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Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

March 4, 2010

Mr. John Greenewald

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Northridge, CA 91325

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request HQ-2010-00130-F

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This is the of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) response to your request for information that you sent to the Department of Energy (DOE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552. You asked for a copy of all records that pertain to investigation number I05SR008, "WMD Terror Threat; Savannah River Site; Aiken, SC."

The OIG has completed the search of its files and identified 31 documents responsive to your request. A review of the responsive documents and a determination concerning their release has been made pursuant to the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552. Certain information has been withheld pursuant to subsections (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C) of the Act, or Exemptions 6 and 7(C), respectively.

Documents 2 and 3, 12 through 26, and 29 through 31 are released with information withheld pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Documents 1 and 4 through 11 are released in their entirety.

Exemption 6 protects from disclosure "personnel and medical and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. . . ." Exemption 7(C) provides that "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" may be withheld from disclosure, but only to the extent the production of such documents "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. . . ."

Names and information that would tend to disclose the identity of certain individuals have been withheld pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Individuals involved in OIG investigations, which in this case include subjects, witnesses, sources of information, and other individuals, are entitled to privacy protections so that they will be free from harassment, intimidation and other personal intrusions.

To the extent permitted by law, the DOE, in accordance with Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), Section 1004.1, will make available records it is authorized to withhold pursuant to the FOIA unless it determines such disclosure is not in the public interest.

In invoking Exemptions 6 and 7(C), we have determined that it is not in the public interest to release the withheld material. In this request, we have determined that the public interest in the identity of individuals who appear in investigative files does not outweigh these individuals' privacy interests. Those interests include being free from intrusions into their professional and private lives.




Documents 27 and 28 originated with the DOE's Savannah River Operations Office (SROO) or a contractor under the purview of that office. The documents have been forwarded to SROO for a determination concerning their releasability. They will respond directly to you concerning the documents.

As required, all releasable information has been segregated from the material that is withheld and is provided to you. See 10 C.F.R. 1004.7(b)(3).

This decision may be appealed within 30 calendar days from your receipt of this letter pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 1004.8. Appeals should be addressed to the Director, Office of Hearings and Appeals, HG-1/L'Enfant Plaza Building, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20585-1615.

Thereafter, judicial review will be available to you in the federal district court either (1) in the district where you reside, (2) where you have your principal place of business, (3) where the Department's records are situated, or (4) in the District of Columbia.

Sincerely,

for 
John Hartman
Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations
Office of Inspector General

Enclosures

Document Number 1

RELEASE

Tab A

Record of Disclosure Form
FACT Form
IG Subpoena Requests and Issued Subpoenas
Deputation Documentation
Consensual Monitoring Requests and Approval

TAB A

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

OFFICIAL CASE FILE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CASE NO. I05SR008

[illegible]

Document Number 2

RELEASE

Tab B

General Correspondence
Correspondence with Federal, State and Local Attorneys
Congressional Correspondences
News Clippings

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

OFFICIAL CASE FILE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CASE NO. I05SR008

INDEX NO.	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	DOCUMENT DATE
B-1	Aiken Standard/Ltr to Pedde tested	20-Jul-05
B-2	Aiken Standard/A need for new SRS mission	20-Jul-05
B-3	Augusta Chronicle/Threatening ltr w/ powder	20-Jul-05
B-4	The State/Suspicious mail to SRS Pres.	20-Jul-05
B-5	Augusta Chronicle/Pess. takes hold SRS Emp.	31-Jul-05
B-6	FBI Notification	5-Aug-05
B-7		
B-8		
B-9		
B-10		
B-11		
B-12		

Document Number 3



U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Inspector General
Region 2 Investigations Office
P. O. Box 447
New Ellenton, South Carolina 29809

August 5, 2005

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Federal Bureau of Investigation

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

One Tenth St.
Augusta, GA 30901

Dear

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, Southeast Region Investigations, is initiating a criminal investigation, OIG Case No: I05SR008, into the following matter:

See the attached OIG Complaint Form for all information relevant to this matter which is available to the OIG at this time.

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at (865) 576-

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Southeast Region Investigations

This document, including any attachment, is the property of the Office of Inspector General and is for OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Appropriate safeguards should be provided. Public disclosure is determined by the Freedom of Information Act, Title 5, U.S.C. 522, and the Privacy Act, Title 5, U.S.C. 522a.

Document Number 4

RELEASE

Pessimism takes hold of SRS workers

Pessimism takes hold of SRS workers

By Josh Gelinas | South Carolina Bureau Chief

Sunday, July 31, 2005

AIKEN - John Wetherbee says his Savannah River Site colleagues were growing disheartened well before the Jan. 18 announcement that 400 people would be laid off.

"There is plenty of concern about the shrinking environment at SRS," said Mr. Wetherbee, who was among those let go. "People talk about that all the time."

For Mr. Wetherbee, a career engineer who'd already been laid off once before, in 1997, his release came as a sort of blessing.

"For the last 10 years I've wanted to go into business," the 48-year-old said.

The University of Florida graduate is well positioned to pursue his goal. As part of his severance package, he's getting his salary for most of the next two months - and will receive a week's pay for each of the 19 years he worked at the site.

He'll also get medical and dental insurance benefits, along with half his pension.

For others, losing their jobs won't be so easy. And, as threatening letters mailed to two top site executives in the days after the layoffs suggested, the process has been unnerving for some.

The letters - which were mailed to Westinghouse Savannah River Co. President Bob Pedde, who leads the private company that manages SRS, and Bechtel Savannah River Inc. President Larry Simmons - appear to be the most extreme form of backlash most can remember after layoffs at the site.

Those laid off and those employed have overwhelmingly condemned the threats.

"I hope they catch those who did it quickly," one person wrote at a chat room for SRS employees at www.ourchat.net. "We don't need people like that floating around here. We don't need a term like 'going postal' to get started about SRS employees."

The latest round of layoffs dropped the site's work force to about 11,000 people. It's supposed to be followed by another cutback of 800 people in coming months.

Without new missions from the U.S. Department of Energy or other federal agencies and the private sector, the site's work force is projected to drop to about 5,000 in the decades to come.

Site managers have stayed optimistic.

Mr. Pedde told the SRS Citizens Advisory Board on Tuesday that he estimated the next round of layoffs "won't come close" to the 500-800 mark.

He also expressed optimism that construction would start soon on a plant at SRS that would convert plutonium into fuel for commercial reactors and take as many as 1,500 people to build. But he paired his optimism with a dose of reality.

"The real question is how far we'll go with these cuts before (that) comes," he warned.

Local SRS supporters point out that Washington Group International, the parent company of Westinghouse, and other engineering companies are hiring some of the laid-off engineers.

That has done little to soothe the concerns of SRS workers, Mr. Wetherbee said.

"They are not very optimistic about new missions at SRS," he said. "Management wants you to believe things are good, but employees aren't buying that."

Reach Josh Gelinas at (803) 648-1395, ext. 113, or josh.gelinas@augustachronicle.com



Annette M. Drowlette/Staff
John Wetherbee says his Savannah River Site colleagues were growing disheartened well before the Jan. 18 announcement that 400 people would be laid off.

BY THE NUMBERS

560: People laid off from SRS this year

175: People laid off in April

385: People laid off in July

800: Cuts expected in coming months

25,000: Site's all-time high employment, in the early 1990s

11,000: The site's approximate employment now

Of the 560 people laid off so far this year:

381: Were salaried employees, including engineers, chemists and managers

179: Were paid by the hour, including operators, mechanics and clerical staff

368: Men

192: Women

379: South Carolinians

180: Georgia residents

1: Unknown

Source: Westinghouse Savannah River Co.

From the Monday, August 1, 2005 printed edition of the Augusta Chronicle

Document Number 5

RELEASE

Suspicious mail sent to SRS president

Georgia authorities are investigating a suspicious letter sent to the home of the president of the Savannah River Site just one day after he notified 400 employees that they would be fired.

At about 3:45 p.m. Tuesday, Linda Pedde, wife of SRS president Bob Pedde found a white powdery substance after opening the mail, said Capt. Steve Morris of the Columbia County (Ga.) Sheriff's Department. The powder was in a regular envelope inside another envelope, which contained a threatening letter. Morris would not discuss details of the letter.

Authorities evacuated six homes in the 3000 block of Stevens Way in the Stevens Pointe neighborhood as a safety precaution. The sheriff's department sent the envelopes to the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta for further testing. Pedde's wife and the two sheriff's deputies who first responded to the scene were decontaminated.

"There's been some talk about the layoffs and a connection there," Morris said. "Logically speaking, that could be a motivation, but that is only an assumption right now."

On Monday, Pedde gave about 400 employees a 60-day notice they would be fired, The Associated Press reported. It's the second phase of a 2,000 worker lay-off, scheduled to be completed by Oct. 1, 2006.

Document Number 6

RELEASE

Wednesday, July 20, 2005

Page

1A

Page

of



VALERIE ROWELL STAFF

A threatening letter with white powder was sent to the home of Westinghouse Savannah River Co. President Robert Pedde (right).

Threatening letter laced with powder

By Preston Sparks and Valerie Rowell
Columbia County Bureau

A suspicious powder and threatening letter were discovered Tuesday at the home of Westinghouse Savannah River Co. President Bob Pedde, one day after he announced the layoffs of 400 people at Savannah River Site.

"Logically, you could assume that it (Tuesday's threat) may be connected (to the layoffs)," said Capt. Steve Morris, of the Columbia County Sheriff's Office. "It's really too early to tell. It would be just an assumption, but it is a possibility."

Will Callicott, a spokesman for Westinghouse Savannah River Co., said the company had no comment and deferred questions to agencies at the scene.

The discovery was reported just before 4 p.m. in Stevens Pointe subdivision. Pam Tucker, the county's emergency services director, said the couple had returned from vacation and found the letter in their mail.

"It's my understanding that it is a threatening letter with white powder," Mrs. Tucker said.

As a precaution, she said, the county's health department was called to make sure anyone exposed to the letter was OK. The Columbia County Sheriff's Office also was dispatched, as was Martinez-Columbia Fire Rescue, to remove the letter and powder.

Gold Cross EMS, the county's emergency management agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation also were called to the scene.

"I'm sure that they'll go ahead and double bag it (the letter and powder) and tag it and get it to a lab so they can get it tested," Mrs. Tucker said.

Capt. Morris said Mrs. Pedde and two sheriff's deputies were decontaminated as a precaution. About six neighboring homes were also evacuated, but officials said there was no immediate threat to neighbors.

Reach Preston Sparks at 866-1222, ext. 115 or
preston.sparks@augustachronicle.com. Reach Valerie Rowell at
(706) 866-1222, ext. 110, or vrowell@augustachronicle.com.

B-3

Document Number 7

RELEASE

A need for new SRS missions

Another 400 people have been terminated at the Savannah River Site, bringing the total number of workers at SRS to fewer than 9,000.

The dismissals were part two of a three-part implementation that will see a reduction of 800 more workers next year. Although no surprise — since the projected numbers were announced months ago — the dismissals bring to our attention once more that the number of workers at SRS is declining. More reductions will be forthcoming in future years unless SRS gets new missions.

It is imperative that government leaders on the county, state and national stage step forward to push for energy-related and nuclear-related missions that are appropriate for SRS. The Site has the infrastructure already in place for a number of potential missions ranging from a new power reactor to a reactor to create nuclear medicine to continued work on hydrogen research that might become a primary energy source in the future.

SRS has strong local support and always has. This is something that officials from the Department of Energy should take into account as they look for appropriate sites for future missions. While other communities have vacillated on their support for hometown facilities, SRS has always had a warm relationship with its surrounding communities in both Georgia and South Carolina.

This local support along with the desirable nature of a large geographic area on which to place new facilities makes SRS a primary location for many new missions. All those in the Aiken area who wish to see SRS hold a key role in the area's economic growth and in the nation's energy future should urge their representatives to push future missions toward SRS.

Document Number 8

RELEASE

THE AIKEN STANDARD

Aiken, South Carolina

Circulation 17,500 Daily
18,000 Sunday

Wednesday, July 20, 2005

Page 1A

Page 2 of 2

Letter: Suspicious package draws testing

Continued from 1A

Callicott declined to comment on the situation as it unfolded at Pedde's residence late Tuesday afternoon.

Preliminary testing was done at the scene Tuesday, Morris said.

The responding officers as well as the residents exposed to the powder were decontaminated.

Authorities cordoned off Stevens Way where Pedde lives and evacuated approximately six neighboring residences.

Morris said they should have some new information as early as today, but he was uncertain how long it would take officials to determine the composition of the substance.

He said officials were being cautious, but expected everyone would be able to return to their

homes by late Tuesday evening.

"We can expect normalcy within the next few hours," he said as the incident unfolded.

The person who sent the letter could face a number of felony charges, including terrorist threats and acts.

Staff writer J.C. Lexow contributed to this story.

Contact Karen Daily at kdaily@aikenstandard.com.

THE AIKEN STANDARD

Aiken, South Carolina

Circulation 17,500 Daily
18,000 Sunday

Letter to Pedde undergoes tests

By KAREN DAILY
Staff writer

A threatening letter stuffed inside an envelope with a white powdery substance was received at the Martinez, Ga., home of WSRC president Bob Pedde Tuesday, but officials say any speculation that the incident was related to the layoffs announced at the Savannah River Site earlier this week is only an assumption.

Columbia County Sheriff's Department Investigations Captain Steve Morris said the letter was stuffed inside and envelope with another envelope that contained the substance.

The powder will be sent to the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta today for analysis, but Columbia County officials will conduct their own criminal investigation to determine who sent the letter.

Among other things, officials will test the powder for

anthrax

"Logically you can assume this is connected to the layoffs, but that's only an assumption at this point," Morris said. "That is one of the things we will be investigating."

Morris confirmed the letter was a threat to Pedde.

On Monday Pedde said the Department of Energy had given the go ahead to carry out the dismissal of as many as 400 employees, bringing the total to 1,200 terminated SRS employees since March.

The layoffs are a part of what was called the "workforce restructuring plan" announced last December.

WSRC spokesperson Will

Please see LETTER, page 14A



Pedde

Document Number 9

RELEASE

Tab C

Indices Checks
National Crime Information Center Checks
Other Background Checks
Evidence Receipts

TAB C

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

OFFICIAL CASE FILE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CASE NO. I05SR008

[illegible]

Document Number 10

RELEASE

Tab D

Reports of Investigation
Administrative Reports to Management
Referrals to the Office of Audits
or Office of Inspections
Management Response to Referrals
Documents Relating to Judicial Actions such as
Indictments/Informations, Convictions, Judgements,
and Sentencing

TAB D

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

OFFICIAL CASE FILE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CASE NO. L05SR008

[illegible]

Document Number 11

RELEASE

Tab E

Closing Documents
Case Closure checklist
Case Chronology

TAB E

TABLE OF CONTENTS

[illegible]

Document Number 12

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

WINDOW1

Case Profile Screen (ICP) Today: 25-FEB-2008

Case Number: 105SR008 **Prede** Action: CASE Open Date: 29-JUL-2005

Rep: R21	List	Title: WMD TERROR THREAT; SAVANNAH RIVER SITE; AIKEN, SC	Priority: Rtn
Off: BRI	List	SAVAN RV INV	SpecInt: N/A
Supv:	List	Agent: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	Status: C.Isd
		Mgr: (C)	

Modified: 09-27-07

Predication Assignment Indices Exec Brief Actions File Review Closing

Case Closure Data

Close Mgr:	List	Date Closed: 25-FEB-2008
------------	------	--------------------------

File Sent to HQ: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) File Recd at HQ:

Ensure that all actions are closed before attempting to close the case.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Save/Commit Enter Query Execute Query Clear Screen Exit Screen

Yellow fields are Mandatory v.12

CASE CLOSURE CHECKLIST

Case File No.: Ios 52008 Date: 2/21/2008
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Case Agent: _____ Office: Region 2

[Enter initials or ✓ for completed items and N/A for non-applicable items]

EIGPT SYSTEM

✓ Index System--Complete and Accurate (RDX Attached)
N/A Investigative Actions--Complete and Accurate (QAT Attached)
✓ Executive Brief Clear, Complete, Concise, and Current (Do Not Attach)
N/A Case Placed in "P" (Priority) Status in Case Assignment Screen (all cases that had been a "P" at any time during the investigation, must be placed in "P" status at closure)

CASE FILE REVIEW

✓ Opening Documentation Complete (Complaint Form, Predication, etc.)
✓ All Appropriate MOIAs in File/No Duplicates/Misfiles
✓ Documentation Serialized/Chronological Order
✓ Table of Contents Complete
✓ Agent Notes (If discarded per Chapt. 7, date & initials: 2/21/08)
✓ All Volumes of Case File, Bulky Exhibits, and Other Folders Contain Appropriate Labels and Identifiers, per Chapter 6
N/A Evidence and/or Subpoenaed Materials Disposed/Returned
N/A Grand Jury Information Processed, per Chapter 8
N/A Discard NCIC Criminal History Reports/Printouts (Date: _____)

INVESTIGATIVE/REFERRAL ACTIONS

✓ Criminal and Civil Referrals, Responses, and Results Documented in Case File
✓ Administrative Referrals, Responses, and Results Documented in Case File
✓ Other Administrative Referral(s) (e.g., RS/RR Type Letter)
✓ Special Interest Response (e.g., Action Items closed out, etc.)
✓ OIG Audit
✓ OIG Inspections
✓ Other: _____
N/A Closing Notification to Department Manager(s):
Oral or Written: _____ Date: _____
Contacted by: S/A, ASAC, SAC _____
Person/Title Contacted: _____

CLOSING STATEMENTS [Check or Initial All that Apply]

✓ All Prudent Investigative Steps Have Been Taken
✓ All Investigative Activities Are Complete and Further Expenditure of Resources is Not Warranted
✓ Completion of Stage 2
N/A Other Applicable Reasons Why Case Should Be Closed (list below)

NOTES/COMMENTS:

APPROVAL/CONCURRENCE:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Case Agent

2/21/2008

Date

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Case Supervisor

2/25/08

Date

Document Number 13

Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
Investigations - Case Index Listing (RDX)

Report run on: February 21, 2008 10:35 AM

Page 1

Case Number: I05SR008

Inv Title: WMD TERROR THREAT; SAVANNAH RIVER SITE; AIKEN, SC

Case Ref	Name	Emp Status	Grade	Type	Category	City	State
1	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	CO		P	V	AUGUSTA	GA
2		CO		P	V	AUGUSTA	GA
3		CO		P	W	AIKEN	SC
4		CO		P	S	AIKEN	SC

Document Number 14

Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
Investigations - Executive Brief Report (REB)

Report run on: February 21, 2008 10:39 AM

Page 1

Case Number: I05SR008

Summary Date: 21-FEB-08

Title:

WMD TERROR THREAT; SAVANNAH RIVER SITE; AIKEN, SC

Executive Brief:

PREDICATION

ON JULY 28, 2005, THE FBI AUGUSTA, G.A. RESIDENT AGENCY REQUESTED OIG INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE RELATING TO 2 ANTHRAX/DEATH THREAT LETTERS RECEIVED ON JULY 19, 2005 VIA U.S. MAIL [REDACTED]

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

ON THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 28, 2005, SAS [REDACTED] DOE OIG CONTACTED [REDACTED] FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), ATLANTA GEORGIA DIVISION, AUGUSTA RESIDENT AGENCY TO DISCUSS INFORMATION PROVIDED EARLIER THAT MORNING [REDACTED] OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONCERNING THE ANTHRAX AND DEATH THREATS [REDACTED] (DESCRIBED BELOW). [REDACTED] THE FBI WOULD ACCEPT ANY INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT THE OIG COULD PROVIDE TO THEIR INVESTIGATION.

EARLIER ON JULY 28, 2005, [REDACTED] THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

ON JULY 19, 2005, AN ENVELOPE WAS [REDACTED]

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] AFTER RETRIEVING THE MAIL [REDACTED] A LETTER ADDRESSED [REDACTED] THAT HAD A RETURN ADDRESS [REDACTED] THE ENVELOPE AND LEARNED THAT THE ENVELOPE CONTAINED TWO (2) FOLDED PIECES OF PAPER. [REDACTED] ONE (1) OF THE FOLDER PIECES OF PAPER AND DISCOVERED THAT THE LETTER STATED, [REDACTED] THE SECOND PIECE OF PAPER FROM THE ENVELOPE AND DISCOVERED THE PIECE OF PAPER CONTAINED A WHITE POWDER LIKE SUBSTANCE.

[REDACTED] 9-11 EMERGENCY AND [REDACTED] AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE (SRS), [REDACTED] FINDINGS AFTER OPENING THE ENVELOPE. COLUMBIA COUNTY, GEORGIA, SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT WAS [REDACTED] THE COLUMBIA COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE NOTIFIED THE FBI RESIDENT AGENCY IN AUGUSTA, GA CONCERNING RECEIVED ANTHRAX ENVELOPE.

PRIOR TO [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] THE THREATENING LETTER THAT [REDACTED] AFTER THEIR CONVERSATION, [REDACTED] THAT A SIMILAR ENVELOPE WAS [REDACTED] INSIDE [REDACTED]

Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
Investigations - Executive Brief Report (REB)

Report run on: February 21, 2008 10:39 AM

Page 2

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THE ENVELOPE AND IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED THE FBI AND COLUMBIA COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT.

THE LAB RESOURCE NETWORK (LRN) ANALYZED BOTH ENVELOPES AND THEIR CONTENTS FOR ANTHRAX, AND BOTH WERE FOUND TO BE NEGATIVE.

ON JULY 21, 2005 THE SRS CRIME STOPPERS RELEASED A BULLETIN VIA EMAIL REQUESTING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE AFOREMENTIONED ANTHRAX/THREAT LETTERS.

ON JULY 26, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOE RECEIVED AN ANONYMOUS TIP VIA FACSIMILE RELATING TO THE WSRC CRIME STOPPERS BULLETIN. THE ANONYMOUS SOURCE ALLEGED IN THE FACSIMILE THAT THEY OBSERVED A LETTER THAT WAS ON THE COMPUTER SCREEN (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) BSRI. THE SOURCE ALLEGED THAT THE LETTER WAS (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) AND THAT THE LETTER (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DISPLEASURE ABOUT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE. ADDITIONALLY, THE SOURCE ALLEGED THAT THE LETTER WAS SIGNED AT THE BOTTOM BY (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) AND THAT SINCE THE SOURCE OBSERVED THE LETTER, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) BEGAN ACTING IN A NERVOUS AND UNUSUAL MANNER.

ON JULY 27, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) A TELEPHONE CALL (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) WSRC AND THAT (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THAT WSRC PLANNED TO IMAGE (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) ASSIGNED DESK TOP COMPUTER HARD DRIVE. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THAT WSRC WAS IMAGING THE HARD DRIVE BASED ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE ANONYMOUS TIP FACSIMILE.

ON JULY 29, 2005, WSRC REPORTED (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) HARD DRIVE DATA CONTAINED TWO (2) FILES THAT APPEARED TO RELATE TO THE ANTHRAX DEATH THREAT LETTERS. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THAT THE PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE DATA FOUND ONE LETTER THAT STATED, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THE OTHER LETTER CONTAINED A STATEMENT RELATING TO (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) TO AN UNKNOWN SOURCE FOR DELIVERING THE ANTHRAX (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) AND ANOTHER STATEMENT CONCERNING AN (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

ON AUGUST 1, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THE OIG WITH COPIES OF VARIOUS OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (OCI) INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS, THE WSRC CRIME STOPPERS BULLETIN, AND THE ANONYMOUS TIP RECEIVED VIA FACSIMILE BY WSRC. THE OCI INVESTIGATIVE NOTES REFERENCE THE FOLLOWING QUOTE TAKEN FROM THE DEATH THREAT LETTER (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

ON AUGUST 4, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THAT THE FBI INTERVIEWED (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
Investigations - Executive Brief Report (REB)

Report run on: February 21, 2008 10:39 AM

Page 3

THE FBI THAT (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) NOT INVOLVED IN THE ANTHRAX DEATH THREAT LETTERS. ADDITIONALLY, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THE FBI CONSENT (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THAT THE FBI SEARCHED (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) ADDITIONALLY, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) A FBI POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION.

ON AUGUST 18, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) OF THE POLYGRAPH QUESTIONS DURING A POLYGRAPH ADMINISTERED BY THE FBI ON AUGUST 4, 2005. IN PARTICULAR, THE QUESTION CONCERNED

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) WITH THE FBI POLYGRAPH QUESTION DUE TO A CONVERSATION THAT (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) BSRI. DURING THE CONVERSATION (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THAT SOMEONE SHOULD (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DISPLEASURE WITH THE WAY THAT WSRC IS MANAGING THE SRS EMPLOYEE REDUCTION IN FORCE.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) OCCASIONALLY WORKED TOGETHER ON SRS WORK PROJECTS. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DUE TO COMMENTS MADE (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) RELATING TO A WORK PROJECT PACKAGE THAT (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) REVIEW AND APPROVAL.

DUE TO THE INFORMATION (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THE POLYGRAPH, WSRC IMAGED (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) COMPUTER HARD DRIVE. DURING THE REVIEW OF THE IMAGED HARD DRIVE, WSRC DISCOVERED THAT (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) TO OBTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING HOW THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE (USPS) HANDLED SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES VIA THE WHITE HOUSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY INTERNET WEBSITES. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THESE WEBSITES ON JULY 19, 2005, THE SAME DAY THAT (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THE FIRST ANTHRAX DEATH THREAT LETTER.

THE ANTHRAX DEATH THREAT ENVELOPES ARE BEING MAINTAINED BY THE USPS LABORATORY FOR FURTHER REVIEW. THE FBI HAS LEARNED THAT THE STAMPS USED ON THE ENVELOPES WERE NOT SELF ADHESIVE AND THAT THE STAMPS WERE MOISTENED PRIOR TO PLACEMENT ON THE LETTERS. ADDITIONALLY, THE WHITE POWDER CONTAINED IN THE ENVELOPE (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) VERIFIED TO BE TALCUM POWDER.

ON AUGUST 10, 2005, THE FBI INTERVIEWED (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) WITH THE FBI DURING THE INTERVIEW AND (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION. HOWEVER, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THE FBI A DEOXYRIBONUCLEIC ACID (DNA) SAMPLE AND FINGERPRINTS ON AUGUST 18, 2005.

Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
Investigations - Executive Brief Report (EBR)

Report run on: February 21, 2008 10:39 AM

Page 4

ON AUGUST 17, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) FBI, AND (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THE FBI WITH A DNA SAMPLE OR FINGERPRINTS. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) WOULD NOT CONSENT (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THESE ITEMS, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) OBTAIN A COURT ORDER TO OBTAIN THESE ITEMS (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THESE ITEMS AND (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) WAS NOT CONVINCED OF (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) WITH THE FBI ON THIS MATTER.

ON OCTOBER 12, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) AT THE SRS. IN ADDITION, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THAT THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE LABORATORY SAID THERE WERE NO FINGERPRINTS DISCOVERED ON THE ENVELOPES. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) IS STILL AWAITING THE DNA ANALYSIS FROM THE STAMP ATTACHED TO THE ENVELOPE.

ON OCTOBER 25, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THAT A WSRC EMPLOYEE DISCOVERED A LETTER, SIMILAR TO THE ORIGINAL ANTHRAX DEATH THREAT LETTER, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THE LETTER WAS TAKEN INTO EVIDENCE BY THE FBI AND ADDITIONAL DETAILS CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER WILL BE PROVIDED AT A LATER DATE.

ON DECEMBER 21, 2005, THE OIG CONTACTED (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) FOR AN UPDATE ON INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS THUS FAR. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) THAT NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS OR LEADS HAD TAKEN PLACE SINCE THE EVENT ON OCTOBER 25, 2005.

ON JULY 13, 2006, THE FBI AUGUSTA RA SAID THAT THE CASE IS STILL BEING INVESTIGATED AS A DOMESTIC TERRORISM THREAT AND THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO RECENT MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS.

ON NOVEMBER 27, 2007, THE OCI ADVISED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS WITH THIS INVESTIGATION.

ON FEBRUARY 21, 2008, THE OIG DETERMINED THAT ALL PRUDENT INVESTIGATIVE STEPS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED TO DATE AND THAT THE FBI NO LONGER REQUIRES OIG SUPPORT WITH THIS FBI INVESTIGATION. THE FBI CASE AGENT WAS NOTIFIED THAT THE OIG WAS CLOSING THIS CASE.

PLANNED ACTIVITY
-CLOSE CASE

DISPOSITION

Document Number 15

Tab F

Request for Investigation
Case Opening Documents
Assignment Letter
Work Plans
Memorandums of Investigative Activity

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

OFFICIAL CASE FILE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CASE NO. I05SR008

INDEX NO.	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	DOCUMENT DATE
F-1	Case Assignment	29-Jul-05
F-2	MOIA - Rcpt of Info (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	29-Jul-05
F-3	Receipt of Reports and Documents (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	1-Aug-05
F-4	MOIA - Rcpt of Info (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	4-Aug-05
F-5	MOIA - Rcpt of Info	18-Aug-05
F-6	Stage II Workplan	29-Sep-05
F-7	MOIA - (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Coordination	25-Oct-05
F-8	MOIA - Coordination	21-Dec-05
F-9	MOIA - Coordination	28-Jul-06
F-10	MOIA - Coordination	21-Sep-06
F-11	MOIA - Coordination	6-Nov-06
F-12	MOIA - Coordination	25-Jan-07
F-13	MOIA - Coordination	14-Apr-07
F-14		
F-15		
F-16		
F-17		
F-18		
F-19		
F-20		
F-21		
F-22		
F-23		
F-24		
F-25		
F-26		
F-27		
F-28		

Document Number 16

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On April 14, 2007, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C), Office of Counter Intelligence (OCI), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Savannah River Site (SRS), was contacted by Special Agent (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOE, Office of Inspector General (OIG) to receive information regarding an ongoing OCI investigation involving an Anthrax hoax letter (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) SRS contractor officials.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) that as of this date, there is no additional information available regarding this matter.

Activity (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	Date: 14-APR-07	Location: Telephone
By: SA (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)		Case No.: I05SR008

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. It is the property of the IG and neither the document nor its contents should be disseminated without prior IG authorization.

Document Number 17

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On January 25, 2007, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Office of Counter Intelligence (OCI), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Savannah River Site (SRS), was contacted by Special Agent (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOE, Office of Inspector General (OIG) to receive information regarding an ongoing OCI investigation involving an Anthrax hoax letter (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) SRS contractor officials.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) that as of this date, there is no additional information available regarding this matter.

Activity: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	Date: 25-JAN-07	Location: Telephone
By: SA (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)		Case No.: I05SR008

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Document Number 18

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On November 6, 2006, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Office of Counter Intelligence (OCI), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Savannah River Site (SRS), was contacted by Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DOE, Office of Inspector General (OIG) to receive information regarding an ongoing OCI investigation involving an Anthrax hoax letter (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SRS contractor officials.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) that as of this date, there is no additional information available regarding this matter.

Activity (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Date: 6-NOV-06 Location: Telephone
By: SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Case No.: I05SR008

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. It is the property of the IG and neither the document nor its contents should be disseminated without prior IG authorization.

Document Number 19

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On September 21, 2006, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Office of Counter Intelligence (OCI), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Savannah River Site (SRS), was contacted by Special Agent (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOE, Office of Inspector General (OIG) to receive information regarding an ongoing OCI investigation involving an Anthrax hoax letter (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) SRS contractor officials.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) that as of this date, there is no additional information available regarding this matter.

Activity: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Date: 21-SEP-06 Location: Telephone
By: SA (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Case No.: 105SR008

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. It is the property of the IG and neither the document nor its contents should be disseminated without prior IG authorization.

Document Number 20

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On July 28, 2006 (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Office of Counter Intelligence (OCI), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Savannah River Site (SRS), was contacted by Special Agent (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOE, Office of Inspector General (OIG) to receive information regarding an ongoing OCI investigation involving an Anthrax hoax letter (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) SRS contractor officials.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) to take a polygraph about (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) with the Anthrax hoax issue and that the U.S. Postal Inspectors, Computer Forensics Laboratory is still conducting a forensic study (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) computer hard drives.

Activity: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Date: 28-JUL-06 Location: Telephone
By: SA (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Case No.: I05SR008

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. It is the property of the IG and neither the document nor its contents should be disseminated without prior IG authorization.

F9

Document Number 21

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On December 21, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Office of Counter Intelligence (OCI), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Savannah River Site (SRS), was contacted by Special Agent (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOE, Office of Inspector General (OIG) to receive information regarding an ongoing OCI investigation involving an Anthrax hoax letter (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) SRS contractor officials.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) that as of this date, there is no additional information regarding this matter. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) would immediately contact the OIG if there any significant develops in this investigation.

Activity: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Date: 21-DEC-05 Location: Telephone
By: SA (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Case No.: I05SR008

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. It is the property of the IG and neither the document nor its contents should be disseminated without prior IG authorization.

1-8

Document Number 22

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On October 25, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Office of Counter Intelligence (OCI), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Savannah River Site (SRS), was contacted by Special Agent (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOE, Office of Inspector General (OIG) to receive information regarding an ongoing OCI investigation involving an Anthrax hoax letter (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) SRS contractor officials.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) back working at SRS. Additionally (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) in a different area at SRS, and, that when a new SRS employee (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) they discovered a letter that looked very similar to the Anthrax hoax letter.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) that as of this date, there is no additional information regarding this matter.

Activity: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Date: 25-OCT-05 Location: Telephone
By: SA (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Case No.: I05SR008

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. It is the property of the IG and neither the document nor its contents should be disseminated without prior IG authorization.

F-7

Document Number 23

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

INVESTIGATIVE WORKPLAN: STAGE 2

I. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Case No: I05 SR008 Case Title: WMD Terror Threat
Case Agent: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Supervisor: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Date Predicated: 28-Jul-05 Date Opened: 29-Jul-05
Date Assigned: 29-Jul-05 Current Status: Routine X Priority _____
U.S. Attorney's Office: Atlanta, GA
Stage 2 Workplan: Original [X] Modified/Revised []

II. PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND OUTCOMES

Planned Elapsed Calendar Days to:

o Complete Draft ROI/IRM:	Staff- <u>180</u>	Calendar- <u>365</u>
o Issue Official ROI/IRM:	Staff- <u>190</u>	Calendar- <u>365</u>
o Complete Stage 2:	Staff- <u>140</u>	Calendar- <u>365</u>

Estimated Investigative Recovery Amount: \$ N/A

IG Subpoenas Anticipated: N/A
(Recipient) (Date)

N/A
(Recipient) (Date)

III. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

PARAMETERS/FOCUS OF STAGE 2 INVESTIGATION

This investigation focuses on two (2) WMD Threat envelopes / letters that were

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The letters threatened to contain Anthrax + stated that

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The OIG has been directed by the FBI, Augusta, GA Resident Agency that all matters regarding this issue will only be given to the DOE Counter Intelligence Office (OCI) located at the Savannah River Site. The OIG has received all information thus far from the DOE OCI office.

STATUTE(S) INVOLVED AND SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE(S)

18 U.S.C. 2332a: - Offense Against a National of the
United States

STAGE 2

LISTING OF ANTICIPATED INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

- Assist DOE OCI as necessary
- Close case

IV. REVIEW AND APPROVAL

	<u>Initials</u>	<u>Date</u>
Stage 2 Workplan Submitted by Agent to Supervisor	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	9/29/05
Stage 2 Workplan Approved by Supervisor	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	9/29/05

SUPERVISOR COMMENTS/DIRECTIONS

Document Number 24

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On August 18, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Office of Counterintelligence (OCI), DOE was advised of the identity of Special (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Inspector General (OIG). (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) the following information.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) of the polygraph questions during a polygraph administered by the FBI on August 4, 2005. In particular, the question concerned (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) with the FBI polygraph question due to a conversation that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) BSRI. During the conversation (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) that someone should (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) displeasure with the way that WSRC is managing the SRS employee reduction in force.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) occasionally worked together on SRS work projects. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) due to comments made (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) relating to a work project package that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) review and approval.

Due to the information (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) the polygraph, WSRC imaged (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) computer hard drive. During the review of the imaged hard drive, WSRC discovered that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) to obtain information concerning how the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) handled suspicious packages via the White House and Homeland Security Internet websites. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) these websites on July 19, 2005, the same day that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) the first Anthrax death threat letter.

Activity: Information provided (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Date: 18-AUG-05 Location: Bldg (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
By: SA (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Case No.: I05SR008

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F-5

MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

Date: 18-AUG-05

Case File No. I05SR008

The Anthrax death threat envelopes are being maintained by the USPS laboratory for further review. The FBI has learned that the stamps used on the envelopes were not self adhesive and that the stamps were moistened prior to placement on the letters. Additionally, the white powder contained in the envelope (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was verified to be talcum powder.

On August 10, 2005, the FBI interviewed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) with the FBI during the interview and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a polygraph examination. However, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the FBI a Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample and fingerprints on August 18, 2005.

On August 17, 2005, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) FBI, and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the FBI with a DNA sample or fingerprints. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) would not consent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) these items. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) obtain a court order to obtain these items (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) these items and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was not convinced of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) with the FBI on this matter.

Document Number 25

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On August 4, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Office of Counterintelligence (OCI), DOE was advised of the identity of Special Agent (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Inspector General (OIG). (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) the following information.

On August 3, 2005, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Atlanta Georgia Division, Augusta Resident Agency interviewed (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) An anonymous source had alleged that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) the Anthrax death threat letter that was received (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) the FBI that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) not involved in the Anthrax death threat letters. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) the FBI consent (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) that the FBI searched (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) on August 3, 2005.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was scheduled to take a polygraph examination on August 4, 2005.

Activity: Information provided (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Date: 04-AUG-05 Location: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
By: SA (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Case No.: 105SR008

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F 4

Document Number 26

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On August 1, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Office of
Counterintelligence (OCI), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) was advised of the identity of
Special Agent (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) DOE, Office of Inspector General (OIG). As requested, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) with OCI investigative reports relating to the Anthrax death threat
envelopes received (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Activity: Receipt of Documents (b)(5),(b)(7)(C) Date: 01-AUG-05 Location: SRS Bldg (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
By: SA (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Case No.: I05SR008

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. It is the property of the IG and neither the document nor its contents should be disseminated without prior IG authorization.

Document Number 29

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

On July 29, 2005, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Office of Counterintelligence, DOE was advised of the identity of Special Agents (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Inspector General (OIG). (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the following information.

On July 21, 2005 Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) released a Crime Stoppers bulletin via Savannah River Site electronic mail requesting any information concerning the Anthrax death threat letters (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The Crime Stoppers bulletin offered a \$1,000 cash reward for information leading to an arrest and provided a method for individuals providing information to remain completely anonymous. In order to remain anonymous, WSRC assigned an electronically generated number in which the anonymous source could use to verify whether the information provided would be considered for a cash reward.

On July 26, 2005, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DOE received an anonymous tip relating to the aforementioned Crime Stoppers bulletin. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Federal Bureau of Investigation, Augusta, Georgia Resident Agency and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) with the anonymous tip information, which contained the name of a possible suspect.

The name provided by the anonymous complainant (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) BSRI. Additionally, the complainant said that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the letters (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) computer screen while having a conversation (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) desk in July 2005.

Activity: Information provided (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Date: 29-Jul-05 Location: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
By: SAs (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Case No.: I05SR008

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. It is the property of the IG and neither the document nor its contents should be disseminated without prior IG authorization.

MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

Date: 29-Jul-05

Case File No. I05SR008

On July 27, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) a telephone call (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) WSRC and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) that WSRC planned to image (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) hard drive based on the information received via the anonymous complaint.

On July 29, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) that WSRC imaged (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) hard drive on July 28, 2005. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) preliminary information relating to the files contained on the imaged hard drive. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) there were two Microsoft Word letters/files found that were of immediate interest and that the last modification date associated with the two files was in June 2005.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) that one letter contained a threat stating that, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) The other letter contained a statement (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) to an unknown source for delivering the Anthrax (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and an additional amount (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Document Number 30

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Prediction Details (PR) Today: 28-JUL-2005

Prediction Number: P05IN218 Prediction Date: 28-JUL-2005

Prediction: [Redacted] Case Number: P05IN218

Region: SE1 List Source Code: LAW List Allegation Date: 28-JUL-2005 Denial: DOG

Title: ANTHRAX LTR TERROR THREAT SRS MANAGERS

Complaint (up to 240 characters):

ON 28-JUL-2005, THE FBI AUGUSTA RA, REQUESTED OIG INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE
RELATED TO TWO ANTHRAX/DEATH THREAT LETTERS RECEIVED ON JULY 19, 2005 VIA U.
S. MAIL BY [Redacted] (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Save Commit Enter Query Exit Via Query Clear Screen Exit Screen

Yellow fields are mandatory.

[Redacted] Work Date: [Redacted] Transfer By: [Redacted]

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

WINDOW1

Case Profile Screen (ICP)

Today: 29-JUL-2005

Case Number: 105SR008 Peds Action: CASE Open Date: 29-JUL-2005

Reg: [SR] List Title: WIND ERROR THREATS ANTHRAX DEATH THREAT Priority: [P] *

O/c: [SR] List Agent#: List SpecInt: [NAT] *

Supv#: List Mgr#: List Status: [O pn] *

Predication Assignment Indices Execution Actions Review Close

Predication#: [P001] Source Code: [LAW] List Element: [DSE] *

*** Incoming Referral Information ***

Code: [] List Control#: [] Response: [] Predication Date: [29-JUL-2005] *

Allegation Date: [28-JUL-2005] *

Complaint (up to 240 characters):

ON 28-JUL-2005, THE FBI AUGUSTA RA, REQUESTED OIG INVESTIGATIVE ASSITANCE RELATED TO TWO ANTHRAX/DEATH THREAT LETTERS RECEIVED ON JULY 19, 2005 VIA U.S. MAIL

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Save/Commit Enter Query Execute Query Clear Screen Exit Screen

v.8

WINDOW 1

Case Profile Screen (ICP) Today: 29-JUL-2005

Case Number: 005SR008 Prede Action: CASE Open Date: 29-JUL-2005

Reg: [REDACTED] List Title: [REDACTED] Priority: [REDACTED]

Ofc: [REDACTED] List Agent#: [REDACTED] List SpecInt: [REDACTED]

Supv#: [REDACTED] List Mgr#: [REDACTED] List Status: Open

Navigation: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Category: [REDACTED] List Case Types: [REDACTED] List [REDACTED] List [REDACTED] List Funct Area: [REDACTED] List

Lead Agcy: [REDACTED] List Joint Agencies: [REDACTED] List [REDACTED] List [REDACTED] List Fci Intrst: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Intel? [REDACTED]

Facility: [REDACTED] List Offense Loc: [REDACTED] State: [REDACTED] List Venue: [REDACTED] List

OIG Issue: [REDACTED] List Inv Programs: [REDACTED] List [REDACTED] List \$ Impact: [REDACTED] TCS? [REDACTED]

Save/Commit Enter Query Execute Query Clear Screen Exit Screen

[REDACTED] v.8

Document Number 31

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

OIG Employee Initials:

Supervisor Initials:

(b)(6),(b)(7)
(C)(b)(6),(b)
(7)(C)

COMPLAINT FORM

I. REFERENCE DATA

Hotline No: _____ Predication No: P05IN218
Date: 28-Jul-05 Time: 12:00 pm Complaint Taken By: _____
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

II. COMPLAINANT INFORMATION

Name: Federal Bureau of Investigation Gender: N/A

Use Name? N/A

OIG confidentiality policy explained? N/A

Complainant Status: Unknown

Employer: _____

Position/Title: _____

Work Address: (Street) _____

(City, State & Zip) Augusta, Georgia

Telephone No.: 706-722-_____
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(Include E-Mail)

Home Address: (Street) NA

(City, State & Zip)

Telephone No.: NA

(Include E-Mail)

III. ALLEGATION(S)

(Who, What, When, Where, Why, How, and Impact. Identify Attachments, Available Documentation, and Other Witnesses.)

ISSUE(S): On July 28, 2005, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Augusta Georgia Resident Agency requested OIG investigative assistance related to 2 Anthrax/death threat letters received via personal U.S. Mail _____
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

DETAILS: At this time, July 28, 2005, the following information is Law Enforcement Sensitive and should not be released:

On the afternoon of July 28, 2005, SAs _____
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
DOE OIG contacted _____ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Augusta Resident Agency to discuss information provided earlier that morning _____
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Office
of Counterintelligence concerning the Anthrax threats _____
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (described below). _____ the FBI would accept any investigative support the OIG could provide to their investigation.

Earlier on July 28, 2005, _____ the following information:

(Details continued on page 3? Yes)

IV. COMPLAINT ANALYSIS

A. Identifiable Criminal, Civil, or Administrative Violation(s)? Yes
 (If yes, identify specific law(s), regulation(s), order(s), contract clause(s), etc.)

Citation & Title

- 18 U.S.C. 2332a Offense Against a National of the United States
-
-
-

B. Estimated Loss to Government: \$ Undetermined

C. Does Complaint Involve Potential or Actual ES&H Hazard? Unknown
 If yes, ES&H Notification (Date, Name, Title, and Location of ES&H Official):

D. Is the Complaint a Security Issue Requiring Immediate Action? No
 If yes, Security Notification (Date, Name, Title, & Location of Security Official):
 July 28, 2005, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) [redacted] OIG on matter

F. Complaint Generated by Organizational Issues? No
 (RIF, reorganization, closing, etc.)
 If yes, explain:

G. Does Complaint Relate to a Current Audit, Inspection, or Investigation? No
 If yes, project title/code:

H. Does Complaint Involve a Notable Information Technology Issue? No
 If yes, OIG Technology Audit Group or Technology Crimes Section
 Notification (Date, Name, Title, and Location of OIG Official):

I. Indices Check Conducted: Date--28-Jul-05

Complainant: +Positive ☒ [FBI-Numerous Unrelated]
 -Negative ☐ []

Subject: +Positive ☐ [n/a]
 -Negative ☐ [n/a]

Witness(s): +Positive ☐ []
 -Negative ☒ (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Negative (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Negative

Results: If positive, see Section VI. "Other Notes" below.

V. ALLEGATION DETAILS (CONTINUED)

On July 19, 2005, an envelope was [REDACTED]

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] After retrieving the mail, [REDACTED] noticed a letter addressed [REDACTED] that had a return address [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the envelope and learned that the envelope contained two (2) folded pieces of paper. [REDACTED] one (1) of the folded pieces of paper and discovered that the letter stated, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the second piece of paper from the envelope and discovered the piece of paper contained a white powder like substance.

[REDACTED] 9-11 emergency and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at the Savannah River Site (SRS), [REDACTED] after opening the envelope. Columbia County, Georgia, Sheriffs Department was [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The Columbia County Sheriffs office notified the FBI Resident Agency in Augusta, GA concerning received Anthrax envelope.

Prior to departing SRS that same day, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] the threatening letter that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] After their conversation, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that a similar envelope [REDACTED] inside their [REDACTED] the envelope and immediately contacted the FBI and Columbia County Sheriffs Department.

The Lab Resource Network (LRN) analyzed both envelopes and their contents for Anthrax, and both were found to be negative.

On July 21, 2005 the SRS Crime Stoppers released a bulletin via email requesting information concerning the aforementioned Anthrax/threat letters.

(Attachments? ☐ Yes ☐)

VI. OTHER NOTES**VII. COMPLAINT DISPOSITION**

- Recommended Action: •
- CCC Recommendation:
 - If an RR/RS, refer to?
 - Other Notes:

CCC Review Date:

CCC Disposition:

CCC Notes:

2/01/01