~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

A REVIEW OF
THE TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIP PROGRAM
1961 - 1969

Prepared By:

Miss Julie Alger

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SECTION 2

TYPES OF TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIPS

AUXILLARY GENERAL TECHNICAL RESEARCH (AGTR) - USS OXFORD, USS JAMESTOWN, USS GEORGETOWN, USS BELMONT, USS LIBERTY.

The AGTRs were US Navy ships from reserve fleets, [redacted] The ships were under the military operational control of the US Navy. [redacted]

Basically, the operating schedule of an AGTR called for 16 week deployments and 2 month turn over port periods. The length of cruises, port calls and shipyard schedules were governed by Navy policies and the ships themselves were sponsored by CNO. With the exception of the OXFORD, it cost approximately $3,100,000.00 to convert an AGTR and $2,472,000.00 to operate it annually.

The AGTRs ranged in operating speeds from 8-10 kts (USS GEORGETOWN) to 15-20 kts (USS BELMONT/ USS LIBERTY), the swiftest being well suited to quick reaction or sweep missions.

MILITARY SEA TRANSPORATATION SHIP (MSTS) - USNS VALDEZ, USNS MULLER

The MSTS ships or T-AGs (Technical Auxillary General) were small coastal transports [redacted] The ships were under the operational control of the military Sea Transportation Service. Both the master and operating crews were civilian [redacted]

[redacted]

Basically, the operating schedule for a T-AG called for 5 days in port for every 25 days at sea (not to exceed 25 days). Length of cruises, port calls and shipyard schedules were established by the Military Sea Transportation Service in coordination with NSA.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Originally, the T-AGs were [redacted] that is, [redacted] In July 1967, sponsorship was turned over to the Chief of Naval Operations as part of a two-fold plan to convert all TRSs to T-AGs [redacted] The plan for conversion was never realized but the sponsorship was shifted as programmed.

These ships, with a maximum operating speed of 10-11 kts, were not capable of quick reaction or shadowing missions but were well suited for sustained, in-depth coverage of a limited area (e.g. the USNS MULLER off [redacted]

Another feature of these ships was the comparatively economical conversion and operating costs. The lower cost of conversion ($3,300,000.00 & $1,891,000.00) was due to the size and less rigid standards of the Military Sea Transportation Service as compared to those of the US Navy. Also, the annual operating cost ($2,586,000.00) was significantly less per year than that of the AGTRs when on-station time is taken into consideration.

The on-station time of the T-AGs was consistently higher than that of the AGTRs because these ships were able to operate at sea for longer periods of time and the yard periods and overhauls could be performed in overseas ports (e.g. the USNS VALDEZ operated from Capetown South Africa 1961-1967) unlike the AGTRs which were required to return to CONUS, or in the case of the OXFORD/JAMESTOWN, to Subic, for yard periods.

USS OXFORD (AGTR-1)

Former Hull Number: AG-159

Liberty Ship type: Z-EC2-S-C5

Displacement: 11,157 tons

Former Name: USS SAMUEL AITKEN (MCE-3127)

General Service Personnel Allowed: Officers - 9; Enlisted - 151

[redacted] Personnel Allowed: Officers - 6; Enlisted - 110

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Propulsion: Reciprocating Steam

Maximum Speed: 11 kts

First Commanding Officer: CDR Howard R. Lund

Conversion: New York Naval Shipyard

Commissioned: July 8, 1961

Cost of Conversion: $13,300,000.00

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

USS GEORGETOWN (AGTR-2)

Former Hull Number: AG-165

Liberty Ship Hull type: A-EC2-S-C5

Displacement: 11,157 tons

Length: 441'

Former Name: SS ROBERT W. HART

General Service Personnel Allowed: Officers - 9; Enlisted - 151

[redacted] Personnel Allowed: Officers - 6; Enlisted - 137

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Propulsion: Reciprocating Steam

Maximum Speed: 11 kts

First Commanding Officer: LCDR Westly A. Gleason

Conversion: Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company

Commissioned: November 9, 1963

Cost: 3,100,000.00

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

USS JAMESTOWN (AGTR-3)

Former Hull No: AG-166

Liberty Ship Hull type: Z-EC2-S-C5

Displacement: 11,157 tons

Former Name: SS J. HOWLAND GARDNER

General Service Personnel Allowed: Officers - 9;
Enlisted - 151

[redacted] Personnel Allowed: Officers - 6;
Enlisted - 137

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Propulsion: Reciprocating Steam

Maximum Speed: 11 kts

First Commanding Officer: CDR Allen J. Kaplan

Conversion: Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co.

Commissioned: December 13, 1963

Cost: $3,000,000.00

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA

USS BELMONT (AGTR-4)

Former Hull Number: AG-167

Victory Ship hull type: VC2-S-AP3

Displacement: 11,500 tons

Former Name: IRAN VICTORY

General Service Personnel Allowed: Officers - 9;
Enlisted - 151

[redacted] Personnel Allowed: Officers - 6;
Enlisted - 128

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Propulsion: Steam Turbine

Maximum Speed: 18 kts

First Commanding Officer: CDR Jerome E. Henderson

Conversion: Williamette Iron and Steel Works,
Portland, Oregan

Commissioned: November 2, 1964

Cost:

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA

USNS VALDEZ (T-AG-169)

Hull Number: T-AG-169

Knot Ship hull type: C1-M-AV1

Displacement: 5,000 tons

Former Name: ROUND SPLICE/JOSEPH J. MARTINEZ

Ship Personnel Allowed: Officers - 11;
Enlisted - 48

[redacted] Personnel Allowed: Officers - 4;
Enlisted - 91

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Propulsion: Diesel

Maximum Speed: 9 kts

First Master: William F. O'Reilly

Re-acquired from Maritime Administration in 1959; returned to Navy in 1961

Conversion: 3,300,000.00

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

USNS MULLER (T-AG-171)

Hull number: T-AG-171

Knot Ship hull type: C1-M-AV1

Displacement: 6,000 tons

Former Name: CHECK KNOT

Ship's Personnel Allowed: Officers - 11;
Enlisted - 48

[redacted] Personnel Allowed: Officers - 4;
Enlisted - 90

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Propulsion: Diesel

Maximum Speed: 10 kts

First Master: William F. O'Reilly

Re-acquired Maritime Administration in 1962 -
Reclassified T-AG-171 in 1963

Conversion Cost: 1,891,000.00

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36





(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SECTION 4

HISTORY OF

USS OXFORD [redacted]

SHAKEDOWN AND FIRST DEPLOYMENT

The USS OXFORD, converted from a Liberty hull to a Technical Research Ship (TRS), was the first U.S. Navy vessel specifically configured for [redacted] Initial plans called for the OXFORD to deploy to the African coast in January 1962 upon completion of its shakedown ops at GTMO. Augmentation of a Latin American TRS [redacted] program however, necessitated the ship's diversion to South America. She arrived on-station in mid-January 1962. The operations area was the east coast of South America [redacted] and operational guidance was provided in [redacted]

An evaluation of the OXFORD's first two cruises indicated that [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA

TOP SECRET UMBRA

USS GEORGETOWN

On 2 January 1964, the USS GEORGETOWN departed Portsmouth, Virginia enroute to Guantanamo Bay for three weeks of general shakedown training exercises. On completion of the training period, the ship proceeded to Montego Bay, Jamaica and then to Key West, Florida.



TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA



THIRD DEPLOYMENT OF THE USS GEORGETOWN

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

On 5 January 1965, the USS GEORGETOWN departed Norfolk, Va. to conduct special operations in the [redacted] area and along the [redacted] coasts. The cruise was divided into three phases: (1) between Norfolk and [redacted]



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted] DEPLOYMENT 1965-1966

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

The GEORGETOWN returned to Norfolk on 7 March 1966.

RELIEF OF THE USNS MULLER MAY-JULY 1966/[redacted] JULY-AUGUST 1966

On completion of upkeep, the USS GEORGETOWN departed Norfolk 17 May 1966 enroute the [redacted] operations area to relieve the USNS MULLER.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

On 23 August, the USS GEORGETOWN arrived in Norfolk where she remained in port until 4 October 1966.

[redacted] DEPLOYMENT OCTOBER - DECEMBER 1966

On 4 October 1966, the USS GEORGETOWN departed Norfolk enroute [redacted] This curise was divided into two parts:

[redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

The USS GEORGETOWN returned to Norfolk, Va. on 21 December 1966.

[redacted] DEPLOYMENT MARCH - MAY 1967

The USS GEORGETOWN departed Norfolk 7 March 1967 for deployment to [redacted] As in the previous deployment, this cruise was divided into 2 phases:

[redacted]

[redacted]

On 25 March the GEORGETOWN suffered a boiler blow-out off [redacted] There were no personnel injury but damage to the ship necessitated her return to Cristobal, C.Z. on 31 March where she remained under repair until 15 April 1967.

MULLER RELIEF MAY - JUNE 1967

On 15 May, the USS GEORGETOWN, having [redacted]

On 23 June, the USNS MULLER returned to station and the USS GEORGETOWN sailed to Norfolk.

[redacted] DEPLOYMENT - NOVEMBER 1967

The USS GEORGETOWN departed Norfolk, Va. on 16 October enroute the Fleet Training Center at Guantanamo Bay for two weeks underway refresher training (23 October-3 November). During this period [redacted]





TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

MULLER RELIEF - JUNE-August 1968

In May 1968, DIRNSA proposed the USS GEORGETOWN relieve the MULLER o/a 15 June

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

The GEORGETOWN relieved by the USNS MULLER on 1 August, arrived in Norfolk 7 August 1968.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

The GEORGETOWN departed Norfolk enroute [redacted] on 17 September and operated in the [redacted] area until 27 October when she sailed for the east coast of [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

A port call was scheduled in [redacted] on 27 November for badly needed waterside/fireside cleaning of boiler and maintenance of the auxillary equipment.

While the ship was returning to the east coast to resume coastal operations, [redacted]



DEACTIVATION OF THE USS GEORGETOWN

The GEORGETOWN arrived in Norfolk on 6 March 1969 after an extended east [redacted] cruise.



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

USS JAMESTOWN [redacted]

The USS JAMESTOWN, a converted Liberty hull, began service as a Technical Research Ship on 20 January 1964 when she left Norfolk for shakedown operations in the Caribbean. The five week cruise included stops at Guantanamo Bay, Kingston, Jamaica and a week of operations off Havana.

FIRST DEPLOYMENT

The JAMESTOWN's first full deployment, a scheduled circimnavigation of Africa, began on 9 April 1964. The 130 day deployment covered approximately 31,000 engine miles and took the ship into the Mediterranean, through the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, south along the East African coast, north along the west coast to Sierra Leone and back to Norfolk. [redacted]

The deployment area was arbitrarily divided into three parts to facilitate tasking and evaluation: Part I - transit of the Atlantic Ocean to and from the deployment area; [redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

THIRD DEPLOYMENT

The ship departed Norfolk 23 March 1965

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 50 USC 403
(b)(3) 18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



The JAMESTOWN's operations between January and October 1969 were, primarily routine in nature. On 7 October the ship left Southeast Asia enroute to its annual overhaul at Sasebo. During this period, the decision was made by DEPSECDEF to deactivate all the technical research ships. The ship was then moved from Sasebo to Yokosuka to be decommissioned in mid-December 1969.

USS BELMONT [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

The USS BELMONT was the first of the Victory type hulls to be converted to a Technical Research Ship. The ship's maximum speed of 18 knots made it more responsive than previous TRSs to situations requiring swift diversion from one operations area to another.

The initial plans provided for 128 enlisted and 6 officer [redacted] personnel. [redacted]

The BELMONT's shakedown cruise to the Caribbean area began on 20 January 1965. Underway training was conducted during daylight hours with the ship returning to Guantanamo each night and on weekends. From 20-26 February, the ship operated in the [redacted] area and returned to Norfolk on 01 March 1965.

FIRST DEPLOYMENT

The BELMONT's first full deployment, starting on 26 April 1965, was scheduled for the west coast of [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

SECOND DEPLOYMENT

In mid-September 1965, the BELMONT deployed to [redacted] where it was tasked [redacted]

THIRD DEPLOYMENT

On 16 March 1966, the BELMONT began its third deployment. [redacted]



FOURTH DEPLOYMENT

In September 1966, the BELMONT began a deployment to the west coast of



TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-50 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

[redacted]

SEVENTH DEPLOYMENT

The BELMONT did not depart for [redacted] again until mid-1968 due to numerous delays encountered during the ship's yard overhaul period and the need for refresher training for the [redacted] personnel on board. The BELMONT's operations orders were changed several times enroute to West coast [redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA

TOP SECRET UMBRA



TOP SECRET UMBRA



After a brief port call in Rota, Spain the ship departed the Mediterranean enroute Norfolk. On 31 October, the BELMONT arrived in Norfolk where stripping and deactivation procedures began. Deactivation was completed in January 1970.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

USS LIBERTY [redacted]

On 5 February 1965, the USS LIBERTY, AGTR-5, sailed from the Bremerton shipyard at Washington. The ship transited to Norfolk, Virginia and arrived 25 February to begin preparing for [redacted]

The USS LIBERTY with [redacted] embarked, conducted shakedown operations at Guantanamo Bay between 29 March and 27 April 1965, and then deployed to the west coast of [redacted] from Norfolk on 15 June 1965.

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

SECOND DEPLOYMENT TO WEST COAST

On 3 January 1966, the USS LIBERTY deployed from Norfolk enroute

The ship operated for approximately 2 months before returning to Norfolk on 21 March 1966.

SUBSEQUENT DEPLOYMENTS TO WEST COAST

On 31 May 1966, the USS LIBERTY sailed from Norfolk to begin her third deployment to the west coast of This mission, which lasted until 30 August 1966, was conducted

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

The LIBERTY returned to Norfolk on 28 February 1967 for upkeep.

FINAL DEPLOYMENT

On 3 May 1967, the LIBERTY sailed from Norfolk to the west coast of [redacted]

[redacted]

On 8 June, the ship was attacked by Israeli topedo boats and fighter jets. Serious damage was sustained by the ship and casualities were high. The ship was subsequently towed to Malta to undergo temporary repairs and later to the U.S. where she remained out of commission until the end of the

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

USNS VALDEZ



EXTENSION OF THE USNS VALDEZ

The USNS VALDEZ was originally slated to be phased out in 1964. As the time for inactivation approached, and prospect of losing the ship became more apparent, strong voices were heard in favor of extending the ship. The basic rationale for the proposal was as follows: TRSs 2 and 3 which were programmed for commissioning by the end of calendar year 1963 would not become operationally available until late FY64. At that time, the VALDEZ, MULLER and ROBINSON were due for deactivation; this left only 3 TRSs to be applied to all existing requirements. TRSs 4 and 5, programmed for December 1964 would not be operationally available until mid-1965, besides, it was believed



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

After annual overhaul in Capetown, South Africa (24 January - 26 February 1964) the ship deployed to

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

[redacted]

The VALDEZ deployed once again to east coast on 3 January 1967 and remained there until 8 April when she began her transit through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean enroute CONUS.

VALDEZ REHABILITATION PLANNING

The VALDEZ, commissioned in 1967 to meet [redacted] had been programmed since 1964 on a year-to-year basis until 1967. She had been operated exclusively from foreign ports since 1961 and because overhaul had routinely been accomplished in Capetown, she had been virtually inaccessible for modifiation and updating of the research department facilities and electonic installations. In 1967, the ship was programmed for overhaul prior to July 1967.

[redacted]

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA



USNS VALDEZ REHABILITATION

Between 14 June - 11 September 1967, the USNS VALDEZ underwent rehabilitation, upkeep and refresher training. Included in the yard projects were: rehabilitation of enlisted men's living spaces including air-conditioning;

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

installation of half deck in #2 hold above existing third deck MILDEPT office spaces; air-conditioning of MILDEPT maintenance area and administration spaces; and painting of the exterior of the ship.

REDEPLOYMENT TO [redacted]

The USNS VALDEZ departed for the west coast of [redacted] on 18 September after test and training exercises. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

In May 1968, the ship returned to the west coast where she operated until 18 December 1968 when she set sail for New York for overhaul.

[redacted]

USNS VALDEZ OVERHAUL 1968-1969

[redacted]

The USNS VALDEZ, then commencing overhaul in the U.S., was examined as to its capability to provide this support.

[redacted]

During the ship's overhaul period, a TRSSCOMM AN/SRC-33 system was installed. It was hoped that this additional equipment would provide the ship with a more reliable communications capability. The USNS VALDEZ, in the past, had experienced chronic communications problems especially while operating in the [redacted]

From the time installation of the system was complet problems with the equipment began primarily involving th antenna and its controls. The ship, originally schedule to depart for [redacted] on 11 December 1968 postponed sailing until January 23, 1969, due to recurring problems involving the installation and testing of the new TRSSCOMM.

During its remaining days in the U.S., the ship received scuttle/destruct devices and conducted walk through drills.

The VALDEZ finally departed for east coast on 23 January 1969.

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-50 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

In April, the ship experienced failure of transmitters which required 26 days in port Monrovia, Liberia to correct. At the same time, TRSSCOMM system developed problems. Correction of these problems was hampered by excessive heat in the equipment bays. It was necessary to send a technician and parts from the U.S. to Monrovia to accomplish repairs.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

On 6 June, the ship suffered a main engine disablement which left it dead in the water off Luanda. The ship was towed to port where repairs were completed on 14 June.

On 13 August, CNO withheld the obligational authority to cover the operations of VALDEZ and MILLER beyond 1 October 1969 (ref Section 6). [redacted] recommended the immediate return of the VALDEZ to the U.S. and CINCLANT, on COMSTS' estimate that 60 days would be necessary to deactivate the ship, ordered her return on 23 August.

The USNS VALDEZ, in port Monrovia for routine port call, received orderes to sail to Norfolk, Va. on completion of the in port period. The ship departed on 27 August and arrived in Norfolk on 18 September to commence deactivation.

[redacted]

TOP SECRET UMBRA

USNS MULLER [redacted]

In early 1962, the Secretary of Defense directed [redacted] In response to the DOD directive, and to determine the resources this would require, [redacted] developed a two-phased program for submission to the Assistant Secretary of Defense and arranged for the charter and conversion of a ship through the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS). (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

In August 1962, COMSTS advised that the USNS MULLER had been selected for reoutfitting and by September alteration procedures had begun.

On 23 April 1963, the USNS MULLER T-AG-169 left Higgens Shipyard near New Orleans for Key West and on 30 April the ship, [redacted]

[redacted]





(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

FIRST DEPLOYMENT APRIL 1963 - APRIL 1964

On 21 April 1964 the ship sailed to Tampa, Florida to undergo its first annual overhaul.

SECOND DEPLOYMENT MAY 1964 - APRIL 1965

On 19 May the MULLER sailed from the shipyards to resume her normal mission

THIRD DEPLOYMENT MAY 1965 - MAY 1966

The USNS MULLER returned to operations on 21 May 1965 when she relieved the USS GEORGETOWN in Key West.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



FOURTH DEPLOYMENT JUNE 1966 - MAY 1967

On 29 June 1966, the USNS MULLER, on completion of drydock and overhaul in New York, relieved the USS GEORGETOWN at Key West and



Muller Generator Casualty

On 11 July, the USNS MULLER, having just completed overhaul, reported failure of 2 generators. COMSTSLANT directed the ship to remain far enough from the coast to preclude drifting into before a tow could be arranged.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

While awaiting tow, the ship established a pattern of drifting for approximately eight hours while all power was shifted to the Research Operations spaces, and then returning to its original position by shifting all ship's power back to its engines.

The following day, the USS EATON took the MULLER in tow to Key West where repairs were completed on 29 July.

Underwater Hull Inspection

COMSTSLANT in turn recommended that members of (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 MULLER's MILDEPT be trained to accomplish hull inspection rather than contracted personnel because this could offer an opportunity to attach objects to the hull as well as draw undesirable attention to the ship.

DIRNAVSECGRU objected to the use personnel for this task and recommended use of shore-based military personnel. COMSTS Port Canaveral subsequently arranged for in-port diving services to accomplish hull inspection and the MULLER was directed to report satisfactory completion of the job in the first SITREP following the inspection.

FIFTH DEPLOYMENT JUNE 1967-JUNE 1968

On 22 June, the USNS MULLER relieved the USS GEORGETOWN at Key West and resumed



The MULLER was accompanied by an escort at all times until her final recall in October 1969. The three destroyers assigned normally operated outboard of the MULLER but within quick reaction range for periods of no less than five days.

The special provisioning and refueling requirements of the destroyers necessitated several changes to the schedule routine the ship had previously employed (see Section 5, p. 103).

SIXTH DEPLOYMENT AUGUST 1968-OCTOBER 1969

On 6 August 1968, the USNS MULLER commenced what was to be her last deployment.

On 16-17 December the ship was off-station in dry dock in Tampa, Florida undergoing repairs to generators.

Deactivation of the USNS MULLER

In July 1969, CNO in response to the proposed Navy FY-70 reduction in funding, recommended the immediate inactivation of the USNS VALDEZ and USNS MULLER. The MULLER was due for her annual yard overhaul in September, but due to CNO's proposal to withhold obligational authority to cover her operations, COMSTS recommended the ship be diverted as soon as possible to NORVA to commence stripping operations.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

[redacted]

The ship arrived on 16 October and removal o(b)(1)
sponsor's equipment began immediately. On 28 Oc(b)(3)-50 USC 403
[redacted] was deactivated. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

CHRONOLOGY OF CRUISES BY SHIP

USS OXFORD [redacted] /AGTR-1)

04 January 1962 - 08 May 1962	East coast [redacted]
16 July 1962 - 02 March 1963	[redacted]
May 1963 - 06 September 1963	East coast [redacted]
31 December 1963 - 31 June 1964	Caribbean
19 February 1964 - 10 June 1964	West coast [redacted]
05 August 1964 - 02 December 1964	West coast [redacted]
03 February 1965 - 03 June 1965	West/East coast [redacted]
17 June 1965 - 31 August 1965	Subic [redacted]
25 September 1965 - 31 October 1965	
11 November 1965 - 18 December 1965	
16 February 1966 - 05 March 1966	
12 March 1966 - 05 June 1966	
19 June 1966 - 28 July 1966	
12 August 1966 - 07 September 1966	
13 September - 28 October 1966	
03 November 1966 - 6 December 1966	
13 December 1966 - 12 January 1967	
23 January 1967 - 24 April 1967	
05 May 1967 - 03 July 1967	
20 September 1967 - 29 November 1967	
12 December 1967 - 15 March 1968	
18 April 1968 - 17 July 1968	

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

28 July 1968 - 23 August 1968

21 September 1968 - 21 December 1968

03 January 1969 - 09 April 1969

24 April 1969 - 27 July 1969

11 August 1969 - 03 November 1969

DEACTIVATED



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

USS GEORGETOWN [redacted] (AGTR-2)

19 April 1964 - 26 May 1964	[redacted]
01 July 1964 - 26 October 1964	East coast [redacted]
06 January 1965 - 30 March 1965	West coast [redacted] Key West
03 April 1965 - 08 May 1965	[redacted]
21 July 1965 - 13 October 1965	East coast [redacted]
15 December 1965 - 07 March 1966	North coast [redacted]
18 May 1966 - 30 June 1966	[redacted]
05 July 1966 - 23 August 1966	
05 October 1966 - 21 December 1966	North Coast [redacted]
08 March 1967 - 13 May 1967	North coast [redacted]
16 May 1967 - 30 June 1967	[redacted]
17 October 1967 - 04 November 1967	Refresher training GTMO
07 November 1967 - 22 November 1967	[redacted]
23 November 1967 - 13 December 1967	
16 December 1967 - 26 March 1968	Mediterranean Ops
08 June 1968 - 09 August 1968	[redacted]
18 September 1968 - 05 October 1968	
06 October 1968 - 27 January 1969	East coast [redacted] Indian Ocean [redacted]
28 January 1969 - 07 March 1969	South Atlantic- [redacted] Norva

DEACTIVATED

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

USS JAMESTOWN [redacted] /AGTR-3)

09 April 1964 - 17 August 1964 Norfolk-Med-[redacted]-Norva

14 October 1964 - 03 February 1965 West coast [redacted]

24 March 1965 - 23 July 1965 East/West coast [redacted]

23 October 1965 - 02 January 1966 [redacted]

07 January 1966 - 01 April 1966

22 April 1966 - 03 July 1966

14 July 1966 - 30 September 1966

11 October 1966 - 23 December 1966

31 December 1966 - 02 February 1967

12 April 1967 - 11 July 1967

07 August 1967 - 13 November 1967

19 November 1967 - 20 February 1968

03 March 1968 - 13 June 1968

02 July 1968 - 30 September 1968

17 October 1968 - 15 January 1969

07 February 1969 - 17 March 1969

31 March 1969 - 30 June 1969

18 July 1969 - 18 October 1969

[redacted]

DEACTIVATED

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

USS BELMONT [redacted] /AGTR-4)

02 December 1964 - 21 December 1964	Bremerton-Norfolk
18 January 1965 - 01 March 1965	Shakedown cruise to GTMO
26 April 1965 - 16 July 1965	[redacted]
15 September 1965 - 28 January 1966	West coast [redacted]
17 March 1966 - 19 July 1966	West coast [redacted] (28 May - 02 July [redacted]
08 September 1966 - 14 November 1966	Northwest coast [redacted]
02 February 1967 - 08 June 1967	Circumnavigation [redacted]
15 August 1967 - 03 October 1967	West coast [redacted]
04 October 1967 - 16 November 1967	East coast [redacted]
17 November 1967 - 14 December 1967	West coast [redacted] transit to CONUS
15 May 1968 - 14 June 1968	Refresher training at GTMO
15 June 1968 - 25 September 1968	West coast [redacted]
26 September 1968 - 30 October 1968	Indian Ocean/West/ West coast [redacted]
31 October 1968 - 28 Novmeber 1968	Transit South Atlantic/ East coast [redacted] /Norva
18 June 1969 - 30 October 1969	Mediterranean

DEACTIVATED

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

USS LIBERTY [redacted] AGTR-5)

05 February 1965 - 25 February 1965	Bremerton - Norfolk
29 March 1965 - 24 April 1965	Shakedown at GTMO
15 June 1965 - 27 October 1965	West coast [redacted] to [redacted]
03 January 1966 - 21 March 1966	West coast [redacted] [redacted]
31 May 1966 - 30 August 1966	West coast [redacted]
01 November 1966 - 28 February 1967	West coast [redacted]
03 May 1967 - 24 May 1967	West coast [redacted] [redacted]
01 June 1967 - 08 June 1967	Mediterranean ops (Torpedoed during Arab-Israeli crisis and subsequently deactivated)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

USNS VALDEZ [redacted] (T-AG-169)

December 1961 - February 1962	South Atlantic [redacted]
February 1962 - September 1962	West coast
October 1962 - March 1963	West coast
08 March 1963 - 24 January 1964	West coast
26 February 1964 - 09 August 1964	West coast
16 August 1964 - 10 February 1965	East coast
21 March 1965 - 20 October 1965	East coast
26 October 1965 - 15 December 1965	West coast
27 December 1965 - 24 May 1966	East coast
21 June 1966 - 10 October 1966	East coast
20 October 1966 - 13 December 1966	West coast
03 January 1967 - 30 March 1967	East coast
09 April 1967 - 16 April 1967	[redacted]
21 April 1967 - 22 May 1967	Mediterranean
18 December 1967 - 16 May 1968	East [redacted]
17 May 1968 - 28 August 1968	West coast [redacted]
29 August 1968 - 18 September 1968	Transit to CONUS for overhaul
23 January 1969 - 18 February 1969	[redacted] operations
19 February 1969 - 26 August 1969	West coast [redacted]
27 August 1969 - 18 September 1969	Transit to CONUS

DEACTIVATED

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

USNS MULLER [redacted] (T-AG-171)

30 April 1963 - 21 April 1964

26 May 1964 - 01 April 1965

10 May 1965 - 21 May 1966

02 July 1966 - 15 May 1967

25 June 1967 - 11 June 1968

06 August 1968 - 07 October 1969

DEACTIVATED

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA

RATIO OF ON-STATION TIME BY SHIP

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

USS OXFORD [redacted] 1967-1969

1967

ON STATION 66%

OFF STATION 33%

* 80 days off station for annual overhaul in Japan and further delay due to engine failure.

1968

ON STATION 73%

OFF STATION 27%

* 33 Days delay in Subic, P.I. for engine repairs.

1969 (308 days only)

ON STATION 79%

OFF STATION 11%

USS GEORGETOWN [redacted] 1967-1969

1967

ON STATION 38%

OFF STATION 62%*

* 66 days in Norfolk, Va. for normal RAV.
109 days in Norfolk, Va. for annual overhaul.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

1968

ON STATION 51%

OFF STATION 49%

* 13 days delay in Naples, Italy due to [redacted]
74 days in Norfolk, Va. for normal RAV.
74 days in Norfolk, Va. for normal RAV.

1969 (only 63 days)

ON STATION 85%

OFF STATION 15%

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

USS JAMESTOWN [redacted] 1967-1969

1967

ON STATION 64%

OFF STATION 36%

* 69 days for overhaul at Yokosuka, Japan
27 days in Subic for engine repairs.

1968

ON STATION 81%

OFF STATION 19%*

* 17 days in Subic due to generator failure.

1969 (291 days only)

ON STATION 78%

OFF STATION 22%

* 23 days in Subic for engine repairs.
18 days in Subic for upkeep.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

USS BELMONT [redacted] 1967-1969

1967

ON STATION 48%

OFF STATION 52%

* 32 days in Norfolk, Va. for normal RAV.
67 days in Norfolk, Va. for normal RAV.

1968

ON STATION 34%

OFF STATION 66%*

* 105 days annual overhaul/refresher training.
14 days in Tema, Ghana for engine repairs.
33 days in Norfolk, Va. for normal RAV.

1969 (304 days only)

ON STATION 34%

OFF STATION 66%*

* 140 days in port Norfolk.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

USS LIBERTY [redacted] 1966

1966

ON STATION 51%

OFF STATION 49%*

* 72 days annual overhaul
53 days in Norfolk, Va. for RAV.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

USNS VALDEZ [redacted] 1967-1969

1967

ON STATION 59%

OFF STATION 41%*

* 86 days state-side overhaul in New York.
6 days in Luanda, Angola for engine repairs.

1968

ON STATION 55%

OFF STATION 45%*

* 91 days in Norfolk, Va. for TRSSCOMM repairs.

1969 (261 days only)

ON STATION 64%

OFF STATION 36%*

* 35 days in port New York for TRSS COMM repairs.
26 days in Monrovia, Liberia for transmitter repairs.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

USNS MULLER [redacted] 1967-1969

1967

ON STATION 58%

OFF STATION 42%*

* 23 days for yard overhaul in Florida.
40 days annual overhaul.

1968

ON STATION 52%

OFF STATION 48%*

* 24 days in port due to [redacted]
12 days in Key West due to engine failure.
42 days annual overhaul in Hoboken, N.J.
14 days in Tampa, Florida for generator repairs.

1969 (289 days only)

ON STATION 63%

OFF STATION 37%*

* 41 days for installation of destruct and scuttle devises.
4 days for cooling system repairs.
4 days for bidder's survey.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50
USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L.
86-36

SECTION 5

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING OPERATIONS

MSTS AND MONTHLY SCHEDULE SUBMISSIONS

The monthly preparation and submission of schedules by [redacted] for the MSTS vessels (USNS VALDEZ and USNS MULLER), resulted in a recurring problem. The monthly schedules were prepared and submitted according to the informal guidelines established when the ships first joined the [redacted] fleet (i.e., [redacted] prepared schedules for the following month and coordinated them informally with MSTSLANT before submitting them through official channels to JCS). This procedure continued after scheduling procedures were defined and documented in [redacted] On numerous occasions, proposed schedules were subject to modifications at the request of MSTS. These changes appeared inconsistent with the informal guidelines developed in the past and caused an excessive amount of communications in finalizing the schedules.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

A TDY visit to HQMSTSLANT in Brooklyn, N.Y. was arranged in order to discuss the development of schedules (the USNS MULLER's in particular). The meeting took place on 01 November 1968 with [redacted]

It was agreed that the operating ratio should be maintained at no more than 25 days at sea following 5 days in Port Everglades. This was the MSTS requirement for normal operations - for occasional operational requirements, MSTS would not object to a slight extension of on-station time beyond the 25 day operating period.

Because of provisioning and refueling requirements for the MULLER and her excort, MSTS requested the 25 day at-sea period be subdivided as follows: 1 day enroute from Port Everglades to station; 9 days on-station (ninth day for visit at Key West Buoy for mail etc); 4 days on-station; 1 day to Key West for water and return to station; 9 days on-station; 1 day return to Port Everglades. The 5 days in Port Everglades included the day of arrival and day of departure. Naturally, due to normal constraints, this schedule would be interupted from time to time, but it was deemed impractical to deliberately vary the pattern without sound justification.

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

MSTS preferred that arrivals to and departures from ports be restricted to days other than Saturday, Sunday or holidays. Though such timing had little cost effect on the MSTS crew personnel, additional costs for tugs, berthing, stevedore support, etc., made these arrivals and departures expensive. However, MSTS agreed to support these arrivals and departures in emergency or urgent operational situations.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

MSTS would not support the need for an overnight port call in Key West (once standard operating procedure), except in the case of an emergency or urgent operational requirement. MSTS allowed only 5 days in port liberty for each 25 days at sea; any additional in port time would reduce the 5 day port call in Port Everglades. Since the majority of the MSTS crew maintain homes and families in Port Everglades, port calls elsewhere could result in a morale problem.

The one-day port call in Key West for water and provisioning took place mostly during day light hours. The ship normally departed Key West at 2030 hours, so as to arrive on station at the first light of morning.

In the event of the threat of extreme weather conditions, the MULLER would normally head for Port Everglades and ride out the storm in port. Attempt to avoid the storm by transiting Additionally, 7 knots (speed of ship) was insufficient to maintain a heading against the heavy wind and seas which normally extend far beyond the actual eye of the storm. It was agreed would be advised immediately of the departure of the ship in the event of a storm threat, and that the decision to move the ship in this situation was a command decision for the Master (skipper)/MSTS.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

With full appreciation that and in view of the numerous administrative and logistical constraints, MSTS informally proposed that MSTS prepare and forward the initial monthly schedule for review and modification/concurrence, instead of the reverse which had been the standard operating procedure. Upon coordination/concurrence, the proposed schedule would be forwarded in accordance procedures. It was also agreed that schedule modifications proposed

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

[redacted] should include [redacted] reason for the change (e.g. "urgent technical requirement, embark visitors", etc), so that MSTS could better appreciate [redacted] effectively coordinate internal MSTS requirements.

This proposal was formally made to and accepted [redacted]

In concluding the meeting, MSTS requested that [redacted] visit MSTS approximately every six months for coordination of operations.

ABRUPT CHANGES IN SCHEDULES

Early publication of monthly schedules was necessary to allow ample time for MSTS and Navy to coordinate, through maritime and commercial authorities, the availability of berth, tug support, and delivery of perishable food and other supplies, etc., with the arrival and departures of other vessels.

Abrupt changes in schedules also involved other agencies such as the U.S. State Department in arranging for port clearances and visas for personnel joining the ship at foreign ports.

In emergency or quick reaction situations these incoveniences could not be avoided but it was generally recognized that mid-stream changes in schedules required strong justification.

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

CONVERSION TO MSTS

The use of AGTRs as TRSs (entirely Navy manned) was challenged in November 1963 and again in February 1964 by RADM J.W. Ailes III, Commander, Service Force, Atlantic Fleet. His objection was based on the use of naval personnel and naval fleet units for support of [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

The objection was forwarded to CNO with a proposal to convert the TRSs to MSTS operations in support of [redacted] thus releasing the involved Navy billets for fleet operations. (6)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

The recommendation was rejected by CNO in Jun 1964, but was subsequently approved by that office in November 1964. At that time CNO directed a program be prepared for an orderly transfer of the Navy's responsibility for operation of the AGTRs to MSTS.

The Bureau of Ships estimated the cost for conversion at 1.4 million per ship and the time in the yard to accomplish conversion at 4 months. MSTS estimated annual operating cost for the three Liberty ships at 1.42 million and the two Victory ships at 1.65 million.(7)

[redacted] and [redacted] then met to develop a schedule of conversion that would allow for the fullest use of [redacted]

The plans for modification of the ships to accomodate [redacted] bogged down in 1966 for the following reasons: [redacted] going on the assumption that the ships would be manned by units of specified numbers, obtained an estimate of costs to convert all 5 TRSs from the BUSHIPS. The estimate, in April 1965, of eight million dollars for expenditure in FY68 was subsequently approved by SECDEF in a PCR of 21 December 1966. However, in 1966, in addition to other alterations, the number of personnel to be accomodated rose from 735 to 813 and it became apparent the basis for SECDEF's approval for conversion was unrealistic.

(6) COMSERVLANT ser: 70/00368 dtd 21 November 1963, "Use of Fleet Units in Support of Non-Military Operations".

(7) BUSHIPS ltr ser: 44-042, dtd 29 May 1965.

TOP SECRET UMBRA

The revised estimate came to 28.7 million. This included increased manning figures, habitability improvements, addition of machine automation equipment and Coast Guard certification. Subsequently it was decided that it was not feasible to convert five ships in one year and in view of the fact that only eight million was included in FY67 CCP for conversion of all five ships it was necessary for Navy to reprogram its manpower resources in FY68 to provide for continued operartion of these ships during that fiscal year.

[redacted] and Navy's proposed programs for conversion demonstrated the advantages of operating under MSTS in peacetime conditions. Operational days per year under MSTS operation would be 259 compared to 193 under Navy operation.

NSA's proposal, however, called for conversion of only the two Victory ships with an estimated life expectancy of ten more years. If accepted, this program would require that one ship be out of operation for most of FY68 and one for seven months in FY69. Under the Navy program one ship would be out for most of FY68 and three in FY69 and one in FY70.

When the above proposals were submitted to the OSD Review Group during the CCP submission 67-73, the group decided that the operational need for the AGTRs would not decline in the coming years and that until [redacted] it would not be feasible to allow any ship to be out of service during FY69.

Therefore, the Review Group recommended the 5 AGTRs continue to be operated by the Navy and that [redacted] be adjusted accordingly.

The recommendation was subsequently approved by SECDEF.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA

[redacted] AS A RESULT OF CLOSURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN PORTS TO U.S. NAVAL VESSELS

As a result of an incident involving U.S. Military personnel from the USS ROOSEVELT while in Capetown, South Africa in Feb 67 , the U.S. State Department announced the unofficial closure of South African ports to U.S. ships.

[redacted]

The loss of these ports [redacted] by requiring long transits to and from suitable ports for overhaul and logistics. The material reliability of the ship was reduced as voyage repair facilities were reduced in quality and there was an increase in cost and time for VALDEZ's surface and air logistics support now coming from the U.S. to other African ports where the survice was erratic. (8)

[redacted]

(8) Department of the Navy Memo dtd 4 March 1967, "DOD Requirement for Facilities and Contractual Support in the Republic of South Africa."

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

[redacted] incorporated into DDR&E's paper, as well as studies from Navy, Air Force and NASA, were forwarded on 5 June to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and thence to the Under Secretary of the State Department for review.

In the interim, [redacted] an exchange of correspondence with CNO and MSTS in order to develop mutually acceptable plans for maximum use of the extremely limited port facilities.

On 27 April 1967, COMSTS provided CNO with comments and recommendations for alternative solutions:

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]

(9) [redacted] dtd 20 March 1967, "DOD REQUIREMENTS FOR FACILITIES AND CONTRACTUAL SUPPORT IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (U) ".

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(10) COMSTS 261324Z April 1967, "AGTR/MSTS Deployments".

COMSTS also pointed out that limitations of good port facilities would require larger and more frequent shipments of all supplies to the ships operating in the area and because of this, operating flexibility would be reduced by the necessity to schedule operations around surface transport rendezvous. COMSTS estimated a 25% reduction in productivity from the VALDEZ as a result of these new restrictions.

CINCLANTFLT, in providing comments to CNO on the effects this new situation would have on [redacted] stated:

> ...present 16 week deployment remains most efficient in utilization and productive coverage of desired areas, recognizing that there will be some degradation of effort during latter part of deployment due material problems, inadequate logistic support and operator fatigue...with 10 day logistic resupply period at Rota, deployment can be increased to 21 weeks without degrading operational capability of AGTR...If Navy responsibility extended to cover east coast in addition to west coast during overhaul of MSTS ship, 21 week employment with 10 day logistic support stop at Rota in mid-cruise feasible...any increase over 16 week deployment should include commensurate increase from 8-11 weeks CONUS time between deployments... (11)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

In July, [redacted] representatives met with JCS, CNO and [redacted] representatives to discuss the denial of South African ports to U.S. Naval ships. The result was a proposal to initiate a test action by scheduling a port call for the USNS VALDEZ at Durban, South Africa. The Director of African Region, ISA, indicated a willingness to process such a request and try to obtain State Department clearance. A message was sent to ASD/ISA [redacted] requesting ASD/ISA make preliminary approach to State Department to help insure a favorable response in regard to Durban entry when JCS/JRC request for clearance was presented.

Through informal channels, [redacted] was advised that clearance for the ship's entry into Durban would not be forthcoming but State Department had indicated that if sufficient justification was provided, they would not object to a port call in South Africa by a TRS.

(11) CINCLANTFLT 050028Z May 1967, "AGTR DEPLOYMENTS".

Between July of 1967 and the final departure of TRSs from the African waters in 1969, no situation of sufficient urgency arose that would permit the suggestion to be tested again.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-10 USC 130
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

CPA RESTRICTIONS

Claimed territorial sea is the area of water over which a country claims territorial rights. CPA is the closest point of approach a ship may make to the foreign landmass, and is measured from the coastal baseline of the country in question.

Although the U.S.does not recognize any claimed territorial seas beyond 3 NM, Technical Research Ships usually conducted operations outside the claimed territorial waters (e.g., [redacted] claimed territorial sea is [redacted] USNS MULLER operated at [redacted]. In cases in which there were overriding [redacted] considerations, request for operations within claimed territorial waters would be considered on an individual basis. (12)

The JCS and commanders of the Unified and Specified commands designate sensitive areas for programs where appropriate,and when required, designation of such areas include geographical boundaries.

The Unified and Specified Commands may increase but not decrease CPAs below the limits established by JCS.

On 23 November 1967, the USS GEORGETOWN was diverted

[redacted]

On 21 December, the USS GEORGETOWN received sailing orders from COMSIXTHFLT, then her parent command, with CPAs affixed as follows:

COUNTRY	CPA	CLAIMED DISTANCE
[redacted]	6	6
	25	6
	25	6
	25	6
	25	unspecified

(12) [redacted] "Operational Guidance for [redacted] Programs and Certain [redacted] (U); Appendix D."

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

CONTINUED:

COUNTRY	CPA	CLAIMED DISTANCE	
[redacted]	25	12	
	25	6	
	25	12	
	12	12	
	6	6	(13)

After her January port call, the GEORGETOWN commenced operations on 6 February under SAILO 1-68 which stated, "CPA for [redacted] shall be thirty-five miles, or beyond the 100 fathom curve whichever is greater." (14)

At the termination of the GEORGETOWN's Mediterranean cruise, [redacted] provided CINCUSNAVEUR with a summary evaluation of [redacted] SIGINT operations in the Med.

The original diversion of the GEORGETOWN was due to [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(13) COMSIXTHFLT SAILO 2-67 for USS GEORGETOWN, dtd 212340Z December 1967, [redacted]

(14) [redacted] to JCS/JRC, ADP-43, 262149Z January 1968.

(15) [redacted] to CINCUSNAVEUR, K-137, 182248Z "USS GEORGETOWN MED OPS (U)".

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

On 14 February 1969, [redacted] forwarded a deployment recommendation for the USS BELMONT, to CINCLANT. This proposed a deployment to the Mediterranean Sea [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

On 13 June, JCS approved the schedule for the first month of the proposed deployment except fot the CPA to [redacted] which was increased from 12 NM to 50 NM. (16)

[redacted]

(16) JCS 132052Z Juen 69, "JUNE RECON SCHEDULE".
(17) USCINCEUR 251519Z July 1969, "RESTRICTIONS ON [redacted] OPERATIONS".
(18) CINCUSNAVEUR 251349Z July 1969, "RESTRICTIONS ON [redacted] OPERATIONS".
(19) COMSIXTHFLT 091510Z August 1969, [redacted]

While the USS BELMONT was successful in completion of her primary mission, the cruise pointed out a problem that would have to be faced in subsequent Mediterranean missions.

The USS BELMONT's summer cruise was the last by a TRS in the Mediterranean prior to deactivation of all TRSs in the fall of 1969.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

ESCORT AND PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS

When the first TRSs were introduced to [redacted] they were not armed for two primary reasons: [redacted] and (2) it would be free of the restrictions applied to U.S. warships in foreign ports.

For six years, the TRSs operated [redacted]

The immediate solution to the problem was to provide the ships with the protection they needed in order to carry out their operations without undo risk to the ships themselves. This was a command decision and took the form, in certain instances, of armed escorts (usually DDs) and air cover.

There was initial concern over the question of whether the appearance of an armed vessel in company with a TRS might not provoke the very hostile reaction we were trying to avoid. It was deemed however, that if the role of the DD excort was fairly passive, i.e., it remained outboard of the TRS, maintaining a loose patrol and not close in unless requested to do so by the TRS, it probably would not cause overt hostile reaction.

[redacted]

The mission of the escort was to provide protective cover for the USNS MULLER [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

"Enclosure (7) to CINCLANT letter serial 000278/331 of 15 September 1966...provided guidance for promeas tive measures to be taken in applying the right of self-preservation in peacetime and rules of engagement [redacted] In addition to these rules, the following rules of engagement were provided:

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(1) If for some reason MULLER is forced to enter [redacted] territorial waters, the commanding officer of the escort is authorized to pursue.
(2) In the event of an engineering or other casualty to MULLER which causes the ship to drift into [redacted] territorial waters, every effort shall be made to tow the MULLER into international waters. The escort vessel, in any case, will remain with MULLER to provide protection in the event the MULLER drifts into [redacted] territorial waters.
(3) In the event [redacted] forces are declared hostile ...U.S. forces in self-defense, may deliver such fire and perform such tactics as are necessary to provide for defense of MULLER as well as themselves, including firing into [redacted] territorial waters and airspace." (20)

The destroyer escort assigned to the MULLER normally maintained a loose patrol 4-8 miles outboard of the ship whenever she moved [redacted] The destroyer assignments for duty were levied by COMSECONDFLT and COMASWFORLANT on a quarterly basis.

In addition to the destroyer, fighter aircraft, as made available to COMKWESTFOR, were put on alert. These aircraft were expected to be on station approximately 10 minutes after call and had an estimated stay time of approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes.

The requirement for destroyer escort, which remained in effect until the MULLER discontinued operations, though not hampering MULLER's activities to any extent, did result in several changes in her routine.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

The destroyer, according to Navy regulations, had to maintain 70% of its fuel at all times. This made it necessary for the escort to leave station to refuel at Key West approximately every 9 days. This, of course, affected the MULLER, not allowed to remain [redacted] North without her escort.

Situations occured, [redacted] that required the MULLER to be on station during a period when she was scheduled to be in Key West with her escort. Normally, a schedule modification for the MULLER would quickly amend the situation, but in view of the escort, two schedules had to be taken into account.

(20) CINCLANTFLT 022304Z February 1968, CINCLANT OPORD 2130, "USNS MULLER PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS".

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

In urgent situations however, the destroyer could remain on station longer, or, if lead-time permitted, be brought into Key West early for fueling. During several instances when rescheduling of the escort was necessary in order to satisfy high priority technical requirements, [redacted] found CINCLANT most helpful in assisting in the arrangements.

(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Like the MULLER, the USS GEORGETOWN, conducting operations in the Mediterranean at the time of the [redacted] was assigned a destroyer escort. ADMINO CINCUSNAVEUR in January 1968, directed one destroyer escort provide direct support to USS GEORGETOWN while she operated in area [redacted] The destroyer was to patrol between GEORGETOWN and the shore, and maintain a CPA of no less than 25 NM. (21)

JCS approved the GEORGETOWN's February [redacted] schedule with one exception; the escort was to remain 10 NM outboard of GEORGETOWN's track. (22)

On 11 February, one UAR Beagle aircraft made three low passes over the GEORGETOWN. As a result of the overflight, COMSIXTHFLT took further precautionary measures for advisory warning to the ship. In addition, the USS F.D. ROOSEVELT and her escorts the USS PUTNAM and USS CONINGHAM, were placed on one hour notice in support of GEORGETOWN's operations. (23) The USS STORMES was assigned as an additional escort for the ROOSEVELT. The USS TALAHATCHIE COUNTY was placed on two hour standby. Further, one VP aircraft was placed on 24 hour coverage to maintain and document a continuous navigational plot of the ship.

(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Later, an SP2H aircraft was assigned to report all surface contacts within 50 NM of the GEORGETOWN.(24)

[redacted]

(21) CINCUSNAVEUR 291741Z January 1968, [redacted]
(22) JCS 8863, 012317Z February 1968, "FEBRUARY 1968 RECONNAISSANCE SCHEDULE".
(23) CINCUSNAVEUR 111135Z February 1968, [redacted]
(24) CTF 67 112038Z February 1968.

Unlike the USNS MULLER, the USS GEORGETOWN's CPA's were increased in addition to the escort. [redacted] Although her escort did not hamper her operations the excessive protective cover involved a number of Mediterranean resources and considerable reaction planning.

The requirement for escort was dropped as GEORGETOWN moved eastward and eventually out of the Mediterranean.

Again, unlike the USNS MULLER, the USS GEORGETOWN's escort and cover was not to become a routine operation since the Mediterranean was not her permanent operations area.

Evaluation of the two situations (the smooth transition to escort and protective cover by the MULLER; the rapid addition of escort and protective cover perhaps as an over-reaction to the UAR overflight), indicated that requirement of escort for TRSs did not degrade [redacted] but did point out that escort operations and protective cover planned in advance created less upheaval in fleet operations and allowed for the proper programming of the resources involved.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



(25) G-1174-67, dtd 20 September 1967. "Diversion of the USS BELMONT (AGTR-4)".

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36



TOP SECRET UMBRA



(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA

COURIER PROBLEM IN AFRICA

In February 1969, a recurring problem involving the disposition of courier material handled by TRSs operating in African waters was addressed by the CO, Research Operations Detachment, USNS VALDEZ.

Until this time, when a ship arrived in Mombasa, Kenya, a courier from the research department had to fly to Nairobi to deliver the outgoing ARFCOS material to the American Embassy and pick up the incoming material. The problem was a matter of security. The couriers traveled in civilian clothes and carried only their military I.D. and government passports. On demand by local military or police authorities to open the package the courier would have no choice but to comply. Though the Kenyan government was traditionally pro-West, the generally unstable conditions throughout Africa made such procedures risky and revelation of some sensitive material could prove extremely embarrassing to the U.S..

[redacted] recommended that the Department of State arrange to have the American Embassy provide courier service to meet the ship on arrival in Mombasa or provide the RSCHOPDET with some kind of authorization which would grant the detachment couriers diplomatic immunity for these trips. (31)

Liaison with the Pouch and Courier Division, U.S. Department of State revealed the fact that the courier service is operated from Washington and is not subject to local controls nor is the service obligated to handle ARFCOS or other Department of Defense courier material beyond the limits of established courier routes. Nairobi, Kenya is a point of entry for State Department courier material and a regular stop on State Department courier routes; there is no U.S. consulate or other post in Mombasa.

The U.S. Embassy in Nairobi had no resources specifically allocated for courier duties and used its own personnel to perform courier functions. It performed similar functions for U.S. naval ships on a courtesy basis when personnel were available.

(31) T-AG-169 ser:014 dtd 13 Feb 69, "Courier Material".

Taking the above into account, [redacted] proposed two possible solutions to NSA/ NIC, and DIRARFCOS. The Pouch and Courier Division, U.S. Department of State advised [redacted] that it could request the Ambassador to Kenya to provide letter of identification for specified couriers of the RSCHOPSDET VALDEZ. These letters would protect the material only and confer no diplomatic immunity on the couriers. Additionally, funds would probably have to be provided to cover commercial air costs between Mombasa and Nairobi.

On the other hand, VALDEZ could discontinue using Mombasa as a courier point while continuing to utilize port facilities there for liberty and dock services. The material would be handled only through African ports where the State Department maintained foreign missions with TOP SECRET CONTROL Officers such as Aden, Mogadiscio, Dar es Salaam, Lourenco Marques and Capetown. This would result in an undesirable accumulation of sensitive material on board the ship and would require rescheduling procedures to arrange for courier drop-offs in ports not normally utilized. (32)

The addressees of the memorandum were asked to comment on the proposals with respect to the adequacy from a standpoint of security and the feasibility from an operational standpoint.

[redacted] then involved in an on-going review of the world-wide [redacted] recommended the problem not be addresses at that time. (33) There were no ships [redacted] then and later events involving deactivation of the TRSs eliminated the problem for the moment.

If, however, at any time in the future, US Navy vessels [redacted] the problem will have to be addresses again.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(32) [redacted] ser: 006103, dtd 6 May 1969, "Courier Material for RSCHOPSDET Aboard USNS VALDEZ (T-AG-169)".

(33) [redacted]094, 281728Z May 1969, "MOVEMENT OF COURIER MATERIAL AT MOMBASA KENYA".

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

DOCUMENT CONTROL/DESTRUCT/SCUTTLE



In addition, CNO authorized the use of certain existing ordinance devices for destruction purpose. They were the M-3 Destruction Kits permanently installed in the Research Operations spaces of some ships in metal bins which also serve as the normal storage location for [redacted] the ABC M-4 File Destroyers for use in classified files, located in separate compartments throughout the ship and the [redacted]

With slight variation, the TRSs were equipped with the "VALDEZ Quick-Fix" type system for equipment/document destruction and scuttling:

> "The USNS VALDEZ has on board devices to scuttle the ship and to destruct electonic devices and documents. An electric ignition and firing method has been provided...The scuttle devices are 14 square shaped explosive charges which will cause a total of

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

14 approximately 18" square hull penetrations below the waterline in 3 compartments...The file destruct are standard stock items (sodium nitrate) (M-4). The electronic equipment destruct devises are standard stock items (thermit) (M1A2). The document and circuit board destroyers are standard stock items (sodium nitrate or sodium tricalcium nitrate) (M-3). NWC China Lake devised and installed a method to electrically ignite file and electronic destruct devices from a central point within the research spaces, scuttle charges are fired from outside the research spaces. Scuttle firing and destruct ignition are installed separately by standard mine safety appliance blasting units. These are battery powered and independent of ship's power." (34)

The destruct devices were repeatedly tested for effectiveness. The system was never proven totally satisfactory regarding the 30 minute goal set for destruction; however, it was determined that if allowed to fire, after 30 minutes, the process of conflagration would be too great to reverse.

Prior to the deactivation of the TRSs, no incident occured that warranted the use of these devices so to date the system has never been tested under actual conditions.

(34) COMSTSLANT 031818Z February 1969, "Scuttle and Destruct Report on Interim Installation."

AGING HULLS

Repetitive mechanical failure was a problem common to all the Technical Research Ships. The origianl TRS program called for retirement of the first ships as it advanced towards that time when TRSs were newly constructed from the ground up, but, when the time came to retire the USNS VALDEZ in 1964, the program had reached a point where funds were not available for new construction and strong justification for such on-going construction was required.

Funds and justification for further ships were never approved so the original 6 ships represented the total resources of the TRS program until its conclusion. (The VICOTRY ships LIBERTY/BELMONT had a life expectancy of 10 years beyond 1967; the Liberty ships OXFORD/GEORGETOWN/JAMESTOWN had a life expectancy of 5 years beyond 1967).

Though yearly overhauls and periodic upkeep was the standard operating procedure, the vessels and installed equipment suffered numerous casualties that can be blamed primarily on "old age" factors and the problems involved with [redacted] on a vessel not constructed originally for that purpose. For example: the USS GEORGETOWN suffered a boiler casualty off Venezuela on 25 March 1967 which required 15 days in port for repairs; lost pump engine 14 December 1967 while enroute to the Mediterranean on a quick reaction mission; suffered a generator outage 1 - 26 May 1968; main engine disablement 27 May - 06 June 1968; failure of a fuel injection system in August 1968; lost SA-01 position due to a hydraulic pump failure 14 - 25 August 1968; experienced boiler steam main damage 13 - 16 November 1969; and had a crank shaft damaged beyond repair December 1968 - 18 January 1969. The USNS MULLER lost two generators 11 - 29 July 1969; suffered a main engine failure 23 March - 05 April 1966 which required the ship to be towed to safety; lost DCGB-04 position due to a short in the equipment with no spare parts available on board 21 December - 29 December 1968; and lost a diesel generator 12 June 1969.

The problem can best be summed up by a statement from CINCLANT concerning the delay of GEORGETOWN's last proposed deployment:

"The extent of GEORGETOWN's engineering problem... cannot be determined for several days because of lack of information on availability of parts for an ancient power plant which has been out of production for many years." (35)

With every material casualty the reliability of a vessel decreased and as the days off station for repairs increased [redacted] At a time when TRSs were being looked to as resources for quick reaction and [redacted] many were approaching retirement and unable to satisfy these requirements.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(35) CINCLANT 051640Z July 1969, "USS GEORGETOWN Deployment Recommendation".

TOP SECRET UMBRA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SECTION 6

DEACTIVATION OF TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIPS

In July 1969, OSD because of budgetary limitations, proposed a reduction to each DOD department's [redacted] Each department was asked to submit a plan based on a 5% and 10% proposed reduction to indicate from where the cuts would come.

CNO subsequently advised [redacted] of those [redacted] programs considered most expendible and proposed the immediate inactivation of the USNS VALDEZ and USNS MULLER, "...in view of the high cost and difficulty in protecting these [redacted] and due to the fact that the program does not provide sufficient resources for adequate upgrading." (36)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

On 18 July, [redacted] forwarded to DEPSECDEF, the program adjustments for FY70 based on a 5% and 10% reduction in funds. With the 10% reduction, [redacted] to retain only 2 ships for deployment in [redacted] waters and one for deployment [redacted] with a possibility of other deployments in the future if priorities change. (37)

The first indication of Navy's actual deactivation move came in August when CNO, because of reduction in operating funds, initiated some preliminary ship movements prior to the final desposition determination by DEPSEC. The AGTRs were placed on the Navy's 703 list- the names of the ships to be inactivated as a result of budget cuts and the USS GEORGETOWN, undergoing upkeep prior to relief of the MULLER, was ordered to remain in port until further notice.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

As a result, CNO advised COMSTS that obligation to cover [redacted] operations of the VALDEZ and MULLER would be withheld effective 1969.

Estimating that 60 days would be necessary to strip the equipment, obtain disposition directions and prepare the ships for lay up, COMSTSLANT recommended that CNO direct the VALDEZ, then operating off the [redacted] be returned to CONUS immediately for deactivation.

On 22 August, CNO directed CINCLANT to return the VALDEZ and indicated the MULLER would continue operating [redacted] until early September before deactivation. (38)

(36) CNO 092141Z July 1969, "Program Adjustments, FY70".

[redacted]

(38) CNO 220054Z August 1969, "Deactivation of USNS VALDEZ and MULLER."

TOP SECRET UMBRA

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

Shortly thereafter, [redacted] concerned with the potential loss of shipborne capability, forwarded a message to CNO expressing reaction to the moves taken by that office to deactivate the ships. These actions were neither coordinated [redacted] nor reported [redacted] until after the fact.

[redacted] (b)(1)

In view of the possible deactivation of the TRSs, [redacted] requested comments from the CINCs regarding their position on this matter. CINCLANT recommended retention of one or more of the TRSs for use in contingency support role. CINCPAC recommended retention of the two TRSs in Southeast Asia because of their "vital role in supporting current and future allied operations." Stating that he could not [redacted] of the AGTRs, USCINCEUR advised that his requirements for [redacted] could best be satisfied by other means.

JCS then advised OSD (DDR&E) that the military requirement to retain three AGTRs as previously suggested [redacted] was not of sufficiently high priority to warrant the removal of the AGTRs from the Navy 703 List.

[redacted]

(39) [redacted] 252114Z August 1969, [redacted]

(40) [redacted] 121246Z SEP 69, "Deactivation of Technical Research Ships."

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

By mid-September, Deputy Secretary of Defense had not yet made a final decision concerning the disposition of the TRSs. In the mean while, CNO proceeded with deactivation planning. The USNS VALDEZ was ordered home and arrived in Norfolk on 18 September to commence deactivation and the MULLER departed station 7 October and proceeded from Port Everglades to Norfolk to arrive 16 October.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

On 01 October, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard concluded that "retention of the 4 AGTRs in the active fleet is not required to satisfy [redacted] or military requirements." (41)

[redacted]

The study had been concluded apparently with out knowledge of the DEPSEC's final decision on 01 October to deactivate the MULLER. In view of his decision, no further action on the report was considered necessary. The first enclosure to the memo was hwoever, forwarded to DEPSEC as additional information relating to the deactivation of the USNS MULLER.

Once the decision on final disposition was firm, schedules and guidelines for deactivation were formulated for each vessel.

The USNS VALDEZ arrived in Norfolk 18 Septmeber 1969. The USNS MULLER arrived in Norfolk on 16 October and completed deactivation on 28 October 1969.

The USS GEORGETOWN, in port Norfolk since 7 MAR 1969 completed deactivation on 19 December 1969.

The USS OXFORD and JAMESTOWN commenced deactivation in Yokosuka, Japan on 4 November. Since these two ships were stricken from the Navy ledger, and the shipswere to be stripped for resale no formal deactivation notices were forwarded.

The USS BELMONT the last to commence stripping, completed deactivation in January 1970.

(41) DEPSECDEF Memo 920425 dtd 01 October 1969, [redacted]