When asked if had ever used plastic storage containers such as sterilite boxes for storage of material at USAMRIID, answer was negative.

When asked if was aware of anyone who worked with Bacillus anthracis or simulants stated that
stated that all of work was recorded in lab notebooks and those notebooks can be found in the lab file cabinets.

had never purchased any pre-stamped envelopes nor did ever use any vending machines in order to purchase pre-stamped envelopes.

has never personally handled any of the anthrax laced letters or envelopes nor has conducted any analytical work on the evidence pertaining to this case.

knew who was but only from working at USAMRIID. was there, but was unaware of how was paid, if was a or recalled seeing at USAMRIID at the rear entrance of Building where escorted from the rear of Building to the front of Building at the time of this visit had a visitor's badge and was escorted to the conference room on the front side of building was allowed to technically piggy-back with because did not have an access badge in the building, which was why was escorted from the back of the building to the conference room. With the exception of the one time escorted never saw inside USAMRIID after.

never saw taking any equipment out of USAMRIID or moving equipment to a place where could use it unobserved.

never observed work at USAMRIID and never showed any interest in the anthrax in front of only knew that was a

never saw working with bacterial cultures or lyophilizers.

is unaware if ever removed or borrowed any equipment from USAMRIID or if ever tried to taint discarded lab equipment.

never saw walk near or go into the walk-in cooler, room on the hot side of Building.
never asked for any isolates, equipment or access to any USAMRIID locations.

does not know where may have stored samples or materials.

The one day was escorted by at USAMRIID, may have brought for

never discussed experiences in with

never talked about or in front of

never made any references to or any issue in front of

did not have any conversations with in which mentioned scenarios involving bio-weapons or how to create them or any ideas about mailing anthrax.

never mentioned ways to avoid forensic detection in bio-weapons cases to

is unaware of having any connections in New Jersey or at Princeton.

never recommended any books to

is unaware if ever visited the Gambrill Parkrode area.

is unaware with whom socialized or spent time with at work nor could identify any of

is unaware of any of activities after left USAMRIID.

never attended any however, people that knows were impressed. provided the names and as having attended at USAMRIID.
Since no one has made any comments about or about giving access to certain areas or to anthrax, stated that

stated that

doesn't specifically remember any conversations that ever had with is unaware of any political issues or funding issues that was involved with. handled all the

is unaware if ever discussed forensic countermeasures to bio-terrorism scenarios.

is not sure if

When escorted observed items in bag that may have been never discussed the use of lyophilizer to make powdered anthrax.

never showed to any materials such as
said that did not spend much time at USAMRIID while was assigned to USAMRIID

never discussed with
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/03/2004

Name

Date of birth

Security Number

Social Security Number

Home address

Home telephone number

was interviewed at [place of employment]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, provided the following information:

 earned a in [field of study] and a

worked at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) from until was assigned to the Division and was provided with various duties and was also involved with

Prior to USAMRIID,

 worked in building and at USAMRIID
was involved with studies involving spent most of time on the hot side of building and one of the division laboratories.

 was involved with a Bacillus anthracis (Ba) study that was headed by Bruce Ivins. This study took place in suite only had duties and was

Investigation on 1/30/04 at

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 2/3/04

by SA

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responsible for ___________ on the hot side of building ______ In this case, ______ would perform __________. 

requested items would be taken to the __________. This was an _______ was not involved with culturing, growing or harvesting the Ba used in this study. ______ was not involved with any aerosol challenges during this study. ______ thinks that IVINS used blood agar plates to grow his Ba. ______ does not know what strain of Ba IVINS used during his study.

also assisted ______ and ______ with a study. This was an aerosol study.

advised that the Ames strain of Ba was used frequently at USAMRIID.

described three ways that carcases/tissue were moved from various laboratories to the necropsy room or to another laboratory:

1) A carcass would be placed in formalin for three weeks and then taken to the Pathology Division. Requested samples would be taken from the carcass and sent to the appropriate division. The rest of the carcass would be placed in a freezer or autoclaved.

2) Unfixed tissue samples would be removed from the laboratory and sent to the Bacteriology or Virology Division.

3) Tissue would be fixed in gluteraldehyde and sent for electron microscopy.

Anytime a carcass or tissue sample left a laboratory, it would be bagged, decontaminated, bagged again and passed out of the laboratory.

advised that room ______ the walk-in-cooler on the hot side of building ______ was used to store animal carcasses.

has never met or talked to ______. heard rumors that ______ was special operations and ______ worked for various government agencies. ______ did not hear any rumors about ______ work habits or personal life.

has never seen or used a sterilite box at USAMRIID.
was shown an envelope consistent with the ones used in the anthrax mailings in 2001. Advised that has never seen or used an envelope like the one was shown.

does not have any professional associates in New Jersey. Attended a meeting in Newark, New Jersey sometime prior to September 11, 2001 and years ago, visited the New Jersey shore.
On February 03, 2004, [redacted] was interviewed at the Springfield Division, and [redacted] Washington Field Office. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] provided a copy of which detailed educational and professional experiences. [redacted] obtained a [redacted] in [redacted] from the [redacted] and [redacted] in the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, from [redacted] to [redacted], and held the position of [redacted] from [redacted] and to [redacted]. As [redacted] at USAMRIID, [redacted] spent [redacted] years.
worked in [ ] in USAMRIID's [ ] (believed to be Building [ ] from [ ])
worked in [ ] in Building [ ] from [ ] Laboratory space was shared by researchers and was assigned based on project type.

received [ ] B.a. stocks from [ ] at USAMRIID [ ]

[ ] did not recall ever working with B.a. Ames.

[ ] used sporulation media to generate spores for permanent storage of bacterial stocks. [ ] did not recall the specific type of sporulation media used. [ ] stocks were maintained in a refrigerator in [ ]. For germination of bacteria from a seed stock, [ ] would streak a plate and select a colony following the incubation period. [ ] was too busy with his own research projects to produce B.a. materials for other scientists.
Aside from contacted via email approximately two years ago regarding materials remaining at USAMRIID. The items were inventoried and confirmed that they were remnants of research. believed that the materials located by were destroyed.

did not ship B.a. domestically or internationally.

Following the publication of the Cell paper in 1983, followed all USAMRIID protocols and obtained the appropriate administrative approvals for the transfer.

and on a article titled "Volume pages The paper reported determination of the nucleotide sequence of the PA gene from B.a. and the 5' and 3' flanking sequences. The paper was published after had left USAMRIID. did not participate in the hands-on research aspects of the sequencing project. described contribution as that of an

BRUCE IVINS developed a halo test to detect recombinant E. coli using immunological reagents for PA which were provided by IVINS used in a study aimed at transferring into Bacillus subtilis.

was working at USAMRIID with had very little collaborative interaction with and . Any proposed studies discussed among the three remained at the 'talking stage' and never developed into functioning research projects. did not receive B.a. materials from .

continued to collaborate on projects with USAMRIID scientists, including and . Most of the work was related to replacement at USAMRIID and continues to work there.
remained in contact with [Redacted], who is still employed at USAMRIID. [Redacted] also collaborated with [Redacted].

The Ames strain was sent to USAMRIID in 1980 or 1981.

Knowledge of the Ames strain was derived from two sources: scientific discussions with [Redacted] and media reports on the CABLE NEWS NETWORK (CNN). [Redacted] worked with PA, B.a. plasmids and virulent B.a. strains, such as Ames and [Redacted] characterized their interaction as 'intellectual collaboration', as they often discussed scientific topics.

[Redacted] and [Redacted] met at USAMRIID and they had a good relationship.

[Redacted] and [Redacted] did not socialize outside of USAMRIID.
never hosted foreign scientists, but was introduced to a scientist from

never lyophilized B.a. and was not aware of any lyophilized B.a. material at USAMRIID. According to there was no reason to dry B.a. for storage, as bacterial spores were sufficiently stable for long-term storage.

... has never met ... and their terms of employment at USAMRIID did not overlap. ... knowledge of was aware that ... was from ... had no relatives or associates in NEW JERSEY.

Recalled traveling to NEW JERSEY ... to attend ... described the perimeter security at Fort Detrick as topnotch. ... stated that samples could be taken from
USAMRIID if a person was intent on doing so; however, knew of no one who removed Select Agents covertly. was not aware of any persons with access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organizations, the media, or others. There were no persons believed to be or suspected of possibly being associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters. was not aware of anyone with whom worked who was lax in handling dangerous items.

followed the anthrax investigation through media reports and publications. referred to the isotopic analysis of the Ames powder and a report that the spores were determined, within the limits of detection, to be approximately two years old. indicated that the interpretation of the data was critical. The results actually indicated that the growth media used to produce the spores was approximately two years old suggested two possible interpretations: the stock of Ames from which the spores derived was two years old, or the stock predated the mailings by many years, but the spores were produced using media that was two years old.

discussed the anthrax mailings with during a Two possible motives were proposed. The anthrax attack may have been perpetrated by someone trying to send a message. The highly purified nature of the spores that at least one of the persons involved in producing the material possessed very specialized skills and knowledge. surmised from media reports that the reagents added to weaponize the spores were not ones used in the US. It was also suggested that a foreign country, such as China, perpetrated to attack to test the defense and response capabilities of the US. was skeptical of this proposal, as such an act would be very risky for any country to take.

was in during the days surrounding the mailings of the anthrax letters. As documentation of whereabouts provided a handwritten telephone log, an employment leave record, and dated email messages encompassing the dates of September, and also provided a document detailing the minutes of a meeting at indicated that could also verify whereabouts during the dates surrounding the anthrax mailings.
A copy of the "Division of Environmental Health and Safety, Academic Personnel Record of Vacations, Holidays and Leaves," suggested that the usual schedule remained and the work of 2001, as was not noted for those days. Used this document to personally track usage of leave throughout the year. Handwritten, office telephone log for the number noted that made and received a total of four calls on September. Three calls were noted as received or made on.

A copy of an email message, dated indicated that was asked to voluntarily submit to a polygraph examination regarding the mailing of the anthrax letters. indicated that would think about the request and contact the Agents within a few days with decision.

The following items, received from have been placed in a 1A envelope (FD-340):

(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription: 02/17/2004

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Interviewed by Special Agent _______ and Postal Inspector _______ at _______ place of employment at Ft. Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, _______ voluntarily provided the following information:

- Earned _______ degree in _______ from _______ College _______.

- Started working at Ft. Detrick in the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in _______ as a _______. From _______ until _______ only had access to the _______ in building _______. In _______ started to receive _______ vaccinations _______. Was vaccinated, and began working in building _______. Specifically, _______ worked in the _______ suites as well as the _______. The only time _______ works in any area other than _______ Division is _______.

- Has never work with Bacillus anthracis but does _______.

- Has been involved in vaccine challenges performed by _______.

- Dr. Bruce Ivins _______.

- Has no knowledge of any foreign visiting scientists at USAMRIID _______.

- Never knew _______.

Investigation on 02/11/2004 at Frederick, Maryland

File #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID; 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A

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Precedence: ROUTINE     Date: 01/27/2004

To: Washington Field     Attn: Amerithrax 3

From: Squad CT-2
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-(Pending) 

Title: AMERITHRAX; MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To report results of lead set for Division to interview

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for Washington Field are one (1) copy and one (1) original FD-302 for the interview of and one (1) FD-540 envelope containing the original notes of the interview and floor plans of USAMRIID used in the interview.

Details: On 1/26/2004, Division interviewed , at place or provided detailed information regarding employment and education history.

From through worked at USAMRIID, Division, building

received the non-virulent Bacillus Anthracis samples from Doctor Bruce Ivins. The samples were retrieved from did not know the location of the freezer used to store the Bacillus Anthracis samples. did not grow Bacillus Anthracis samples at USAMRIID.

did not conduct research inside of building 1412. did not go into the hot areas of building 1412.
To: Washington Field  From: 
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 01/27/2004

I did not know who was not a member of

Please refer to the enclosed FD-302 for further details of the interview.
To: Washington Field  From: 
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 01/27/2004

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Read and Clear

++
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/27/2004

Since ___ born ___

social security account number  home ___

telephone number ___

was interviewed at  place of employment, ___

After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, ___ provided the following information:

Since ___ has ___

at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. From ___ to ___

received a ___

worked in Building ___ Division ___

Starting in ___ for approximately ___ conducted research on Non-Virulent forms of Bacillus Anthracis ___

Investigation on 1/26/2004 at ___

File # 279A-WF-222936- ___ USAMRIID-Sd ___ Date dictated 1/27/2004

by ___

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Continuation of FD-302 of ___________ conducted the Bacillus Anthracis research under the direction of ___________.

While at USAMRIID ___________ was assigned ___________.

The Bacillus Anthracis samples were stored in a freezer. ___________ was not familiar with the number of personnel with access to the freezer. ___________ worked under IVINS' department would grow the Bacillus Anthracis samples. ___________ did not assist with the growing of Bacillus Anthracis samples.

Upon completion of each laboratory work day, ___________ destroyed all Bacillus Anthracis samples utilizing the autoclave. ___________ could not identify other researchers at USAMRIID utilizing Bacillus Anthracis.

___________ could not identify the strain of Bacillus Anthracis used for research. ___________ did not use modified G Sporulation media and was unfamiliar with the media.

___________ utilized single colony culture techniques. After receiving the Bacillus Anthracis samples, ___________ would add antibiotics diluted in a liquid at a specific concentration. The culture would be monitored for growth or reaction to the antibiotics. Different types and quantities of antibiotics were mixed and added to the Bacillus Anthracis cultures. Typically, the samples were completed in a four to six hour time period. After the test results were recorded, all samples were destroyed the same day by autoclave.

___________ has not participated or used drying techniques for Bacillus Anthracis or any other organism. ___________ has not utilized
a lyophilizer has no experience or training in laboratory drying techniques. was unable to provide names of anyone with experience using a lyophilizer or drying techniques. was not familiar with the location of stored samples of dried Bacillus Anthracis.

was unclear if the Bacillus Anthracis used for research was fully characterized. believes the Bacillus Anthracis was most likely fully characterized, since it was identified as a unfamiliar with the origins of the Bacillus Anthracis used in her The samples were provided to by Bruce Ivins.

was familiar with one person, with expertise in learned of by reading research materials and books on the subject.

had no first hand knowledge of bacterial contamination at USAMRIID. However, read in a research paper of one incident of bacterial contamination at USAMRIID. The paper indicated a visiting scientist died at USAMRIID as a result of exposure to

worked in building at USAMRIID. was assigned office in the staff area adjacent to the conducted research in laboratory space within the Division. could not recall the room numbers of the laboratories. utilized both level II and level III laboratory space within the Division.

did not conduct research inside of building would go to building only to has not been in the hot areas of building has not been in the walk-in cooler, room of building does not know what is stored in room was not aware of anyone "piggy-backing" into hot areas at USAMRIID. was unable to provide information on visiting scientists inside the hot areas, since had not been in the hot areas.

was unaware of anyone removing select agents from the hot zone. If someone wanted to remove select agents from the hot zone, identified three possible methods to remove the agents from the hot zone. First, someone could pass the select agent through the "Pass Box". The "Pass Box" is utilized to pass
continuation of FD-302 of ________________________

On 1/26/2004

Page 4

Laboratory notebooks from the hot zone to the clean zone. The notebook inside the hot zone is placed inside the box. The box door is closed and UV lights inside the box are turned on. After the UV treatment, the notebook is removed from the box on the clean side. Second, someone could carry the select agent through the decontamination shower. After showering, the individual could hide the select agent material in their street clothes before exiting the decontamination area. Third, an individual could place the select agent inside the autoclave from the hot zone. A person could place a select agent inside the autoclave, but not turn it on. Once through the decontamination shower, the person could open the autoclave on the clean side and remove the select agent.

Was unaware of anyone indicating they might make a select agent for use in some improper fashion. Was unaware of anyone with access and the ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents, which expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media or others. Was not aware of any persons believed to be or suspected of possibly being associated with the mailings of anthrax letters. Could not identify anyone has worked with that was lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents.

Was not aware of anyone at USAMRIID interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents. Has no ideas on how to prepare dried Bacillus Anthracis and send it through the mail. Is unaware of anyone which expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques. Has no ties or associates with ties to the Trenton, New Jersey or other areas of New Jersey. Was at the time of the anthrax mailings. Has no knowledge of anyone traveling to New Jersey during September or October of 2001.

The laboratory maintained basic standard operating procedures (SOP) for decontamination of laboratory work areas. The SOP for basic decontamination of Level II and III laboratories were similar. The SOP directed workers to use a ten percent bleach solution to clean surfaces. Also, workers were directed to turn on UV light sources on the room ceiling and inside the hoods.

Indicated paraformaldehyde or glutaraldehyde fumigation were not used in area at USAMRIID. However
observed on several occasions small areas sealed off inside building 1425. The sealed off areas were marked with warning signs indicating fumigation was taking place. Typically, the fumigation of laboratory areas was conducted on Fridays. [ ] was not sure if the virology areas were ever fumigated, as [ ] did not go into the virology area.

[ ] utilized glass or metal containers at USAMRIID. [ ] does not recall using or observing plastic storage containers, such as sterilite boxes, at USAMRIID.

[ ] was not aware of any unofficial or off the record research conducted at USAMRIID. [ ] recorded all of [ ] research in laboratory notebooks. [ ] turned in all completed notebooks into the laboratory librarian.

[ ] has not purchased or used pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the anthrax mailings. [ ] has no knowledge of pre-stamped envelopes being available or for sale at USAMRIID. However, the pre-stamped envelopes may have been sold at the U.S. Post Office on the grounds of USAMRIID.

[ ] did not handle any of the anthrax-laced letters sent to USAMRIID. [ ] has not conducted analytical work on the evidence in the anthrax investigation.

[ ] did not know who [ ] was. [ ] does not recall observing [ ] at USAMRIID or elsewhere. [ ] indicated [ ] was not a member of the
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/26/2003

On 02/27/2004, [ ] date of birth
[ ] social security number [ ] home address
[ ] was interviewed at [ ] place of employment.

After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and
the nature of the interview, [ ] provided the following
information:

[ ] provided the following overview of
[ ] educational and career experience:

Investigation on 02/27/2004 at [ ]

File # 279A-WP-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-WP-222936-LEAD

by SA [ ] and SA [ ]

Date dictated n/a

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If never interviewed:

1. Obtain details on education, specializations, nature of work at each laboratory of employment; details on work with biological organisms (particularly *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba)).

   Answer: Covered above. ______ has never worked with any virulent form of Ba. ______ has worked with the Sterns (vaccine) strain of Ba during the normal course of ______ immunization duties.

2. Determine whether any work with Ba was on the living organism or only with components such as toxin, DNA, etc.

   Answer: ______ has never worked with any virulent strain of anthrax, only the vaccine strain used for immunizing USAMRIID employees.

3. Obtain details on all projects involving Ba including identification of contracts, subcontractors, lab assistants, whether the work involved spores or just vegetative cells, strains used, specifically how the Ba was grown, storage technique and all storage locations, distribution to any other researchers.

   Answer: Although ______ has never worked on any science driven projects involving Ba agreed to identify ______ coworkers ______ Division ______

4. Have you ever used the modified G sporulation media? When, on what organism and strain, where was it stored?
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Continuation of FD-302 of _________ On 02/27/2004 Page 3

Answer:_________ has never worked with any form of anthrax created using modified G sporulation media.

5. What type of culture technique did you use? Was it single colony or multiple colony culture technique? If you used both, what time-frames did you use each?
Answer:_________ has never cultured any form of Ba.

6. Identify any work involving the drying of Ba. Was a lyophilizer used? What was the specific technique? Are any samples of dried Ba still maintained? Were high resolution images collected?
Answer:_________ has never dried any form of Ba and has never used a lyophilizer.

7. Were the strains used fully characterized? Where did they originate, and where have they been disseminated? If the strain was Ames, did it come from Bruce Ivins or _________
Answer:_________ has never worked with any form of virulent anthrax(characterized or uncharacterized).

8. Identify any persons who have expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production, lyophilizing. Is there anyone else we should talk to about the above issues?
Answer:_________ does not know of any individuals with the above listed expertise.

9. Identify any areas of USAMRIID which had problems with bacterial contamination, particularly _________ suites.
Answer:_________ never heard about any issues of bacterial cross contamination in any area of USAMRIID but did note that in 1999_________ a USAMRIID employee, had an accidental needle stick and may have been exposed to a virulent strain of anthrax.
10. Identify the areas routinely used by the employee (use floor plans).

Answer: [ ] spent almost all of [ ] time while at USAMRIID in Building [ ] rooms [ ] remembers going into Building [ ]

11. Determine if the person used the hot areas of building [ ] Was the walk-in cooler, room [ ] used? Who was observed using the walk-in cooler? Do you know what was stored there?

Answer: [ ] did not conduct work in the hot areas of building [ ] was unaware of the existence of a walk-in cooler in room [ ]

12. Did people "piggy-back" in and out of the hot areas at USAMRIID? Were visiting scientists taken into the hot areas by USAMRIID researchers?

Answer: [ ] stated that [ ] cannot remember ever witnessing anyone "piggybacking" into the BL3 area at USAMRIID, but did remember individuals "piggybacking" in the general access doors of Building 1425.

13. How could someone remove Select Agents from the hot areas covertly? Identify any individuals who attempted this.

Answer: [ ] believes the person would need to conceal the sample of select agent in clothing in order to make it out of the BL3 area. After leaving the BL3 area [ ] did not know how the person would remove the sample from the building.

14. Are you aware of anyone who said they might make a Select Agent for use in some improper fashion?

Answer: [ ] could not identify anyone who said they might make a select agent for subversive reasons. [ ] did recall the FBI arresting several

15. Are you aware of any persons with the access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media, or others?

Answer: No

16. Are there any persons you believe to be or suspect of possibly being associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters? Who and why?

Answer: No

17. Are there any people with whom you have worked who were lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents?

Answer: No

18. Was there anyone at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so?

Answer: No

19. How would you go about preparing dried Ba and sending it through the mail?

Answer: [blank] had no idea of how someone would prepare dried Ba and send it through the mail.

20. Are you aware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques?

Answer: No

21. Do you or any of your associates have any personal or professional association with Trenton, New Jersey, Princeton or other areas of New Jersey?
22. Did you or any of your associates travel to New Jersey in September or October 2001? Do you recall where you were during that time period?

Answer: No. Does not believe has ever been in NJ. Remembers driving to but does not recall traveling through New Jersey.

23. Are there SOPs for decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets in your work areas? What are they?

Answer: Remembers an SOP that had been established for decontamination of the suites after a "hot" individual had been recovered and moved to USAMRIID by the never used this SOP and stated that it was only to be instituted if a "hot" person was quarantined and removed from the suites.

24. Has paraformaldehyde or glutaraldehyde fumigation been employed in the areas? When?

Answer: Has no knowledge of this process.

25. Have you ever smelled bacterial decontamination agents in the suites?

Answer: Has never smelled bleach, a common bacterial decontamination chemical, at USAMRIID but does remember a distinct decontamination smell routinely coming from a specific area where lab study monkeys were being disposed of in an incinerator. Also remembers the smell coming from the labs where the monkey related research had taken place and were subsequently being cleaned and decontaminated. Stated the smell reminded of, "fresh green beans in summer time".

26. Have you ever used plastic storage containers, such as sterilite boxes, for storage of your materials at USAMRIID? If so, how, where and when were they
purchased? By whom? Did you ever notice any such storage boxes missing?

Answer: remembers using thick clear plastic boxes that were approximately 8" X 12" X 6". remembers that the boxes had metal safety locks with rubber gaskets that created an air tight seal.

27. Are you aware of any work being conducted with Ba or its simulants which was unofficial or not recorded?

Answer: No

28. Was all of your work recorded in lab notebooks? Where are they stored?

Answer: stated that before the mid 1990s all of the USAMRIID immunization records were exhaustively documented by employees in lab books. After the mid 1990s USAMRIID switched to and now uses a computerized immunization record keeping system that now tracks all immunization records.

29. Did you ever purchase pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the mailings for your own use or for anyone else? If so, did you ever give them to anyone else? Where were the envelopes stored?

Answer: No

30. Did you ever use any of the vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes? If so, which machine and when?

Answer: No

31. Did you personally handle any of the anthrax-laced letters or envelopes? If so, when, what rooms, who else was present?

Answer: No

32. Did you do any analytical work on the evidence in this case? Get details.
Continuation of FD-302 of ____________________________ On 02/27/2004, Page 8

Answer: No

Questions regarding

1. Did you know who was prior to ____________________

Answer: Yes

2. Do you recall ever seeing ____________________ in USAMRIID? If so, what parts of which building did you see in? ____________________

Answer: ____________________ would routinely see ____________________ when ____________________ work area (previously identified) for immunization against a variety of select agents. ____________________ stated that ____________________ would routinely run into immunization compliance problems due to the fact that ____________________ remembers ____________________ ranting and raving specifically about ____________________ and ____________________ non compliance issues. ____________________ stated that once an employee became non compliant ____________________ immediate supervisor was notified. ____________________ remember ____________________ department had ____________________ access into the ____________________ suites turned off during the ____________________ Soon after ____________________ access badge was turned off ____________________ Once ____________________ was compliant, ____________________ access was turned back on. ____________________ remembers ____________________ being immunized against ____________________

3. Do you recall seeing ____________________ inside USAMRIID after ____________________

If so, was ____________________ escorted? What kind of badge was ____________________ wearing and using? When did you see ____________________ Where did ____________________ go inside USAMRIID?
Answer: left USAMRIID in and has no knowledge of activities after that date.

4. Did you ever let "piggy-back" into any areas with you? What areas and when?

Answer: No

5. Did you ever see taking any equipment to a place where could use it unobserved?

Answer: No

6. What did work with at USAMRIID?

Answer: was not sure exactly what did at USAMRIID. knows that was a and did a lot of socializing. always remembers seeing in the hallways with a cup of coffee in hand talking to other people.

7. Did you ever see working with bacterial cultures or lyophilizers?

Answer: No

8. Did ever remove or borrow any equipment from USAMRIID? Did ever try to obtain discarded lab equipment?

Answer: was not aware of any equipment related issues surrounding

9. Did you ever see near the walk-in cooler, room in the hot side of

Answer: stated that was only in building on occasions to did not specifically remember any walk in cooler in building

10. Did ever ask you for any isolates, equipment, or access to any USAMRIID locations?
11. Do you know where stored samples and materials?
   Answer: No

12. Are you aware of any samples may have brought with from prior research or employment? What were they?
   Answer: No

13. Did ever discuss experiences in Details?
   Answer: Not that remembers. was aware that

14. Did talk about discussions with or Details?
   Answer: does not know who or are and has never heard of either person.

15. Did make any references to killing people?
   Answer: No

16. Do you recall complaining about any political issues or other issues, particularly involving senators or media personnel?
   Answer: No

17. Were there any conversations in which mentioned scenarios involving bioweapons and how to create them? Did ever mention the idea of mailing anthrax?
   Answer: No

18. Did ever mention ways to avoid forensic detection in bioweapons cases?
   Answer: No
19. Do you know if [_____] had any connections in New Jersey? At Princeton?
   Answer: No

20. Did [_____] ever recommend any books to you as good books to read? What were they? Do you still have them?
   Answer: No

21. Do you know if [_____] ever visited the [_____] area?
   Answer: [_____] has never heard of [_____] and did not know the location of [______].

22. Do you know with whom [_____] socialized or spent time with at work? Can you identify any of [______]?
   Answer: [_____] remembers [_____] spending time with [_____] while at USAMRIID. [_____] does not know who [_____] socialized with outside work but remembers that [_____] who was also employed at USAMRIID. [_____] thinks [______].

23. What, if anything, do you know about [_____] activities after [_____] left USAMRIID?
   Answer: [_____] has no idea of what [_____] was doing after [_____] left USAMRIID.

24. Did you ever attend any presentations given by [_____]? Do you recall any controversial issues being discussed?
   Answer: No

25. [_____] has anyone made any comments to you about [_____] or about having given [_____] access to certain areas or to Ba?
   Answer: No
26. Is there anything we have not asked you that you could tell us which could be related to the anthrax letter mailings?

Answer: No

then went on to say that [ ] does not believe that [ ] had anything to do with the mailing of the anthrax letters and does not believe [ ] could kill anyone.

If interviewee hosted foreign visiting scientists:

[ ] stated that [ ] never hosted a foreign visiting scientist while employed at USAMRIID. Therefore the listed questions were not asked of [ ].

If interviewee was an [ ] member:

1. Did [ ] spend time with the [ ]

Answer:

2. What conversations do you remember having with [ ]

Answer: [ ] does not remember ever having any conversations with [ ].

3. Were you aware of any political issues [ ] which [ ] was involved in?

Answer: No
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4. Answer: [Blank]
   never attended

5. Answer: No

6. Answer: No

7. Answer: No

8. Answer: No

9. Answer: No

10. Answer: No

11. Answer: No
Resident Agency of the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [blank] provided the following information:

- [blank] worked in a laboratory at USAMRIID, where [blank] worked primarily with anthracis (BA) was trained to work with BA, but was never required to. [blank] was aware that "tons of BA samples" came in after September 11, 2001; however, [blank] never handled any of them.

- [blank] never used the modified G sporulation media.
- [blank] did not grow active cultures and, therefore, did not use any culture techniques.

When asked if the strains of BA used were fully characterized, [blank] said that [blank] did not know and again reiterated that [blank] never worked with BA.

- [blank] did not know BRUCE IVINS.
- [blank] stated that most of the professors who worked at USAMRIID have expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production, and lyophilizing. [blank] listed [BLANK].
Continuation of FD-302 of ________________, On 12/24/2003, Page 2

personally knew who had expertise in weaponization techniques and spore production of BA.

_______ was shown a copy of the floor plans for buildings 1425 and 1412 of USAMRIID. _______ identified the _______ area located on the _______ floor plan, as the area where _______ worked. When asked to identify any areas of USAMRIID which had problems with bacterial contamination, _______ stated the only ones _______ was aware of would have taken place in _______ said _______ never used the hot areas of building 1412 and _______ was never on the _______ floor.

_______ said that people did piggyback in and out of some areas at USAMRIID, but _______ had no knowledge about the hot areas. _______ was surprised at how easy it was to get in and out of the building. _______ believes the facility is "not that secure". _______ said that people who are cross training between virology and bacteriology had access to both areas and the security soldiers had access to everywhere.

When asked how someone could remove select agents from the hot areas covertly, _______ said _______ had never been in the labs, but _______ thought it would be easy and that people could possibly pipette it into a tube. _______ is not aware of any individuals who attempted this.

_______ is not aware of anyone who said they might make a select agent for use in some improper fashion.

_______ is not aware of anyone with the access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents, who expressed hostile attitudes towards any political organization, the media, or others.

_______ does not know any person that _______ believes to be, or suspects of, possibly being associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters.
did not know of anyone at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents, or the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so.

had no idea how to go about preparing dried BA and sending it through the mail.

is not aware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.

When asked if or any of associates have any personal or professional association with Trenton, Princeton, or other areas of New Jersey, stated that but did not have access to any hot areas.

said that neither any of associates traveled to New Jersey in September or October, 2001.

was asked if there are Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for

When asked if had ever smelled bacterial decontamination agents in the virology suites, said did not know, as had not been in there; however, you could smell autoclaves at work near those areas.
When asked if had ever used plastic storage containers, such as Sterilite boxes, for storage of materials at USAMRIID, stated had and that most of the time it was for

is not aware of any work being conducted with BA or its simulants, which was unofficial or not recorded.

said all of work was recorded in lab notebooks, which are stored

never purchased pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the mailings for own use or for anyone else, because did not do mailings for never used any of the vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes. purchased stamps at a store near home.

said did not personally handle any of the anthrax laced letters or envelopes.

did know who saw at USAMRIID on a weekly basis in and in some of the hallways in the rest of the building. saw very regularly. Sometimes was escorted and other times was not. was not aware of what type of badge was wearing and using. was in many different areas inside USAMRIID.

did not recall ever letting piggyback into any areas with

did not ever see taking any equipment out of USAMRIID or moving equipment to a place where could use it unobserved, with the exception of

was aware that worked with anthrax at USAMRIID. It was common knowledge that
never saw working with bacterial cultures or lyophilizers.

was not aware of ever removing or borrowing any equipment from USAMRIID, or ever trying to obtain discarded lab equipment.

When asked if had ever seen near the room, in the hot side of building stated may have, but does not remember. However did see in the hallways a lot.

said never asked for any isolates, equipment, or access to any USAMRIID locations. Everything had access to, did as well.

said there was lots of public relations work going on at USAMRIID and people from all over the world were given tours of some of the suites.

did not know where stored samples or materials, but stated that there are storage areas all over USAMRIID.

is not aware of any samples may have brought with from prior research or employment.

said that never discussed
never heard make any reference to

did not recall ever complaining about any political issues or other issues, particularly involving Senators or media personnel.

said never mentioned ways to avoid forensic detection in bio-weapons cases.

did not know if had any connections in New Jersey or at Princeton.

does not know if ever visited the

does not know with whom socialized or spent time with at work. When asked if could identify any of said never saw with is aware that lived at
Continuation of FD-302 of __________, On 12/24/2003, Page 7

_ does not know anything about __ activities

had heard about a __________ which involved a suspicious type package, but __ is unaware if it could be related to the anthrax letter mailings,

was not aware if any of the visitors were given access to any hot suites or any locations where live, virulent BA was stored or utilized, but __ was aware that many visitors did go through those areas.

said that all the visitors coming through __ area were escorted at all times and were never left in the lab alone. __ said that on __ tours, there was never any opportunity during the visits for the visitors to have removed samples from USAMRIID without being observed. __ said that many people on staff participated in or assisted with visits.

When asked if any of the visitors made any requests to obtain samples of any type from USAMRIID, __ said they did not but many of them wanted of pictures and literature.
described a picture of the BA spore, which had been enlarged many hundred times,

said that none of visitors showed any particular interest in anthrax, the Ames strain, weaponization techniques, or lyophilizing methods.

was unaware if any of the visitors to USAMRIID had access to a lyophilizer while they were there. said the visitors at USAMRIID did not work or use any rooms at the facility.

said there were not any foreign visitors ever observed in the possession of pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the mailings. said that none of the visitors ever asked about locations in Frederick where they could purchase stamped envelopes for personal use during their visits.

said that none of the visitors ever showed any anti-American sentiments during their visit.

said that did spend time with

had many conversations with but none were alarming and all were work related.

is not aware of any political issues, which was involved in but was aware that it was always a problem getting funding.
could not think of any other information about interactions with which might potentially relate to the case.
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