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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

NOV 14 2018

FOIA Case # F2017 13192
FBI FOI/PA Request # 1407846-000

Mr. John Greenwald
8512 Newcastle Ave
Northridge, CA 91325

Dear Mr. Greenwald:

Further reference is made to your September 12, 2012, Freedom of Information Act request to the Department of State regarding an assassination attempt on George W. Bush. By previous correspondence we advised you that portions of one document was referred for review to another federal agency. The review of this document by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has now been completed.

Information has been withheld from this document based on one or more of the following provisions:


- 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6), which concerns material the release of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual's personal privacy.
- 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(7)(C), which concerns records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes the release of which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of an individual's personal privacy.
- 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(7)(E), which concerns records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes the release of which would divulge techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA online portal by creating an account on the following web site: <https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, or by emailing ogis@nara.gov. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

If you have any questions regarding a particular aspect of this case, you should contact the Office of Information Programs and Services (A/GIS/IPS), Department of State, SA2, Washington, DC 20522-8100. In any communication, please refer to the case number.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. Caramelo", with a large, stylized flourish extending from the end of the signature.

Michael D. Caramelo, Chief
DS/MGT/FOIA-PA
Freedom of Information and
Privacy Act Division
Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Enclosures:
Document

b6 Per FBI
b7C

C06383888

REFER TO STATE

Tb111a1 1542.txt

UNCLASSIFIED
TELEGRAM

TRANSFERRED FOR
DIRECT REPLY DS

June 13, 2005

To: SECSTATE WASHDC - IMMEDIATE

Action: DS

FROM: AMEMBASSY TBILISI (TBILISI 1452 - IMMEDIATE)

TAGS: ASEC, PTER, GG

Captions: DS CHANNEL, SENSITIVE

**Subject: JUNE 10, 2005, INVESTIGATION UPDATE - THREAT AGAINST
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TBILISI, GEORGIA**

Ref: (A) TBILISI 1213 (NOTAL), (B) PATE/DSCCER EMAIL, 16 MAY 2005, (C) TBILISI 1252; (D) PATE/DSCCER EMAIL, 10 JUNE

1. (U) The following information is Sensitive But Unclassified - Handle accordingly. Please note that the following information is for law enforcement use and information only, and contains sensitive information regarding Georgian law enforcement investigative procedures.

2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: As per REFS, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and United States Secret Service (USSS) investigative efforts into the threat against the President of the United States during his Tbilisi visit are ongoing. Their joint investigation in cooperation with the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs has developed several investigative avenues that are being pursued. Three subjects of interest have been identified and proactive investigative steps are being taken to further their knowledge of the individuals and narrow the focus of the investigative efforts. END BACKGROUND.

3. (SBU) Initial analysis of the hand grenade by the FBI lab shows [REDACTED]

No latent prints were developed and testing on the device continues.

b7E Per FBI

References

9/21/07
JK

Scrub / mch / mag / 7000 ft / 1700 ft of Decid

JUL 12 2005

REF ID: A58416

Tbilisi 1542.txt

4. (SBU) (REF C) has been identified and a home address was obtained. DNA samples from [redacted] and [redacted] (formerly identified as [redacted]) (REF C) have been [redacted] for DNA comparison.

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5. (SBU) FBI Laboratory advised FBI Legal Attach (LEGAT) Tbilisi that they obtained DNA samples from the beer bottles of [redacted] the cigarette butt of [redacted]. The laboratory advised that none of the samples matched the major contributor of DNA found on the handkerchief used to wrap the hand grenade. It should be noted that these results do not completely exclude these individuals from having committed the act, but do exclude them from being the major contributor found on the handkerchief.

b6 Per FBI
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6. (SBU) The Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) provided LEGAT Tbilisi with a cigarette butt believed to contain DNA of [redacted]

Refer

[redacted] This cigarette butt was forwarded to the FBI Laboratory for DNA extraction and comparison.

7. (SBU) The Armenian National Security Service (NSS) has replied to the official request for information regarding the origin and manufacture of the hand grenade. A translation of the reply indicates that the Armenians confirm that they have produced this type of hand grenade in the past, and that it is entirely possible that this is an Armenian model. They further advised that all factories manufacturing this particular munitions have closed and that they are no longer making this grenade. From a photographic analysis from evidence photos submitted by LEGAT Tbilisi, the Armenians believe that the hand grenade's useful life may have expired and concur that the spoon being inhibited by the handkerchief from deploying at a normal speed may have resulted in a light strike. They Armenians have qualified all of these statements however, by stating that a photographic analysis is not sufficient to give a definitive answer. They state that without a hands-on physical examination of the actual device, all of the foregoing is simply conjecture. LEGAT Tbilisi is sending two Armenian experts to Quantico to physically examine the device from June 13-20, 2005.

Refer

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JUN 13 2004

REF ID: A5421542

Thilisi 1542.txt

8. (SBU) As of June 6, the FBI has developed interest in three subjects and proactive investigative steps are being taken to further their knowledge of the individuals and narrow the focus of the investigative efforts. The subjects are as follows:

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a) [redacted] a Georgian citizen of Azeri (Azerbaijan) heritage. [redacted]

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[redacted] is unemployed and lives at home with his two brothers and parents. He is of the Muslim faith although he is not overly religious. He does not attend Mosque although he does associate with more devoutly religious individuals with ties to Iran ([redacted]) and identifies himself with the Shia sect of Islam. He drinks alcohol on a regular basis and has a gambling habit. Currently, there is [redacted]

[redacted] Confidential Informant (CI) who [redacted]

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b6 Per FBI
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[redacted] it is apparent from conversations that [redacted] harbors anti-American sentiment, has antipathy towards George W. Bush, and has stated that some unspecified Jihadist groups in Iraq, Jordan, or Algeria would pay for an assassination of the President.

b6, b7C

b) [redacted] is a member of a South Ossetian opposition group known as SAMARTLIANOBA. He has a criminal record for illegal firearms possession. He has also been active in the Labor Oppositionist Party that stands opposed to the current regime in Georgia.

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[redacted] has previous experience in the security [redacted]

b6, b7C

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Sector and has some paramilitary background. maintains residences in Tbilisi and the autonomous region of South Ossetia. Shortly after the President's visit, departed Tbilisi and was at his home in South Ossetia where Georgian authorities could not cover him until June 8, 2005.

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c) UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL: June 4, [redacted] a Georgian citizen, came forward to the MOIA with information about a suspicious individual that she observed prior to and during the beginning of the President's speech. [redacted] related that she had been fearful of coming forward before but had been coaxed by a friend in the MOIA to relay what she knew. [redacted] advised that on the day of the speech at approximately 1030, she was standing directly in front of the northern end of VIP bleachers waiting for the speech to begin. She observed a Caucasian male, brown hair, 5'10" - 5'11" tall, wearing dark sunglasses, a black, heavy leather coat with a fur collar, and clutching something to his chest. He had a red bandana wrapped around his hand. The individual was standing 2-3 people away from her and [redacted] found it extremely odd that this individual was wearing a heavy coat on such a hot and sunny day. She feared the individual was a pickpocket and kept an eye on him to see if he was going to commit a crime. Occasionally, the wind would blow and the tarp being used as underpinning on the VIP stands would rustle and hit this individual. [redacted] advised that when this occurred she could hear him cursing in the Georgian language. [redacted] continued to observe this individual for approximately 3 hours until she felt like the UNSUB had noticed her watching him and she became fearful and moved away. She said that she moved approximately when President Bush's speech was beginning. [redacted] and her 13-year old son, who also noticed this individual, were initially interviewed jointly by the FBI and Georgian authorities and both individuals related similar facts separate from one another. She is being re-interviewed today. [redacted] has been shown photographs and video of the area in question and has tentatively identified the individual. A Georgian sketch artist is also working with [redacted] to develop a composite of the subject. Given that this individual was located in the area where the

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grenade was thrown, was dressed suspiciously inappropriate

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for the weather conditions for the day, and was clutching something to his chest for an extended period of time with a red handkerchief wrapped around his hand, an effort is being made to identify and locate this individual. Similarly, efforts are being made to identify people standing around that may also have observed this individual.

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LEGAT Tbilisi may request FBI Lab assistance to enhance the photographic and video images of this individual.

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9. (SBU) Assistant Legal Attache is coordinating with Armenian authorities.

b7E Per FBI

It is hoped that the Armenian authorities can shed light on this.

10. (SBU) LEGAT Tbilisi is urging Georgian authorities to refine their press statements to display the red handkerchief and narrow down the description of where the incident took place. It is possible that the Georgian tip line has not been as successful as hoped due to the extremely general nature of the statement and overarching vagueness of Georgian request for assistance.

Refer

11. (SBU) RSO Comment: The information regarding the possible suspects is very sensitive and under investigation by the FBI. No definitive conclusions have yet been made regarding its accuracy. As additional information becomes available, Post will advise the Department accordingly. Post advises Department to review attachments contained in REF B, C and D for additional investigative details. End Comment.

NILES