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ARMY RESEARCH OFFICE
P.O. BOX 12211
RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK NC 27709-2211

November 7, 2013

ARO FOIA Office

Mr. John Greenewald
[redacted]

SUBJECT: FOIA #14-0005, Request for Document AD0471901, entitled: "*A Study of Area Security Measures, Greece (World War II), France (World War II), China (1937-1945), Korea (1950-1953) and Nicaragua (1926-1933)*"

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

Reference your request above. After a review by our Security Officer, our Physical Sciences Directorate management, I have determined that the report is releasable in its entirety and is, therefore, attached.

Costs are waived in accordance with DoD Directive 5500.7-R. If you have any questions, you may contact Ms. Marie Sander at marie.e.sander.civ@mail.mil or telephonically at 919 549-4201.

Sincerely,

Edward E Beauchy

Enclosure

Edward E. Beauchamp
FOIA Officer
US Army Research Office

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A-3

A STUDY OF REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

Greece (World War II)
France (World War II)
China (1937-1945)
Korea (1950-1953)
Nicaragua (1926-1933)

SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON 16, D.C.

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The contents of this report, including any conclusions or recommendations, reflect the work of SORO and are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.

This particular study was conducted in response to a request from the United States Army Combat Developments Command Military Police Agency, Fort Gordon, Georgia.

Using agencies are encouraged to submit additional questions and/or comments which will lead to clarification or correction of errors of fact and opinion; which fill gaps of information; or which suggest other changes as may be appropriate. Comments should be addressed to:

Director, Special Operations Research Office
The American University
5010 Wisconsin Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20016

A STUDY OF REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

Greece (World War II)
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by

John M. Lord

Paul A. Jureidini

Skaidrite Maliks

Carl Rosenthal

James M. Dodson

COUNTERINSURGENCY INFORMATION ANALYSIS CENTER
SPECIAL OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE

The American University 5010 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20016

SORO/CINFAC/ 0090/65 July 1965

FOREWORD

This study in rear area security was requested by the United States Army Combat Developments Command Military Police Agency (USACDCMPA), Fort Gordon, Georgia. Its purpose is to provide data on causes, indicators, positive countermeasures, and negative countermeasures which would assist the USACDCMPA in the construction of a model or matrix reflecting the relationship between the above factors and escalation of rear area security problems. The definition of rear area security is contained in paragraph 8. 1b, FM 100-10.

The five cases which comprise this paper, and the case study approach, were agreed to jointly by the USACDCMPA and the Counterinsurgency Information Analysis Center (CINFAC) of the Special Operations Research Office. Degradation definitions of area control and their relationship to numerical figures (see Attachment I) were suggested to CINFAC by the USACDCMPA.

Of the five case studies, only two had a classic rear area control situation: Greece and France during World War II. Rear area control in Nicaragua 1926-1933, China 1937-1945, and Korea 1950-1953 had more of the characteristics of area control. Although similarities exist between rear area control, proper, and area control, emphasis, measures, and countermeasures and the utilization of troops differ. China and Nicaragua were marked by the absence of "fronts" in the traditional terms of an extended line. The Japanese penetrated deeply into the interior of China, advancing along railroad lines, capturing and holding strategic points, but occupying little territory. In Nicaragua, the country was fully occupied, but it was divided into five distinct zones, which were then garrisoned according to tactical situations. In Korea, counterinsurgency operations were in effect before the outbreak of the war, and during the war, guerrilla pockets were bypassed and only mopped up when troops could be withdrawn from the front.

Because of the above considerations, and especially in the Chinese case study, a broad and flexible outline was utilized. Brief background information is given in Section I/SYNOPSIS. In Section II/SITUATIONS, causes, indicators, positive and/or negative countermeasures of each degradation are examined without, however, being separately identified as such. In the Chinese case study, however, the descriptions of degradations were replaced with specific types of incidents because of the nature of the conflict. In Section III/OUTCOME AND ANALYSIS, a brief review of rear area and/or area control measures is undertaken to highlight the most effective positive or negative aspects of the problem.

This study is based solely on a review of selected unclassified material. Time limitations precluded collection and use of appropriate classified material and a full review of all unclassified literature on the subject. A bibliography, however, has been added for the convenience of anyone desiring to study any particular aspect in greater depth.

ATTACHMENT I

USACDCMPA DEGRADATION DEFINITIONS AND THEIR NUMERICAL RELATIONSHIPS

DEGRADATION DEFINITIONS

Tranquil to disorderly. In this situation, a high degree of area control exists and is interrupted only by a manageable number of individual, uncoordinated violations of laws, orders, and regulations.

Disorderly to threatening. In this situation, the degree of disorderliness indicates a widespread contempt for civil forces controlling the area. Gangs or groups have formed and operate against civil institutions with impunity. No significant activities are directed against the military establishments.

Harassing actions. Here, isolated, limited actions are taken against military forces operating in the area. The actions are significant only because they represent the first overt resistance experienced by or against military forces.

Frequent actions. The repetition of harassing actions is such that in any given command area, a definite pattern of resistance is evident. The frequency is of such a nature as to require deliberate defensive actions and these measures begin to detract from the full capabilities of service and support resources.

Prolonged actions. In this situation, either frequent or infrequent situations occur in which sustained actions are taken against "soft" bases These actions last for an hour or more and include minor holding actions against service support reactions but not against tactical resources.

Severe actions. These actions are clear and evident attempts to attack and destroy a given base area. They include the short-term holding of an objective and force the commitment of emergency tactical resources.

NUMERICAL RELATIONSHIPS

Tranquil to disorderly. Not more than 2 percent of the total strength in any given area is involved in matters relevant to the maintenance of law and order. This is about 50 percent of the troop slice for the Military Police Corps in the Army. In this same situation, each base is securing itself with less than 15 percent of its people involved in security for any given 24-hour period.

Disorderly to threatening. In this situation, the major military police effort is on law and order. About 3 to 3.5 percent of the troop population (75 to 85 percent of the military police effort) is devoted to this effort. There is no impact on other service support resources.

Harassing actions. Here, 100 percent of the military police effort is directed to security and population control. Service support resources begin to experience an adverse effect on their missions due to the need to provide additional local security. This adverse effect is in the order of magnitude of a 10-percent reduction in services and support.

Frequent actions. In this situation, all military police resources plus some tactical resources are needed to keep the service support effort at 90 percent effectiveness.

Prolonged actions. Here, from time to time, bases are destroyed and in any given single functional area there is complete (100 percent) cessation of service support activities for up to 24 hours and a 25-percent reduction in all other activities for the same period of time.

Severe actions. Here, tactical resources are required to maintain the percentages in prolonged actions on a continuing basis.

Prolonged severe actions. This is a situation in which there is generally a 25-percent reduction, across the board, in all service support activities and significant tactical resources are required to prevent further degradation of service support activities.

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CHARTS

GREECE

(World War II)

by

John M. Lord

Chart 1



Based on a chart drawn from memory by General Speidel while in Landsberg Prison in 1946
Taken from CASE STUDY IN GUERRILLA WAR GREECE DURING WORLD WAR II
by D M Condit SORO The American University, 1961

MILITARY COMMAND GREECE (after reorganization in late 1943)

I. SYNOPSIS

Italy, without consulting her Axis ally, Germany, invaded Greece upon the latter's rejection of her 28 October 1940 ultimatum. The subsequent rout of Italian forces by the Greek Army left the Italians pushed back 30 miles behind their starting line on the Greek-Albanian border by the end of the Greek offensive in February 1941. Italy's failure in Greece forced Hitler to delay organizing his massive spring assault against Russia for almost 2 months while he disposed of a possible Greek-British threat to the Axis southern flank in the Balkans.

Following Bulgaria's provisional adherence to the Axis on 1 March 1941, German troops invaded Greece from Bulgaria. British troops began entering Athens on 3 March to bolster Greek defenses. The main German thrust came through Yugoslavia in Operation MARITA beginning 6 April 1941, following German pressure on Yugoslavia and an anti-Axis coup in that country in March. Yugoslavia surrendered on 17 April. The Greek commander in Athens signed (against orders) an armistice effective 23 April, while the King and his government fled to Crete. The Germans quickly consolidated their victory on the mainland and after a spectacular campaign drove the British out of Crete by 29 May 1941. The King and his Prime Minister became a Government-in-Exile operating chiefly from London and Cairo.

A. OCCUPATION

Greek patriots came to look on Axis treatment of their conquered country as more a partition than an occupation.[1] Greek pride was irreparably offended by the presence of the distrusted Bulgarians and the despised Italians as major occupiers.[2] The principal German-occupied areas were the Piraeus (Athens' port) area and the Thessalonica (Salonica) region with its hinterland to the Yugoslav border.

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

Greece was divided as follows:

German occupation area:	Thessalonica area and hinterland to Yugoslav border; Piraeus and nearby coastal areas; Turkish border area and certain islands bordering Turkey; most of Crete.
Italian occupation area:	Athens; Peloponnesus; most of mainland northern Greece; eastern Crete; major portion of Greek islands; Ionian Islands (annexed).
Bulgarian occupation area:	Region between Bulgarian border and Aegean Sea (eastern Macedonia and western Thrace—later annexed); islands of Thasos and Samothrace.
Albanian area:	Epirus to the Achelous River in western Greece (annexed).
Vlach State:	Semiautonomous state set up in southwestern Macedonia with Romanian support; dissolved in 1942.

A Greek puppet government was set up in Athens to which Special Plenary Ambassador Hermann Neubacher was assigned as German representative. Italy was given prime responsibility for the occupation until just before the Italian surrender in September 1943, when the Germans took over.

The German organization in Greece after September 1943 is indicated in Chart I. In addition to policy disagreements between Ambassador Neubacher and the military, particularly over retaliation policy, the German military chain of command was poorly coordinated and often worked at cross-purposes [3] Field Marshall von Weichs, who was headquartered in Belgrade and in overall command of the Balkans (Southeast Command), was largely preoccupied with Yugoslavia. Gen. Alexander Lochr, overall commander for Greece (Army Group E), had primary responsibility for both internal security and coastal defense against possible Allied landings. His authority, however, conflicted with that of Lt. Gen. Wilhelm Speidel (Military Command Greece), who was responsible for

the internal administr · -n of Greece. (The Greek puppet government had only nominal authority.) Speidel did not report to Loehr but directly to the Military Command Southeast in Belgrade. To further confuse matters, the Senior SS and Police Leader for Greece, General Schimana, while theoretically reporting to von Weichs in Belgrade, in fact came directly under Reichs Leader SS Himmler in Germany. Overlapping authorities thus resulted in inefficiencies and inconsistencies of administration which sometimes frustrated German security efforts.[4]

B. ANTIOCCUPATION

The following were the main elements of the Greek resistance forces:

1. EAM/ELAS: EAM (National Liberation Front) was established on 27 September 1941 by the Greek Communist Party and associated groups as a front for Communist political activity. It succeeded in attracting non-Communists, some prominent, by its policy of stressing noncontroversial, antioccupation aims, but it was at all times under Communist control. Its military arm, ELAS, was formed between December 1941 and December 1942. While it often cooperated with the other resistance groups for tactical purposes, and with the Allied Military Mission (AMM)—on which it was dependent for arms and other supplies until the Italian surrender of September 1943—EAM/ELAS never lost sight of its overall political goal: the seizure of power in Greece for Communists after the war. Toward this end it systematically attacked rival resistance groups with the aim of destroying them, and often succeeded.[5]

2. EDES (National Democratic Greek League): Formed in mid-1941 in Athens, from which it subsequently moved into the mountains of western Greece (Epirus) in order to harass Italian supply lines on the one major east-west road. Originally composed of political moderates, it accepted a number of monarchists and rightists. Charges of EDES collaboration with the Nazi occupation in fighting EAM/ELAS have been substantiated.[6] EDES enjoyed particularly

good relations with the AMM. and following the strengthening of EAM/ELAS with surrendered Italian arms. the AMM backed EDES strongly with money and weapons as a political opponent to the Communists.[7]

3. EKKA (National and Social Liberation): Formed in July 1941 by republican (antimonarchist) non-Communists. EKKA was frequently attacked by Communist EAM/ELAS forces and was finally destroyed by them in April 1944.

4. Other resistance groups: Numerous other resistance groups were organized. many of which never became operational. others having only a local significance. Many subsequently merged with EAM/ELAS. attracted by its "National Liberation Front" nonpolitical propaganda. Many isolated small resistance groups which failed to join EAM/ELAS were destroyed by the latter.[8]

5. AMM (Allied Military Mission): Originating in a 12-man British mission dropped into Greece to destroy the Gorgopotamos Bridge (see below, Situations) in September 1942. the British Military Mission became the Allied Military Mission when joined by U.S. personnel from OSS in December 1943. The AMM planned operations for the resistance. and channeled Allied supplies and funds to the guerrillas. It was primarily a British operation. Following the Italian surrender of September 1943 and the consequent strengthening of EAM/ELAS. the AMM gave all-out support to EDES. enabling the latter to withstand the Communist attacks.[9] In all. the Allies dropped 2,514 tons of supplies to Greek guerrillas in 1,040 successful sorties.[10]

The following are estimated strengths of the antioccupation forces:[11]

Date	EAM/ELAS	EKKA	EDES	AMM
Summer 1942	(Forming)	Under 100	1,500	*
Sept. 1942	*	*	*	12
Spring 1943	5,000	Under 1,000	5,000	*
Summer 1943	12,500	*	5,000	30-40
Fall 1943	20,000	*	*	*

Continued

Date	EAM/ELAS	EKKA	EDES	AMM
Spring 1944	30,000	(Destroyed by EAM/ELAS)	10,000-12,000	*
Summer 1944	40,000	*	*	Under 400

*Figures not available

II. SITUATIONS

A. TRANQUIL TO DISORDERLY (JUNE 1941 - OCTOBER 1941)

Stunned by their sudden defeat by the Germans, the Greeks at first made little resistance to the occupation. Hitler attempted to curry favor with the Greeks by paroling their Armed Forces rather than bearing the expense of keeping the soldiers in detention camps. At the same time, Hitler spoke of the valiant Greek military tradition. The Greeks were not marked for special adverse treatment, as were Jews and Slavs, and the Germans anticipated a fairly easy occupation.[12]

Events and the Germans' own actions, however, conspired to alienate the Greek populace from the start. The Greeks were offended at being occupied principally by the despised Italians, and by their traditional enemies, the Bulgarians. Deteriorating economic conditions caused by the war, particularly the food shortage of the first occupation winter, 1941-42, caused increasing resentment toward the occupying forces who were consuming Greek food.[13] The demobilized Greek Army supplied a manpower pool for all resistance groups. Army officers were available to provide leadership.

During this period, however, resistance activity was concentrating on organizing in politically conscious urban areas, and particularly in Athens, where numerous embryo groups sprang up, many of which never developed further.

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

The Greek case suggests that during the initial stage of occupation of a possibly hostile area, great intelligence efforts should be concentrated on traditional urban centers of political activity, with close surveillance of former military officers and nationalist politicians, around whom resistance groups might cluster.

At this time, Greece was a rear area, both as the southern flank of the German front in Russia, and as a main supply line for the battle for North Africa. Axis requirements were to deny the area to the Allies, and to keep the single important north-south railroad and road to Athens open for supplies. These requirements were easily met during this period.

B. DISORDERLY TO THREATENING (OCTOBER 1941 - JUNE 1942)

During this period, resistance groups began moving into the mountainous inland areas where they could have scope for activities against the Italian occupiers. In this formative stage, the guerrilla bands were still small and uncoordinated. Their activities were necessarily restricted to thefts from Italian depots, cutting and stealing of telephone wire, waylaying of weak patrols, and sniping at the occupants of isolated outposts.[14] No significant activities were directed against military establishments, and no special control measures were required to maintain security.

Other minor incidents which indicated growing popular discontent with the occupation were: pulling down of the occupiers' flags, hoarding of foodstuffs, listening to foreign broadcasts, helping British soldiers left behind in Greece, distributing anti-Axis or pro-Allied propaganda, wearing insignia of Allied countries, refusal of civil servants to serve effectively, or to serve at all, the puppet Greek regime. The Italians imposed severe penalties for those engaged in these activities and prohibited meeting on the streets in groups

of more than two persons. Anti-Axis or pro-Allied slogans began to be shouted in the streets and painted on walls. The controlled press indicated its discontent by overstating Axis progaganda to the point of ridicule, and printing Axis news sloppily while news of the Allies was printed carefully. Illegal anti-Axis newssheets were circulated in Athens, although the penalty for their distribution was death.[15] The Greek Nazi Party headquarters in Athens was destroyed, but the organization responsible, PEAN (Patriotic Union of Fighting Youth), was eliminated in the process.

C. DISORDERLY TO THREATENING (OCTOBER 1941 - MAY 1943)

In Thessalonica (Salonica), the one large area occupied by German troops, guerrilla activities, including acts of sabotage and terrorism, began in October 1941.[16] The activities noted in section B above, against the Italians, also took place here. The Germans took more ruthless measures than the Italians, however. The German High Command published a notice that Greeks found guilty of pulling down German flags, hoarding foodstuffs, or helping British soldiers would be shot. The Germans immediately began a policy of retaliation when, during the period 23-25 October 1941, all males between the ages of 16 and 60 in seven villages were executed—a total of 416. The seven villages were razed and the women and children resettled. Six Moscow-trained Bulgarian Communists parachuted into the area were captured and quickly executed.

Such prompt and drastic action appeared to discourage the flowering of the guerrilla movement in the Thessalonica area. Overt action in that part of the country did not develop again on any large scale for many months, while for the less ruthless Italians the situation deteriorated. However, the German retaliation policy certainly stiffened the Greek resistance in its hatred of the Germans, an inevitable negative effect of such a countermeasure.[17]

D. HARASSING ACTIONS (JULY 1942 - SEPTEMBER 1942)

During this period, German armies were poised at El Alamein for an assault on Egypt while some of the heaviest fighting of the war took place in Russia. Greece was the rear area southern flank for the latter front and a vital supply line for the Axis force in North Africa. It now became vital to keep the single north-south railway to Athens open.

Greek resistance forces were now well located in the mountains. Colonel Zervas had moved his EDES bands into western Greece (southern Epirus) in order to handicap the Italians seriously by disrupting their communications along the one road leading from Albania across Greece. However, while the Italians were forced to travel in carefully guarded convoys, harassed by snipers, only isolated, limited actions were taken against these convoys.[16]

E. FREQUENT ACTIONS (OCTOBER 1942)

In October 1942, a definite pattern of resistance to the Italian occupiers became evident, signaled by the Louros Gorge Bridge Ambush of 23 October. EDES guerrillas still found the town garrisons along the main road too strong for assault, but they were able to mount this complex and devastating tactical operation with impunity.

The site chosen for the ambush was a stretch of road midway between two Italian strongpoints, the towns of Ioannina and Arta. Here the road, after a bridge over the Louros River Gorge, passed through a narrow, rocky defile, which could be easily blocked and which could not be bypassed.

Reconnaissance revealed that Italian truck convoys always made their supply trips on the same day of the week. As there had been no recent subversive activity in the area, the Italians had been lulled into a false sense of

security. The convoys were lightly guarded and the same convoy pattern was invariably adopted.

The Greek attack was entirely successful. The bridge was mined and destroyed just as the rear tank of the convoy crossed over it. At the same time, the lead tank crossed a mined portion of the road, detonating an explosion which brought down carefully placed rocks, blocking the roadway.

Rifle fire and grenades then poured upon the trapped Italians as they sought shelter. When Italian resistance ended, mules were brought up and loaded with captured supplies and wounded and dead guerrillas. Trucks and supplies which the guerrillas were unable to take were soaked in gasoline and set afire.

An Italian motorcycle platoon was dispatched to check on the late convoy. The guerrillas had cut the telephone wires between the two cities. The platoon hit a guerrilla roadblock and was forced to turn back. The advent of darkness delayed rescue operations until the next day.[1] Possible countermeasures to this type of ambush are discussed in the following section.

F. PROLONGED ACTIONS (NOVEMBER 1942 - JUNE 1943)

During this period Greek resistance fighters carried out prolonged actions, including holding actions against Italian communication lines, both rail and road. Italian blockhouses and other emplacements guarding roads and rail bridges were assaulted and minor holding actions were carried out against service support reactions by the Italian forces. These actions succeeded in closing the single main road leading from Albania south to Greece and then on eastward to the Aegean, the Metsovon Highway, during a great part of the period, seriously interfering with Italian supply. A 12-man British military mission--nucleus of the later AMM--had arrived at the end of September 1942

and was now prepared to act. The destruction of the Gorgopotamos Railway Bridge in November 1942 cut off through rail traffic for 6 weeks on the single railway line to Athens, from whence supplies were shipped to the North African front.[20]

In addition to ambushes, the Greek resistance forces dynamited road bridges and retaining walls, placed various types of mines on the road, and dropped special standup nails over stretches of highways.[21] They also sabotaged standing Italian vehicles by loosening wheels and puncturing tires. Snipers shot at vehicle drivers.[22]

To protect the rail lines the Italians took the following measures: bridge security was tightened; guard posts were set up at each end of major bridges. In addition, a number of Italian troops were billeted close to each bridge (as, for instance, near Gorgopotamos, 80). Troops garrisoned in towns near bridges were on alert so as to be brought up quickly by road or rail. No one was allowed to approach within a mile of the railway after dusk (reduced to about 220 yards in urban areas). A limited number of reprisal actions were also undertaken by the Italians, as, for instance, after Gorgopotamos, when 14 Greeks were shot.[23]

Daily guerrilla attacks on telephone lines (usually above ground and paralleling roads) took place during this period. Lines were cut and telephone wire, in short supply among guerrillas, was stolen for their own use. Telephone repair crews were ambushed. Snipers shot at technical personnel repairing wires. Sites requiring repairs were mined.

As countermeasures for telephone communications security, the Italians used regular patrols along roads where lines were located. They boobytrapped certain telephone poles by mining them so that they exploded when the guer[illegible]las tried to saw through the poles. They mined areas around the poles.

Italian measures during this period were insufficient to keep their communications—road, air, or telephonic—consistently open. Their road

communications with their lines back to Italy, via Albania, were frequently blocked in northwestern Greece. While the Italians sometimes sent armed expeditions into the mountains to halfheartedly burn village houses and hang villagers, these activities did not deter the guerrillas and may have stiffened their determination.[25]

G. SEVERE ACTIONS (JUNE 1943 - SEPTEMBER 1943)

At the beginning of this period, Greece ceased to be a rear area for the North African front as Axis troops evacuated Africa. The AMM, together with the various Greek resistance groups, carried out during this period Operation ANIMALS : a cover operation in Greece for the Allied invasion of Sicily, with the object of holding German divisions in Greece which might otherwise be transferred to the Italian peninsula. Germans became increasingly concerned with the prospect of an early Italian surrender and began to take over increasingly the main occupation tasks of Greece, including rail and road security.[26]

By this period, the Italian Eleventh Army responsible for the occupation of Greece consisted of eight divisions totaling 270,000 men (of which 20,000 were on Crete). The Germans revised their organization to that of Chart I. Prior to the summer of 1943, the Germans had only one division on the Greek mainland and one on Crete. By 1 August 1943, mainland Greece had three German divisions and one Bulgarian division directly under German control.[27]

The German Operation ACHSE was devised to take over Greece and the surrendering Italians. Fuehrer Directive No. 48 of 26 July 1943 placed German Theater control in the Balkans over the Italian Eleventh Army.

As the Germans took over the main occupation duties in Greece, communications security was tightened. Guard details at rail and road bridges were increased in size. Searchlights were played over main rail bridges at night.

Concrete pillboxes were constructed at each end of rail bridges. Heavy machine gun and mortar positions were set up with carefully arranged fields of fire. Pillboxes were surrounded by minefields, and the latter by concentric barbed wire fencing.[28]

Despite these precautions, AMM demolition experts were able to keep a vital bridge closed for 4 months. This destruction of the Aspos rail bridge on 21 June 1943 was accomplished by setting charges at the bottom of the piers supporting the bridge, located in a gorge believed by the Germans to be inaccessible, and therefore not guarded.[29]

H. SEVERE ACTIONS (SEPTEMBER 1943 - OCTOBER 1943)

With the surrender of Italy in September 1943, the Germans put Operation ACHSE into full force. EAM/ELAS was greatly strengthened in supplies and munitions by the surrender of elements of the Italian Eleventh Army directly to them. EAM/ELAS thus became independent of supply from the Allies, and began a guerrilla civil war to destroy EDES. The latter, though down to 70 men at one point,[30] began receiving all-out AMM support, and managed to survive. Actions against the Germans naturally diminished as a result of this intraguerrilla fighting, and the stringent security efforts of the reinforced Germans also made guerrilla operations much more difficult. Nevertheless, the guerrillas at this time controlled 67-80 percent of Greece, according to various German estimates,[31] and guerrilla forces, particularly ELAS at this time, were able to maintain severe harassing actions against German troop movements and installations. The Germans had obtained the surrender of most of the Italian troops in Greece by October 1943. They found communications lines disrupted; the Metsovon Highway across Northern Greece had been effectively closed for 2 years. During the period

September-October 1943, therefore, the Germans began by consolidating their occupation organization and improving their security measures. By October 1943, German Army Group E had two German Corps, LXVIII and the XXII Mountain Corps, available for both coastal defense and tactical operations. The former was assigned the defense and security of eastern Greece and the Peloponnesus, and the latter the defense and security of the Epirus region of southern Albania and western Greece down to the Gulf of Patras.[32]

I. PROLONGED SEVERE ACTIONS (NOVEMBER 1943 - SEPTEMBER 1944)

During this final period of the Axis occupation of Greece, the Germans brought to completion their security measures for Greece. The considerable success of these measures is masked by the fact that Germany was losing the war on other fronts and had in the end to effect a hurried evacuation from Greece in the face of combined guerrilla and Allied operations. Nevertheless, their security measures kept their lines of communication intact until the evacuation.

German troop strength at its peak at the end of 1943 is estimated at 140,000 for mainland Greece. Thereafter it declined to about 100,000 by the summer of 1944, just prior to the German evacuation.[33]

One form of guerrilla operation, usually involving cooperation between guerrillas and Allied liaison officers, was a series of train ambushes. They proved an extremely important form of harassment of the Germans in 1944. These operations were of great tactical complexity, as illustrated by the train ambush near Katerini of 3 August 1944.[34]

Intelligence on the composition of trains was obtained by means of runners who watched loadings. Greek railway repair workers were sources of intelligence as to schedules. The resistance desired to avoid destroying trains,

with Greek passengers on board, and aimed at pure supply trains (in order to gain the supplies for themselves as well as to harass the enemy), avoiding clashes with troops. Ideal points for train ambushes were considered by the guerrillas to be the following: a curved area of track, if possible near bridges or tunnels, passing through a defile or between hills and a body of water, with the hills having sufficient scrub vegetation to provide cover for the ambushers. The curve of the track was to prevent sighting of the ambush until the last minute.[31] Dried-up water courses anywhere along the track were also useful as readymade trenches. Charges were laid so as to blow up the engine. The guerrillas were then to attack the derailed cars, which hopefully did not contain troops. Runners were ranged along the track bed to watch for German patrols. They reported to the demolition section prior to arrival of the train. Holes were dug under the rails and explosive charges placed at 10-yard intervals with primer cord connecting each bundle of charges. The detonator was not attached immediately in case the wrong train came along first. Waiting until the preliminary armored car with flanged wheels ran along the track and rounded the bend, the men rushed up to the track to insert the primer cord into the detonator. In the case of the Katerini ambush, the train turned out to be carrying troops as well as supplies. However, the troops made no organized effort to fight off the guerrillas being thrown into confusion in the derailed cars. The guerrillas then threw bakelite bombs into the cars.

Meanwhile, a small group of guerrillas (as few as two) would have been sent ahead of the train to blow up the track as soon as they heard the first explosion, preventing help from reaching the ambush scene from the armored car which had preceded the train. Nevertheless, help from heavily armed German troops could usually be brought up rather quickly so that fast action by the guerrillas was essential in order for them to make their escape.

In road security, the Germans were successful in opening the route across northern Greece into Albania. Part of the reason was that the Allies

had instructed the guerrillas to lie low between the fall of 1943 and the spring of 1944, in anticipation of harassing actions during the summer of 1944. Also, in Epirus the Germans had a tacit agreement with EDES to keep the Yannina-Arta road open.[37]

During this period, the Germans had some first-rate fighting soldiers in Greece, particularly the 1st Mountain Division under Army Group E. As the guerrilla war wore on, antiguerrilla combat schools were organized and increased the number of available trained troops.[38]

One particularly effective technique was the formation of special guerrilla-hunting details. These were detachments of young, battle-hardened soldiers, organized into small units and trained and equipped to fight guerrillas. When possible, natives who knew guerrilla methods were also enlisted in these details. They were trained and armed for close-in, hand-to-hand fighting in forested, mountainous terrain. These guerrilla hunters dressed like the local population, sometimes even wearing pieces of native uniform. They were effective both in stalking and annihilating small bands on their own and as a combat adjunct in larger operations.

However, the Germans had too few first-class troops, and many were unreliable recent recruits of Slavic or Tatar origin. Although many Italian troops were brought into the German ranks, Italian disaffection increased as time went on, and Army Group E could never place complete confidence in them.[39]

The major success of the Germans in augmenting their troop strength came with the creation of Greek complements: The Security Battalions. Their main duty was to aid the Germans in the suppression of the guerrilla bands. The Security Battalions had been started in the summer of 1943 Greek generals, politicians, and even former resistance leaders collaborated with the Germans in the formation and direction of these battalions. They were first organized on a purely voluntary basis, although later, conscription was

attempted; but as most men could escape conscription by joining guerrilla bands if they chose, most members of the battalions were volunteers.

In exploiting this valuable source of manpower, acquainted with the local language, customs, and terrain, the Greek collaborators were allowed to maintain the impression that the Allies did not object to their activities so long as they did not directly oppose Allied operations. They played on many Greeks' fear of the Communist elements in the EAM/ELAS bands. Some recruiters for the battalions implied that Britain looked with at least implicit favor on the organization.[40]

The Security Battalions were strongest in the Peloponnesus, where all elements combined to bring about this development. The Germans regarded this region, after the loss of Afr a, as practically a front line and maintained more troops there than elsewhere on the mainland. By early 1944, the Germans had declared martial law in the Peloponnesus. Since the road network in this area was relatively well-developed, it was easier for the Germans to maintain control and harder for the guerrillas to find safe havens. Also, as a result of attacks on local guerrilla organizations by the Communist EAM/ELAS, many leaders of these organizations went over to the Security Battalions. EAM/ELAS took reprisals on villages accused of helping the Germans, a fact which increased local dislike for this guerrilla force, most of whose members were not from this area, and whose leftist principles were contrary to those of the normally conservative Peloponnesians. Those villagers who did not want to join EAM/ELAS found no other guerrilla organizations to join and often ended up with the Security Battalions.

Enrollment in the Security Battalions has been variously estimated at from 5,000 to 15,000. Although commanded by Greek Regular Army officers, each unit had a German liaison officer serving with it. In action, the German officer acted as battalion commander.

The Security Battalions showed themselves merciless in actions against their fellow Greeks, and even took reprisal actions against villagers. The battalions thus proved a major tactical and psychological success for the Germans.[41]

When the Germans set about securing their occupation areas in Greece late in 1943, they found themselves short of troops. They therefore devised a system of strongpoints along their supply roads and railways to keep these open.

These strongpoints were used particularly to protect important bridges, tunnels, or mountainous areas with curved roads. They were carefully sited in a dominating position where the terrain could be surveyed for some distance. However, owing to a lack of troops to man them, at times blockhouses on some important roads in western Greece had to be sited some 6 or more miles apart.[42]

Strongpoints were laid out to allow all-round defense with bulletproof, or at least splinterproof, shelters. Approaches were defended by minefields and barbed wire obstacles. Radio communication between strongpoints was a necessity to prevent troops from feeling isolated and depressed, and to enable them to summon aid in case of attack. Wire communications were extremely vulnerable to guerrilla attack.[43]

The Germans found that insufficient forces at a strongpoint or on a patrol invited guerrilla attack. It was therefore recommended that strongpoints never be staffed by a platoon of less than 40 men led by a carefully selected officer, even if this meant establishing fewer strongpoints. Otherwise, morale dropped as the troops felt insecure. As this procedure might sometimes lead to an inadequate number of strongpoints, however, one German general felt that it would have been better to establish more strongpoints at the outset than were needed, leaving some unmanned until an emergency occurred. These could have then been occupied in a "surprise move" to upset guerrilla

plans. (But there was the possibility that unused strongpoints might also be used by the guerrillas at times against the Germans.)

Intervals between strongpoints were thus areas of great vulnerability. To guard these intervals, the Germans employed two types of road patrols: men sent out from the blockhouse staff and divisional motorized road-control detachments.

Each strongpoint was responsible for a given security section of the road and sent out patrols—often three men with a leader--to walk along and guard the road. The patrols operated at varying intervals, were occasionally reinforced, and were sometimes assigned mine-locating detail.

The roving motorized road-control detachments assigned by divisional headquarters to supplement the road patrol system of the strongpoints operated on staggered schedules, but on a 24-hour basis. They were particularly active during darkness or in weather of poor visibility. Their duties were to check Greek civilians using the roads, to test the combat readiness of strongpoints, to oversee the condition of the roads, and to come to the assistance of any strongpoint, walking patrol, or supply column that might come under attack. Operating at platoon strength with an officer in command, the detachments were mounted on armored reconnaissance cars and trucks, with machineguns and searchlights and 20-mm. antiaircraft artillery. They had radios to report to headquarters.

The motorized road-control detachments were extremely effective, but their use was limited in Greece by the availability of motor vehicles and fuel.[44]

Aircraft would have been extremely valuable in conjunction with the road patrols both for observation and combat support of ground forces and strongpoints, but suitable aircraft were not generally available.[45] Another measure that proved very helpful in securing lines of communication was the establishment of barrier zones. In critical areas, all civilian traffic on a given road or in the area immediately adjacent to it would be forbidden.

Sometimes entry to the zone was prohibited after dark; sometimes it was completely forbidden. Anyone other than a member of the occupation force found in the zone at a forbidden time might be fired upon at sight.[46]

The Germans used Greek labor details to clear the roads of mines. When the guerrillas resorted to "rock mines"—mines which could simply be left on the road disguised as rocks and which exploded on contact with vehicles—the Germans simply cleared the roads of all rocks over a certain size. Motorized repair crews were kept constantly ready, particularly in the mountains, where the breakdown of one car might trap all others using the road.[47]

Road security also involved the protection of vehicles from sabotage. Whenever possible, therefore, Greek labor was avoided in vehicle workshops or depots. Single vehicles were inviting targets for sabotage. Therefore, it was ordered that all traffic travel in convoys, and on irregular schedules. The position of armed vehicles in convoys was frequently switched. Insignia, markings, and command flags were eliminated. In short, everything possible was done to avoid setting a pattern upon which guerrillas could plan attacks. The Germans also found it useful to camouflage or screen from view important facilities along the road or even sectors of the road.[48]

Aside from the security measures mentioned above for the railways, the Germans developed the use of armored cars with flanged wheels and searchlights to patrol the railway and search for guerrilla saboteurs. These armored cars "felt out" the way for trains and reversed to come to their aid in case of attack.

The trains themselves were almost always manned by Greek civilians who were apt to be injured or killed in any attack. When they carried Greek civilians they became in effect hostages against guerrilla attack. At times the Germans, particularly when moving their own troops, deliberately carried civilians as hostages in cages pushed ahead of the locomotive. Sometimes this stopped the attack.

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

Responsibility for the rail security of urban areas belonged to the assigned army post or station commander. "Outer security" for towns and villages was attempted simply by closing the roads, paths, railways, or streams leading out of the town, either by barbed wire obstacles or patrols. Sometimes trenches, obstacles, observation posts, and combat installations were built. Incoming traffic was carefully checked. These German measures were not particularly effective. It was usually not difficult to enter or leave the towns after darkness.[49]

Within the towns there were areas particularly vulnerable to guerrilla attack, which the Germans protected to obtain inner security. All military installations required special protective measures. Rooms or areas were enclosed and their entrances guarded. Only checked individuals could enter or leave. Whenever possible, quartering of troops with local families was avoided. Barracks were set up and surrounded with barbed wire, barriers, and sentries. However, the Germans were never able to do away with private quartering, though this led to overclose contact between Germans and the local populace, and to frequent intelligence leaks.[50]

A cardinal rule of the Germans in Greece was to react swiftly and in force against any guerrilla activity. Since these incidents occurred daily, German troops were more or less constantly engaged in minor operations. Such operations were generally characterized by three conditions: They were carried out immediately following contact, they were performed independently by troop units below divisional level, and their mission was to destroy the guerrillas.[51]

Small-scale tactics involved in these cases usually consisted of forming a pocket and combing the area. However, German units normally lacked secrecy, surprise, and sufficient troops to make an adequate encirclement and they often degenerated into punitive expeditions and were not regarded as particularly successful.[52]

Major operations, on the other hand, were more successful in the Germans' consideration. These were undertaken against strong, entrenched forces, and only on the basis of adequate information concerning the guerrillas' hideouts and habits. Information was obtained through ground and air reconnaissance, monitoring of guerrilla radio and telephone communications, exploitation of captured documents, and the interrogation of prisoners. The use of spies was also attempted, but the number caught by the guerrillas appears to indicate that, in general, these were not particularly effective. Even after the actual operation had started, intelligence collection was continued: the value of air reconnaissance was particularly demonstrated, and the monitoring of guerrilla communications, often given in the clear during operations, was limited only by the availability of interpreters.[53]

Major operations were minutely planned by one or two officers, with extraordinary attention paid to the maintenance of secrecy and security. Only after the plan was complete were division commanders briefed and rehearsed in a map exercise. They then briefed regimental unit commanders, but not others. Indeed, a specific attempt was often made to deceive German troops so that leaks in security might misinform guerrilla intelligence.[54]

The purpose of major operations was not to take terrain, but to destroy guerrillas. The almost universal tactic planned for a major operation was to accomplish a large encirclement, then to compress the ring and push the guerrillas inward, finally to come to grips with and destroy the guerrillas in battle. To compensate for their lack of trained, combat-ready troops, the Germans used second-class troops for stationary blocking operations and first-class troops for assault echelons. These were followed, when possible, by reserves, so that local guerrilla breakthroughs could be intercepted. The Germans also tried to protect possible escape routes by echeloning machine-gun positions in depth. To counteract the guerrilla tactic of remaining hidden as troops passed by, German commanders also inaugurated the practice of

having a second line to comb territory already passed by forward units. They also learned that even after the final battle had been fought and the guerrilla surrender had been received, it paid to comb the area of encirclement still again; by so doing, they flushed out a surprisingly large number of hiding guerrillas.

One of the most interesting German tactical discoveries concerned the matter of timing. While it was extremely important to reach and close the outer encirclement line quickly, the Germans learned that, from this point on, they should take whatever time was needed to insure a slow, steady compression, avoiding gaps in the line and troop fatigue. The important thing was to keep the guerrillas within the ring and to destroy them methodically.

The Germans inflicted heavy losses on the guerrillas in these operations. In Operation PANTHER, undertaken in late 1943 to clear major transportation routes, the Germans used upwards of two divisions and claimed to have inflicted 1,400 casualties. In early 1944, German and Bulgarian troops made a number of sweeps in northeastern Greece which, according to German records, were highly profitable. In Operation WOLF, the Germans inflicted casualties of 254 dead and 400 captured. In Operation HORRIDO, guerrilla casualties were 310 dead, wounded, and missing (a ratio of 18 to 1). In Operation RENNTIER, the Germans and Bulgarians cost the guerrillas 96 dead and 100 captured, while suffering only 9 casualties (a ratio of almost 22 to 1). Operation ILTIS, however, resulted in a mere 15 casualties.

In 1944, the Germans concentrated against the forces of EAM/ELAS. In Operation MAIGEWITTER, undertaken in the spring of 1944 against ELAS forces in northern Greece, the Germans claimed to have killed 339 guerrillas and captured 75 guerrillas and 200 suspects. In June 1944, Operation GEMSBOCK, employing three German divisions against 9,000 ELAS and other Communist forces on the Greek-Albanian border, brought guerrilla losses of 2,500 killed or captured, with German losses of 120 killed and 300 wounded,

the ratio dropping in this instance to 6 to 1. It should also be noted that, despite fairly high casualties, the guerrillas successfully extricated about 72 percent of their forces.

GEMSBOCK was followed by Operation STEINADLER. Using about 18,000 troops, the Germans moved against ELAS forces estimated at 6,000-8,000 strong in north central Greece. The Germans killed 567 guerrillas and captured 976 guerrillas, 341 Italians, and 7 British officers.

Finally, Operation KREUZOTTER was planned as a three-phase attack. The first two phases were to be against ELAS in southwestern Greece and Boeotia. The third was to be against EDES. ELAS losses against this August 1944 operation amounted to 298 killed and 260 captured, while the Germans lost 20 killed, 112 captured, and 1 missing, a ratio of about 4 to 1.[55]

The third phase of KREUZOTTER was apparently canceled by the pressure of events in late summer of 1944.[56] By 10 September 1944 the guerrillas began the Operation NOAH'S ARK, planned with the Allies to harass the German withdrawal. The German position had become untenable in Greece, not as a result of guerrilla operations, but because of their overall military situation. By early October, German troops were out of the Peloponnesus. On October 12, they left Athens. By October 30, they had pulled out of Thessalonica (Salonica), and by early November 1944, they had left the Greek mainland entirely. The German withdrawal was in orderly fashion, despite the guerrilla harassment.[57]

III. OUTCOME AND ANALYSIS

German operations in Greece to protect their rear area communications were generally effective despite occasional successful sabotage efforts by the

Greek resistance. Their policy of prompt reaction to all guerrilla actions, combined with their tactical operations in force, managed to keep the guerrillas off balance. Their policy of retaliation against the lives of Greek civilians, often selected at random, however, may have intimidated the populace, but it probably increased the determination of the resistance forces to fight on.

Despite the emphasis which the Germans placed on major tactical operations during the final stages of their occupation of Greece, they were realistic enough to know that, strategically, they could not eliminate the guerrillas in the country as a whole. They therefore concentrated successfully on inflicting heavy casualties on the guerrilla organizations, and in maintaining control over communications and specific vital points.[58]

FOOTNOTES

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[1] European Resistance Movements 1939-1945: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the History of the Resistance Movements Held at Milan 26-29 March 1961 (New York: Pergamon Press, 1964), p. 306.

[2] D. M. Condit, "Greece (1942-1944)," MS, 1965, p. 9. To be included in D. M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., "Challenge and Response—Studies in International Conflict" (Task NUMISMATICS I) (Washington, D. C.: Special Operations Research Office, to be published in 1965).

[3] D. M. Condit, Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II (Washington, D. C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1961), pp. 226-230.

[4] Ibid., p. 230.

[5] Condit, "Greece (1942-1944)," op cit., pp. 10-12.

[6] U. S. Army Special Warfare School, Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Warfare in Greece 1941-1945 (Washington, D. C.: Office of Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964), pp. IV-9-10.

[7] Condit, "Greece (1942-1944)," op. cit., pp. 10-11.

[8] Condit, Case Study, op. cit., pp. 40-45.

[9] Condit, "Greece (1942-1944)," op. cit., pp. 19-26.

[10] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[11] Ibid., passim.

[12] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[13] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[14] U. S. Army Special Warfare School, op. cit., pp. I-24-25.

[15] Condit, Case Study, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

[16] U. S. Army Special Warfare School, op. cit., p. II-2.

[17] Condit, "Greece (1942-1944)," op. cit., pp. 42-43.

[18] U.S. Army Special Warfare School, op. cit., p. II-3.

[19] Ibid., pp. 3-6.

[20] Condit, Case Study, op. cit., pp. 190-196.

[21] Ibid., p. 207.

[22] Ibid., pp. 206-210.

[23] Ibid., pp. 190-196.

[24] Ibid., pp. 206-210.

[25] Ibid., pp. 225-226.

[26] Ibid., pp. 223-224.

[27] Ibid., pp. 226-232.

[28] Ibid., p. 237.

[29] Ibid., pp. 196-200.

[30] U.S. Army Special Warfare School, op. cit., pp. V-10-13.

[31] Condit, Case Study, op. cit., p. 226.

[32] Ibid., p. 227.

[33] Ibid., p. 232.

[34] Ibid., pp. 202-206.

[35] Ibid., p. 203.

[36] Ibid., p. 205.

[37] U.S. Army Special Warfare School, op. cit., pp. IV-9-11.

[38] Condit, Case Study, op. cit., p. 232.

[39] Ibid., p. 233.

[40] Ibid., pp. 234-236.

[41] Ibid., p. 237.

[42] Ibid., p. 238.

[43] Ibid., p. 23[illegible].

[44] Ibid., p. 239.

[45] Ibid., p. 239, note f.

[46] Ibid., pp. 239-240.

[47] Ibid., p. 240.

[48] Ibid., p. 240.

[49] Ibid., pp. 240-242.

[50] Ibid., p. 242.

[51] Ibid., p. 242.

[52] Ibid., p. 243.

[53] Ibid., p. 36.

[54] Ibid., p. 76.

[55] Condit, "Greece (1942-1944)," op. cit., pp. 36-39.

[56] Ibid., p. 39.

[57] Ibid., pp. 43-45.

[58] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[59] Condit, Case Study, op. cit., p. 231.

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Condit, D. M. "Greece (1942-1944)," MS, 1965. To be included in Condit, D. M., and Cooper, Bert H., Jr. "Challenge and Response—Studies in International Conflict" (Task NUMISMATICS I). Washington, D. C.: Special Operations Research Office, to be published in 1965. Based primarily on research accomplished for the Case Study (see above), this paper adapts the material used in the previous study for comparative usage in the forthcoming newer volume.

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FRANCE

(World War II)

by

Paul A. Jureidini

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I. SYNOPSIS

On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Britain and France, fulfilling their treaty obligations to Poland, declared war on Germany on September 3, when an ultimatum to the German Government was ignored. Major fighting, however, did not begin on the Western Front until 10 May 1940; and in 6 weeks France lay prostrate. On June 17, Marshal Henri Philippe Petain asked for an armistice, and in the early hours of June 25, it was officially concluded.

Alsace and part of Lorraine were annexed by Germany and reincorporated into the Third Reich. Two French territorial departments in the North, Pas de Calais and Nord, were incorporated in the occupied territory of Belgium ruled by a military governor from Brussels. The remainder of France was divided into two zones: a German-occupied and administered Northern Zone and an unoccupied Southern Zone administered by the Petain government. "The demarcation line between the northern occupied zone and Vichy France in the south meandered across the waist of the country except for a coastal strip appended to the occupied zone." The French Fleet was neutralized at Toulon, and the French Army was disbanded with the exception of a token "Armistice Army" composed of 94,000 men. Finally, the colonies remained under the administration of the Petain government.[1]

Although France was split by the terms of the armistice into two geographically equal parts, three-fifths of the 46,000,000 Frenchmen came under German control. Included in the Northern Zone were almost all of France's iron and coal deposits, the heavy industrial complexes, most of the mechanical, textile, electrical, and chemical manufacturing, important wheat centers, the main sources of dairy products and meat, the center of commerce and finance, the main routes of communication, the navigable waterways, and the ports of the Channel and the Atlantic."[2]

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

Like most countries of Western Europe, France, on the eve of World War II, had a highly sophisticated governmental structure, republican in form. The French Parliament was composed of two chambers: the Senate and the National Assembly, with the Prime Minister designated by the President of the Republic but elected by the National Assembly and responsible to the latter. The President of the Republic, elected by the National Assembly for a period of 7 years, had limited constitutional prerogatives. Highly centralized, the governmental structure was territorially divided into regions, departements (departments), and arrondissements (districts). National security was entrusted to the Surete Generale (National Security), and the Deuxieme Bureau (G-2), while police, in the major cities, and the gendarmerie (constabulary), in the countryside, were responsible for the maintenance of local order.[3]

A. OCCUPATION

In the Northern Zone, the Germans adopted the French administrative system with the territory divided into regions, departments, and districts. These were administered through French officials by the staff of the military governor of France. The military governor, in turn, was responsible to Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (The Armed Forces High Command) in Berlin, except in an invasion, in which case he became responsible to the Commander in Chief, West.[4]

Instead of disbanding the police forces and the gendarmerie, they were incorporated into the German security system. The Abwher (Army intelligence), the Sicherheitdienst (SD or security police of the Nazi Party), and a few Geheime Staatspolizei (secret state police, or Gestapo) were, however, attached to the central headquarters in Paris, and to each regional and district headquarters. Occupation troops, furthermore, which were also involved in the

maintenance of security—Waffen SS troops, Landesschtzen (security) battalions, military police detachments, and Ost (made up of anti-Bolshevik Russians) battalions—were equally attached, in varying strengths to central, regional, departmental, and district headquarters. The total number of German police troops may have reached 160,000 men. These also could be reinforced with tactical elements from the operational forces manning the defenses along the coastal strip, and which normally came under the Commander in Chief, West.[5]

In the Southern Zone, a special police force, the Milice, was created to keep track of all Communists and Jews, ostensibly. Close cooperation was maintained with the German security apparatus, as is indicated by the fact that the Milice was later used in Paris.[6]

Although French pride was assuaged in the armistice agreement, by and large, the terms favored the conqueror. Politically, and to a certain extent psychologically, the Germans tried to promote the idea of a New Order for Europe, an idea that was not without appeal. Thus the allowance for an "independent" Vichy regime, Vichy control over France's colonies, the "Armistice Army," and a neutralized French Fleet. In reality, however, the existence of Vichy was advantageous to the Germans militarily, economically, and socially. There was fear in the German General Staff that the total subjugation of France would lead the French Fleet to join England, and the French colonies, with their colonial armies and economic potential, to either declare their independence of France, pending the outcome of the war, or join England. Under the terms of the armistice agreement, therefore, the Germans not only were able to neutralize the French Fleet and the colonial army, but with a supine Vichy regime, were equally able to ensure that the economic exports of the French colonies reached them.

Socially and psychologically, the existence of Vichy played into German hands. French bitterness over England's unwillingness to provide the fullest measure of support was played upon by the Germans, as was the feeling

in France that if the French Army could not stop Germany, England certainly could not, and that it would be only a matter of time before England fell. Thus cooperation with Germany would benefit France after the war, and as long as the trappings of independence remained, the Germans could count on at least a passive French people.[7]

B. ANTIOCCUPATION

Resistance groups began to develop in France almost as soon as the armistice was concluded with the avowed aim of resisting the Germans and overthrowing the Vichy regime. However, because of the dismemberment of France and a concomitant lack of cooperation, and because most of the groups tended to reflect the social and political scene of pre-World War II France, they never became a factor until their coalescence in mid-1943 under De Gaulle's Free French leadership. It should be pointed out that the French Communist Party did not join the ranks of the resistance until after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.[8]

German pressure and suppression in the Northern Zone forced the resistance groups to develop more on a local basis, and their ultimate emergence was slower than those in the Southern Zone. By 1942, however, and after several ill-fated attempts, four main groups appeared: Ceux de la Resistance (those of the resistance), Ceux de la Liberation (those of the liberation), Liberation-Nord (Liberation North), and L'Organisation Civile et Militaire (Civil Military Organization). In the Southern Zone, where their presence was more tolerated and suppression less severe, three main groups appeared fairly early: Combat, Franc Tireur, and Liberation. Because of the more tolerable climate, these groups developed on a regional basis, and the absence of fragmentation made it easier for them to merge their activities into one

organization, L'Armee Secrete (Secret Army), under De Gaulle's leadership late in 1942. In February 1943, a Comite de Coordination—becoming the Committee of Directors—was set up in the Northern Zone for the four groups by De Gaulle's representative, General Delestraints (alias Vidal), and these groups agreed to pool their forces with those of the Secret Army. An important factor in the readiness of these groups to merge was the fact that De Gaulle controlled both money and supplies through a French organization in London called the Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action (Central Bureau for Information and Action), which cooperated with its British equivalent, Special Operations Executive (SOE). Later, the OSS came to be represented on the SOE.[9]

In May 1943, De Gaulle created in France the Conseil National de la Resistance (CNR). Its discovery by the Germans in June 1943, and the arrest of two of its leaders—both De Gaulle representatives—and Communist attempts to control the CNR, forced De Gaulle to create the Delegation Generale as the representative body of the provisional government of France. The CNR was to be an advisory body only, and all matters affecting France and the resistance were to be the responsibility of the Delegation Generale.

In March 1944, when the Communists again sought to control the resistance by creating, through the CNR, the Comite d'Action Militaire (COMAC), which would presumably decide on all military actions, De Gaulle countered with the creation of the Force Francaise de l'Interieur (FFI) which he superimposed on the Secret Army. All military action groups were subordinated to the FFI, under Gen. Joseph P. Koenig, then headquartered in London.[10]

Thus, other than resisting the Germans and attempting to deny them the industrial and agricultural products of France, and working to overthrow the Vichy regime, another important goal for the resistance was added during the course of the war: forestalling a Communist takeover.

II. SITUATIONS

In general, and as viewed by the Allies, the aim of the French resistance was to assist in the invasion of France when it took place. There was fear in Allied circles in London that an oversupply to the resistance would embolden its leaders into a premature uprising which could be easily wiped out by the Germans. Another nagging fear was of the relative strength and organization of the French Communist Party and its ability to take over major areas of France before they could be liberated by the Allies and restored to a properly constituted provisional French government. Thus, the Allies undertook to supply the resistance with light weapons only, and the number and quantity of arms delivered increased noticeably as D-day neared. Until the actual landings took place, the Allies hoped that the resistance would organize itself effectively, engage in intelligence gathering and reporting, assist in the evacuation of downed airmen, and be prepared to execute a number of important planned operations once the landings had taken place.[11]

Turning points corresponding to operational phases (situations) could be discerned as the resistance evolved. A Tranquil to Disorderly situation could be said to have existed between July 1940 and December 1941. A Disorderly to Threatening situation came into existence early in 1942, lasting until about February 1943. Harassing action took place during the remainder of the year and early 1944; and in 1944, prior to, and in support of, the invasion, Frequent Actions, Prolonged Actions, Severe Actions, and a Second Front erupted in quick succession.*

*The development of these situations was by no means an "across-the-board" phenomenon. In the Southern Zone they developed faster and the actions taken by the resistance there were broader and more intensive. Again, as the landings took place, different situations came to exist in France, ranging from a Second Front near the Allied lines to frequent actions elsewhere.

A. TRANQUIL TO DISORDERLY (JULY 1940 - DECEMBER 1941)

Resistance at first

> . . . took subtle forms: referring to the conquerors as "C-es Messieurs," passing on bitter little jokes, chalking derisive comments on walls by night, never understanding either German or German attempts to speak French, or, perhaps, if one were a waiter, simply putting one's thumb in a German officer's soup. One frail lady of 78 daily stationed herself in the Paris subway to trip German soldiers with her cane. Yet there were some, even from the first, who risked much, making false papers or concealing and passing on British flyers and escaped French prisoners of war. Others cheated the Germans in various ways; factory workers let sloppy or inadequate work pass through their hands; trainmen delayed, or even managed to lose, shipments destined for the Germans; dock workers concealed rotten vegetables among good ones so the rot would spread.[12]

The German behavior, during the early phases of the occupation, was circumspect. Psychologically, the apparent invincibility of their armies in the early phases of the war, the stunning rout of the French Army, and the general belief that England would shortly fall, were advantageous factors which helped them promote their New European Order. To that end, the Germans took great pains in their propaganda to urge the union of France and Germany in that New Order, and the German Ambassador to Vichy, Otto Abetz, who married a French woman, was held up as an example of that union. Great efforts were also made to assuage French pride and court the French into cooperation. Realizing full well the feelings of the French for Napoleon, the Germans moved the remains of Napoleon's little son—the King of Rome—from Vienna for reinterment at the Hotel des Invalides. At the same time, however, strict radio, press, and movement restrictions were imposed, along with harsh economic levies. German terror—the outright deportation or execution of hostages—was also utilized to counter French terrorism—generally, individual acts against German soldiers.[13]

In the Southern Zone, the cult of Petain, the Hero of Verdun, was in full swing, abetted in these early stages by a wave of anti-British feelings.

All in all, the German psychological advantage was temporary at best. French hatred of Germany, the traditional enemy, was deeply rooted, and the early passiveness of the French was a result of their stunning defeat compounded by a wait-and-see attitude in a large number of French leaders.[14]

B. DISORDERLY TO THREATENING (JANUARY 1942 - FEBRUARY 1943)

A number of factors contributed to the development of this situation. The French Communist Party for one, forced into inactivity as a result of the German-Russian nonaggression treaty, was driven to resistance with the invasion of Russia and was moving toward unity of action with other French resistance groups. Germany had also occupied the Southern Zone with the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942, and the semblance of French independence disappeared. Britain had survived the German onslaught, and, along with the Free French under General De Gaulle, was beginning to supply the resistance. Finally, the Free French had gained prestige as a result of their victories in Syria and Lebanon, and their resistance in North Africa; and their early efforts at uniting the various factions of the French resistance were beginning to bear fruit.[15]

More specifically, however, it was the German attitude toward the French which contributed more to the growth of the resistance. The

> . . . German strategy against the resistance based on theory that terror would prompt the French population to prevent acts of sabotage; but the population as a whole did not possess this power, even had it so chosen, and the reprisals and the wide publicity given the terror served merely to feed the resistance with recruits.[16]

This strategy was based on Hitler's decree—Nacht and Nebel—

> . . . whereby all acts of resistance were to be punished either by death or by deportation to Germany, with no information provided the victim's relatives as to his fate.[17]

Another factor which eventually swelled the ranks of the resistance was the accord signed between Vichy and the Third Reich on July 1, 1942, according to which the French were to provide 150,000 skilled workers to work in Germany in exchange for the repatriation of 50,000 French prisoners of war. By October when only 17,000 workers had volunteered, and it became apparent that the Germans were about to resort to forced labor, able-bodied Frenchmen began deserting the urban areas for remote farms, forests, and mountains. By the end of 1942, the resistance had at its disposal large numbers of men. Notwithstanding this early phase in the development of the resistance, 1,429 acts of sabotage were committed, according to German record.[18]

C. HARASSING ACTIONS (FEBRUARY 1943 - MAY 1944)

During 1943 and early 1944, the monthly average of sabotage acts had increased sixfold. A prime target was the railroads. Between June 1943 and May 1944, the resistance destroyed 200 locomotives and 2,000 freight cars, and damaged 1,822 locomotives, 1,500 passenger cars, and 8,000 freight cars. The theft of arms and equipment and the ambushes of convoys and lone vehicles increased at a great rate, as did attacks on German and Vichy security agents. Attacks on prisons in which resistance fighters were held also took place. And in the Massif Central, the resistance roamed almost at will, holding fixed positions for extended periods of time.

In the fall of 1943, Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, Commander in Chief, West, had reported that the resistance was preparing to support the invasion in concert. Up to the middle of 1943, the Germans had relied on terror, searches, identity card checks, travel restrictions, and intelligence to combat the resistance. In a sense, they were aided in their task by the French resistance's obvious distain for security. Thus they were able to destroy a few resistance

groups in the early stages of their formation, and the capture of two principal leaders of the resistance in mid-1943 almost paralyzed the leadership. But by mid-1943 it became apparent that these measures, in themselves, were not enough to cope with the situation. Marshal Rundstedt was particularly worried about his lines of communication, and 25,000 German trainmen were imported to run the lines. All trains were heavily armed with guards. Flatcars, sometimes with civilians aboard as hostages, were pushed in front of locomotives.[19]

Unable to prevent ambushes, raids, and sabotage by annihilating the insurgents, the Germans employed various tactics for protection. Guards at depots and other installations were doubled and changed at irregular intervals. Guard posts were established along major rail lines, and some lines were patrolled. To protect military convoys, armored vehicles were placed at head and tail. Sometimes motorcycles equipped with machineguns preceded the column to check for roadblocks and ambushes, and in troublesome regions machine gunners sprayed the roadsides as the column progressed. Civilians often were carried in prominent spots on the vehicles, a tactic later used during the fighting in Paris to safeguard tanks. To protect against "tire bursters" or other devices laid on the roads to damage tires, the Germans sometimes fixed brooms to the front bumpers of their vehicles.[20]

So troublesome and irksome did the resistance become, especially in the now occupied Southern Zone, that the Germans and Italians were forced to launch coordinated and concentrated attacks. The Italians in July 1943 moved against some 1,200 maquis (guerrillas) in the Haut-Savoie, exterminating them in the process. In February 1944, a Vichy force composed of gendarmes, gardes mobiles, Waffen SS, and militia, moved against some 500 guerrillas in the Plateau des Glieres, in the Massif Central. The attack failed, and on 18 March the Germans took over. Twelve thousand German troops were used, as well as mountain artillery groups, 10 armored cars, and air power. The

battle lasted some 14 days, in the process of which the guerrillas were annihilated.

In February and March 1944, the Germans utilized three divisions in operations against the guerrillas in the Ain region of the Massif Central. The Germans lost 1,000 men, wounded and killed, and wreaked their vengeance on the population by burning their villages.[21]

By 1944, even the German General Staff recognized that the defeat of the Third Reich was a matter of time. The invasion of Fortress Europe was awaited, and the main concern of the German military command was to safeguard its routes of communication to allow for the quick movement of units and their uninterrupted supply. The New Order for Europe had failed, and the Germans had ceased to court the French population. Their strategy now, as far as the guerrillas and the resistance was concerned, was to make it as expensive in lives and possessions for anyone to contemplate taking up arms against them. The psychological advantage had passed to the French who, sensing their imminent liberation and the imminent defeat of Germany, were willing to pay any price in order to redeem their honor lost on the battlefield in 1940. Therefore, despite the operational successes of the Germans against the guerrillas in this period, and despite the terror which they wrought on the population, the ranks of the guerrillas and the resistance continued to grow.[22]

D. FREQUENT TO PROLONGED ACTIONS (MAY 1944 - AUGUST 1944)

On the eve of the invasion, the German command's concern over their lines of communication and withdrawal grew. In particular, they were worried about the roads through the Rhone Valley, Route Napoleon through the Vercors to Grenoble, and the Bordeaux-Toulouse-Carcassone road linking the two German armies in the south and the southwest of France.

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

> Throughout June and July, German forces totalling the equivalent of two or three divisions patrolled and fought to keep open the Bordeaux-Toulouse-Carcassone route. These included a reserve infantry division, contingents of a reserve corps, and two Kampfgruppen of the 11th Panzer Division. In early July, a force of approximately division strength attacked resistance strongholds in the Cevennes, claiming to have killed 355 maquisards. In mid-July tactical forces rescued police and milice whom the maquis had surrounded in the Ain and Jura and reopened the supply line north of Lyon. The Germans claimed 500 insurgents killed and 12,000 dispersed. In the meantime, two other forces of unspecified strength but large enough to be commanded by general officers were employed in the Massif Central near Limoges and Clermont-Ferrand.[23]

During June and July 1944, at the height of the Allied invasion, the Germans launched large concentric attacks in the above areas to keep the roads open. In June 1944, the Germans attacked some 5,500 guerrillas in the Vercors area with two divisions, one panzer and the other a mountain division. The guerrillas had sought to create in the area a fortified enclave, but after protracted fighting, in which the Luftwaffe and a glider task force were brought in, the guerrillas were forced to evacuate, losing some 1,000 killed. But an estimated 20,000 German soldiers were kept from the front.

In central France, the Mont Mouchet was the scene of important combat. On June 16, the Germans attacked with one division, and fighting lasted for the better part of 2 days. Fighting again broke out in this area on June 26—this time, however, with Luftwaffe support.[24]

Keeping these vital lines of communication and withdrawal was vital to the Germans, and no attempt was made to differentiate between civilian and combatant. The use of terror had earlier proved that it could no longer generate submissiveness. Psychologically, the Germans were fighting for their lives, and the use of extreme measures was in part due to this mentality, and the large casualties being wrought in this irregular form of combat. The measures could hardly ingratiate the Germans with the French, and these acts

are still remembered, but the Germans, harried on all sides, had little time in which to observe the niceties of war.[25]

F. PROLONGED TO SEVERE ACTIONS (MAY 1944 - AUGUST 1944)

Since April 1944, the Allies had drawn up an action directive for the FFI to be implemented on D-day and the following periods. In the immediate areas of what was to become the front, only the supply of information was required of the resistance. In the rear area zone, which would be modified as the Allies advanced, sabotage had to be undertaken; and in the "nonoperational zone," which included areas where major thrusts were not contemplated or where travelling was difficult, guerrilla warfare was called for. This action directive included the following plans: Plan VERT, paralysis of the railways for a period of 15 days, equal to the time needed in which to establish a beachhead; Plan BLEU, the destruction of the electrical network; Plan TORTUE, the delay of enemy concentrations by guerrilla warfare; and Plan VIOLET, cutting underground cables. The signal by which the FFI was to implement this plan was given, by code, on the eve of D-day.[26]

A number of resistance groups launched their operations prematurely and were wiped out. But on D-day, and in the following weeks and months, the activities of the FFI ranged from harassment to frontal warfare.

In the southeast, 52 locomotives were destroyed on June 6 and the railway lines cut in more than 500 places. Normandy was isolated as of June 7. The telephone network in the invasion area was put out of order and beginning June 20, the railway lines of France were rendered inoperational, except in the Rhone Valley where the line Marseilles-Lyon was kept open by the Germans despite heavy engagements with maquis units.[27]

Although the German local reserves were able to reach the front area despite resistance actions.

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

> . . . marked delays were achieved against movement of strategic reserves. The French claim to have delayed up to 12 divisions for from 8 to 15 days. The most dramatic incident, conceivably a direct contribution to Allied success in the early days of the invasion, was delayed by rail sabotage and by direct action against motor columns of the 2nd SS "Das Reich" Panzer Division. Ordered to move from Toulouse to counterattack in Normandy, first elements of the armored division did not traverse the 400 miles until 12 days after receiving the movement order. Harried by the resistance and strafed by the RAF, which was informed by the resistance, some 4,000 of the division were killed and 400 captured en route. In frustrated fury against the insurgents, men of this division summarily shot all male occupants of the village of Oradour-sur-Glane (Haute Vienne) and herded the women and children into the village church, there to burn them alive. There were a thousand victims.[28]

Once the beachheads were secured in Normandy, and later in southern France, the resistance undertook mopping-up operations in the rear of advancing Allied armies, seizure and control of terrain forward of Allied lines, and direct fighting with the Allies all along their lines. In Brittany, 30,000 maquisards were entrusted with mopping-up operations, thus relieving General Patton's army. Successfully undertaken, the German Army was forced into encirclement around St. Nazaire, L'Orient, and Brest. In the South, during the encirclement of Toulouse and Marseilles, FFI cooperation hastened the advance of the invading French and U. S. Armies. This action prevented the Germans from completely dismantling the port facilities, thus allowing the disembarkation of 14 Allied divisions and the daily unloading of 18,000 tons of war materiel and supplies.

In the southeast, the cities fell quickly under FFI control. On 23 August, the Region of Saleve was taken by regional elements of the FFI who were then incorporated into Mareshal de Lattre's 1st Army, liberating the city of Lyon on 3 September.

On 7 September, at Pary-le-Monial, the 25,000 members of the FFI from the Departments of Lot, Correze, Pyreneens, and Languedoc joined the front and formed part of the linking elements from the Allied armies of the north and south.[29]

FFI elements played an equally important part in the liberation of Paris, although their insurrection in that city could have been wiped out had not General Eisenhower, at the last moment, diverted the 2d French Armored Division to provide the necessary support. In any case, the liberation of Paris—it was to be bypassed—may have saved Paris from the complete destruction which Hitler had planned for it in an order to General Choltitz. The latter chose to disregard Hitler's directive.

With the liberation of Paris, and to avoid further similar independent actions by certain elements within the FFI, General De Gaulle disarmed the resistance, and more than 137,000 members of the FFI joined the ranks of the regular French armies in its continuing campaign to liberate France.[3c]

With the invasion under way, the climate in France was one of general insurrection. In such a situation, and especially while in the process of retreating, German measures to counter unconventional threats posed to their rear areas were very much dictated by the exigencies of the situation, and the outrages committed reflected a frustration bordering on despair. Nothing that the Germans could do, even General Choltitz's action saving Paris from destruction, could now pacify the French.

III. OUTCOME AND ANALYSIS

The widespread, deep-rooted anti-German feelings which the French harbored were in effect the psychological motivation upon which a minority—for the resistance in its early years was indeed a minority—counted upon from the beginning, despite France's defeat, the isolation and apparent weakness of Great Britain, the instinct of self-preservation, prudence, and finally the position

adopted by such men as Marshal Henri Petain. Cooperation with Germany, on the other hand, seemed more promising. Everywhere, the German armies were victorious; the New Order for Europe, which the propaganda machine of the Third Reich expounded, appealed to quite a number of leaders and certainly to the middle class and upper middle class which feared communism; and most important, ultimate liberation was a dream which few shared. The fact remains, however, that the Germans succeeded only in keeping the resistance at bay.

German tactics, in the first years, were successful in preventing the development of meaningful resistance organizations in the zone which they occupied. Indeed, the meaningful development of the resistance occurred in the unoccupied Southern Zone, where French repressive measures—the Vichy regime was never able to apply the harsh measures which the Germans did, and almost tolerated the resistance—and the terrain lent itself to such a rapid development. Most important, however, to the success of the resistance was the role which SOE, and later De Gaulle, played in unifying the different groups and supplying them with military advisers, weapons, and money. As the resistance grew and their activities increased, the Germans resorted to two tactics: large-scale terrorism and limited search-and-kill operations. Terror, in the form of the summary execution of hostages, deportation, and torture, failed because the Germans presumed that a terrorized population would act to prevent resistance, which called for powers which the population obviously did not have even if it had been so motivated. And limited search-and-kill operations did not succeed because they were not part of a broader and more systematic plan.

Toward the end, when it became apparent that Germany had lost the war, the application of extreme measures of terrorism only increased the determination of the conquered to seek revenge at the first opportunity. And when the landings took place, the Germans could not cope effectively with a nation in a state of insurrection.

In the final analysis, therefore, it appears that the Germans were unable to erase French hatred for them; that terrorism reopened old wounds; and that once proven to be vincible, a repressed population is apt to join in seeking revenge on its former conqueror. Also, it is apparent that without outside support, and the psychological transformation which victory and ultimate liberation brings with it, the resistance could not have developed into anything meaningful.

FOOTNOTES

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[1]Charles D. MacDonald, "France (1940-1944)," MS, 1965. To be included in D. M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., "Challenge and Response—Studies in International Conflict" (Task NUMISMATICS I) (Washington, D. C.: Special Operations Research Office, to be published in 1965).

[2]Ibid., p. 3.

[3]Statesman's Yearbook, 1939, passim.

[4]MacDonald, op. cit., p. 9.

[5]Ibid., pp. 36-37.

[6]Ibid., pp. 9-16, 37-38.

[7]Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[8]Andrew A. Molnar, et al., Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Washington, D. C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1963), p. 201.

[9]Ibid., pp. 201-202.

[10]MacDonald, op. cit., pp. 24-26.

[11]Henri Michel, Histoire de la Resistance 1940-1944 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958), p. 97.

[12]MacDonald, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

[13]Ibid., p. 35.

[14]Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[15]Michel, op. cit., pp. 52-60.

[16]MacDonald, op. cit., p. 41.

[17]Ibid., p. 39.

[18]Ibid., p. 31.

[19]Ibid., p. 42.

[20] Ibid., p. 41.

[21] Michel, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

[22] Ibid., pp. 125-127.

[23] MacDonald, op. cit., pp 48-49.

[24] Michel, op. cit., p. 100.

[25] Ibid., passim.

[26] Ibid., p. 108.

[27] Marcel Badaut, "La Resistance en France et les Allies," European Resistance Movements 1939-1945: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the History of the Resistance Movements Held at Milan 26-29 March 1961 (New York: Pergamon Press. Distributed by the MacMillan Company, 1964), p. 391.

[28] MacDonald, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

[29] Badaut, loc. cit.

[30] Ibid.; see also MacDonald, op. cit., p. 55.

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CHINA

(1937-1945)

by

Skaidrite Maliks

APPENDIX I

DISPOSITION OF THE CHINA GARRISON ARMY*

(July 1937)

H. Q. China Garrison Army (Commander: Lt. Gen. Tashiro)	Tienching	Main Force	Tienching
H. Q. Infantry Brigade 1st Infantry Regiment	Peiping	An Element	Between Tienching and Shanhaikuan
Main Force	Peiping	Artillery Regiment	Tienching
One Battalion	Fengtai	Tank Unit	
One Battalion 2d Infantry Regiment	Tienching	Cavalry Unit	
		Engineer Unit	
		Signal Unit	

APPENDIX II

COMPOSITION OF THE SHANGHAI EXPEDITIONARY ARMY**

Shanghai Expeditionary Army H. Q. 3d Division

11th Division (minus the Amaya Detachment)

7th Division Independent Machine Gun Battalion

5th Tank Battalion

8th Independent Light Armored Car Company

10th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment (Minus 1 battalion and 1/2 of the ammunition train of the regiment)

5th Independent Heavy Siege Artillery Battalion

4th French Mortar Battalion

5th to the 10th Field Anti Aircraft Gun Units (inclusive) 16th Division

7th to the 9th Field Searchlight Units (inclusive) 3d Division

8th Independent Engineer Regiment

6th Independent Air Company

H. Q. of the Signal Unit of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army

11th Field Signal Company

40th Radio Platoon

50th to the 52d Radio Platoons (inclusive)

4th Fixed Radio Platoon

APPENDIX III

THE ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE 10th ARMY***

Army Commander—Lt. Gen. Yanagawa	One Independent Machine Gun Battalion
10th Army H. Q.	One Independent Light Armored Car Company
6th Division	Eight Field Anti Aircraft Artillery Units
18th Division	Three Field Searchlight Units
114th Division	Two Independent Engineer Units
Kuniseki Detachment	

*North China Area Operations Record, 1937-1941, pp. 15-16.

**Central China Area Operations Record, 1937-1941, pp. 14-15.

***Central China Area Operations Record, 1937-1941, p. 17.

I. SYNOPSIS

Prior to the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek was attempting to govern a country that was torn by internal political conflict and civil war.

After the Manchu Empire had been replaced by a republic in 1911, attempts were made to constitute the traditionally semiautonomous Chinese provinces under one centralized government. However, the Kuomintang leaders of the National Government never succeeded completely in consolidating their control over the numerous provincial warlords in China.[1] Consequently, after 1927, Chiang Kai-shek's Nanking government was not only fighting the warlords but also became engaged in a broader civil war with the Chinese Communists. It was primarily the increasing Japanese pressure on China that led to an unofficial Kuomintang-Communist truce in December 1936 and eventually to the formation of a United Front against Japan in September 1937.

At the time of the Japanese invasion of China, Chiang Kai-shek was the Chairman of the National Government. Although Chiang Kai-shek supported constitutionalism in theory, in practice he promulgated laws and issued decrees without obtaining the countersignature of the yuan (committee) presidents or ministers concerned.[2] Furthermore, having been raised in the Confucian tradition, he firmly believed that the professional ruling class should come from an educated elite.[3]

As a result of the internal struggle for power between the Nationalists and the Communists in China, the war against Japan became eventually subordinated to the so-called "war within the war."

The Sino-Japanese War, which lasted for 8 years (1937-1945), was ignited by the Lukouchiao incident.

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

On the night of 7 July 1937, while a company of the Japanese 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment stationed at Fengtai,[4] was on night maneuvers north of Lukouchiao (the Marco Polo Bridge near Peiping), it was fired upon by units of Gen. Sung Cheyuan's 29th Army. The Japanese returned fire and both sides suffered some casualties during the engagement. This incident marked the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War.[5]

There were some efforts on both sides after the Lukouchiao incident to localize the conflict; however, such efforts failed.[6] In the meantime, Japanese reinforcements from the Kwantung Army and from Korea had been pouring into the area and the situation escalated rapidly from an incident to a general undeclared war.[7]

The incident which triggered the war was actually one of a series of assaults by the Japanese on Chinese territory. The background of the Lukouchiao incident is concisely summarized in the following paragraph:

> Hostility to Japan by Chinese nationalists dates at least from the Twenty-One Demands of 1915, and particularly from the seizure of Manchuria in September 1931. It was not until after 1931, however, that this hostility became so widespread among many different Chinese elite groups that it presented a serious obstacle to Japanese ambitions. In the period 1931-1937, Chinese unity behind Chiang Kai-shek and patriotism among urban elements . . . developed more rapidly than the simultaneous efforts by Japanese officers to set up pro-Japanese puppets in China's five northern provinces. It is this circumstance more than any other that solidified the determination of Japanese leaders to use the incident of July 7, 1937, as a pretext for invasion.[8]

The war which was ignited by the Lukouchiao incident on 7 July 1937 ended on 14 August 1945, with the Japanese acceptance of the Allies' demand for an unconditional surrender.

The Japanese commander in chief in China formally surrendered at Nanking on 9 September 1945, at Chiang Kai-shek's request, at the Central Military Academy, symbolizing Whampoa's military might.[9]

A. OCCUPATION

Among the primary motives for Japan's military expansionism in Asia, such as in Manchuria and China, was the need to obtain great quantities of raw material for its growing industrial empire and find markets for Japan's manufactured products. Consequently, the policy followed in Japanese-occupied territory was for the occupational forces to live off the land and export all other raw materials to Japan.[10]

A statement by Prince Konoye in December 1938 outlined clearly Japan's political, social, and economic objectives in China. He stated:

> The Japanese Government are resolved to carry on military operations for the . . . extermination of the anti-Japanese Koumintang régime and at the same time to proceed with the work of establishing a new order in East Asia. . . . Japan, China, and Manchukuo will be united by the common aim of establishing a new order in East Asia and realizing a relationship of neighbourly amity, common defense against Communism and economic cooperation. . . . In order to ensure the full accomplishment of this purpose Japan demands that Japanese troops shall be stationed . . . at specified points (in China).[11]

The Japanese Foreign Office played up especially Japan's "idealistic sacrifice" so that China may be "reborn" and become part of the New Order in East Asia. To realize this goal it was necessary that the Chinese appreciate their own heritage and consequently become free from the "worship" of foreign ideas (i.e., U.S. and European).[12]

Once the Japanese considered a territory occupied, the military government officials were under orders, as far as possible, to govern the area as it had been in the past in order to keep active opposition at a minimum. "In China every effort was made to retain the same traditional laws, regulations, and customs as those in existence before the occupation."[13]

The Japanese had several reasons for setting up puppet governments in China. It would free Japanese occupation forces to assume duties elsewhere,

and relieve the Japanese from routine problems associated with the occupation. On a purely technical basis, Japan could not legally institute a military government, because theoretically Japan had not declared war on China.

Among the puppet governments established in China by the Japanese were the Provisional Government of China at Peiping (14 December 1937) and the Reformed Government of China at Nanking (28 March 1938).[14] These puppet governments were instruments of the Japanese Army and had jurisdiction over areas which coincided roughly with the "spheres of influence" of the two major organizations of the Japanese Army in China. Namely, the North China Area Army coincided with the Peiping regime and the Nanking headquarters with the Reformed Government.[15]

The governments had limited effectiveness because the Chinese puppets tended to become vested interests to rival factions of the Japanese Army.[16] The puppet governments had practically no real authority in the rural areas, and in the Japanese-occupied cities, officials lived in daily fear of assassination.[17] Furthermore, the Japanese Army regarded the reliability of its Chinese puppet officials to be inversely proportional to their honesty.[18] Consequently, the worst officials favored continued Japanese control because it brought them large profits and they feared reprisals once the Japanese had departed.[19]

As a result of the various ineffective puppet governments, on 30 March 1940, a new centralized National Government of China was officially established at Nanking.[20] This pro-Japanese Government was headed by Wang Ching-wei. The purpose of this new centralized regime, which resulted from a reorientation of Japanese policy toward China, was to "harmonize Japanese economic demands on China with the . . . need to establish a regime that the Chinese could and would support."[21]

However, from the very beginning Wang Ching-wei's government ran into trouble because of the conflicting opinions among the Japanese authorities

and jealousy on the part of other Chinese puppets who were his rivals. Nevertheless, Wang Ching-wei's central government was far more successful than the previous puppet regimes and also the most independent from Japanese control.[22] This was probably due to Wang Ching-wei's personal stature and prestige.[23]

On the whole, as Chinese resistance increased, the puppet governments became less effective and the Japanese Army relied more and more on population control through fear and intimidation. This is borne out by analyzing Japanese propaganda materials in north China. It showed that over 99 percent of the themes in a series of propaganda pamphlets emphasized the strength and power of the Japanese Army and only 40 percent contained a peaceful theme.[24]

The development of the Lukouchiao incident into a general undeclared war caught Japan unprepared and short of troops ready for immediate action.

Japanese military strategy dealing with occupation in China was dominated by the problem of manpower shortage. In order to offset this disadvantage Japan followed a two-point military program:

1. The Japanese recruited large puppet armies to take over routine occupation duties.

2. The Japanese put into effect a flexible plan for occupation and control of strategic lines and points in guerrilla-threatened regions.[25]

At the time of the Lukouchiao incident in July 1937, the Japanese had roughly 3,000 men in the China Garrison Army.[26] (See Appendix I.)

The immediate reinforcements for the China Garrison Army came from the Kwantung Army and from Korea. In addition, three divisions (the 5th, 6th, and 10th) were increased to full mobilization strength and sent to China. These were placed under the command of the China Garrison Army commander.[27]

Prior to the establishment on 17 November 1937 of the Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo to deal with the war in China, an organization known as Central Authorities, composed of the Army and Navy General

Staffs and the War and Navy Ministries, directed Japanese operations in China.[28]

The Order of Battle of the North China Area Army was published on 31 August 1937, and included the 1st and 2nd Armies. The commander of the North China Area Army had orders from the Central Authorities to secure the Peiping-Tientsin area and other nearby strategic points and to establish "law and order" in this area.[29] Furthermore:

> . . .in order to break the enemy's will to fight and thereby hasten the conclusion of hostilities, the North China Area Army commander will destroy the enemy in Central Hopeh Province without delay.[30]

In the meantime, the Oyama incident in Shanghai (9 August 1937)[31] provided Japan with the opportunity to send additional troops, namely the Shanghai Expeditionary Army. Its main force consisted of the 3rd and 11th Divisions (see Appendix II). The commander had orders from the Central Authorities to assist the Navy in suppressing the enemy in the vicinity of Shanghai to occupy strategic positions in Shanghai and in districts to the north of it and to protect Japanese residents.[32]

On 11 September 1937, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army received additional units from Japan. However, by 20 October, the Central Authorities found it necessary to order the 10th Army to land its main strength at Hangchow Bay to envelop and destroy the Chinese forces in the vicinity of Shanghai (see Appendix III). They were to attack the right rear flank of the Chinese, while landing another force of more than division strength near Paimaokou to attack the Chinese left rear flank.

On 7 November 1937, the Central China Area Army was organized with the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army as its main force under the command of Gen. Iwane Matsui. Its mission was to cooperate with the Navy and annihilate the Chinese troops in the vicinity of Shanghai.

At this time the Japanese apparently still believed a quick victory was possible and the Japanese did not want to adversely influence public opinion

abroad. Consequently, the Order of Battle of the Central China Area Army was not issued until 1 December 1937, when the Japanese realized that the conflict in China could not be localized and made the decision to capture China's capital, Nanking.[33]

The Central China Area Army, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, and the 10th Army were deactivated on 14 February 1938. Instead, the Imperial General Headquarters (previously the Central Authorities) ordered the organization of the Central China Expeditionary Army.

The mission of the Central China Expeditionary Army was to secure the strategic areas on the right bank of the Yangtze River north of and including Hangchow, Hsuancheng, and Wuhu.[34]

The organization and location of the China Expeditionary Army on 1 October 1939 was as follows:[35]

Headquarters, China Expeditionary Army	Gen. Nishio Juzo	Nanking
North China Area Army	Gen. Tada Hayano	Peiping
First Army	Lt. Gen. Shinozuka Yoshio	Taiyuan, Shansi
Twelfth Army	Lt. Gen. Iida Sadakata	Tsinan, Shantung
Eleventh Army	Lt. Gen. Okamura Yasuji	Hankow
Thirteenth Army	Lt. Gen. Fujita Susumu	Shanghai
Twenty-first Army	Lt. Gen. Ando Rikichi	Canton

There are no official strength reports on Japanese forces in China because such records have allegedly been either lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids.[36] Nevertheless, unofficial sources provide some data even though frequently incomplete and contradictory.

One source estimates that in the first half of 1939 the Japanese had an army of at least 900,000 men in China distributed as follows: Canton area, 60,000; Hankow area, 300,000; Shansi, 120,000; Honan, Hopei, and Western Shantung, 200,000. The remaining 220,000 men were in garrisons and on lines of communications.[37] The same source stated that a Japanese Admiralty

spokesman had set the figure somewhat higher, stating that there were more than 1 million men in north and central China.[38]

It is reported that there were 36 Japanese divisions in China in 1940, of which 18 were stationed in the north to deal with the activities of the Eighth Route Army. In central China, to cope with the New Fourth Army, the Japanese had four divisions, four independent brigades, and some 200,000 puppet troops.[39] The latter were of little value in actual combat since they were mostly coerced into fighting for the Japanese.

Japanese Army plans called for the mobilization of some 300,000 puppet troops in China, but at the end of the war estimates of puppet troops exceeded 450,000.[40]

The puppet forces were generally the arm of the puppet governments in China; however, the senior command remained always in Japanese hands. While their military value and trustworthiness were generally low they did replace to some extent the Japanese forces. Many puppet troops were composed of captured and/or surrendered Chinese Nationalist soldiers who had been recruited by the Japanese. It was not uncommon that whole units deserted and joined the Japanese. For instance, about the time Wang Ching-wei became President of the new puppet government, some 50,000 Nationalist Chinese troops deserted and went into the service of the puppet government.[41]

The puppet troops generally took over the routine occupation duties such as garrison duty, guarding communication and transportation lines, and maintaining law and order. In military operations against the Chinese guerrillas they had to be backed up by Japanese troops.[42] Even though many puppet forces had some kind of an unofficial truce with the local Chinese troops it became evident after 1941 that the Japanese shifted more and more garrisoning of occupied areas and other duties over to the puppet troops.[43] This was supposedly due to better puppet organization and effectiveness rather than to a decrease in

guerrilla activities,[44] actually it was partly due to the need for Japanese troops in the southwest and the Pacific.

B. ANTIOCCUPATION

At the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War China had approximately 30 divisions—300,000 men.[45] About 80,000 of these were considered to be well-trained troops, equipped with German weapons. Roughly three-fifths of the troops were deployed around Shanghai and Nanking.[46]

These troops were known as "the Generalissimo's Own"; they were trained by Germans and most of their officers were graduates of Whampoa or Central Military academies and were loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.[47]

In addition to "the Generalissimo's Own," the Kuomintang Armies consisted of provincial troops and the Moslem troops of Tsinghai, Kansu, and Ningsia. The latter totaled about 80,000 men and were considered to be better trained than most of the provincial units, who left much to be desired in terms of modern military standards.[48]

By the time the Japanese armies had already spread far into north China and intense fighting was taking place in Shanghai, the United Front was established. On 22 September 1937 the Chinese Communists issued a proclamation dissolving their Soviet Republic, affirming their adherence to Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, and uniting their forces with the Kuomintang to fight the Japanese.

The Communists were to integrate their Red Army with the Government's Central Army and cease all subversive activities against it.

The two largest fighting forces of the Chinese Communists during the war against the Japanese were the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.

The Red Army changed its name to the Eighth Route Army in August 1937, and was reorganized by the National Government following the establishment of

the United Front. The Government put an upper limit on the new Eighth Route Army's manpower at 45,000 men and divided this force into three divisions as follows:[49]

115th—Commanded by Lin Piao, the strategist

120th—Commanded by Ho Lung, the ex-bandit

129th—Commanded by Liu Po-cheng, the one-eyed general.

The Eighth Route Army operated primarily in north China and covered an area of approximately four provinces. It functioned mainly as a "central dispersing and strategy center, facilitating and training smaller units and maintaining guerrilla zones."[50]

The New Fourth Army did not exist when the war broke out. It was organized in the beginning of 1938, drawing from Communist remnants left behind in central China when the main Red Army evacuated in 1934.[51] The New Fourth Army operated over three provinces in central China, mostly within the Japanese invasion and occupation areas.

Both of these armies were supplemented by guerrilla units and armed peasants; however, their numbers are difficult to determine.

Strength estimates of the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies (excluding part-time village militia) between 1937 and 1945 were as follows at the end of each year (except for 1945):[52]

Year	Eighth Route Army	New Fourth Army
1937	80,000	12,000
1938	156,000	25,000
1939	270,000	50,000
1940	400,000	100,000
1941	305,000	135,000
1942	340,000	110,000
1943	339,000	125,000
1944	507,000	252,000
1945	1,029,000	269,000

The basic field organization of the troops during the war was as follows:[53]

Army Groups (Chi Tuan)	Each consisted of two or more armies
Armies (Chun Tuan)	Each consisted of two or more corps
Corps (Chun)	Each consisted of two or more divisions
Divisions (Shih)	Each consisted of two or more infantry brigades plus one artillery battalion or regiment, and contingents of engineers, single troops, medical units, and transport. Total: 10,000.

Thus the division was the tactical and administrative unit while the army corps was the strategical unit.

The chain of command was complex and cumbersome. The field armies were controlled through regional commands which were known as "war zones." A war zone comprised the geographical area which lay within a major theater of operations. As the war expanded, new war zones were established to cope with the spreading Japanese offensives. The commander of a war zone exercised supreme command over all troops operating within that zone.[54]

The Chinese Communist armies were assigned certain war zones for defense. However, the Communists refused to be confined to their assigned zones and demanded that they be given entry into any Kuomintang zone they wished to enter.[55] Such tactics inevitably led to clashes with Kuomintang troops. As a result the United Front disintegrated and the Chinese Communists ended up fighting both the Kuomintang armies and the Japanese. This resulted in a general deterioration of the Chinese war situation.

From the time the United States declared war on Japan, both the Communists and the Kuomintang became almost totally absorbed in their own status *vis*-a-vis one another, rather than in fighting the Japanese. The inter-party struggle worked on the theory that the United States would defeat Japan and that the fruits of this victory would obviously go to the side of the party that won out in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle for power in China.

II. SITUATIONS

The reconstruction of the development of rear area situations in China as envisaged in the format presents two problems in this particular case.

First, there was a general absence of "fronts" in the traditional terms of an extending line held by the Chinese in the face of the invading troops. While the Japanese penetrated deeply into the interior of China they occupied only limited territory. Their strategy was to advance along the railroad lines capturing strategic points, which they held, but the territories in between became the so-called "twilight zones," usually controlled neither by the Chinese nor the Japanese. Consequently, there were only small areas where the Japanese held undisputed control. "Almost the whole of North China was a guerrilla front."[56]

Secondly, there was a "paucity of original orders, plans, and unit journals. . . [because] most. . . were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids."[57] Furthermore, existing data pertaining to rear area security are frequently either still classified, or else written in Japanese, or both. Consequently the reconstruction of Japanese operations in China is extremely difficult.

Although there is a considerable amount of published material on the Sino-Japanese War, most of it is either in the form of personal accounts, containing bias and errors, or studies which dwell primarily on generalities of the various aspects of the Chinese Communist guerrillas, the struggle with the Kuomintang, and similar themes.

Consequently, this situation section is confined to describing generally the rear area security measures which the Japanese attempted to enforce in China between 1937-1945.

OCCUPATION OF STRATEGIC LINES AND POINTS

In north China, where the guerrilla forces were quite large and aggressive, the Japanese concluded that total annihilation of the enemy would be costly and very difficult. Furthermore, the outbreak of the Pacific war with the United States necessitated the transfer out of China of a certain number of experienced troops, thus diminishing the chances of carrying out such an operation successfully.[58]

The Japanese reasoned that in order to control China effectively it was not necessary to occupy the entire country but rather to gain control of certain strategic points and the lines between these points.

As a result of this strategy, Japanese occupation consisted of holding all the main cities (*chien*) in northern and central China as far west as Hankow, and the transportation lines which they controlled.[59]

The holding of transportation lines necessitated also the holding of very narrow strips of land on each side of the road or railroad; the territories between these narrow strips were "twilight zones."

Therefore, the areas under complete dominance of the Chinese guerrillas were considered less important to the Japanese occupation forces than those "twilight zones," which were adjacent to Japanese lines and control points. In many regions these zones would be controlled by the Japanese during daylight hours and by the guerrillas at night; or by the Japanese only so long as they were willing and able to maintain a superior armed force there.[60]

The smallness of Japanese-occupied territory is supported by the estimates made toward the end of 1943, which put the area behind the most advanced Japanese positions of "occupied" China proper at approximately 345,000 square miles. Out of this total the Japanese controlled about 82,000 square miles; the guerrilla areas[61] ("twilight zones") comprised about 67,000 square miles; and the Communists controlled about 155,000 square miles (of which 110,000 were in north China proper), made up primarily of sparsely populated

mountain regions. The remaining 41,000 square miles were under the Chungking (Nationalist) control.[62]

TROOP DEPLOYMENT IN REAR AREAS

Japanese troop deployment in rear areas was contingent on local conditions. In addition to special security forces, a major portion of the occupation units were used to guard the most important points and communications-transportation lines.

The standard deployment used by the Japanese was: one to two companies in the important towns, two squads to a platoon in villages, and a squad to a platoon (20 to 30 men), to garrison a fort or stronghold.[63]

Because of the extensive guerrilla activities in China, the requirements for rear area security were great and the number of troops so engaged at times actually exceeded the forces engaged in frontline action.[64] For instance, it is estimated that in the spring of 1938, two-thirds of the Japanese forces in China were engaged in protecting lines of communications.[65]

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

Apart from arbitrary executions and other terroristic tactics,[66] there are two basic categories of security measures which the Japanese employed in China, namely fortification of transportation lines, which included railroad and convoy security strongpoints, and patrols, and population control through village security.

Railroad Security

Railroad security generally required a certain amount of local assistance. In some cases the Japanese took hostages or made whole villages, through the pao chia system, responsible for stretches of railroad track

adjacent to the particular village.[67] This system of railroad protection was known as "railway-loving-villages."[68]

In regions with puppet governments, Railroad Protection Youth Corps were organized. Such corps were composed of children under 14 years of age who would patrol the tracks to see that everything was safe and in working order. They had special uniforms and received a salary. Because of their youth they generally escaped retaliation from the guerrillas.[69]

Generally, major railroad lines (i.e., from Paotingfu to Tinghsien) were fortified in certain sections, with pillboxes situated about one-third of a mile apart and capable of holding 20 men. These pillboxes were usually surrounded by trenches, and all railroad stations had permanent garrisons.[70] Bridges and other vulnerable spots were guarded with blockhouses. It was also prohibited to grow tall crops, such as corn and kaoliang, within 500 meters (about 547 yards) of a railroad, so as not to provide cover for the guerrillas.[71]

Later on, the "cage policy" or "fortress tactics" were developed and associated with General Tada, then the commander in chief of the North China Expeditionary Army.

This defensive measure consisted of digging deep (about 10 feet) and wide blockage ditches (which could not be jumped across) and building high walls along the sides of the railroads and highways.[72] It not only assisted in protecting the lines of transportation from guerrilla attacks, but aided the Japanese in blockading and breaking up guerrilla base areas.[73]

In addition to fortifying and patrolling the railroad tracks, the Japanese ran light armored trains over the tracks at dawn to check for danger spots. In most cases, regular trains would run with the locomotives in the center and one or two empty boxcars forming a buffer at the head of the train.[74]

In north China, the railroads were subject to frequent attacks by the guerrillas and consequently the Japanese seldom ran trains alone, preferring groups as a convoy. An armored train would usually precede the main body

and each individual train would contain an armed unit. The trains often mounted machineguns both in the front and the rear. These train convoys worked fairly well in areas removed from enemy air bases.

Sabotage activities on railroads in north China ranged from the removal of sections of track (which were either buried or taken away to be melted down for ammunition and weapons) to the demolition of bridges as trains were in the process of crossing.[75]

Punishment for sabotage or attacks on the railroads often took the form of burning the village closest to the section of railroad track attacked, or the execution of all males between 12 and 40 years of age in the village, on the assumption that they had helped the guerrillas.[76]

While the railroad security measures appear to have been relatively successful, there were also areas where the Chinese peasants dug ditches for one side by day and filled them up for the other side by night. Furthermore, the puppet troops frequently looked the other way when guerrillas crossed the Japanese blockade lines.[77]

According to Eighth Route Army estimates, the Japanese had built, by the end of 1942, about 9,600 miles of walls and blockage ditches in north China, 29,846 blockhouses, and 9,243 forts or strongholds.[78]

Convoy Security

Japanese motor convoys passing through guerrilla areas had armed guards and were sometimes accompanied by an armored car or light tank.

The Japanese made every attempt to put on a visible show of superior force so as to discourage guerrilla attacks. Rubber dummy soldiers were used from time to time to deceive the enemy as to the numbers of guards on the convoy or the actual strength of blockhouses by sending dummy "reinforcements" on the trucks.[79]

In potential ambush areas the convoy was speeded up, and if attacked attempted to break through the ambush or raid rather than stop to fight it out. The Japanese usually relied on superior firepower to break through. In case of roadblocks or the destruction of the leading vehicle, the men would get out of the trucks and take up firing positions from surrounding cover. At times the convoy would attempt to break through under the cover of their armored car or tank fire.

Trucks in the convoy traveled usually 100 yards apart while the point and rear security vehicles would be 200 yards ahead of or behind the main body. This was done in order to keep the more vulnerable trucks close together as a unit and out of immediate range of enemy ambush fire while permitting more freedom to the front and rear security vehicles in case of surprise attack.[80]

Strongpoints

The Japanese made extensive use of strongpoints to insure greater security in occupied areas. They were located in commanding positions such as along railroad lines. It is estimated that the Japanese had constructed some 30,000 strongpoints in China and that approximately one-third were destroyed in fighting the guerrillas.[81]

The strongpoints were constructed primarily as a defense against small-arms fire and grenades, since the guerrillas rarely had any heavy weapons. Most of the strongpoints were blockhouses, either square or circular in design, constructed of local materials such as brick, stone, or mortar. They were generally 3 or 4 stories high and covered with a roof of sufficient strength to resist small mortar shells. The blockhouses were surrounded by barbed wire fences, minefields, and blockade ditches.[82] Once construction was completed, it was difficult for the guerrillas to take them because they lacked artillery.[83]

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

Because of the limited use of small arms, the guerrillas frequently employed tricks in their attempts to destroy the strongpoints, such as tunneling under the blockhouse and blowing it up or dressing up a "suicide squad" in Japanese uniforms, thus being able to get better access to the strongpoints.

In view of the limited availability of radio equipment, communication was carried on by flares and code flags. Each strongpoint was so constructed, whenever feasible, as to be within sight of another strongpoint or a garrison unit.

Patrols

Patrols were used by the Japanese to stabilize the areas between the strongpoints; to check railroad and communication lines for sabotage attempts; and to make periodic checks of the surrounding area for evidence of guerrilla activity. Most patrols were made on foot to insure greater coverage and nothing heavier than light automatic weapons was carried.[84]

A weakness in the Japanese patrol techniques was their insistence upon regularity and punctuality. They followed a definite unchanging time schedule and followed the same route every day. Consequently, the guerrillas quickly learned to "set their watches" by the patrols and timed their ambushes and raids accordingly. Yet the Japanese continued in the same manner in spite of casualties.[85]

Village Security

External security measures against guerrilla attacks consisted of clearing the immediate area near the village so as to get a clear range of fire. Guns were situated at strategic points on the wall around the village. All curved or irregular walls were generally torn down and rebuilt along straight lines. Sometimes two double walls were constructed to obstruct the attackers

further. Villages which lacked walls were encircled by barbed wire, electrically charged wire fences, minefields, or combinations thereof.[86]

Internal village security was concerned with guarding against guerrilla infiltration and preventing the villagers from giving assistance to the guerrillas.

A close check was made of individuals at the entrance of villages permanently occupied by a Japanese or puppet force. Persons were registered, were required to have identification (certificates of residence), and to state the purpose of their trip, their destination, and length of time away, in addition to undergoing a close search for concealed weapons, food, etc. Persons without a certificate of residence were subject to execution as spies and bandits.[87]

Periodic spot checks and searches were made of homes and shops in villages and an exact census was kept of all persons residing there. Plaques were posted on the front doors listing the individuals residing within.

Patrols would make checks of villages and hold census counts at all kinds of hours and sometimes several times a day. On other occasions, a village would be surrounded and an intensive house-by-house search conducted. If there was one man more in the household than listed on the plaque, he was assumed to be a guerrilla and if one person was missing it was assumed he had joined the guerrillas.[88]

On some occasions, the guerrillas would enter a village and destroy all the certificates and census plaques, thus coercing the villagers to join the guerrillas or otherwise to suffer the consequences from the Japanese.[89]

One of the major security measures in villages and towns in China was the hoko system, a Japanese version of the pao chia.[90]

The Central China Expeditionary Army issued a directive in January 1939, for maintenance of public peace, which included the order to "strengthen the self-defense capacity of towns and villages by encouraging the Chinese authorities to popularize the Mutual Guarantee System,"[91] (i.e., pao chia).

In essence, this system organized the population into residential groups whose members were held mutually responsible for any subversive anti-Japanese activities in their respective areas.[92]

Traditionally, this system of population control required the division of the society into progressively larger groups of families of approximately tens, hundreds, and thousands. Thus, government control could be extended down to the basic societal unit, namely, the family.

The Japanese version was to organize 10 families residing close together into a pao and five of these family groups constituted a "great pao" or tai-pao. The Japanese would appoint some respected and influencial Chinese leader as the head of the tai-pao, who then in turn would select five other Chinese heads to take charge of each pao within his jurisdiction.[93]

The tai-pao was charged with collecting taxes and keeping an accurate census. At times he was expected to organize and train "self-defense corps" or militia. These were generally composed of men from 18 to 45 who would be used for routine guard duty and for keeping local law and order.

In effect, the pao chia system made hostages of the important people of the Chinese community and because of the love and respect which the community had for these men the villagers would restrain themselves from activities which would endanger the pao heads. Likewise, the pao heads generally tried to cooperate with the Japanese occupation forces because of personal fear and out of consideration for the welfare of the other people.[94]

Nevertheless, while the pao chia system contributed to the curtailment of active mass support for the guerrillas, and worked more effectively than taking a large number of hostages at random, it was never completely successful in China. This is attributed partly to the many Chinese in Japanese service, who continued to assist the guerrillas when they were able to do so without any risk, and partly to the Japanese in the system who were

corrupt.[96] The failure of the system was particularly evident in north China where it degenerated into one of purely physical control.[98]

In order to cope with the increasing guerrilla activities, the Japanese initiated (in 1942) General Okamura's "three-all" policy which literally meant "kill-all, burn-all, destroy-all" (sanko-seisaku).[97] The Japanese would surround and destroy suspected guerrillas, sector by sector, while killing many innocent Chinese, burning homes, and destroying crops and livestock.[98] Since such actions frequently drove the local population over to the side of the guerrillas, the Communists sometimes provoked the Japanese into applying the "three-all" policy in order to alienate the people further away from the Japanese.[99]

In the case of central China the pao chia system was more effective because it was integrated with the "Rural Pacification Movement" and "New Citizen Movement " (Hsin Kuo Min), which operated through the establishment of "model peace zones."

These zones were turned over to Wang Ching-wei's Nanking regime, which was charged with implementing these movements, designed to restore a measure of local government, increase agricultural production, exercise thought control, promote the cooperative movement among the peasants, and organize student and youth organizations.[100]

Consequently, the pao chia system and the village militia made it more difficult for the guerrillas to organize the villagers in central China, and "the restoration of normal government with some measures of reform offered the local population tolerable conditions under Japanese occupation."[101]

Cognizance should be taken of the special village security problem encountered by the Japanese in central Hopei, where the people built an extensive and complex system of underground tunnels.

The villagers had initially constructed underground shelters to hide themselves and their property when Japanese troops were reported to be

approaching a village. Later, these underground shelters were connected by several tunnels inside the village and eventually, tunnels were constructed to link several villages. This intricate system of tunnels was feasible primarily because of the particular type of subsoil found in the central Hopei region which made it relatively easy to tunnel through, and which required a minimum of timber support.[102]

In addition to permitting the villagers and the guerrillas to escape from Japanese encirclement, the tunnel systems also enabled the guerrillas to cross underneath Japanese fortified lines of transportation and to attack the Japanese in villages which they thought had been abandoned.[103]

At first, these tunnels ran in straight lines between the various villages, and the Japanese attempted to isolate them by digging deep lateral trenches in the field, thus supposedly cutting through and exposing these tunnels.[104]

This proved to be ineffective in the long run because the villagers thought up new designs.

> Tunnels were built zigzag, and up and down; they connected, through emergency entrances, with wholly independent subsidiary tunnel systems at different levels going off in all directions.[105]

Then the Japanese reportedly resorted to pumping poison gas into the tunnels.[106] In answer to this Japanese measure the Chinese hung up antigas curtains at the tunnel entrances and made provisions to wall up and cut off any part of the tunnel system which was entered or discovered by the Japanese.[107]

Furthermore, the entrances and some sections of the tunnels were mined and full of boobytraps, which made the Japanese very reluctant to enter these tunnels.[108] The Japanese would sometimes use captives or their puppet troops to walk ahead of them in the tunnels but this too was reportedly ineffective because the Chinese developed firing devices some 15 to 20 yards behind, which would be released when the Japanese followed the captives into the tunnels.[109]

III. OUTCOME

At the end of the war the Chinese Communists claimed that they had captured half a million puppet troops, 3,500 Japanese, and 34,000 Nationalist Chinese troops. In the way of weapons, they claimed to have taken over 200,000 rifles, 2,000 machineguns, and 150 artillery pieces.[110] Although there is no way of confirming these figures, it is felt that they may be largely correct.

With regard to the effectiveness of the Japanese measures in China the following conclusions could be drawn:

1. Oppressive economic exploitation and brutal occupation policies appeared to give strong impetus to armed resistance.

2. It was of first importance for counterguerrilla forces to understand guerrilla warfare and to be competent in guerrilla tactics before attempting to engage in effective counterguerrilla action.

3. A key Japanese weakness in respect to cutting off the guerrillas from the local populace was the overemphasis placed on the purely mechanical techniques of isolation (i.e., blockades, patrols), and the general unawareness of the need to drive a political wedge between the guerrillas and the people.

4. Well-organized native puppet forces were trained to take over a major portion of the occupation duties and were useful regardless of the degree of guerrilla activity. However, in actual combat they had to be supported by Japanese troops.

5. Control of guerrilla regions by occupying only strategic lines and points required a minimum of manpower.

6. Blockades were often effective but were a costly means of counter-guerrilla actions.

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

7. Guerrillas did not have to be annihilated to be controlled. Economic pressure, isolation, and blockade were frequently successful in controlling their activities.[111]

FOOTNOTES

[1]Michael Lindsay, "China (1937-1945)," MS, 1965. To be included in D. M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., "Challenge and Response--Studies in International Conflict" (Task NUMISMATICS I) (Washington, D. C.. Special Operations Research Office, to be published in 1965), p. 1.

[2]Paul A. Jureidini, et al., Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts (Washington, D. C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1962), p. 471.

[3]Ibid.

[4]The attacked Japanese soldiers were part of the China Garrison Army (about 3,000 men) stationed in north China as authorized by the Boxer Protocol of 1901, in order to protect its nationals and to guard communication lines between Peiping and the ports of north China.

[5]U.S., Army Forces in the Far East, Headquarters, USAFFE and Eighth U.S. Army (Rear), Military History Section. North China Area Operations Record, July 1937-May 1941. Japanese Monograph No. 178. Distributed by Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 1955, p. 15.

[6]Lindsay, op. cit., p. 2.

[7]An interesting interpretation of the Lukouchiao incident is put forth by a noted Japanese journalist, Tamura Masasaku. He states that the incident was a premeditated plot by a group of Japanese militarists, known as the "China section" in the general staff and war ministry. They wanted to extend the incident as a means of expanding their military influence in China. Tamura Masasaku, Miao-ping jim-ken (Tokyo, 1953), as cited in F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 197.

[8]Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 32.

[9]Liu, op. cit., p. 226.

[10]Cene Z. Hanrahan, Japanese Operations Against Guerrilla Forces (U), (Official Use Only) (ORO-T-268) (Chevy Chase: Operations Research Office, 1954), p. 5.

[11]As quoted in Owen M. Green, The Story of China's Revolution (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1945), p. 214. Emphasis added.

[12]F. Hilary Conroy, "Japan's War in China: An Ideological Somersault," Pacific Historical Review, XXI (November 1952), p. 371.

[13]Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 6.

[14]Johnson, op. cit., pp. 41-42.

[15]Ibid., p. 42.

[16]Conroy, op. cit., p. 372.

[17]Lawrence K. Rosinger, "Politics and Strategy of China's Mobile War," Pacific Affairs, XII (September 1939), p. 274.

[18]Michael Lindsay, "The North China Front: A Study of Chinese Guerrillas in Action," Amerasia, VIII (March 31, 1944), p. 108.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Wang Ching-wei planned to secure popularity for his government by winning over the old Kuomintang officials who still resided in Shanghai; to obtain the aid of Chinese bankers with large business holdings in Shanghai and its vicinity; to get the favor of the overseas Chinese; and to divert their funds to peace movements. Ray E. Bromwell, "News from the Far East," Amerasia, III (September 1939) pp. 326-327.

[21]Johnson, op. cit., p. 42.

[22]Lindsay, "China (1937-1945)," op. cit., p. 59.

[23]Wang Ching-wei was a political rival of Chiang Kai-shek. Since the early days of the Kuomintang he had been an important leader and had held several high offices in the National Government including the Prime Ministry. Wang Ching-wei fled in 1939 from Chungking to Indochina and then to Shanghai where he held lengthy and secret negotiations with the Japanese and then proceeded to establish a rival government. Ibid., p. 60; Kao Tsung-wu, Sino-Japanese War MS [1943] (Washington, D. C.: Military Intelligence Service, War Department, 1943), passim.

[34]David N. Rowe, "Japanese Propagnnda in North China, 1937-1938," Public Opinion Quarterly, III (October 1939), p. 573. For further inquiry about Japanese propaganda see also David N. Rowe, "The T'ai Chi Symbol in Japanes War Propaganda," Public Opinion Quarterly, V (Winter 1941), pp. 532-547; Selden C. Menefee, "Japan's Psychological War," Social Forces, XXII (May, 1943), pp. 425-436. See also Hideya Kumata, "Spiritual Mobilization—the Japanese Concept of Propaganda, Four Working Papers on Propaganda" (Champaign, Illinois: Institute of Communications Research, 1955), p. 1-26.; Japanese Propaganda in the Mirror of Events (Hankow, China: The China information Committee, 1938); and U.S., Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, Japanese Infiltration (Washington, D.C.: August, 1944).

[25]Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 8.

[26]North China Area Operations Record, II 1937-1941, op. cit., p. 15.

[27]Ibid, p. 25.

[28]U. S., Army Forces in the Far East, Headquarters, USAFFE and Eighth U.S. Army (Rear), Military History Section, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937-1941. Japanese Monograph No. 179. Distributed by Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1955, p. 13.

[29]North China Area Operations Record, 1937-1941, op. cit., p. 28.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Lieutenant Oyama, commander of the 1st Company of the Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force (about 4,000), and 1st Seaman Saito were killed by members of the Chinese Safety Unit.

[32]Central China Area Operations Record, 1937-1941, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

[33]Ibid, pp. 17-18.

[34]Ibid, p. 26.

[35]Johnson, op. cit., p. 39.

[36]North China Area Operations Record, 1937-1941, op. cit., p. 1.

[37]Walter H. Mallory, "Strategy of Chiang Kai-shek," Foreign Affairs, (July, 1939), p. 710.

[38]Ibid.

[39]Gene Z. Hanrahan, "The Chinese Red Army and Guerrilla Warfare." Combat Forces Journal (February, 1951), p. 13.

[40]Hanrahan, Japanese Operations, op. cit., p. 9.

[41]Edgar O'Ballance, The Red Army of China: A Short History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 129.

[42]Lindsay, "The North China Front," op. cit., p. 109.

[43]U.S. Senate, Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, 82nd Cong. 2nd Sess., 1952, p. 2370.

[44]Hanrahan, Japanese Operations, op. cit., p. 9.

[45]Evans F. Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p. 30.

[46]Liu, op. cit., p. 147.

[47]Carlson, op. cit., p. 30.

[48]Ibid, pp. 30-31.

[49]Johnson, op. cit., p. 73; O'Ballance, op. cit., p. 123.

[50]Hanrahan, "The Chinese Red Army," op. cit., p. 12.

[51]Johnson, op. cit., p. 74.

[52]Lindsay, "China (1937-1945)," op. cit., p. 33.

[53]Carlson, op. cit., p. 27.

[54]Ibid, pp. 26-27.

[55]Hearings on Institute of Pacific Relations, op. cit., p. 2307.

[56]Lindsay, "The North China Front," op. cit., p. 100.

[57]North China Area Operations Record, 1937-1941, op. cit., p. 1.

[58]Hearings on Institute of Pacific Relations, op. cit., p. 2367.

[59]O'Ballance, op. cit., p. 130.

[60]Hanrahan, Japanese Operations, op. cit., p. 20; O'Ballance, op. cit., p. 130.

[61]Those zones which were only under temporary control by the guerrillas were called "areas" as opposed to "bases" which had a permanent status.

[62]Hearings on Institute of Pacific Relations, op. cit., pp. 2368-2369.

[63]Lindsay, "China (1937-1945)," op. cit., p. 50.

[64]Hanrahan, Japanese Operations, op. cit., p. 20.

[65]George E. Taylor, The Struggle for North China (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p. 49.

[66]See, for instance, Harrison Forman, Report from Red China (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1945), passim.

[67]Taylor, op. cit., p. 82.

[68]Ibid, p. 49.

[69]Hanrahan, Japanese Operations, op. cit., p. 26.

[70]Taylor, op. cit., p. 49.

[71]David Weile, "The War Behind Japan's Lines in North China," America (June 1940), p. 163.

[72]Hearings on Institute of Pacific Relations, op. cit., p. 2366. Lindsay, "China (1937-1945)," op. cit., p. 50.

[73] This defensive measure was developed into the "silk-worm nibbling" strategy. "The plan was to work out gradually from the areas under full Japanese control by building a line of forts connected . . . by a system of blockade ditches or fences; then to consolidate the territory behind this line; and finally to start another line further out, still further encroachment on the Chinese base area." Lindsay, "China (1937-1945)," op. cit., p. 49.

[74] Hanrahan, Japanese Operations, op. cit., p. 26.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Rosinger, op. cit., p. 274.

[77] Lindsay, "China (1937-1945)," op. cit., p. 40.

[78] Hearings on Institute of Pacific Relations, op. cit., p. 2366.

[79] Harrison Forman, "Tunnel Warfare," Irregulars, Partisans, Guerrillas, ed. Irving R. Blacker (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 187.

[80] Hanrahan, Japanese Operations, op. cit., p. 28.

[81] Ibid., p. 20.

[82] Lindsay, "China (1937-1945)," op. cit., p. 49-50.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Hanrahan, Japanese Operations, op. cit., p. 22.

[85] Ibid., p. 23.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Hearings on Institute of Pacific Relations, op. cit., p. 2370.

[88] Taylor, op. cit., p. 82.

[89] Hearings on Institute of Pacific Relations, op. cit., p. 2370.

[90]This was a time-tested system which was officially promulgated in 1898 when the Chinese ruled Formosa and, prior to 1937, Chiang Kai-shek had tried to use it to eliminate the Communists.

[91]Central China Area Operations Record, 1937-1941, op. cit., pp. 106-107.

[92]Lindsay, "China (1937-1945)," op. cit., p. 51.

[93]Ibid.

[94]Hanrahan, Japanese Operations, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

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[97]Johnson, op. cit., p. 55; Hearings on Institute of Pacific Relations, op. cit., p. 2366.

[98]North China Area Operations Record, 1937-1941, op. cit., p. 221.

[99]Johnson, op. cit., pp. 116-117.

[100]Hearings on Institute of Pacific Relations, op. cit., pp. 2369-2370.

[101]Lindsay, "China (1937-1945)," op. cit., p. 60.

[102]Ibid., p. 37.

[103]Hearings on Institute of Pacific Relations, op. cit., p. 2367.

[104]Forman, "Tunnel Warfare," op. cit., p. 180.

[105]Ibid.

[106]Hearings on Institute of Pacific Relations, op. cit., p. 2367.

[107]Ibid.

[108]Ibid.

[109]Forman, "Tunnel Warfare," op. cit., p. 181; Lindsay, "China (1937-1945)," op. cit., p. 36.

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KOREA

(1950 - 1953)

by

Carl Rosenthal

I. SYNOPSIS

The Republic of Korea, from the date of its independence in mid-1948, was confronted by a Communist insurgency designed to subvert the Republic and establish a unified Korean state under Communist domination.[1] When subversion alone failed to accomplish this objective, the Government of North Korea in June 1950 initiated war on the Republic, supported by the insurgent bands which attempted to disrupt the United Nations war effort at the front by perpetrating attacks against UN installations and supply lines in the rear areas. Even after the conventional military hostilities were ended by the armistice in July 1953, vestiges of the insurgency still lingered for an additional year.[2] Hence, among the numerous problems confronting the Republic was the necessity to conduct counterinsurgent operations during the first 8 years of its independence.

Korea, a mountainous and densely populated nation jutting out from the central Asian mainland, had been relegated since 1910 to the position of a dependency in the Japanese Empire.

The allied defeat of Japan in World War II abruptly ended Korea's colonial status. Despite the clamor by the Korean people for full and immediate independence, however, the United States and Russia agreed to a temporary joint military occupation of the peninsula. The United States was to assume responsibility for the territory south of the 38th parallel, and the Russians the territory to the north of this line, until the Korean economy was rehabilitated and a native leadership was trained to assume the reins of government.[3] This temporary line turned into a permanent barrier when in mid-1948 two hostile governments, one democratic, the other Communist, were established in the former zones of the occupying powers. From the time of its birth, the Government of North Korea subjected the Republic of South Korea to subversion, designed to bring the entire peninsula under Communist control.[4]

The instrument of the North Korean Government for this task was the communistic South Korean Labor Party (SKLP), also known as the South Korean Workers' Party. Although there are no verifiable statistics regarding the numerical strength of this party, it is estimated that SKLP membership totaled over 150,000 by midsummer 1948, of which approximately 20,000 were hard-core Communists. In addition, the SKLP had at its disposal a guerrilla force comprised of party members, Communist sympathizers, bandits, and others harboring grievances against the Republic, numbering perhaps 5,000 men.[5]

The most numerous concentration of guerrillas was located in the Chiri Mountain region. This forested range located in the southwestern region of the mainland had been utilized by bandits and partisans as a refuge since Japan's conquest of Korea in 1910. Other principal bases of this guerrilla force were located in the Taebaek Mountains along South Korea's eastern coast and near the center of the Republic on a spur ranging southwestward from the main Taebaek Range. A large number of insurgents were also positioned in the Hanla Mountains on Cheju-do, an island situated 50 miles off the mainland of southwest Korea.[6]

In April 1948, the insurgents in the Hanla Mountains incited the populace into a large-scale rebellion which was only put down by the combined efforts of the South Korean National Police (SKNP) and the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). This island was the scene of a far larger and more bloody revolt in October, when the guerrillas again came out of their mountain stronghold to terrorize the inhabitants of the villages situated along the island shore. More than 500 rioters were killed before order was restored.[7] In order to obviate further public disorder, the South Korean 14th Regiment, located on the mainland at Yosu, was called to reinforce the large number of security forces already on the island. Before this regiment departed for Cheju-do, however, it was also incited into rebellion by a Communist-inspired partisan group within its ranks.[8]

The SKLP had a widespread organization which managed to form cells within the Korean Army, as well as a network of cells on the provincial, county, and village levels. The cell in the South Korean 14th Regiment numbered almost 300 party members, among whose number were included many of the regiment's officers. The mutiny stirred up by this cell was suppressed by loyal army and police units only after a week of fierce fighting. However, most of the Communist leaders of the rebellion were able to escape into the Paegun Mountain and Chiri Mountain areas north of Sunchon.[9] The last rebellion which the Communists were able to incite within the Korean Army occurred in November 1948, at Taegu in southeastern Korea, but it was quickly suppressed.[10]

Beginning in late fall, guerrillas in the Chiri and Taebaek Mountains also engaged in a stepped-up campaign of raids against villages and police outposts. Their purpose was twofold: to expand the area under their control by terrorizing the local inhabitants, and to pillage food, clothing, and weapons, since only a fraction of their supplies could be secured from the north.[11]

Although the Government of North Korea was unable to supply the guerrilla bands with logistic support, it did furnish some of the insurgents with specialized training in guerrilla warfare at the North Korean Army School at Kodong. Before the beginning of the war, more than a thousand of these guerrillas, mostly indigenous Communist South Koreans, had been infiltrated back below the parallel to assume positions of leadership in the SKLP guerrilla organization. With the large-scale infiltration of these insurgents and the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Korea in mid-1949, except for an advisory unit of less than 500 men, guerrilla activity mounted in intensity.[12]

The North Korean People's Army (NKPA) contributed to the pressure exerted on the Republic from within by launching hundreds of forays into South Korean territory.[13] Simultaneously, the Government of North Korea and the SKLP coordinated a propaganda campaign, blaming the Syngman Rhee

administration for the Republic's chaotic economic condition and the widespread unemployment.[14]

Beginning in midsummer 1949, the ROKA was used, in addition to the national police, to counter the growing threat posed by the guerrillas. During the period from July to December 1949, army troops launched 542 separate attacks against the insurgents, an average of three per day.[15] The first coordinated attempt to dislodge the rebels from their strongholds in the Chiri Mountains began in December 1949, and lasted until March 1950. This so-called "Winter Punitive Operation" committed three divisions of the ROKA against the rebels.[16] Although guerrilla activity was significantly reduced during this operation, the number of insurgents by June 1950 had actually climbed to more than 7,000 men, owing to increased Communist infiltration from the north and the disaffection of many non-Communists with the Rhee government.[17]

The discontent of the populace with the Rhee administration was reflected in the election of the National Assembly in 1950. Only 32 incumbents were reelected to office and supporters of Rhee shrank to only 45 seats in an assembly of 200 representatives. The North Korean Government, interpreting the election results to mean a repudiation of the Republic, proposed reunification on terms which would have led to a Communist-dominated Korea. In response to the rejection by the National Assembly of the Communist terms, the Government of North Korea dropped its cold war strategy and put into execution its previously prepared plans for the invasion of South Korea.[19]

The original plan of the North Korean Government called for coordination between the local guerrilla forces operating from within and the Communist armies driving from the north. The Communist advance, however, was unexpectedly rapid since the ROKA had three divisions committed to antiguerrilla operations deep inside the Republic, while the remaining five divisions had been left to guard the border.[19] The guerrilla units, consequently, remained relatively inactive until the United Nations, which had entered the conflict on June 27, was

finally able in mid-August to stem the North Korean advance by stabilizing a defense along the Naktong River.[20]

A. OCCUPATION FORCES

Throughout South Korea there was prevalent widespread disenchantment with the Rhee administration as the primary source of the Republic's ills. Anticipating postwar disturbances, although not on the scale on which they actually erupted, U.S. authorities had provided South Korea with a large-scale military and technical assistance program, designed to establish a police force and police reserve units. The latter was the nucleus out of which the army eventually grew. By June 1950, the national police force totaled 45,000 men and the army 98,000 troops (eight divisions), of which 65,000 were combat trained.[21] From 1948, as has been seen, the ROKA was increasingly utilized to supplement the police in maintaining internal security. Consequently, the training of the army was curtailed and few units by the outbreak of the war had attained the point of training beyond company-level exercises.[22]

Furthermore, the weaponry possessed by the South Korean Government was clearly inadequate to sustain more than small engagements. The police were equipped with pistols, carbines, and some captured Japanese weapons, while the army was similarly equipped except for the addition of a few machineguns, mortars, and antitank weapons.[23]

The inadequate logistic support of South Korea's security forces was rectified, however, when the United Nations, under U.S. leadership, entered the war. However, the police, whose many responsibilities included the maintenance of security outside of military areas, did not fully share in this support. This factor, taken together with their inferior training and unfamiliarity with paramilitary techniques, helps account for their difficulty in effectively

coping with guerrilla activity, particularly during the early stages of the war.

To a certain extent, guerrilla success was also related to the low standards maintained for admittance into the SKNP. Underpaid and poorly educated, the police were inclined to be callous and brutal, and they frequently subjected the inhabitants of villages to extortion. This created widespread resentment toward the Republic, motivating many non-Communists to become sympathetic to guerrilla propaganda.[24]

B. ANTIOCCUPATION FORCES

Prior to the Communist Chinese intervention in the Korean War (October 15, 1950), it appears that guerrilla operations were directed solely by the SKLP under the leadership of Lee Chu Ha and Kim San Yong of the party's Underground Activities Guiding Unit. Apparently, even within the party itself, individual leaders of guerrilla units operated with substantial independence from SKLP headquarters.[25] Following the entry of the Chinese into the war, however, there was an attempt made to coordinate the operations of the guerrilla units by organizing them under the command of the North Korean People's Army 526th Branch Unit, with headquarters in Pyongyang.[26]

Under the direction of the 526th, the guerrillas south of the 38th parallel were organized into two branches. The 3rd Branch Unit was composed of guerrillas located in the Taebaek Mountain region and the 4th Branch Unit was comprised of guerrillas based in the central and southwestern mountains. Three of four other branch units, ordered to infiltrate south, failed to do so. The 6th managed to ensconce itself in the central mountains. In addition to the branch units under the authority of the NKPA, there were still numerous guerrilla bands, independent of Pyongyang, operating under varying degrees of direction

from the SKLP.[27] There was still a third and very large class of bands, employing guerrilla tactics, composed of bandits and the destitute, who roved South Korea committing widespread depredations agninst military and civilian property. Only rarely is it possible to distinguish between the acts committed by each of these three groups.

The tactical objectives of the guerrilla units were: to draw manpower from the front lines, interdict UN lines of communication and supply routes, destroy rear area installations, furnish Pyongyang with military intelligence, and terrorize the local population into cooperation. The military and political objectives of the insurgents were: the strengthening of party cells, the dissemination of Communist propaganda, the creation of dissatisfaction toward the ROK Government, the fostering of antagonism toward UN forces, the disruption of economic life, and the infiltration of the Government, police, and army.[28]

The basic weakness of the guerrillas, which doomed the attainment of these objectives, was the lack of an adequate supply pipeline from the north. The insurgents were almost completely dependent on local resources for food supply, clothing, and weapons.[29] Particularly important was the fact that the guerrillas were never able to procure an adequate supply of weapons, even during the period of peak guerrilla activity. Only about 60 percent of the guerrillas were armed at any one time, and their weaponry included only pistols, rifles, hand grenades, and a very small quantity of demolition explosives, mortars, and heavy artillery pieces.[30]

II. SITUATIONS

A. PROLONGED ACTIONS (JUNE 23 - SEPTEMBER 15, 1950)

During the initial phase of the Korean War, the South Korean guerrilla bands remained relatively inactive owing to the rapid southern advance of the North Korean People's Army. The SKLP insurgents engaged in only minor acts of terrorism against ROKA units, primarily in areas close to the vanguard of the advancing Communist troops. The bulk of their activities were nonmilitary in nature, consisting of covert propaganda, agitation, and rumor spreading.[31] The greater number of paramilitary incidents were perpetrated by North Korean regulars who employed guerrilla tactics in raids behind UN lines. In late August, however, when the Communist drive southward was repulsed at the Pusan perimeter, the SKLP guerrillas joined with their northern counterparts in a more aggressive guerrilla campaign designed to help weaken the UN perimeter defense.[32]

In this situation, the guerrillas took frequent action against service support facilities, basically employing in their operations hit-and-run tactics. They revealed, however, little inclination to engage in holding actions against tactical forces. Although insurgent activity was a constant source of irritation to the allies, at no time during this period did it constitute a threat serious enough to interfere with UN supply lines or communication facilities. This was partly the result of a lack of coordination among the various guerrilla units and an insufficient quantity of heavy arms and explosives with which to perpetrate major sabotage.[33]

For example, occasionally guerrillas would attack trains in rear areas of the Pusan perimeter, frequently in the Yongchon-Kyongju region in the east, or along the lower Naktong in the Samnangjin area. Generally, however, these

attacks resulted in only a few persons wounded, minor damage to rail equipment, and a brief cessation of traffic along the line.[34] Guerrilla bands frequently launched raids against villages, such as those against the communities of Kovon-ri and Uncheon, but they were perpetrated more to procure logistical necessities than to attain any significant military objective. During late August the most successful guerrilla attack occurred against a radio relay station which was located 8 miles south of Taegu. A guerrilla force, estimated at 100 men, overpowered the 70-man police force charged to guard the installation, and then set fire to the building. After the station was destroyed, the guerrillas quickly dispersed.[35] The most serious incident during September was also committed against a radio relay station, this one located at Changwon, 4 miles northeast of Masan. The installation was destroyed and its defenders shot.[36]

The immediate implementation by the United Nations Command authorities of antiguerrilla countermeasures prevented insurgent activity from becoming a serious threat to allied supply lines. Early in July, U.S. 8th Army (EUSAK), established the Office of Coordinator, Protection of Lines of Communication.[37] This agency directed the South Korean National Police to guard rear area depots, communication facilities, and key points along road and rail lines.[38] Police units were also attached to U.S. ground forces to help control the civilian population, perform counterintelligence missions, and screen refugees in order to detect infiltrating Communist agents among the large number of Koreans fleeing from the NKPA into UN lines.[39] Korean tactical units were also diverted from the combat zone in early August to assist in these tasks, but returned to the front along with many rear area UN units in the latter part of the month when the North Koreans renewed their offensive. Other measures taken to reduce the Communist potentiality for sabotage included more detailed security checks on civilians employed in transportation and

communication facilities and the roundup and imprisonment of all South Koreans suspected of being Communists or Communist sympathizers.[40]

Assisting rear area security land forces in their tasks were UN reconnaissance aircraft. Aerial spotting operations with T6 airplanes began as early as June 29, 1950, with the establishment of the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron Airborne, at Taegu. During July this group maintained a surveillance of all refugee groups moving in the area of the combat zone, warned unsuspecting ground troops of impending ambushes, and patrolled UN main supply routes in search of any suspicious activity.[41] Although numerous sorties were flown by this squadron in anti-insurgent operations during the war, there is little descriptive data concerning specific counterguerrilla air missions.

As a nonmilitary countermeasure, the Information and Educational Section of ROKA employed propaganda to bolster the morale of the South Korean people trapped behind Communist lines and to assuage the fear of North Korean victory on the part of those behind the UN lines. Radio broadcasts and leaflets dropped by UN planes behind allied and Communist lines predicted victory for the Republic and warned against cooperation with the North Koreans.[42] Subsequently, however, when the NKPA was driven north of the 38th parallel, the Government continued to devote the content of its propaganda almost exclusively to military themes, heedless of the people's desire to be reassured, amidst the prevailing chaotic economic conditions, of eventual social and economic reform. Even these ineffectual propaganda attempts to help muster the support of the populace in the rear areas were virtually eliminated after April 1951.[43] Consequently, a large non-Communist element of the South Korean population was indifferent or even disaffected toward the Republic's war effort and provided sympathy and aid to the guerrillas in some areas of Korea where effective UN occupation was absent.[44]

B. SEVERE ACTIONS (SEPTEMBER 15 - OCTOBER 1950)

By mid-September 1950, the United Nations Command had the resources at its disposal to mount a bold offensive against the North Korean Army, with troop landings at Inchon, coordinated with a breakout from the Naktong defenses. This offensive cut the enemy supply lines and trapped thousands of North Koreans behind UN lines as the allies knifed through enemy units, bypassing the remnants. By the end of September, no organized units of NKPA remained in the Republic, but many thousands of cutoff Communist troops managed to find refuge in the Chiri Mountain, Taedok Mountain, and Hoemun Mountain areas controlled by the SKLP guerrillas.[45] These bands were joined by numerous SKLP members and sympathizers who had previously operated clandestinely, but whose identity as Communists had been revealed during the brief North Korean occupation of their home communities. It is estimated that the combined strength of the North Korean troops and SKLP guerrillas within the Republic totaled more than 40,000 by the latter part of October.[46]

The guerrillas had apparently made no preparations for the possibility of a UN counteroffensive. They had, therefore, neglected to build up caches of supplies or to provide for the coordination of their activity under centralized direction. Consequently, the guerrillas now found themselves disorganized, cut off from communications with their retreating allies in the north, and forced to concentrate the bulk of their activity on raids against villages and farms in order to obtain much needed food and clothing. During October, as the guerrillas began to recover from the shock of the UN offensive, however, ambuscades and raids against the lengthening UN supply lines began to increase in effectiveness and severity.[47]

Not only were the number of guerrilla incidents in October more numerous than in the preceding months, but also the size of the guerrilla bands and their operational effectiveness increased significantly. There were numerous raids

against train and truck convoys and frequent attempts to destroy rear area installations and SKNP stations. In at least one instance the guerrillas were bold enough to fight a pitched battle with a UN troop unit of battalion size. Since the large national police force was unable to contain the guerrilla threat by itself, the United Nations Command found it necessary to divert from the rapidly advancing front large numbers of tactical units for the protection of military installations and supply lines.[48]

One of the most devastating attacks of the war against a town occurred on October 1, when approximately 2,000 enemy guerrillas stormed Wonju, killing 1,000 civilians and 5 U. S. officers. Other spectacular raids against towns occurred on October 13 when enemy remnants numbering 6,000 men, originally belonging to the NKPA 5th and 7th divisions, attacked the communities of Samchok, Ulchin, and Mukho.[49] Two days later, guerrillas attacked a radio relay station located less than 5 miles north of Seoul. And on October 23, some 2,000 enemy guerrillas, pretending to be refugees, launched a surprise assault on a battalion of U. S. Marines at Kojo, inflicting serious losses.[50] Throughout the entire month, there were numerous attacks directed against SKNP stations guarding road and rail lines, and frequent ambushes of railroad trains and truck convoys.[51]

As the allies moved north, counterguerrilla activity was aimed basically at protecting the lengthening UN supply lines and patrolling the main guerrilla concentration areas, particularly the central and southwestern mountain region. U.S. and Korean units, however, engaged in no coordinated, centrally directed campaign, but conducted antiguerrilla efforts independently within assigned sectors. In the main, nothing other than conventional patrol tactics was used.[52]

Undoubtedly these antipartisan measures did limit guerrilla activity. But the UN failure to actively seek out and destroy the enemy bands provided the insurgents with the needed time to reorganize their forces, expand their

base of operations, and reestablish communications with the north with costly results for the UN forces during the following 4 months.

The unit entrusted with the responsibility of patrolling the southwestern mountain areas was the IX Corps, which early in October assembled in the Taejon-Chonju area where it prepared to secure the supply routes from the old Pusan perimeter. The 2d Infantry Division assumed general responsibility for the area west and southwest of Taejon, and the 25th Division for the Taejon area and that south and east of it. The newly activated ROK 11th Division was attached to IX Corps on October 5th to help with security in rear areas. On October 10th the 8th Army Ranger Company was attached to IX Corps, and it joined with the 25th Division Reconnaissance Company in antiguerrilla activity in the Poun area, northeast of Taejon. On October 16, the recently formed ROK III Corps, to which the ROK's 5th and 11th Divisions were attached, was to assume responsibility of the Republic of Korea army zone south of the Seoul-Chunchon-Inje-Yangyang axes.[53]

Finally, police battalions and four newly activated ROKA units, the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 7th antiguerrilla battalions—special only by name, not by training—engaged in containing the guerrilla bands located near the 38th parallel in central Korea. The guerrillas in this area were mostly remnants of the NKPA 10th Division, soon to reorganize and infiltrate deep into southeast Korea.[54] Above the parallel, forward reserve units, protecting the advancing UN supply lines, engaged in bitter actions, especially in the Wonsan and Hungnam areas, against NKPA regulars employing guerrilla tactics.[55]

The vulnerability of trains to attack, especially in the trunk line areas, necessitated that UN personnel constantly ride the trains as guards.[56] Nevertheless, guerrillas frequently succeeded in stopping the trains, usually by laying ambushes, rather than by attempting to derail them by tampering with tracks, or by sabotaging other rolling stock on the line. Pitched battles between the security forces and the guerrillas ensued. Generally, however, the guerrilla

ambuscades were unsuccessful, since only momentary stoppage of the trains was accomplished, and the guerrillas rarely succeeded in ransacking the trains and confiscating the cargo.[57]

In addition to the continued employment of aerial reconnaissance, the use of helicopters in antiguerrilla operations was experimented with beginning in October in Operation BUSHBEATER, when the Marines, landing in helicopters, swept the area westward to the Soyang River. The objective of Operation HOUSE-BURNER I was to destroy huts housing guerrillas before the winter weather set in. Although these Marine operations had only very limited immediate military significance, they did demonstrate adequately the potentiality of the helicopter as a tactical weapon in counterguerrilla operations.[58]

C. PROLONGED SEVERE ACTION (NOVEMBER 1950 - FEBRUARY 1951)

With the intervention of the Chinese Communists, the guerrilla organization was strengthened, new leaders were infiltrated to take charge and carry out new orders, and specific missions were assigned to each unit. As the Communist armies pushed southward, the frequency and effectiveness of guerrilla operations increased substantially.[59] Before the month of November was over, approximately 30 percent of the total UN force was engaged in the antiguerrilla effort.[60] The UN command viewed the developing situation with anxiety as the allies began to experience the adverse effects of the increased guerrilla activity. Additional combat units were diverted from the front where they were badly needed, thereby preventing the formation of adequate UN reserve forces. Furthermore, the guerrillas succeeded in establishing area control over large regions of South Korea, especially in the southwestern part of the Republic.[61]

By mid-December, however, all the U.S. divisions and most of the Korean divisions originally committed to counterguerrilla operations were ordered to the front to help assist in breaking the new enemy push to the south, which was led by the forces of Communist China. Until January 1951, only police battalions and the ROK Army's several antiguerrilla units, soon to be renamed security battalions, operated against the guerrillas, and then only waged a campaign of containment. At mid-January 1951, estimates of guerrilla strength ranged as high as 37,500.[62]

During no other period of the Korean War did the insurgents constitute so serious a threat to the UN war effort. Not only did the number of reported incidents increase sharply, but also the focus of guerrilla activity turned from raids and ambuscades against towns and villages to attacks against UN military forces, communication facilities, and supply lines.[63] Furthermore, the guerrillas operated in larger units than any time previously, often at more than battalion strength; and the area of the paramilitary operations likewise expanded, encompassing large regions of the Republic.[64]

In southeast Korea, remnants of the NKPA II Corps, scattered during most of October throughout the Republic, were able to band together in November and use guerrilla tactics to harass UN supply lines. Particularly large concentrations hovered around the MSR of I Corps. Few convoys were safe from their attack. Other guerrilla groups were operating on both major routes between Pusan and Taegu, ambushing supply convoys and conducting harassing actions in the Namchang and Taegu areas.[65]

In the Yongwol area, about 2,800 North Korean stragglers behind UN lines were grouped to form the NKPA 1 guerrilla unit and conduct guerrilla operations. The work of the organizers continued with little interference and soon five additional brigades were formed with a total strength of 10,000 men. These forces formed the spearhead for the assault on UN troops in Yongwol late in 1950.[66]

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

By November, the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 7th ROK antiguerrilla battalions were almost constantly engaged with NK guerrilla forces in the Hwachon area of central Korea. These guerrilla forces conducted large-scale attacks against Hwachon, Yanggu, Chongpyong, and Chunchon. At one time, the North Korean forces held Chunchon against deliberate tactical counteroperations cutting off all its communications with Seoul, located only 45 miles to the southwest.[67]

Furthermore, in early December, an estimated 20,000 guerrillas were operating in the southwest corner of Korea. The Chiri Mountain area between Hadong and Kochang was increasingly menaced by guerrilla activity despite efforts of the newly organized ROKA 11th Division (which had replaced the U.S. and ROKA units diverted to the front) and the national police to suppress it. By the end of the year, large areas of southwest Korea had fallen under guerrilla control.[68]

Antiguerrilla forces, composed of ROK police and army security forces, continued to engage basically in a campaign of containment against guerrillas in rear areas.[69] One major effort was made, however, during this period, to eradicate the guerrillas who were constituting an increasing threat to the main supply routes (MSR's) in southeastern Korea.

The guerrillas located in this region numbered about 6,000 men and were reportedly former members of the North Korean 10th Division which had been infiltrated from the north, behind UN lines, to create havoc in the allied rear areas in coordination with the new Chinese offensive.[70] The U.S. 1st Marine Division, assisted by police battalions and a regiment of South Korean Marines (a combined force numbering over 20,000 men) on 18 January 1951, was assigned the task of eliminating this guerrilla unit. By February 15, the closing date of the so-called Pohang guerrilla hunt, the Marines had killed 120 and captured 184 guerrillas, while sustaining losses of 16 dead, 148 wounded, and 10 missing.[71] Despite the small number of casualties inflicted by the Marines, the virtual absence of direction from the north, the lack of food,

clothing, and medical supplies, and the unusually cold winter weather contributed to the complete destruction of the morale of the NK 10th. Consequently, the guerrillas split up into numerous small bands and filtered out of the Taebach Mountains. Henceforth this area was no longer a guerrilla stronghold.[72]

It also appears that methods to prevent train and convoy ambushes were experimented with during this period. Trains were provided with a sandbagged car, pushed ahead of the engine, to absorb the shock of landmine explosions, in addition to carrying a complement of security guards whose duty it was to deal with guerrilla attacks directly. Hospital trains frequently had two gondola cars in front; the first to explode mines placed on the tracks by guerrillas, the second to carry a machinegun platoon.[73] Roads fit for vehicles—especially the 75 mile stretch of MSR from Pohang to Andong—were under the constant surveillance of motorized patrols, each supported by at least one tank or 105-mm howitzer. Although close air support was seldom needed, increased reconnaissance flights over MSR's were ordered.[74]

D. PROLONGED ACTIONS (MARCH 1951 - AUGUST 1952)

By April 1951, guerrilla strength had been reduced from the November 1950 peak strength of 40,000 to less than 15,000.[75] The decline is partly accounted for by the fact that large numbers of North Korean troops trapped behind UN lines by the Inchon Landing regained their status as regulars when, in early 1951, large areas of the Republic once again came under Communist rule. Desertions and casualties resulting from combat and from disease also help account for the sharp reduction. During the period from the spring UN counteroffensive against the Chinese to the final stabilization of the front along roughly the 38th parallel (July 1951), guerrilla manpower was further reduced

to 8,000;[76] and by the end of the first year of armistice negotiations (July 1952), guerrilla numbers diminished to less than 4,000.[77]

Also, during this period the area encompassed by guerrilla operations narrowed, owing to the cumulative diminishing effect of UN counteroperations along with the deterioration of the guerrilla communication system from the north. These conditions necessitated the withdrawal of the guerrilla's 6th Branch Unit in July from the central stronghold area to the southwest. By the end of 1951, insurgent activity in the Taebaek Mountain and central mountain areas, although not eliminated completely, was considered merely a minor source of irritation.[78] The weakening of guerrilla control in these areas was reflected in the attitude of the local civilian populace who increasingly tended to become more cooperative with the government authorities as guerrilla strength waned.[79] Henceforth, the partisan bands were now concentrated in a single stronghold of the Chiri Mountain region.[80]

Along with the decline in guerrilla strength and the shrinkage of area under enemy control went a gradual change in the pattern of guerrilla activity. Although the insurgency maintained its previous tempo during the first 4 months of this period,[81] guerrilla manpower was no longer of sufficient strength to assail well-guarded rear area installations. Consequently, the guerrillas increasingly concentrated their efforts on hampering the allied war effort by attacking trains along trunk routes and ambushing convoys, usually composed of only a few vehicles.' However, the objective of these raids generally was not the destruction of the convoy's equipment but rather the capture of badly needed supplies.[82]

Acts of sabotage continued to remain few in number since the guerrillas lacked the explosives necessary to destroy such potential targets as bridges, roads, fords, and other means of communication. The most frequent and major forms of sabotage, besides the disruption of railroad traffic, were the cutting of telephone lines and the destruction of national police vehicles. There was

also noted during this period an increase in arson, especially in cases involving provincial government and police buildings.[83]

The number of incidents involving civilian property, however, did not decrease as sharply as those involving military property. Police records indicate widespread guerrilla harassing activities against numerous villages in Cholla Pukto Province. Their activities included murder, robbery, and the abduction of locally prominent citizens. If these acts did not sufficiently terrorize the inhabitants into cooperation, the guerrillas often set fire to the village. During the course of a raid against a village, the guerrillas frequently distributed propaganda leaflets or made the citizens of a hamlet, under force of arms, attend a public lecture on communism.

In late spring 1951, the Communists attempted to revitalize the flagging guerrilla effort by infiltrating southward troops freshly trained in guerrilla tactics, and by reorganizing the remaining guerrilla bands under the designation of the Southern Guerrilla Army. A new leader, Lee Yong Sang, was also appointed to head the reorganized guerrilla forces.[84] After armistice negotiations began on July 10, 1951, Lee and his SKLP lieutenants directed insurgent activities in southwestern Korea and for a few months the level of guerrilla activity did increase, with a significant number of raids occurring against police outposts.

During the period of Operation RATKILLER (December 1951 to March 1952), the guerrillas went into hiding, but after this operation ended, the insurgents began regrouping and reorganizing. Buried weapons were retrieved and the pillaging of villages for supplies was resumed. Operation FERRET, begun in March to eliminate this guerrilla activity, continued until July 12, but failed in its objective. The remaining insurgent bands became extremely aggressive during May and June, perpetrating large numbers of sneak attacks on trains, convoys, and police posts. Most serious was the train raid

occurring north of Kwangju, on June 24, which resulted in 82 casualties to friendly forces.

From March through November 1951, ROK police and army security battalions (formerly designated as antiguerrilla battalions) waged effective local campaigns of reduction and containment. Primarily these tactics consisted of patrols along supply routes and in known areas of guerrilla concentration.[85] However, no coordinated and concerted action against the guerrillas was undertaken until Operation RATKILLER was begun on December 2.

The basic tactic employed in this operation was tight encirclement and blockade, followed by a concentrated attack. In this operation the ROKA 8th Division and ROKA Capital Division, plus the equivalent of another division in army security battalions and police (their combined strength totaling over 30,000 men), were directed to engage in a three-phase attack. In Phase I, friendly forces moving from opposite directions closed in on the Chiri Mountain Peak, while security battalions and police blocked all roads, trails, and other means of escape. At the conclusion of the phase, 1,600 guerrillas were killed and 1,800 were captured. During Phase II (19 December 1951 to 4 January 1952), two divisions were employed to clear a high mountain mass above the town of Chonju with the result that more than 8,300 guerrillas were either killed or captured. The last phase involved mopup operations in the Chiri Peak in order to eliminate the guerrillas who had been overlooked or who had filtered into the massif during the previous 3 weeks. Guerrilla losses in Phase III raised the total number of insurgents killed to 11,000 and those captured to 5,700. Over 50 major leaders were included in the capture, although Lee Yong Sang managed to escape.[86]

Despite the large number of casualties inflicted during Operation RATKILLER, over 4,000 guerrillas were estimated still to be at large in the Chiri region. To eliminate these, a division-sized group of army security battalions and police units began a series of mopup operations on March 17.

The first, called Operation FERRET, lasted until July 12.[87] FERRET was followed by Operation MONGOOSE, which involved rescreening the mountains, for a period of more than a month, by security forces in two-division strength. During the latter operation, over 500 guerrillas were either killed or captured.[88]

The fact that the casualty figures of these operations greatly exceeded the then current intelligence estimates of guerrilla strength indicates that these estimates may have been too low. Later screening of prisoners also verified that more than 4,300 persons taken captive were innocent inhabitants of the area.[89] Furthermore, the employment of house-to-house searches, although having the effect of driving many guerrillas back into their mountain stronghold where security forces would have a better opportunity to engage them, also had the effect of antagonizing numerous local inhabitants who resented the oftentimes brutal manner in which these searches were conducted. By way of example, the records of more than 300 guerrillas, captured between January 1 and March 31 and held at Namwon, Korea, showed evidence that 183 had joined the partisans relatively recently. They averred as the cause for their disaffection the unjust acts committed against them by antiguerrilla forces.[90]

Air strikes and psychological warfare were stepped up during this period, with air action accounting for 110 enemy casualties. Leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts from planes were made throughout the area, apparently causing several surrenders, although the precise number does not appear to be documented.[91] The type of propaganda employed, however, was aimed primarily at the guerrillas and only secondarily at the Communists in the communities. There also continued to be no attempt made to conciliate discontented non-Communist elements who might provide sympathy and aid for the partisan forces. Consequently, it appears that UN propaganda frequently failed to hit its target, caused resentment among innocent bystanders, and did not convey appropriate propaganda messages.[92]

E. FREQUENT ACTIONS (AUGUST 1952 - JULY 1953)

By the close of Operation MONGOOSE, guerrilla strength numbered no more than a few thousand. As the Government continued to exert unrelenting pressure upon the insurgents, guerrilla activity against military property became increasingly confined to small operations involving assaults on police posts, sabotage of UN vehicles and, in a few cases, ambushes of railroad trains and truck convoys. The only serious actions taken against UN property were clandestine in nature, involving arson, as in the cases of the great fires which swept Pusan and its large military supply bases in 1953.[93]

However, as late as the fall of 1953, there continued to be frequent attacks against villages and, in a few instances, against towns with populations as large as 10,000. Although a larger proportion of these incidents were probably perpetrated by bandits than was the case in any previous period of the war, large numbers of villages in southwest Korea were still terrorized by Communist bands. The people of this region were reluctant to provide information to the Government about the Communists among them until 1954, when it was apparent that the guerrillas were no longer able to commit reprisals against them.[94]

To eliminate this still potentially serious guerrilla threat, in mid-August 1952, a division of security forces took over the screening task and for over a year combed the Chiri Mountains regularly and systematically.[95] By the time this effort, called Operation BLOODHOUND, closed at the end of November 1953, guerrilla strength in Korea had been reduced to about 1,000 men. During BLOODHOUND a patrol from one of the security battalions, on September 17, 1953, found and killed the top guerrilla leader, Lee Yong Sang.[96]

Although the armistice agreement had been in effect over 4 months at the close of Operation BLOODHOUND, the Government, on December 1, 1953, ordered the opening of Operation TRAMPLE, designed to decisively eliminate all

guerrilla bands. For months, the army and police, in two-division strength, screened and rescreened the southwestern mountain region. During this operation, it appears that psychological warfare loudspeaker teams were in direct combat support. The result of this final counterinsurgency effort was that by mid-1954, all important guerrilla leaders had been killed or captured, all guerrilla units had been destroyed or broken up, and only 200 guerrillas in scattered leaderless bands remained at large.[30]

III. OUTCOME AND EFFECTIVENESS

Only during the period from November 1950 to February 1951 did the guerrillas constitute a serious threat to UN supply lines, and even during this period the insurgents never succeeded in interrupting the flow of traffic to the front. The single factor most responsible for their failure was lack of logistical support. UN manpower at the front prevented infiltration of logistical support by land, while other routes of supply were blocked by allied domination of the sea and air corridors. Consequently, the guerrillas almost completely depended for food, clothing, weapons, and ammunition upon the civilian populace and raids on UN installations.

Organizational difficulties also contributed significantly to the guerrillas' failure. There does not appear to have been any firm direction of the guerrilla effort until the latter part of October 1950, when the 526th Branch Unit was established in Pyongyang. When the new Communist offensive was halted, however, and the UN counteroffensive drove the Communists back to the 38th parallel, guerrilla communications with the north were again interrupted and central direction disintegrated.

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

Until December 1951, Korean security forces did not attempt a coordinated effort against the guerrilla bands, but waged only a campaign of containment. Although this policy of containment did not provide adequate safeguards for a large segment of the civilian population, it did prevent the guerrillas from expanding even further the areas under their control. More adequate precautions were taken to ensure the safety of rear areas.

Early in the war, the UN forces were able to successfully devise a number of countermeasures to reduce the vulnerability of rear area installations and military supply routes to attack by irregular forces.[99] UN units constantly patrolled MSR's in search of guerrilla activity, and aerial reconnaissance was frequently employed to report to headquarters any suspicious activity behind UN lines. Trains were better protected by the employment of security forces riding within the train and by the use of a gondola car in front of the cab to absorb the shocks of any landmine explosions. The danger to convoys was reduced by the encouragement of denser traffic along the roads, thereby providing the guerrillas with less time to perpetrate ambushes before being discovered, and by accompanying large convoys with tanks and howitzers. Experiments were also made with the use of helicopters in antiguerrilla missions. Although these operations attained only limited immediate military success, they did amply demonstrate the potential of the helicopter as a tactical weapon in counterguerrilla warfare.[100]

As a result of these countermeasures, guerrilla activity against UN property suffered decreasing effectiveness. Although insurgent bands frequently stopped trains, especially on the trunk routes, only infrequently did they ransack the cargo. The number of successful ambuscades against convoys was also small, and the vast majority of those that did succeed were against convoys usually consisting of two or three vehicles. There were even fewer incidents of guerrillas attaining success in raids against UN supply depots.

In contrast to the immediate application by the UN of countermeasures to safeguard military property, the Korean Government was negligent in devising countermeasures to ensure the safety and loyalty of the civilian population in areas of guerrilla activity. Incentives to support the Government and oppose the guerrillas, such as public works projects for the unemployed, monetary rewards for information leading to the apprehension of guerrillas, and indoctrination in the duties of responsible citizenship, were conspicuously absent.[101]

Particularly lacking as a countermeasure was the use of propaganda to allay the discontent of a large non-Communist segment of the population, and to deprive the guerrillas of civilian sympathy. The antiguerrillas in Korea presented no concrete program other than to preserve the status quo, and there was no attempt to dramatize the UN Civil Assistance Program, which was virtually keeping alive the inhabitants of South Korea.[102] Friendly propaganda behind the lines was directed almost exclusively toward the partisan forces and had only limited effectiveness.[103]

On the other hand, the Communists had actively attempted to win over the minds of the people by supporting their paramilitary operations with propaganda directed at the village level. The Communists stressed dissatisfaction with the Rhee government, alleged that corruption of government officials had contributed to ruining the impoverished people, and assailed police tactics. The guerrillas also averred that ultimately they would win, and promised the people a better livelihood and the rectification of all grievances. Many of the destitute were evidently swayed by this propaganda, particularly the decrying of police brutality.[104]

Instead of cultivating the support of the civilian populace to aid in the maintenance of law and order, the police frequently had been oppressive and cruel. This helped swell guerrilla ranks by creating resentment toward the Government and a desire for revenge.[105]

Furthermore, the police failed to provide adequate protection for civilian property. Especially during the initial phases of the war, they failed to report incidents in time for competent army units to take counteractions. This situation underlined the jealousy and rivalry which existed between the army and police, and was not resolved until early 1953, when police units employed in antiguerrilla operations were placed under ROKA control.[106]

Army units, however, also did not operate with the desired effectiveness, owing to inadequate training and poor command, particularly in the early stages of the war. Thus, some units were kept continuously engaged in antiguerrilla operations until they became stale and ineffective. Small unit leadership was often poor and lacking in aggressiveness, as was evidenced by the fact that repeated contacts with guerrillas were made without result. The army also failed to utilize such means of covert warfare as antipersonnel mines, counter-ambuscades, infiltration into the guerrilla ranks, agitations, and boobytraps.[107]

Despite these many shortcomings, the Government ultimately succeeded in eradicating the guerrilla threat. Its success was basically due to the ability to divert combat units from frontline duty to engage in antiguerrilla operations, since UN manpower was present in sufficient force to blunt any renewed Communist offensive at the front. The inability to procure logistic support from their allies in the north, the cessation of hostilities at the front and the beginning of negotiations to terminate the war, and the initiation of coordinated counterguerrilla operations, broke the morale of the guerrillas, dissipating their belief in any final victory. Although the insurgents did manage to elicit some support among disgruntled elements of the population after 1952, the vast majority of the citizenry was ill disposed to associate itself with the losing Communist effort, particularly in areas where effective antipartisan occupation was restored. By the conclusion of operations in mid-1954, only a few hundred insurgents in scattered, leaderless bands, remained within the boundaries of South Korea.

FOOTNOTES

[1]B. C. Mossman, "Korea, 1950-1953," MS, 1965, pp. 1-8. To be included in D. M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., "Challenge and Response—Studies in International Conflict" (Task NUMISMATICS I) (Washington, D. C.: Special Operations Research Office, to be published in 1965).

[2]Ibid., pp. 32-33.

[3]U. S., Department of State, The Conflict in Korea: Events Prior to the Attack on June 25, 1950. Publication 4226 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 3.

[4]Shannon McCune, Korea's Heritage: A Regional and Social Geography (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1956), pp. 51-52.

[5]Mossman, op. cit., p. 9.

[6]Ibid., p. 10.

[7]Foreign Area Studies Division, U. S. Army Area Handbook for Korea (Washington, D. C.: Special Operations Research Office, November 1964), p. 562.

[8]Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 73.

[9]Handbook for Korea, op. cit., p. 562.

[10]Lt. Col. John E. Beebe, "Beating the Guerrilla," Military Review, XXXV (December 1955), p. 6.

[11]Mossman, op. cit., p. 11.

[12]Ibid., p. 12.

[13]Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Troop Education and Information Bureau, War History Compilation Association, Korean War History for One Year: 1 May 1950 to 30 June 1951 (Seoul), p. A16.

[14]Department of State, op. cit., p. 8.

[15]Sawyer, op. cit., p. 74.

[16]Republic of Korea, op. cit., p. A16.

[17]Fred H. Barton, Salient Operational Aspects of Paramilitary Warfare in Three Asian Areas (ORG-T-228) (Chevy Chase, Md.: Operations Research Office, 1953), p. 9.

[18]Mossman, op. cit., p. 4.

[19]Barton, op. cit., p. 10.

[20]Beebe, op. cit., p. 6.

[21]Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 13.

[22]Beebe, op. cit., p. 6.

[23]Appleman, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

[24]Beebe, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

[25]Ibid., p. 8.

[26]Concepts Division, Aerospace Studies Institute, Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 1950-1953 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: January 1964), p. 14.

[27]Mossman, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

[28]Beebe, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

[29]Mossman, op. cit., p. 18.

[30]Concepts Division, op. cit., p. 9.

[31]Barton, op. cit., p. 10.

[32]Beebe, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

[33]Concepts Division, op. cit., p. 9.

[34]Appleman, op. cit., pp. 383-384.

[35]Ibid., p. 384.

[36]Ibid., pp. 477-478.

[37]Concepts Division, op. cit., p. 42.

[38]Beebe, op. cit., p. 6.

[39]Appleman, op. cit., p. 383.

[40]Republic of Korea, op. cit., pp. A104-A106.

[41]Concepts Division, op. cit., p. 42.

[42]Republic of Korea, op. cit., p. A104.

[43]Ibid., pp. A104-A105.

[44]Barton, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

[45]Beebe, op. cit., p. 6.

[46]Republic of Korea, op. cit., pp. A67-A69.

[47]Appleman, op. cit., p. 722.

[48]Ibid., p. 721.

[49]Republic of Korea, op. cit., p. A67.

[50]Ibid., pp. A67-A68.

[51]Appleman, op. cit., p. 721.

[52]Mossman, op. cit., p. 727.

[53]Appleman, op. cit., p. 721.

[54]Mossman, op. cit., p. 27.

[55]Ibid., pp. 726-727.

[56]Appleman, op. cit., p. 727.

[57]Barton, op. cit., p. 106.

[58]Concepts Division, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

[59]Republic of Korea, op. cit., p. A67.

[60]Concepts Division, op. cit., p. 14.

[61]Mossman, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

[62]Ibid., p. 28.

[63]Beebe, op. cit., p. 7.

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NICARAGUA

(1926--1933)

by

James M. Dodson

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I. SYNOPSIS

Nicaragua's history, following achievement of independence from Spain in 1821, was marked by internal discord and a series of revolutions. This chronic instability was rooted in the conflict between the Conservative and Liberal parties, centered respectively in Granada (center of the aristocratic class) and Leon (center of a large artisan and small landholding class).[1]

Bitterness between the two parties was based on localismo, the tendency toward the national supremacy of a city resulting in intense civic pride, and personalismo, political adherence to a paternalistic leader.[2] Political disputes arising out of this conflict were traditionally resolved by force of arms. Consequently, even local disputes resulted in revolution.[3]

Disputes between Liberals and Conservatives began in 1821 and continued unabated. In the 1900-1910 period alone, there were 16 revolutions. In 1925, hostility between the two parties again created a revolutionary situation. When, in August 1925, a Marine legation guard stationed at Managua was withdrawn, the two factions edged toward civil war. Though attempts had been made to create a constabulary, this force was an infant body incapable of enforcing law and order.[4]

Events leading to U.S. intervention in December 1926, U.S. supervised elections in 1928, and the formation of a Nicaraguan National Guard began essentially with a Liberal revolt on the east coast in May 1926. Though this first outbreak was suppressed by the Conservative government, U.S. troops landed to protect lives and property. Acting under orders to remain strictly neutral, this force occupied Bluefields and maintained it as a neutral zone from 6 May to 5 June 1926, when it was withdrawn.[5]

In August 1926, rebellion again broke out. Though this revolt was easily suppressed in the west, the Liberals were able to control several towns in the

eastern section. Accordingly, U.S. forces again landed at Bluefields, maintaining it as a neutral zone until November 1926.[8]

In October, after unsuccessful negotiations policed by U.S. forces, hostilities resumed. Subsequently, Adolfo Diaz (who had served as President in 1912) was chosen as interim President until elections could be held in 1928. Liberals refused to accept this government, and on 1 December 1926 set up a rival government.[9]

When the military situation deteriorated, President Diaz notified the United States that his government would be unable to protect U.S citizens. On 23 December 1926 a contingent of naval personnel landed at Puerto Cabezas and Rio Grande on the west coast.[9]

The period January to March 1927 was marked by an increase of Marine detachments, the creation of further neutral zones in the east, and substantial military victories by Liberal forces under the command of General Moncada. By the end of March, the contending Nicaraguan forces faced each other in an area 20 miles from Matagalpa.[9] Conditions at this time were described by Henry L. Stimson:

> The long-continued disorder and violence had also produced a general disintegration in the social fabric of the country; semi-independent bands of marauders were taking advantage of the situation to plunder even the settled districts. Our minister had reported to Washington that a general condition of anarchy was probably approaching.[10]

Under the terms of a peace settlement negotiated by Stimson at Tipitapa, the two factions agreed to disarm, the army was to be disbanded and replaced by a constabulary, the United States was to insure fair elections in 1928, and general amnesty was to be granted to the rebels. Subsequently, rebels turned in 3,704 rifles and 31 machineguns while federal troops relinquished 11,000 rifles and 306 machineguns.[11]

Augusto Sandino, a Liberal leader, refused to disarm under the terms of the truce. In late May, with a force of approximately 200 hard-core

insurgents, Sandino sought refuge in the jungle vastness of Nueva Segovia in the north. At this point the Nicaraguan Government was impotent to deal with bandit activity, having disbanded its army. Consequently, President Diaz called on the United States to restore order.[12]

The Sandino insurrection consisted of three phases: (1) May 1927 to June 1929, during which Sandino conducted offensives with some prolonged attacks on small Marine and National Guard garrisons, resulting in the dispersal of rebel forces and the eventual withdrawal of Sandino to Mexico on 29 June 1929; (2) May 1930 to January 1933, which was marked by Sandino's return to Nicaragua with augmented forces, by further offensives by his forces, and by greater participation of the National Guard in policing the country; (3) January to February 1933, marked by a decline in Sandino's forces and a major successful offensive by the National Guard resulting in the surrender of Sandino on 22 February 1933.[13]

In theory, Nicaragua had a constitutional form of government composed of legislative, executive, and judicial branches, each having equal power. In fact, however, the government was conducted by a series of dictators who controlled the Congress and courts. With the exception of the elections supervised by the United States in 1928, 1930, and 1932, elections were fraudulent.[14]

Elections meant that the winning party assumed absolute control over the machinery of government for 4 years. The opposition was thus completely eliminated from participation in government. For this reason, opposition parties resorted to revolution as a method of forcing governmental changes.[15]

A serious lack of responsible local government, the absence of a civil service, and protracted revolutionary instability created economic dislocation. These difficulties were magnified by poor sanitation and inadequate diet, the lack of an adequate public health and school system, low wages, and a primitive agricultural system.[16] Indigenous civil control was either nonexistent or ineffective until 1933.

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

During the period of its peak strength, the U. S. occupying force consisted of two infantry regiments and an aviation unit. During most of the occupation, however, the occupation force consisted of one regiment, minus one battalion, supported by Marine aviation units.

A. OCCUPATION

U. S. force levels were as follows: In May 1927 there were approximately 5,500 officers and enlisted men: in July 1928, 3,958 Marines were serving with the 2d Marine Brigade and its supporting aviation units or attached to the Nicaraguan National Guard. In November 1928, Marine and naval forces totaled 5,480 men. In January 1929, there were 5,217 U. S. military personnel in Nicaragua, reduced in December 1929 to 1,790 Marines and 112 naval personnel. By June 1930 there was a total of 1,248. At this time the strength of the Guardia Nacional (National Guard) was 2,176. Additional U. S. forces were sent in July 1930 to supervise the national election. Thus, in November 1930 there were 1,252 U. S. military personnel in Nicaragua. In addition, 160 Marines acted as officers in the National Guard, making a total of 1,412. In February 1931, the total armed forces of the United States and Nicaragua numbered 1,500.[17] On 1 April 1932, Marine and naval personnel totaled 753, exclusive of the 205 officers in the Guardia Nacional.[18]

For purposes of administration, the country was divided into five specific areas, each under the command of a Marine officer. Greatest strength was concentrated in the northern and central areas, where tactical demands were greatest.[19]

In the preliminary stages of the Marine occupation, U. S. forces were armed with mortars, machineguns, automatic rifles, submachineguns, hand grenades, rifle grenades, and the 0.30 cal. rifles. In time, due

to the requirements of rapid deployment and logistical limitations, lighter weapons were substituted, particularly the Browning automatic rifle (BAR), the Thompson submachinegun, and the rifle. Toward the end of the occupation, small patrols depended on the automatic rifle, the Thompson submachinegun, rifles, and hand grenades.[20]

An agreement under which a Nicaraguan National Guard was to be created was signed on 22 December 1927. This agreement provided for: (1) the creation of a Guardia Nacional of 93 officers and 1,136 enlisted men at a cost of $689,132 per annum; (2) the Guardia was to be considered the sole military and police force of the Republic and to have control of arms, ammunition and military supplies, forts, and prisons throughout the Republic, subject only to the direction of the President of Nicaragua.[21]

As a result of intensive rebel activity in 1930, the Guardia was increased until, on 1 October 1930, total personnel of the Guardia numbered 2,256, an 85 percent increase. In 1932 the Guardia numbered about 200 officers and 2,150 enlisted men.[22]

In addition, there were two classes of armed civilians (civicos) placed under the control of the Guardia. A force of auxiliaries was created in November 1931. This force consisted of a total complement of approximately 300 and was later disbanded.[23]

The Guardia was armed with 1895 Krag rifles, Browning machineguns, BARs, and Thompson submachineguns. All ordnance items were procured in the United States or by purchase from the U. S. Marine Corps.[24]

B. ANTIOCCUPATION

From 1929 to 1930 the insurgents were divided into two groups, one in the north in Nueva Segovia and the other in the central section. The forces of these groups varied in strength from 100 to 300 men, each having

from three to five automatic weapons.[26] Ammunition was secured in Honduras in exchange for goods and livestock. Rebel units were reinforced by the operations of many part-time bandit units. It was this type of bandit that made the intelligence system of the insurgents so effective. The insurgent command was a loose confederation of armed groups that varied in strength.[26]

Sandino's first stated objective was to set up a separate government in the north. In the beginning he mounted offensives in an attempt to drive the Marines out of the country. When counteraction was taken, he turned to defensive actions. By the end of the insurrection, his force, which numbered approximately 1,800, was utilized in an attempt to force negotiations with the Government.[27]

The insurgents were armed with Remington 22s, 45-70s, horse pistols, Krags, and Lewis machineguns. They were, in most cases, poorly officered and ill-disciplined.[28]

In the classic manner of guerrilla operations, the insurgents employed ambush, strategic retreat, and terror. Most valuable of all, of course, was their complete knowledge of the terrain.

Sandino was able to use to good advantage the large amount of intelligence information he acquired. A GN-2 report of June 1931 described the effectiveness of this intelligence:

> There seems to be but little doubt that Sandino and the chiefs operating with him are reliably informed of our every movement. Their knowledge is pretty complete and enables them to avoid us. Sandino's information is obtained from spies mostly and not from any well-regulated reconnaissance or intelligence service.[29]

II. SITUATIONS

The level of insurgency varied according to political, economic, and climatic conditions within the country. During the rainy season, mid-May to mid-November, when roads and trails were impassable, the insurgents retired to the mountains in the northern areas. During the dry season, insurgents made incursions into the cattle and coffee-growing sections of the southern and western parts of the country.[30]

The terrain of the northern and central sections of Nicaragua is ideally suited to guerrilla operations. These areas are dotted with unbroken chains of mountains, densely forested slopes, and isolated valleys. The dense jungle is impenetrable except by a few trails. The rural inhabitants of these areas were friendly or at least neutral toward the insurgents. Thus, roving bands of insurgents were able to draw ample food supplies from the surrounding countryside. Sufficient numbers of internal security forces were not, however, able to gather enough food to sustain large-scale operations far from their bases of supply.[31]

A. TRANQUIL TO DISORDERLY (MARCH 1927 - APRIL 1927)

Although naval forces had landed in Nicaragua and established neutral zones as early as December 1926, it was not until March 1927 that U.S. occupation forces reached any substantial level.[32]

In March 1927, the 5th Marine Regiment and an observation squadron (VO-IM) were landed at the request of the Diaz government. Quickly an emergency force of 800 Marines and naval personnel were deployed to guard the Corinto-Managua railroad pending the arrival of an expeditionary brigade. Accordingly, an expeditionary brigade was sent to Managua to replace ships detachments at various outposts.[33]

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

At this point in the occupation, political considerations were more important than military requirements. The seriousness of the situation was not correctly gauged by military and civil authorities. On 15 May 1927, after the Tipitapa truce agreement, Mr. Stimson reported that "the civil war in Nicaragua has definitely ended." Several of the Marine commanders concurred in this opinion. Although most of the Liberals disarmed, poor intelligence failed to reveal the buildup of Sandino forces in May, resulting in an unwarranted sense of security.[34]

The primary task of the 2d Marine Brigade (the official title of the occupying force after March 26) was the disarmament of the warring parties and the prevention of further armed conflict. To accomplish this mission, part of the 5th Regiment deployed in a defensive line along the Tipitapa River and enforced a neutral zone. The strength of the brigade at this time was 181 officers and 2,800 enlisted men.[35]

Disarmament of the warring factions and reinforcement of the 2d Marine Brigade marked the end of the first tranquil-to-disorderly situation. The Tipitapa truce agreement was highly significant from the point of view of the occupation authorities. U.S. forces, from May on, were committed to unspecified pacification operations in a large unmapped jungle area.[36]

The creation of neutral zones was the primary countermeasure in this situation. A neutral zone has been defined as:

> . . . a proscribed region, the safety of which was threatened by the contending factions. Certain localities were taken under control for the purposes of protecting the lives, property, and interests of Americans and other foreigners. No fighting was permitted within the zone; all armed forces were required to withdraw, usually within twenty-four hours, or turn in their arms and ammunition.[37]

Civil administration in these zones remained in the hands of the faction in local control except where intervention was necessary to maintain neutrality.

At the beginning of the occupation, it was contrary to U.S. policy for Marine elements to conduct aggressive operations against armed bands. Since the Nicaraguan National Guard was not operative at this time there was no agency to maintain law and order.[38]

The policy of creating neutral zones over 9,000 square miles of territory was only partially successful. Troop concentrations in 1926 were not large enough to effectively institute this policy. In addition, the policy of neutrality was not rigidly enforced, leading to increased Liberal resentment. In 1927, with more substantial forces, the United States was able to enforce partial disarmament by both factions through an expansion of the system of neutral zones.[39]

The failure of the occupation forces to contain banditry in May 1927 was largely the result of poor intelligence. Most of the inhabitants were favorably disposed toward the Liberals and usually uncooperative. In addition to a lack of information, there was a failure to evaluate and quickly disseminate the information which was available. Thus, during this first stage of the occupation, "the magnitude of the task of restoring peace to Nicaragua, maintaining law and order, and developing a strong constabulary was, at first, only vaguely appreciated by the American and Nicaraguan authorities."[40]

By the beginning of May 1927, numerous bandit groups were operating in various sectors of the country. Marine units still stationed primarily along the railroad soon began to clash with these elements. These clashes mark the beginning of the harassing actions.[41]

B. HARASSING ACTIONS (14 MAY 1927 - 2 JULY 1927)

A Marine patrol from Leon was attacked by an insurgent group on 14 May 1927. The first serious clash occurred at Le Paz Centro on 16 May 1927, when 300 revolutionists attacked a Marine-defended town. This band had no connection with the overall Sandino movement. Following these two preliminary engagements, the 2d Marine Brigade was deployed to outlying districts and ordered to begin policing activities.[42]

Garrisons were established in the important towns and along railroad facilities. On 21 May, a detachment was sent from Leon to occupy the town of Esteli. The 11th Regiment, which had arrived on 19 May, was used to garrison towns along the railroad. At this point, the country was divided into districts, each occupied by a battalion. In addition, small detachments of a squad or more occupied the smaller towns in order to provide outposts for the larger garrisons. Some small posts were established to protect the lines of communication to the south. By the end of May, outposts had been established as far north as the Somotillo-Esteli-Jinotega line.[43]

Little information was available, at this time, on Sandino's intentions, the disposition of his forces, and his overall capabilities. Sandino was thought (due to poor intelligence) to have withdrawn to the north. By the end of May, however, he appeared with a force of approximately 200 near Ocotal.[44]

By early June, the 2d Brigade had reached a strength of approximately 3,300 men. This force was scattered in some 43 different garrisons in addition to those along the eastern coast.[45] At this juncture, serious errors in judgment were made. Despite the fact that the Marines had just begun pacification measures and a national police force was in only an infant stage, pressures mounted for withdrawal of part of the

Marine force. Senior Marine officers and others suggested that order could be maintained with half the number of Marines then in Nicaragua.[46]

Accordingly, a Marine aviation squadron and the 5th Marine Regiment, less one battalion, were withdrawn. By the end of June, the Marine force had been reduced by 1,000, and a number of small garrisons were withdrawn. Minor clashes between Marine forces and insurgent units continued during this period.[47]

By 12 May, the organization of the National Guard had begun. Marine officers assigned to the guard initially concerned themselves with the organization of civil guards which could be used to maintain order in towns not garrisoned by Marines. The first company of the Guardia (3 officers, 50 enlisted men) was organized in June at Managua and sent soon after to Ocotal, one of the most important garrisons in the northwest.[48] Thus initially, the National Guard was to be used to help restore law and order in the most turbulent parts of the country.[49]

On 2 July 1927, Marine units were directed to disarm Sandino and his band. Subsequently, an expedition composed of seven officers, 75 Marines, 74 guardias, and 200 pack animals was dispatched to Nueva Segovia. It was anticipated that this unit would operate in a southernly direction while the garrison at Ocotal would deploy to the west.[50]

Stringent countermeasures were not undertaken until 2 July when the Marines were ordered to disarm Sandino and his followers. Countermeasures up to this time consisted primarily of piecemeal patrolling, the establishment of fixed garrisons, and the organization of an indigenous police force. These measures were largely ineffective because of inadequate force levels, poor intelligence, political pressures, and the overconfidence of U.S. authorities.

C. PROLONGED ACTIONS (15 JULY 1927)

Sandino, having learned of the intent to catch his forces in a pincer, attacked Ocotal on 15 July with a force of approximately 400.[51] Greatly outnumbered, Marine detachments consisted of 1 officer and 39 enlisted men, reinforced by a National Guard detachment of 1 U.S. officer and 47 enlisted men. The engagement lasted some 12 hours, during which the Marine forces were able to drive off the insurgents only through the assistance of aerial support. The employment of Marine dive bombers from the 2d Marine Brigade marked the first time in military history that airpower was used in close ground support operations. Casualties totaled: Marines, 1 killed, 1 wounded; guardias, 3 wounded; insurgents, 50-300 killed, mostly from bombs.

D. TRANQUIL TO DISORDERLY (15 JULY 1927 - 19 SEPTEMBER 1927)

The disorganization of insurgent forces and the relative calm that followed the battle of Ocotal led to the formation of several unfortunate conclusions by U.S. authorities.[52] These authorities concluded that the defeat at Ocotal had been disastrous for the insurgents and that insurgent strength and effectiveness had been effectively curtailed. The U.S. minister reported to Washington that "it is not supposed that Sandino will offer much further serious resistance."[53] Further reduction of U.S. forces then proceeded according to previous plans. By the end of July 1927, the Marine brigade was reduced to 1,700.[54]

When it became clear, contrary to intelligence estimates and the opinions of U.S. authorities, that Sandino's forces were not dispersed, the Marines undertook a limited offensive late in July.[55] A contingent of approximately 100 was sent to disarm Sandino and to recapture the San

Albino mine. On 30 July, this force captured Jicaro, a onetime capital of the insurgent forces. Finally, on 1 August, this force recaptured the San Albino mine.[56]

At this point, intelligence erroneously indicated that Sandino was in flight down the Coco River. Consequently, in early August amnesty was offered to what U.S. authorities believed to be the remnants of the insurgent forces. The insurrection, it was thought, had come to an end.[57]

In reality, Sandino had used the summer of 1927 as a recruiting period. After gathering several thousand followers he retired to the mountainous area of Nueva Segovia. From these dissidents he was able to cull an effective fighting force of about 1,000 men. During this period the insurgents received money from other Latin American countries and the United States, and military and medical equipment from Honduras. These preparations progressed without the knowledge of U.S. officials.[58]

E. PROLONGED ACTIONS (19 SEPTEMBER 1927)

The relatively quiet period following the Ocotal engagement lasted until 19 September 1927, when 200 insurgents attacked Telpaneca. This battle was similar to the Ocotal conflict.[59] A force of 40 Marines and Guardias fought at close quarters for approximately 4 hours, and two marines and two guardias were killed.[60] Following this battle, the Sect of the Navy reported:

> The situation grew worse; Sandino organized the population of the northern part of western Nicaragua into a complex system of intelligence and supply and amassed a force of about 1,500 men . . . Sandino received automatic weapons, much ammunition, and the plaudits of publicity.[61]

F. FREQUENT ACTIONS (OCTOBER 1927 - DECEMBER 1928)

On 9 October 1927, a 19-man patrol was attacked by 400 insurgents employing machineguns at Quilili. Through the use of hand grenades, the patrol was able to fight its way out of this ambush.[62]

Insurgent forces continued to grow during the remaining months of 1927. Marine patrols in northern Nicaragua had approximately 22 contacts with the insurgents, between the time of the battle of Ocotal and January 1928.[63]

Civil disorder broke out in the east and bandit gangs attacked outlying towns. New reinforcements were then landed at Puerto Cabezas. The commander of the occupation force was constantly misinformed by poor intelligence. It was not until about the middle of October that the commander learned of the deteriorating situation. Aerial reconnaissance confirmed reports that Sandino had concentrated a force of several hundred troops at a fortified camp in eastern Nueva Segovia.[64] At this point, U.S. military and civilian authorities should have been aware that the overall military situation was beyond the control of greatly reduced U.S. forces.[65] Despite a lack of manpower, logistical and intelligence difficulties of great magnitude, and an erroneous estimate of Sandino's capabilities, a decision was made to attack the insurgent stronghold. This offensive was to be made in late September.[66]

By early December, Marines made almost daily contacts with insurgent forces. On 26 December, a Marine patrol was overwhelmed by an insurgent force which included 25 fully uniformed soldiers of the Honduran Army. On 30 December, a strong insurgent force attacked Marines near Quilili. A series of battles (usually from ambush) between Marine forces and insurgent units took place from the latter part of December through 14 January.[67]

The unexpected combat strength of the insurgent forces made a revision of plans for an attack on Sandino headquarters necessary. Accordingly, Marines from San Albino and a group of dive bombers attacked the insurgent camp at

Chipote on 14 January 1928. Considerable damage was inflicted by counter-insurgent ground forces and bombing and strafing attacks by air forces. A reinforced Marine and National Guard force then advanced on the insurgent stronghold. On 26 January, the headquarters was reached, but was found to be deserted. Further patrols failed to establish contact with the insurgents.[69]

After a series of military setbacks, the 11th Marine Regiment in January was again assigned to Nicaragua. The overall military situation was made more critical by a mutiny of National Guard units at Pesomotillo. By the end of January 1928, it was estimated that the insurgents had a well-organized force of 1,500 operating in the northwestern part of the country. These forces used the ambush to great advantage and occasionally attacked towns held by small Marine garrisons.[70]

In January 1928, the commander of the Marine brigade divided those parts of Nicaragua occupied by the command into the following areas: (1) the Northern Area: all of western Nicaragua north of the general line from Somotillo (exclusive)—Achuapa-Esteli (both inclusive)—Jinotega (exclusive). Headquarters of this command was in Ocotal; (2) the Southern Area: all of western Nicaragua south of the general line from Somotillo (inclusive)—Achuapa-Esteli—(both exclusive)—Jinotega (inclusive). This area was commanded by the 5th Regiment with headquarters in Managua; and (3) the Eastern Area: the east coast of Nicaragua and such Nicaraguan territories as could be controlled by troops supplied from the east coast of Nicaragua. The headquarters of this area was at Puerto Cabezas.[71]

During the early part of February 1928, it became apparent that insurgent forces were congregating in the vicinity of Terreo Grande. Qualili and San Rafael del Norte were occupied by detachments of 50 Marines each on February 6th and 7th. It was evident that Sandino intended to attack the Jinotega force of 450 officers and men assigned to that area, but active patrolling dispersed the insurgent forces and denied them control of important towns.[72]

REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

Between the period 15 January and 18 April there were 28 contacts with the insurgents. During this time there were three principal contacts. On 28 February an empty pack train was ambushed near Jocoto by 200 insurgents armed with machineguns. Five Marines were killed, eight wounded. On 19 March, near Murra, aerial forces made contact with approximately 100 insurgents. On 31 March, near Blandon, a Marine patrol routed an insurgent force of 75 men. By the end of March 1928, the insurgent forces were forced to move only under cover of darkness. They generally avoided contact with Marine patrols and operated only in dispersed groups. [72]

During this period, the National Guard had not developed as rapidly as contingencies demanded. With the exception of a company which was stationed in Nueva Segovia, most of the Guard personnel were occupied with routine duties in the pacific parts of the country. The authorized strength of the Guard late in 1927 was 43 officers and 1,136 enlisted. [73] After the 11th Regiment occupied Nueva Segovia, most of the Guard troops were withdrawn. Thereafter, for several months, National Guard troops were used primarily in the peaceful sections of the country. [74]

By the time the 11th Regiment had been brought up to strength, the thickly settled parts of Nueva Segovia (the Northern Area) had been pacified. Insurgents had been forced to retreat to the east and southeast or into Honduras. [75]

An offensive was made against Sandino's forces in southern Nueva Segovia early in March prior to the general elections. This operation met with little success, because contacts with insurgent groups were limited and indecisive. At this time the insurgents were able to take effective evasive action utilizing the terrain to good advantage. [76]

In early April, detachments were sent to eastern Nueva Segovia and Jinotega. After 10 days of offensive operations, the Marines were able to clear this area. As a result, insurgent forces retreated into the sparsely inhabited

area of north central Nicaragua, an area largely inaccessible except by a few trails in the dry season.[77]

Almost the entire eastern half of Nicaragua was undefended. Insurgent forces had almost complete access to this area. For this reason, special measures were taken to protect the eastern portion of the country. Accordingly, the Eastern Area was formed with a headquarters at Puerto Cabezas. An additional 160-man Marine force was sent to Puerto Cabezas and plans were made to contain the insurgents in the north central area.[78]

The final phase of Marine measures to capture Sandino and/or to neutralize his insurgency began on 17 November 1928 at the close of the rainy season.[79] Aggressive patrolling (19 patrols) covered some 4,000 square miles of difficult terrain, resulting in the gradual cornering of Sandino's forces. At this time U.S. occupational strength was 5,673 officers and men.

The last battle of the large-scale operations took place on 6 December 1928 at Cuje. A large Marine force with only one casualty routed a large force of insurgents near the Honduran border.[80] Following the battle, the Commandant of the Marine Corps stated that:

> Nicaragua has been pacified, with the exception of a few disorganized bandits in remote sections, the mission of the Marine Corps is being accomplished, and the country seems to be rapidly assuming a normal state.[81]

This last offensive operation drove Sandino and 25 followers from Nicaragua to Mexico on 29 June 1929.

Marine forces did not institute systematic and aggressive patrolling until January 1928. These forces, augmented by aviation units, were quite successful in driving the insurgents into northern areas or at least in containing them in manageable sectors. Occasionally, the counterinsurgency forces attempted large-scale pincer operations which failed because of insurgent mobility.

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During this situation, air support was used to great advantage. Mobility of ground forces was, however, hampered by unfamiliar terrain and thick jungle foliage. Patrols up the Coco River enjoyed some success as the exploits of Edson's patrol indicate.[92]

Poor intelligence continued to hamper counterinsurgency forces. Information obtained from the residents of most areas was unreliable since local sentiment most often lay with the insurgents.

Logistical support also proved a difficulty. The supply of outposts in Ocotal and other northern areas from the west coast took about 11 to 13 days. Hazardous terrain meant that much of the supply had to be carried by pack animals.

During this period, the treatment of the civilians by Marines was exemplary. Civil rights of citizens were respected, resulting in a partial decline of anti-U.S. sentiment. There was no program of civic action, however, and aside from the 700 volunteers recruited by President Moncada (this force was disbanded in July 1929 after pressure from the United States) there were no indigenous counterinsurgency forces.[93]

During the latter part of 1927 and the early part of 1928, Marine garrisons remained on the defensive. Patrols were successful primarily in keeping channels of communication open. As 1928 progressed, U.S. occupation forces were more successful due to more adequate forces, better organization with decentralized control of operations by area commanders, better leadership, and a better supply system including air transport.[94] For the year ending 30 June 1928, the Marines had conducted 85 engagements with the insurgents at a cost of 66 casualties.[95]

Little was done during this time to combat unemployment and other serious social conditions. Political instability continued as did protracted civil disorder.

Though the National Guard was beginning to reach an effective level in 1928, it had not been extensively used up to the end of this situation. By November 1928, the National Guard had a total of 49 contacts with insurgent forces.[86]

G. TRANQUIL TO DISORDERLY (JANUARY 1928 - MAY 1930)

In November 1928, a peaceful election supervised by U.S. Marines resulted in a liberal administration headed by Gen. Jose Moncada. This election marked the first peaceful and constitutional transition of party government in Nicaragua's history. During 1929, banditry was reduced to a manageable level, and U.S. forces held only the larger towns or were placed in reserve.

Soon after the election, General Moncada committed National Guard units to antibandit operations. The increased effectiveness of the Guard was largely due to the fact that its personnel possessed the police powers of sanction and compulsion. These powers were used to erode the popular base of Sandino's support. Previously, the Marines had not possessed any substantial police powers.

Because National Guard units were committed as active fighting forces, it became possible in 1929 to make reductions in Marine garrisons and brigade strength. This year was primarily one of transition from Marine to National Guard operations. The Guard had some 24 contacts with insurgent forces during 1929.[87]

In August 1929, the 11th Regiment was detached from the 2d Brigade. After this reduction, brigade strength was approximately 2,500. In the northern areas, all but 10 posts were turned over to the National Guard.

This new role imposed strains on the Guard, resulting in 10 mutinies and other outbreaks among Guard personnel during this period.[88]

The first extensive countermeasures were suggested by a Marine general on 6 May 1929. Feeling that the insurgents would abandon banditry if they could find other means of financial support, he suggested that a road-building program be instituted. Further, the Marines recommended that all persons who applied be given work and that a general amnesty be extended to all dissidents who desired work. The estimated cost of the programs was $40,000 per month.[89]

The Marines suggested that the Nicaraguans undertake the roadbuilding task. Senior officers feared a resumption of guerrilla warfare by unemployed "floaters" following the coffeepicking season in the summer of 1929. The roadbuilding program did not meet with approval at the State Department.[90]

Nevertheless, Marine forces began to test their "unemployment thesis." A Marine officer announced in the summer of 1929 at Yali that he would employ and protect former insurgents who would lay down their arms. Within a month, 125 former insurgents began the task of constructing roads for the Marines at a pay of 50 cents per day per laborer.[91] In addition, to curtail defection within the National Guard, a court-martial system based on U.S. naval law was established on 26 September 1929.[92]

A resettlement policy was attempted by the Marines in Ocotal, Yali, and Jinotega during May 1930. All inhabitants of several specified areas were reconcentrated into six designated villages by 1 June 1930. The National Guard adopted a similar policy. This policy was largely ineffective, and was suspended on 8 July 1930.[93]

The Nicaraguan Congress refused to appropriate money for the road-building program and it was abandoned after 11.2 miles of road were completed. The resettlement program was ineffective because of inadequate food supplies and insufficient housing.[94]

No psychological operations other than the offer of amnesty were undertaken and there were no systematic efforts to utilize propaganda in conjunction with military measures.[95]

H. FREQUENT ACTIONS (FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD); HARASSING ACTIONS (U.S. OCCUPYING FORCES) (MAY 1930 - JANUARY 1933)

A new outbreak of banditry occurred in May 1930. Sandino, with new financial resources, returned to Nicaragua and began operations near Jinotega. As a result, banditry increased throughout the northern and central areas with the National Guard having some 119 contacts with insurgents during 1930.[96]

The 2d Marine Brigade remained at approximately the strength it had after the withdrawal of the 11th Regiment until March 1931. At that time, elements of this brigade withdrew from all towns along the railroad except Managua and Corinto and two additional garrisons in the northern area were turned over to the National Guard. Thus, this force was held in reserve. The Marines continued limited patrolling against the insurgents but were primarily used to support Marine officers serving with the Guard as a safeguard against mutiny. Finally, Marines helped supervise the congressional election of 1930.[97]

In the Eastern Area, Marine units were reduced to two posts: Luz and Neptune in Puerto Cabezas. In April 1930, all posts were withdrawn. The Brigade was reduced to approximately 1,200 with only 236 remaining in the northern area.[98]

Although the overall ground strength had been reduced, the aviation squadron continued to operate in conjunction with the National Guard. During the year ending 30 June 1930, this squadron had made 1,275 military flights and a total of nearly 5,000 flights with more than 5,900 air hours. In this period, aerial forces had five contacts with the insurgents. Additionally,

air forces helped to keep communications open with isolated National Guard posts and assisted in emergency supply operations and the evacuation of the wounded.[99]

The last official battle of the Nicaraguan occupation occurred on 31 December 1930. Near Ocotal, a 10-man Marine communications patrol was attacked by a large force of Sandinistas. All 10 marines were killed.[100]

As the Marine brigade gradually assumed reserve duties, the National Guard became more aggressive in its operations against the insurgents. In the Northern Area, National Guard forces managed to drive several insurgent groups into Honduras; other groups were pushed into the uninhabited region of eastern Nueva Segovia. In the central area most of the insurgents were driven to the north.[101]

Marine participation at this time was of a limited nature. While National Guard units took the offensive, Marines assisted by holding garrisons. Sporadically, Marines acted as automatic riflemen in support of Guard units. On one or two occasions, Marines in Nueva Segovia participated in combined operations with the National Guard.[102]

Late in 1930, the National Guard began joint offensive operations with forces from the central and northern areas. National Guard patrols from each area began search-and-clear operations along the Coco River while at the same time Marines occupied strategic posts and assisted in patrol of the Honduran border. During the coffeepicking season of 1930, Marines set up garrisons on six plantations and maintained aggressive patrolling throughout the coffee district until the spring of 1931.[103]

In 1931, Sandino again took the offensive. On 13 February 1931, the United States announced that all Marines would be withdrawn after the national election of 1932. During the interim period, Marines were to assume the task of training ranking officers of the National Guard.[104]

Sandino, following the severe earthquake at Managua on 31 March 1931, in which there were some 5,000 casualties, begnn an offensive on the east coast near Puerto Cabezas. This success was followed by attacks on Gracias a Dios, San Pedro del Norte, and Rama. These attacks, which were launched from the coast into the interior, indicated that the National Guard had serious liabilities, including poor leadership and poor intelligence. Complicating this deteriorating situation was the fact that Marines, aviation units excepted, were prohibited from intervening actively.[105]

In the fall of 1931, Sandino mounted offensives in Chontales, Dhinandega, Leon, and Esteli. On 31 November 1931, the insurgent forces overran a small town on the Leon and El Sauce Railroad. Immediately, President Moncada proclaimed martial law in the north and set up a force of 200 auxiliaries. At this time, the U.S. Minister stated that the "situation is as grave as, or graver than, any time since I have been in Nicaragua."[106] This situation was aggravated by increased unemployment, discontent within Liberal ranks, and the influx of arms from Honduras.[107]

By the end of 1931, the National Guard had had 141 contacts with insurgent forces.[108] The objective of the Guard was the interdiction of insurgent units in the north. Only occupation of the long northern border—a mission beyond the capabilities of the National Guard—would have successfully accomplished this task. As a result, the National Guard was largely unable to pacify the northern districts and by the end of 1931 the insurgent forces appeared to have grown in strength.[109]

At this time, the Marine force consisted of 1,763 men and was concentrated in the Managua area. The National Guard was widely deployed throughout the northern and eastern sections of the country. As a result, in November 1931, Marine aviation units flew daily supply runs to Esteli, Ocotal, Apali, Condega, and El Sauce. Almost 30 tons of supplies were flown weekly and military personnel were rapidly switched from one critical area to another.[110]

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During 1932, U.S. authorities concentrated on shifting the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order to the Nicaraguan Government. At U.S. insistence, the National Guard was increased in strength until it had 267 officers and 2,240 enlisted. Insurgent operations continued during 1932 (including an attack at Las Puertas, which was the most serious defeat suffered by the National Guard) and National Guard forces had some 160 contacts with isolated groups. The Marine brigade was held in reserve and no important combat operations were undertaken, although the aircraft squadron continued to give full air support to National Guard units.[111]

In order to insure peaceful elections in 1932, a mobile National Guard patrol called Company M was established in July under the command of Captain Chester Puller. This patrol was very successful in its offensive operations and the elections were held in November without incident. During the last 6 months of the occupation the National Guard had 96 contacts with insurgent forces.[112]

In December 1932, the command of outlying districts was turned over to Nicaraguan officers. Commands of districts near the Capital were the last to be transferred and the process was not completed until 31 December. On 1 January 1933, a Liberal, Juan Sacasa, was installed as President. On 2 January 1933, the remainder of the 2d Marine Brigade was withdrawn from the country.[113]

In January 1931, President Moncada increased National Guard strength by 500. In addition, he allocated $13,000 for roadbuilding in Nueva Segovia.[114] In 1932, a military academy was activated and a command and staff school was established.[115]

During this situation, little was done in the way of civic action programs, psychological operations, or economic improvement. Those individuals who were unable to find employment turned to thievery and banditry. To increase employment, the Government, in addition to roadbuilding in Nueva Segovia, began railroad projects in the north.[116]

Following the earthquake, the Government was able to give employment to several thousands. These reconstruction activities were only temporary, however, and severe labor unrest contributed to the raids on the east coast and the Department of Chinandega in November 1931.[117]

Also during this situation, local police units were created which, though economically dependent upon the municipalities, were incorporated as important parts of the National Guard and subject to its control. Although the municipalities incurred the cost of local police forces, they paid the money directly to a dispersing officer of the National Guard, who paid the personnel. Thus the municipalities were responsible for police protection, while at the same time the Guardia Municipale was integrated into the National Guard. By 1932, there were 250 municipal police in the National Guard.[118]

In addition, a group of armed civilians are drawn from volunteer groups. One class of civicos formed local defense units, while the second was employed by private firms for protection of haciendas.

In November 1931, a force of auxiliaries was created when the insurgents made a thrust toward the railroads in the Departments of Leon and Chinandega. These auxiliaries were recruited primarily from the rural districts and had a total force level of 300. During December 1931 and most of 1932, auxiliary units (augmented by 250 additional men) fought effectively with Guardia units. These units were commanded by regular National Guard officers and were equipped by the Guard.[119]

The strategy of the National Guard in combatting the insurgency had two aspects: obtaining the security of critical points, and, at the same time, maintaining local offensives against the large and small insurgent groups in all parts of the country. The main task of the Guardia was to reduce defensive forces to a minimum in order to concentrate as much force as possible in offensive operations. For this reason, the country was divided into military departments and areas with a commander in each. Active defenses were set

up along the railroads, and the strategic towns were garrisoned with units large enough to provide security and to mount offensive patrols.[120]

Marine aviation units were used to good advantage for close ground support, reconnaissance, supply, and transfer of personnel. Without aerial support, it is probable that the National Guard forces would have met with little military success.

Although the Guard was not capable of sealing the border area, in July 1932, the Honduran Government decided to police the border region near Ocotal. Although the patrolling did not yield immediate results, eventually the flow of supplies and ammunition from Honduras to Sandino's insurgents was curtailed. This greatly weakened the overall insurgent effort.[121]

The National Guard, although it did not provide an effective counterbalance to the insurgent forces until 1932, accomplished the following objectives:

1. Pacified the Departments of Carazo, Chontales, Managua, and Rivas, and parts of the Departments of Leon, Chinandega, Matagalpa, and Bluefields.

2. Helped supervise the elections of 1928, 1930, and 1932.

3. Secured the railroad from Corinto to Granada.

4. Kept the mines at Pis Pis, Neptune, and Santo Domingo operable.

5. Forced the insurgents to limit their activities to sparsely settled northern sections. The National Guard did not succeed in suppressing banditry until 1933 and it was never able to capture Sandino.

6. Maintained a legally elected President in office for 4 years.

7. Compelled peace terms and served as an effective national military force.[122]

The effect of other countermeasures was negligible. Throughout this entire period there was an almost total lack of measures which are now regarded as essential aspects of a successful counterinsurgency program

III. OUTCOME AND ANALYSIS

The insurrection ended on 2 February 1933, when an agreement between Sandino and the President was signed. A general amnesty was granted to the insurgents which was retroactive to 4 May 1927. On 22 February 1933, Sandino officially surrendered the following military equipment: 18 machine-guns, 342 rifles, and a large store of ammunition. At the time of disbandment, the insurgent force was comprised of 1,800 men.[123]

Since the beginning of the occupation, U.S. naval forces had lost 33 men killed in action, 15 dead from wounds, 24 from disease, 41 from accidents, and 24 from other causes. U.S. forces had undertaken continuous and almost unassisted operations against the insurgents for 2 years. These forces fought 150 engagements of major importance.[124]

Under the leadership of Marine officers, the National Guard had approximately 510 contacts with the insurgents. It is estimated that nearly 200 national guardsmen were either killed or wounded in action. Some 1,000 insurgents were killed, 526 wounded, and 76 captured.

At the time of the U.S. withdrawal, a well-organized military force numbering 2,650 was turned over to the Nicaraguan Government. In addition to the regular military and police functions of the Guard, this force had a medical department, an efficient legal department, a military academy, and an adequate countrywide communications system.[125]

Politically, the country was not left in a stable condition. Internecine struggles continued, resulting in a military dictatorship by the head of the National Guard, Anastasio Somoza. The economic condition of the country was not improved. The occupation itself had caused considerable indignation throughout Latin America. In Nicaragua itself, the military power of the National Guard was used as a political instrument to support a dictatorship.

Finally, although the National Guard became a political extension of the Somoza administration, its presence did terminate the conflict between localismo and personalismo.[126]

The initial failure of Marine forces in 1927 and 1928 was due to an underestimation of the enemy and an overestimation of Marine capabilities. The force committed at the beginning of the occupation was quite inadequate in terms of composition, size, and equipment, and U.S. forces had little training in guerrilla operations. In addition, Marine officers failed to recognize and assess the obstacles that the Nicaraguan terrain and weather placed in the way of counterinsurgency operations against an elusive enemy.[127]

Until the initiation of aggressive patrolling in January 1928, the Marines were almost entirely on the defensive, fighting their way out of numerous ambushes. There is considerable evidence indicating that only the employment of airpower in the early stages prevented the insurgents from achieving decisive victories.[128]

The military problems of insufficient force, inadequate training, and physical obstacles were compounded by a very poor intelligence system, logistical difficulties, and political pressures. In addition, the absence of a coordinated civic action program for economic, social, and educational development, the failure to use propaganda and psychological operations, and the failure to utilize resettlement on any large scale meant that little was done to remove the causes of the insurrection.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the campaign was the use of airpower as an extension of counterinsurgency operations. Because it was the first substantial air-ground war in history, Nicaragua was the incubator for close air support thinking.

Although at first air units were hampered by the lack of communication with ground forces, they were used with good effect to limit insurgent movement, to detect concentrations of insurgent forces, to concentrate heavy weapons on

specific targets, to link outposts with the railway center at Managua, and to supply isolated garrisons, thus improving flexibility.[129]

In 1927 alone, aerial forces launched 84 attacks on insurgent forces, transported 1,500 personnel and 900,000 pounds of equipment, built 18 airfields, and expended 300 bombs and some 30,000 rounds of ammunition. By the end of the occupation, combat and logistic air support had been welded together as a successful counterinsurgency weapon.[130]

The Nicaraguan occupation and counterguerrilla operations demonstrated the following:

1. The need for aggressive patrolling coordinated with expansion of occupation of critical areas and consolidation of rear areas. U.S. forces in Nicaragua began defensive-offensive operations in January 1928. Patrols should be small (20 was the ideal number in Nicaragua) and mobile.

2. The necessity of maintaining an adequate intelligence system. Throughout the Nicaraguan occupation, the mobility of counterguerrilla forces was constantly limited by insufficient and slowly disseminated information.

3. The need for systematic civic action programs, and coordinated psychological operations in conjunction with military operations. The failure to institute such programs seriously weakened the overall military effort in Nicaragua. The single psychological measure employed was the offering of amnesty to insurgent forc

4. The necessity of denying the insurgents a base of supply by sealing borders. In Nicaragua the Sandino forces were able, time and time again, to regroup in Honduras.

5. The facility of close air-ground counterguerrilla operations.

6. The necessity of making immediate search after initial contact with insurgent forces.

7. The need for the creation of secure bases from which offensive operations can be undertaken.

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8. The need for sufficient troops (at least a division in Nicaragua) operating under a military administration or martial law.

9. The necessity of constructing or reinforcing a constabulary which can maintain law and order in urban areas and local areas outside the combat zone. In the Nicaraguan campaign, it was highly significant that Marine officers were integrated into the National Guard as tactical commanders. This improved coordination between regular U.S. forces and indigenous counterinsurgency forces and led to greater tactical flexibility.

FOOTNOTES

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[24] Ibid. , p. 76.

[25] Ibid. , p. 25.

[26] Ibid. , p. 23.

[27] Ibid. , p. 21; see also Nalty, op. cit. , pp. 7, 8.

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[29] GN-2 Report, June 1931, quoted in Smith, op. cit. , p. 24.

[30] Smith, op. cit. , p. 23.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Metcalf, op. cit. , p. 420.

[33] Megee, op. cit. , p. 34.

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[37] Metcalf, op. cit., p. 418.

[38] Ibid.

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[40] Metcalf, op. cit., p. 422 and Megee, op. cit., p. 34.

[41] Metcalf, op. cit., p. 423.

[42] Cummins, op. cit., p. 52; see also Metcalf, op. cit., p. 426.

[43] Metcalf, op. cit., p. 424.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid., p. 424.

[46] Ibid.; see also Megee, op. cit., p. 35.

[47] Ibid., p. 425.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

Ibid., p. 426.

[51] This is an estimated figure based on conflicting figures in Cummins, op. cit., p. 53 and Metcalf, op. cit., p. 426.

[52] Metcalf, op. cit., p. 427.

[53] Quoted in Cummins, op. cit., p. 56.

[54] See Metcalf, op. cit., p. 427.

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[88] See Metcalf, op. cit., pp. 439, 440.

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[90] Ibid.

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[99] Ibid.

[100] Cummins, op. cit., p. 87.

[101] Metcalf, op. cit., p. 443.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid.; see also Cummins, op. cit., p. 87.

[105] Cummins, op. cit., pp. 88, 89.

[106] Ibid., p. 91.

[107] Ibid.

[108] See record of contacts in Smith, op. cit., pp. 349-368.

[109] Ibid., p. 29.

[110] Cummins, op. cit., p. 92.

[111] Metcalf, op. cit., pp. 444, 445.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Ibid., p. 446.

[114] Cummins, op. cit., p. 87.

[115] Ibid.

[116] Ibid.

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[118] Smith, op. cit., p. 16.

[119] Ibid., p. 18.

[120] Ibid., p. 35.

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[122] Smith, op. cit., p. 42.

[123] Cummins, op. cit., p. 446.

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[126] Nalty, op. cit., p. 19.

[127] Megee, op. cit., p. 36.

[128] See Heinl, op. cit., p. 277 and Megee, op. cit., p. 39.

[129] Ibid.

[130] Heinl, op. cit., p. 289. For the role of air power in the Nicaraguan campaign, see Gen. Vernon E. Megee, "The Genesis of Air Support in Guerrilla Operations," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, XCI, 6 (June 1965), pp. 49-59.

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Heinl, Robert D., Jr. Soldiers of the Sea. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1962. Most of Chapter 6 is devoted to a military analysis of the Nicaraguan occupation. Colonel Heinl's heavily documented material is necessary for a full understanding of the tactics used in the Nicaraguan campaign.

Megee, V. E. "Guerrilla Lessons from Nicaragua," Marine Corps Gazette, XLIX, 6 (June 1965), 32-40. This article by a retired Marine general ties together the many aspects of the Nicaraguan campaign and relates them to the more general requirements of counterguerrilla warfare. A very useful source.

_____. "The Genesis of Air Support in Guerrilla Operations," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, XCI, 6 (June 1965), 49-59. Although this article deals primarily with air operations, their effectiveness and relevance to future counterinsurgency operations, it provides much useful data on other aspects of the military campaign.

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REAR AREA SECURITY MEASURES

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