MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Briefing Note on Advance Portion of NIE 11-5-59: SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES

BACKGROUND

This advance portion of the forthcoming estimate is submitted in response to USIS instruction that, as soon as possible after the meeting of the Hyland Panel, those sections of the estimate dealing with certain offensive missile systems be presented to the USIS for approval. The present draft was prepared by OKE largely on the basis of the GMAIC contribution, taking into account the views of the Hyland Panel. Several important substantive issues remain unresolved.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Page 4, para 4: Army would give greater weight to the possibility of BW use in missiles. We recommend holding to the text, and we anticipate that Army may be willing to drop the point.
Page 10, para 16: Air believes major setbacks have probably occurred in testing a new, large ICBM (see their next reservation below). We believe the remainder of the paragraph in the text supports the sentence in question.

Page 11, para 17: Air believes the USSR has developed two different ICBMs, a smaller one which became operational in prototype in early 1969 and a larger one which is now under test and will become operational soon. Air’s views have been submitted to GMAIC and the Hyland Panel, and no other body have they won any support. Air intends to present its position in some detail at the USIB meeting. (The Air reservation carries forward to page 12 para. 19, page 14 para 21, page 15 para 26, and the table on page 18.)

Page 12, para 19: State, Army, Navy and Joint Staff held the first half of the 1960 as the probably ICBG date for the Soviet ICBM. The views of the dissenting agencies are those of their GMAIC representatives, and there is a fair chance that the principals will be willing to withdraw or compromise these reservations. The text represents ONE’s attempt,

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TOP SECRET
in view of the uncertainties and the conflicting expert
testimony, to arrive at a reasonable spread on IOC
date for national planning purposes. It reflects our
interpretation of the Hyland Panel's conclusions. It
should be noted that C5I favors an IOC in mid-1989 or
earlier, while Chairman CMAIC does not believe it has
yet occurred. Although neither Col White nor Col
MacFarland took formal reservations, we recommend
that they be invited to comment on the text at the briefing
session. (The State, Army, Navy, and Joint Staff
reservations carry forward to the table on page 18.)

Page 15, para 24: Air wishes to show CEP as 3-5 n.m.,
falling between theoretical and degraded accuracy. We
believe the text implies a spread of uncertainty, but
neither CMAIC nor Hyland Panel was able to arrive at
a finite lower limit.

Page 19, para 52 and table on following page: Navy believes
the submarine-launched cruise-type missile has a
maximum range of 200 n.m. We recommend the text,
which reflects the interpretation held by all other agencies of what we believe is good evidence from test flights.

Page 29, para 39: Navy believes sub-launched ballistic missiles are probably now in operation. In light of the tenuous evidence, we recommend the text's evaluation of possible, which is the interpretation of all other agencies.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

ABBOT SMITH
Acting Chairman